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SUMMARY 
 
The study represents a descriptive analysis of the tensions that drive the need for an educated 
military in South Africa and, more specifically the role of the South African Military Academy in the 
provision thereof.  The purpose of the research was to demarcate the proper role of the South 
African Military Academy in the academic and professional preparation of officers for the South 
African National Defence Force (SANDF).  This purpose necessitated, firstly, an analysis of the 
need for education in armed forces in general and in South Africa in particular, with specific 
reference to the tensions underpinning military education and training.  It secondly called for a 
broad assessment of the nature of professional military education in the SANDF at large to 
contextualise the role and function of the South African Military Academy.  These discussions are 
based on a literature overview, document analysis and unstructured interviews with decision-
makers.  
 
In the first part of the study, a framework is developed for the education of officers.  The framework 
is based on the assumption that modern military professionalism is rooted in a need for training to 
develop military skills, education to understand and develop the military body of knowledge and 
experience as the application of skills and knowledge.  It is also based on the identification of four 
knowledge clusters that need to be the focus of officer education, namely the external security 
environment within which armed forces operate, the nature of armed forces as organisations, the 
professional employment of armed force(s), and the physical environment within which armed 
forces operate.  The framework highlights three levels of officer development: the making of 
lieutenants, the making of colonels, and the making of generals. 
 
This framework is used for the analysis of education, training and development in the SANDF.  
Both the positive and negative attributes as well as trends in training and education in the SANDF 
are discussed.  The discussion serves as the departing point for an outline of the debate about the 
role of the Military Academy since democratisation in 1994.  It is argued that there is no clarity 
about the role and function of the Military Academy.  Critical questions are also asked about the 
nature of the academic programmes offered to officers at the Military Academy.  The departmental-
level agreement between the Department of Defence and the University of Stellenbosch is pointed 
out as the raison d'être for many of the problems with which the Military Academy is confronted. 
 
 iii 
The study finally highlights the need for education as a requirement for officership in the SANDF, a 
reconsideration of military socialisation at the Military Academy, the difficult position of the Faculty 
of Military Science, the need for a core academic programme, and structural changes that are 
needed at the Military Academy.  It is recommended that, like many foreign military academies, the 
future existence of the Military Academy be assured through national legislation.  The involvement 
of the University of Stellenbosch in the education of young officers at the Military Academy should 
not be terminated.  However, the existence, functioning, organisation and structure of the Military 
Academy should not be based on a “goodwill-approach” between the University and the 
Department of Defence. 
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OPSOMMING 
 
Die studie bied ŉ beskrywende analise van die spannings wat die behoefte aan ŉ opgevoede 
weermag in Suid-Afrika onderlê en, meer spesifiek, die rol van die Militêre Akademie in die 
voorsiening van opvoeding in dié verband.  Die besondere oogmerk van die navorsing is die 
afbakening van die werklike rol van die Suid-Afrikaanse Militêre Akademie in die akademiese en 
professionele voorbereiding van offisiere vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Nasionale Weermag (SANW).  
Hierdie oogmerk vereis, eerstens, ŉ ontleding van die noodsaaklikheid vir die opvoeding van 
weermagte in die algemeen en in Suid-Afrika in die besonder, met spesifieke verwysing na die 
spannings wat militêre opvoeding en opleiding onderlê.  Dit noodsaak, tweedens, ŉ breë 
waardering van die aard van professionele militêre opvoeding in die SANW om die rol en funksie 
van die Suid-Afrikaanse Militêre Akademie te kontekstualiseer.  Die besprekings is gebaseer op ŉ 
literatuuroorsig, dokumentontleding en ongestruktureerde onderhoude. 
 
In die eerste deel van die studie word ŉ raamwerk vir die opvoeding van offisiere ontwikkel.  Dié 
raamwerk is gebaseer op die aanname dat moderne militêre professionalisme gebaseer is op 
militêre opleiding om vaardighede te ontwikkel, opvoeding om die militêre kennisliggaam te 
verstaan en ontwikkel, asook ervaring as toepassing van vaardighede en kennis.  Die raamwerk 
omvat ook die identifisering van vier fokus kennisareas, naamlik die eksterne omgewing waarin 
weermagte opereer, die organisatoriese aard van krygsmagte, die professionele aanwending van 
krygsmag(te), en die fisiese omgewing waarin krygsmagte opereer.  Die raamwerk beklemtoon 
voorts drie vlakke van offisiersopvoeding: die ontwikkeling van luitenante, die ontwikkeling van 
kolonels, en die ontwikkeling van generaals.  
 
Die raamwerk word vervolgens vir ŉ ontleding van opvoeding, opleiding en ontwikkeling in die 
SANW gebruik.  Beide die positiewe en die negatiewe kenmerke sowel as tendense van opleiding 
en opvoeding in die SANW word bespreek.  Dié bespreking dien as vertrekpunt vir ŉ ontleding van 
die debat oor die rol van die Militêre Akademie sedert demokratisering in 1994.  Daar word 
aangevoer dat daar geen duidelikheid oor die rol en funksie van die Militêre Akademie bestaan nie.  
Kritiese vrae word gevra oor die aard van die akademiese programme wat aan offisiere by die 
Militêre Akademie gebied word.  Die departementele ooreenkoms tussen die departement van 
Verdediging en die Universiteit Stellenbosch word voorgehou as die raison d'être van baie 
probleme waarmee die Akademie gekonfronteer word.   
 
 v 
Die studie beklemtoon die behoefte aan opvoeding as ŉ vereiste vir offisierskap in die SANW, die 
heroorweging van militêre sosialisering by die Militêre Akademie, die heroorweging van die posisie 
van die Fakulteit Krygskunde, die behoefte aan ŉ akademiese kernleerplan, en strukturele 
veranderinge wat by die Militêre Akademie vereis word.  Daar word aanbeveel dat, soos in die 
geval van verskeie buitelandse militêre akademies, die toekoms van die Militêre Akademie deur 
nasionale wetgewing verseker word.  Die betrokkenheid van die Universiteit Stellenbosch in die 
opvoeding van offisiere moenie daardeur beëindig word nie.  Die bestaan, funksionering, 
organisering en struktuur van die Militêre Akademie moet egter nie op ŉ 
“welwillendheidsooreenkoms” tussen die Universiteit en die Departement van Verdediging 
gebaseer wees nie. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
It is not genius which reveals to me suddenly and secretly what I should do in 
circumstances unexpected by other; it is thought and preparation. 
Napoleon1 
 
1.1 BACKGROUND AND PROBLEM FORMULATION 
  
War, conflict and the use of force for various purposes are central to our understanding of the world 
and the way in which it has evolved.  Despite the dubious morality of using military force in 
situations of conflict and war to achieve personal or political aims, the fact remains that it has been 
used to do just that throughout recorded history.  During most of history, the use of military force 
was regarded as a craft or an art.  The idea that it has a substantial theoretical and intellectual 
foundation that could and should be studied was a product of the Enlightenment and the 
philosophical period that was dominated by the Romantic philosophers.2  The history of military 
professionalism from the 18th century onwards is, thus, also the history of the development and 
growth of military education.  Today, Hauser argues, the military profession is not a particularly 
intellectual one, but it cannot afford to be anti-intellectual either.3 
 
Since the Second World War, the need for increasingly refined expertise and education is a 
universal characteristic of all professions, including the military profession.4  Van Creveld pointed 
out that two factors underpinned the nature of the military profession in this particular era: the 
expansion of civilian higher education and the shifting definition of war.  In combination, these 
factors led to a world-wide revolution in education within armed forces, to the extent that today, 
most armed forces require their officers to be educated – to have a university degree.  Indeed, if a 
long-term military career is foreseen, one that will culminate in high rank, officers are being advised 
to have an advanced degree.5 
                                                
1
 Hunerwadel, JP, “Planning to Win: A Study in Strategy and Operational Art”, Air & Space Power Chronicles, 
26 February 2002.  Available at <http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/hunerwadel.html> 
[27 January 2004] 
2
 Malik, JM, “The Evolution of Strategic Thought”, In Snyder CA (ed.), Contemporary Security and Strategy, 
Routledge, New York, 1999, pp. 17-18. 
3
 Hauser, WL, "Professional Writing: A Professional Obligation", Military Review, August 1974, p. 42. 
4
 Reddel, CW, “Preface”, In Converse, EV (ed.), Forging the Sword: Selecting, Educating, and Training 
Cadets and Junior Officers in the Modern World, Imprint Publications, Chicago, 1998, p. xi. 
5
 Van Creveld, M, The Training of Officers: From Military Professionalism to Irrelevance, Free Press, New 
York, 1990, p. 102. 
   
2 
Military officers should have the intellectual expertise required to employ a nation's armed forces – 
all its military resources – in support of and within the larger totality of a nation's security.  They 
have to understand and deal with military, economic, technological and other societal changes in 
an intellectual manner, otherwise, as Corbett warned, militaries will "rot".6  Preston, thus, argued 
that throughout history and across all nations, military education had only one purpose: 
"… encouraging open minds to accept the need for continual adaptation".7  
 
Not many militaries has gone through the kind of turmoil and transformation the South African 
National Defence Force (SANDF) faced since the democratisation of the country in 1994.  Within 
the South African military, much attention has been focused on the idea of Education, Training and 
Development (ETD) 8 as a means of transformation.  Training in particular was an important driver 
of the changes that were brought about since 1994.  In contrast to the role of training, the general 
attitude towards education was rooted in the view that intellectual excellence as such is not what 
the military is all about.9  This general attitude was an important legacy from the apartheid military 
that was carried over to the SANDF.  The former South African Defence Force had a very tactically-
and operationally-minded focus on training and experience.  This stands in stark contrast to the 
general approach in revolutionary armed forces, such as Umkhonto we Sizwe – the military or 
armed wing of the African National Congress – who very often have a broad and more intellectual 
attitude towards their tasks.  A high emphasis on training within armed forces also reflects the 
assessment of one particular school of thought concerning the preparation of armed forces – with 
Martin van Creveld as its main disciple.  Van Creveld emphasised the idea that militaries should 
focus on the development of military practitioners capable of running a country's defence force.  
Officers, this school of thought maintained, should not be developed at all to engage in intellectual 
debates or academic writing about defence forces and security issues.10   
 
The tension between the training and education of officers is acute in situations of limited resources 
where a defence force has to make some trade-offs.  In South Africa in particular, the military has 
                                                
6
 Borowski, HR (ed.), The Harmon Memorial Lectures in Military History, Office of Air Force History, United 
States Air Force, Washington D.C., 1988, p. 269. 
7
 Ibid., p. 270. 
8
 Please note that the SANDF makes use of the notion “Education, Training and Development” (ETD) as an 
overarching umbrella concept to describe all learning and teaching activities in the Department of 
Defence.  The abbreviation ETD will thus be used throughout this document when discussing learning 
and teaching in the SANDF. 
9
 Esterhuyse, AJ, “Ten Years of Democracy and the Return of Bad Times: Studying Security, Strategic and 
Military Affairs in South Africa”, Journal of Contemporary History, Vol 29, No 3, December 2005, p. 161. 
10
 Van Creveld, M, op. cit., p. 102.  
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been confronted with a very small defence budget and a growing operational schedule since 1994, 
specifically in the sphere of peace missions.  Thus, allowing young officers to study at the South 
African Military Academy in Saldanha for three years is, in the view of some, probably deemed to 
impinge upon the budgetary and operational requirements of the SANDF.  In the recent past, the 
closure of the Military Academy has been discussed on senior command and management level in 
the SANDF.  Indeed, SANDF officers are very often sceptical about the need for a military academy 
in South Africa.11  The opinion that is generally held is that there is sufficient time later in the career 
of an officer to engage in studies.  Thus, the problem statement of the study is rooted in the 
tensions that underpin the need for educated armed forces in general and in South Africa in 
particular. 
 
1.2 IDENTIFYING SUB-PROBLEMS 
 
Through a thorough study of the literature, own experience and interviews with academics and 
military personnel, at least four areas of tension (sub-problems) have been identified for the 
purposes of this study. 
 
Firstly, given that military expertise is the result of the interplay between military experience, 
training and education,12 no armed force can neglect either the training or the education of its 
officers.  There is a natural tension between training and education that most armed forces have 
difficulty to manage and very often prefer to ignore.13  For a variety of reasons, militaries are 
comfortable with and have a natural preference for training.  Military training focuses on the 
provision of skills – teaching the officer "what to think" not "how to think".  Education, on the other 
hand, aims at developing a mental flexibility to look beyond the horizon, to anticipate and to shape 
the future.  The tension between training and education is intensified by the challenge, pointed out 
                                                
11
 An opinion of the author based on personal discussions, interviews and personal conversations with a 
number of mid-level and senior officers of the SANDF.  It is a commonly held view in the military that if 
it were not for pressure from the policy environment, the SANDF would already have closed the Military 
Academy.    
12
 Huntington, SP, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations, Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, 1957, p. 13. 
13
 See the following articles in this regard: Mason, RA, "Innovation and the Military Mind", Air University 
Review, Jan-Feb 1986, Available at 
<http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1986/jan-feb/mason.html> [16 February 
2005] and Kline, JA, "Education and Training: Some Differences", Air University Review, Jan-Feb 
1985. Available at <http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1985/jan-feb/kline.html> 
[25 February 2005] 
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by Downes, that it is more difficult for the trained man to gain a general scientific education than it is 
for the educated man to undergo military training.14     
 
A second concern, rooted in the difference between training and education, is the tension between 
the military world with its disciplined regimental ethos and the academic world with its ethos 
informed by the need for freedom of thought.15  This tension is acute at institutions that have to 
address both the training and educational needs of the military – military academies and defence 
colleges in particular.  The one world aims at developing "… critical, creative, broad-gauged 
visionaries with the intellect to dissect the status quo, grasp the big picture, discern important 
relationships among events, generate imaginative possibilities for action, and operate easily in the 
conceptual realm".16  The other world emphasises the need for disciplined skills to operate 
and "… largely discourages independent thought and critical inquiry”.17  Consequently, Foster 
maintains, the military’s undue emphasis on obedience, loyalty, pervasive doctrine, regulations, and 
operating procedures breeds an orthodoxy that drives out any need for original thought. 
  
The third tension that underpins military education concerns its focus.  Military personnel have to be 
true professionals in the profession of arms while, because the profession of arms is also a 
government bureaucracy, they also have to be good bureaucrats.  Underpinning this dualistic 
nature of the military profession is the question concerning the way in which officers should be 
educated so as to address both worlds.18  Military education on the one hand has to prepare 
officers as professionals in the management of violence, the management of defence and the 
management of peace but, on the other hand, also to be good bureaucrats.  At most military 
education institutions this boils down to a tension between academic studies focusing on issues 
such as strategy, security and military affairs; and those related to the management sciences.  
Even at military training institutions there are often debates about the relevancy of particular 
programmes for combat elements on the one hand, and combat support and combat service 
support elements of armed forces on the other.  
 
                                                
14
 Downes, C, Special Trust and Confidence: The Making of an Officer, Frank Cass, London, 1991, p. 200. 
15
 Ibid., p. 135. 
16
 Foster, GD, “Research, Writing, and the Mind of the Strategist”, Joint Forces Quarterly, Spring 1996, 
p. 112. 
17
 Ibid., p. 112. 
18
 See the discussion of this problem by Snider, DM and Watkins, GL in the introductory chapter in Snider, 
DM & Watkins, G (eds.), The Future of the Army Profession, McGraw-Hill, New York, 2002 and in 
Esterhuyse, AJ, “Management and Command in the SANDF: Changing Priorities”, Strategic Review for 
Southern Africa, Vol XXVI, No 1, May 2004. 
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A last tension concerns the debate of whether the focus of military education should be on the 
"making of lieutenants" or the "making of colonels."19  The one view – a long-term strategic view – 
emphasises the need for the military profession, like all other professions, to educate its members 
as a pre-requisite for entering the profession of arms.  This school of thought places a high 
premium on the availability of military academies with a large academic component as part of its 
programme for the development of officers.  The other view – a short-term tactical view – 
emphasises the immediate need of the military for junior leaders and the necessity to expose them 
to the realities of the military world as early as possible in their careers.  Proponents of this view 
argue that tactical training and experience form the bedrock of a junior officer's world and that the 
need for education becomes more important as the individual progresses towards the strategic 
environment.  This school of thought is based on the assumption that the officer needs to earn his 
commission through practical leadership and that there is sufficient time later in the career of an 
officer to busy himself with academic studies.  There is thus a tension within militaries between pre-
commission liberal (academic) education and professional (military) education.  On a higher level, 
this tension concerns the interplay between a general scientific academic formative education and 
a professional vocational education in the making of officers.   
           
1.3 PURPOSE AND OUTCOMES OF THE RESEARCH 
 
The study is a descriptive analysis aimed at demarcating the proper role of the South African 
Military Academy in the academic and professional preparation of officers for the SANDF.  This aim 
calls for, firstly, an analysis of the need for educated armed forces in general and in South Africa in 
particular, with specific reference to the tensions underpinning military training and education.  It, 
secondly, requires a broad assessment of the nature of professional military education in the 
SANDF at large to contextualise the role, function and challenges of the South African Military 
Academy. 
 
The purpose of the study aims at providing a number of outcomes.  This includes conceptual clarity 
on: 
 
 the need for the education of armed forces in general and the SANDF in particular; 
 the focus of academic and professional education of officers; 
                                                
19
 See the discussion of this problem in Crackel, TJ, "On the Making of Lieutenants and Colonels", The Public 
Interest, No 76, Summer, 1984.  See also the remarks by Galvin, JR, "What's the Matter Being a 
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 the problems that most militaries – and particularly the SANDF – experience in the provision 
of military education; and 
 a theoretical framework for educating militaries. 
 
In addition, the study makes recommendations to the SANDF in general and the Military Academy 
in particular about education in the South African military.  The study constitutes and provides a 
framework or basis for future research on the education of the military in South Africa in particular 
and Africa in general.  The research of this study will also be published in accredited academic 
journals and used for debate at academic conferences.  The study is furthermore intended as a 
background for a debate and discussion of the future nature and contribution of the Military 
Academy to education in the South African military.  The following research outputs have resulted 
from research that was done in preparation for this study: 
 
 one paper published in an international academic journal;20  
 five papers published in national accredited journals;21 
 one paper in a non-accredited journal;22 
 one conference paper delivered at a national conference;23 and 
 a conference paper at an international conference.24  
  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                               
Strategist?", Parameters, Vol XXV, No 2, Summer, 1995, p. 161. 
20
 Esterhuyse, AJ, “Professional Military Education and Training: Challenges Facing the South African 
Military”, Defence Studies, Vol 6, No 3, Sep 2006, pp. 377-399. 
21
 Esterhuyse, AJ, “The South African Military Academy: A Time for Debate and Change”, Strategic Review 
for Southern Africa, Vol XXVIII, No 2, November 2006, pp. 89-106; Esterhuyse, AJ, “Educating for 
Professionalism: A New Military for a New South Africa”, Scienta Militaria, Vol 34, No 2, 2006, pp. 21-
43; Esterhuyse, AJ, "The Military Educational Predicament: Identifying Core Educational 
Requirements", Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol XXVII, No 2, November 2005, pp. 100-122; 
Esterhuyse, AJ, "Ten Years of Democracy and the Return of Bad Times: Studying Security, Strategic 
and Military Affairs in South Africa", Journal for Contemporary History, Vol 29, No 3, December 2005, 
pp. 148-167; Esterhuyse, A.J. "Management and Command in the SANDF: Changing Priorities", op. 
cit., pp. 40-60. 
22
 Esterhuyse, AJ, "Military Training and Education: Understanding the Difference and Tension", op. cit., 
pp. 9-10. 
23
 Esterhuyse, AJ, "Ten Years of Democracy and the Return of Bad Times: Studying Security, Strategic and 
Military Affairs in South Africa", Paper delivered at the SASA Congress in Bloemfontein, 28 June 2004. 
24
 Esterhuyse, AJ, "Ten Years of Democracy: Education and the Rise of Professionalism in the South African 
National Defence Force", Paper delivered at the 72nd Meeting of the Society of Military History, The 
Rise of Military Professionalism, Hosted by The Citadel – The Military College of South Carolina, 24-27 
February 2005. 
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1.4 RESEARCH QUESTION  
 
Based on the purpose of the research, the central research question is formulated as follows:  
 
How can the tensions that underpin the need for an educated military in South Africa, be 
dealt with in general and at the South African Military Academy in particular? 
 
It is foreseen that, by pursuing this goal, an answer will be found to the question on how the South 
African Military Academy can adequately prepare officers for the SANDF through the study of 
military and strategic affairs.   
 
The study is underpinned by two propositions.  Firstly, the continuous focus on training and 
experience in the development of young officers in the SANDF will create an increasing inability to 
educate mid-level and senior officers in the SANDF.  Secondly, the South African Military Academy 
will increase its relevancy for the SANDF by drawing a clear line of demarcation between training 
and education on the one hand and, on the other hand, focusing on the vocational needs of the 
South African military through the development of a core curriculum. 
 
 1.5 TERMINOLGY AND CONCEPTS 
 
Although the different concepts that are used in the making of officers will be explained in detail in 
the study, it is necessary to provide short definitions of the most prominent conceptions.   
 
Military training is understood as the activity that armed forces use to develop the necessary skills 
to perform effectively on the technical and tactical levels of war.25  Military training is rooted in the 
need for action.  It places the focus on the primary function of the military – warfighting – and the 
skills required to do that well.  In the military domain, training is required to teach soldiers all the 
skills they need to be good at fighting, or, in the realm of peace missions, the skills required from 
soldiers in their capacity as peacekeepers.  Thus, military training aims at the provision of skills – 
fighting skills in particular.26  
 
                                                
25
 Sarkesian, SC, Williams, JA and Bryant, FB, Soldiers, Society, and National Security, Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, Boulder, 1995, p. 17. 
26
 Esterhuyse, AJ, “Military Training and Education: Understanding the Difference and Tension”, African 
Armed Forces Journal, April 2004, p. 9. 
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Professional Military Education (PME) is a higher order umbrella concept that describes all the 
higher order education and developmental activities within the armed forces.  It is used specifically 
to describe all the educational and developmental activities that armed forces itself provide to their 
officers from the beginning until the end of their careers.  The term is used primarily to distinguish 
between the educational and developmental activities provided by the military itself on the one 
hand and civilian higher education on the other.  Military education underpins the existence of a so-
called body of military knowledge, and is rooted in the need for constant reflection. 27 
 
The term broad liberal education is used to describe education of a general scientific nature.  In 
most instances, it is education provided to the military through participation of members of the 
armed forces in civilian educational programmes.  This type of education usually takes place at an 
individual level with members of the armed forces participating in civilian (higher/tertiary) education 
programmes at civilian universities or at military universities.28 
  
A military academy is a military institution responsible for the training, education and socialisation of 
officer cadets before appointment and in preparation for a career as an officer in the armed forces.  
The emphasis at military academies is strongly on the provision of under-graduate education. 
 
A military university is a military educational institution responsible for the education of 
commissioned officers of the armed forces, where such education facilitates passage to higher 
ranks.  Military universities do not offer functional training, often allow for the enrolment of civilian 
students, and have a strong post-graduate focus. 
 
The idea of military professionalism categorises the military as a Huntingtonian organisation with a 
specific professional expertise, societal responsibility and organisational corporateness. 
 
1.6 THE NEED FOR THE RESEARCH 
 
Showalter emphasised that education provides credibility at all levels of society at large as a mark 
of merit.29  Education in the SANDF – and with that the role of the military as an educator – 
                                                
27
 Ibid., pp. 9 & 10. 
28
 Sarkesian, SC et al., op. cit., p. 172. 
29
 Showalter, DE, "'No Officer rather than a Bad Officer': Officer Selection and Education in the 
Prussian/German Army, 1715-1945", In: Kennedy, GC & Nielson, K (eds.), Military Education: Past, 
Present, and Future, Praeger, Westport, 2002, p. 56. 
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underpins the standing of the military in the eyes of the broader South African society.  In South 
Africa, this is an extremely important notion since unequal access to jobs and education and 
consequently extreme levels of income inequality were some of the defining characteristics of 
apartheid.30  Consequently, the provision of military education determines the success of the 
SANDF in the same manner that the provision of education in general is at the heart of a successful 
New South Africa.  There is thus a clear need for research focusing on the education of the military 
in South Africa. 
 
One of Africa’s major security challenges is fragile civil-military relations and unprofessional 
militaries.31  Very often, this translates into military intervention in politics.  Military education is an 
important factor in keeping professional militaries in the barracks.32  Stated differently, an 
uneducated South African National Defence Force (SANDF) may threaten the very democracy it is 
trying to protect and uphold in South Africa.  The Military Academy in Saldanha, housing the 
Faculty of Military Science of the University of Stellenbosch, is the most important educational 
institution of the SANDF.  Indeed, the interaction between the University of Stellenbosch and the 
Defence Force represents a unique civil-military interface for the education of officers.  Very 
recently, both the Commandant and the Dean of Military Science at the Military Academy were 
replaced, highlighting civil-military, educational and other tensions at the institution.33 
 
The need for research is also rooted in the role of education as a facilitator of security sector reform 
in Southern Africa in general and a democratic South Africa in particular.  This particularly concerns 
the way in which the military has to transform itself to fulfil its role in a democratic South African 
society and how it should operationalise ideas such as human security that has become a 
cornerstone concept in the South African security architecture.  It is also important to reconsider 
military education in South Africa against the background of the reform of the educational 
landscape in the country in general. 
 
In addition, the role of education should be considered as a tool in preserving South African 
strategic and military knowledge.  This has never been a priority in the South African military.  The 
                                                
30
 Handley, A, "The New South Africa, a Decade Later", Current History, Vol 103, No 673, May 2004, p. 196. 
31
 Howe, HM, Ambiguous Order: Military Forces in African States, Lynne Reinner, London, 2001.  
32
 See Chapter 7 of the following study: Malan, MR, Civilian Supremacy over the Military: Guidelines for 
Embryonic Democracies, Thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree 
Master of Military Science (Political Science) at the University of Stellenbosch, September 1994. 
33
 Anon, “Rektor Sit Voet Dwars by Krygskunde”, Kampusnuus, Staff Newspaper of the University of 
Stellenbosch, 13 April 2006, p. 1.  
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role of education in this regard is critical in ensuring that the flame is kept burning; that the SANDF 
remains intellectually prepared for any eventuality it might face in future.  The need for research is 
furthermore rooted in the need for education to prepare the military in South Africa for the typical 
kind of operations that is expected from militaries in democratic societies in times of peace when 
vital interests are not at stake.  From this perspective, the need for education in the preparation of 
the military to engage the polity actively in a mutually beneficial but asymmetrical civil-military 
interaction and to participate actively in the defence budgetary process should be considered.         
 
1.7 DELIMITATIONS 
 
The study focuses on the education of professional military practitioners – soldiers, sailors and 
airmen who served as officers in their respective services.  The schooling of technical musterings is 
not considered.  The education of professional engineers, artisans, tradesmen and the like is 
consequently also not addressed; neither is musterings in the medical services, which are 
controlled by professional bodies.  In addition, in consideration of education in the SANDF in 
general the emphasis is on those military institutions that are involved in the provision of military 
schooling of an educational nature.  Institutions, such as corps schools that operate clearly in the 
training realm, are also excluded from the study. 
 
The interviewees reflect a predominance of army personnel.  This is a reflection of the position of 
the army as the senior service in the SANDF and, more importantly, the predominance of army 
personnel in the joint services environment.  The Joint Training Division and most of the senior ETD 
institutions form part of this joint services environment.  The description of the command and 
control of the Joint Training Division itself and as it relates to the SANDF at large is described as it 
is at the time of writing.  Certain changes were made in this regard towards the beginning of 2007.  
These changes are not going to affect the nature of education in the SANDF in general and at the 
Military Academy in particular and, consequently, the changes were not incorporated into the study. 
 
No effort is made during the study to provide a structured overview of the academic programmes 
offered by most outstanding military academies across the world.  The approach in this study is to 
focus on the philosophical roots of military education in general and the knowledge clusters on 
which some of these institutions focus in the development of their academic programmes.  
Although not included in this study, an overview of the nature of these academies (joint or single 
service), the duration and structure of their programmes, and how the programme is imbedded in 
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the ETD system of the particular defence force might be particularly useful in establishing a 
benchmark against which the programmes of the South African Military Academy can be evaluated.  
This is indeed one of the weaknesses of this study since it focuses on what military academies 
ought to do, not what they actually do. 
 
The study is primarily concerned with the content and the structure of officer education in general 
and in the South African Defence Force in particular.  The issue of who should educate the military 
in South Africa is not comprehensively addressed in this study.  Though the matter receives some 
attention throughout the study, it is not dealt with in a comprehensive in-depth manner.  It is 
believed that this particular problem should be addressed in a more comprehensive way in a 
separate study.     
 
It should also be noted that the masculine form of language is used throughout the study.  This is 
not an effort to downplay the important role of woman within armed forces these days, but merely to 
simplify the writing process.  Thus, all arguments are intended as to be applicable to all individuals 
serving in the armed forces.    
 
1.8 RELATED LITERATURE 
 
Much has been written on military education in general.  Consequently, an extensive literature on 
military education is available.  However, the research that has thus far been done on the education 
of the military in South Africa is limited – almost non-existent.  A review of the general literature on 
military education reveals three broad themes, namely historical literature, theoretical literature and 
future-orientated literature.   
 
The historical literature focuses on the development of military education in general or provides 
chronological overviews of the development thereof at specific military educational institutions or in 
specific defence forces.  In the case of the latter, military education per se is not necessarily the 
object of analysis.  It does, however, provide some insight into the difficulties that these institutions 
experience in the provision of military education.  Besides the work of Visser34 that was done on the 
history of the South African Military Academy, the most well-known studies in this regard include 
                                                
34
 Visser, GE, Die Geskiedenis van die Suid-Afrikaanse Militêre Akademie, 1950-1990, Unpublished PhD 
dissertation, Universiteit van Stellenbosch, Stellenbosch, November 2000. 
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the books by Downes on education in the British armed forces35 and those by Lovell on the 
American service academies.36  An extensive list of literature is also available on the education of 
the German armed forces in the period between the Napoleonic wars and the Second World War. 
 
Theoretical literature on military education aims at providing answers to the challenge of military 
education in general or addresses particular problems in military education from a theoretical 
perspective.  The work by Converse – Forging the Sword37 – is an important contribution to the 
need for military education from a theoretical perspective.  Most of the literature in this regard is, 
however, published as articles in academic journals.  Military education from this perspective is in 
most instances also discussed as part of the bigger transformational challenges that face armed 
forces in general.  The use of education in the transformation of the United States military in the 
aftermath of the war in Vietnam is a well-known example in this regard.  The work of Moskos on 
post-modern militaries is typical of academic work in this context.38  In South Africa, Heinecken has 
done research focusing on the post-modern nature of the SANDF, specifically on the need for 
education to prepare the SANDF for so-called "… soft missions".39  The necessity of education to 
prepare soldiers for these missions was also the focus of articles by Neethling.40 
  
Future-orientated literature aims at outlining the importance and specific challenges that military 
education has to deal with in future.  Books edited by Snider and Watkins The Future of the Army 
Profession41, Smith Preparing Future Military Leaders42 and Kennedy and Nielson Military 
Education: Past, Present, and Future43 are the most prominent in this regard.  No research in South 
Africa has yet been done that focus exclusively on the education of the military for future 
challenges. 
 
                                                
35
 Downes, C, op. cit.  
36
 Lovell, JP,  Neither Athens Nor Sparta?  The American Service Academies in Transition, Indiana University 
Press, Bloomington, 1979. 
37
 Converse, EV (ed.), Forging the Sword: Selecting, Educating, and Training Cadets and Junior Officers in 
the Modern World, Imprint Publications, Chicago, 1998. 
38
 Moskos, CC & Wood, FR, The Military: More Than Just a Job?, Pergamon-Brassey's, Washington, 1988 
and Moskos, CC et al. (eds.), The Post-Modern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War, Oxford 
University Press, New York, 2000. 
39
 Heinecken, L, "Preparing for Operations Other than War: How Equipped is the SANDF to Deal with 'Soft 
Missions'", Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol XXIV, No 1, June 2002. 
40
 Neethling, T, “The South African Military and Peacekeeping: Reflections on Conditions, Capacity Building 
and Prospects”, Scientia Militaria, Vol 31, No 1, 2003. 
41
 Snider, DM & Watkins, G (eds.), op. cit. 
42
 Smith, H (ed.), Preparing Future Leaders: Officer Education and Training for the Twenty First Century, 
Australian Defence Studies Centre, Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra, 1998. 
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1.9 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
 
The study is a descriptive analysis and as such combines two research approaches.  Neuman 
noted that descriptive research focuses on “how” and “who” questions (“How does it look?” “Who is 
involved?”)44  However, Earl Babbie noted in his book The Practice of Social Research that 
descriptive studies are seldom limited to a merely descriptive purpose.  Scientists usually go on to 
examine why the observed patterns exist and, more importantly, what they imply.45  The research in 
this study falls into the above category since it includes an explanatory component or analysis.  The 
first part of the research in this study is therefore explanatory by nature while the last part is more 
descriptive by nature.  It should be noted, however, that the study is primarily descriptive by nature 
in the sense that it provides a detailed and highly accurate picture of education in the SANDF and 
at the Military Academy.46 
 
There is firstly a need for a conceptual analysis of military education.  A theoretical understanding 
of the nature and the need of military education and its role in professional armed forces 
necessitate such an approach.  Of central concern is the need for conceptual difference between 
the nature and need for training, experience, and education in armed forces.  This analysis includes 
a discussion of the realist theory or tradition that underpins the so-called “military mind”.  
Understanding the military mind – the military way of thinking – is an important tool in 
understanding the need for military education.  This analysis also demarcates the need for a 
general scientific education vis-à-vis professional military education in armed forces.   
 
In addition, the study focuses on the development of a theoretical framework as a means for 
explaining, understanding and analysing education in the SANDF in general and at the Military 
Academy in particular.  The framework is developed by means of deductive argumentation in which 
a number of factors about the education, nature and use of military forces are considered.  This 
includes (inter alia) consideration of basic military education, military doctrinal education and 
politico-military education, as well as consideration of Africa as a theatre of operations, and the 
bureaucratic and professional nature of armed forces.  The conceptual analysis and theoretical 
framework is used to describe the nature of education in the SANDF and at the Military 
                                                                                                                                                               
43
 Kennedy, GC & Nielson, K (eds.), op. cit. 
44
 Neuman, WL, Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches, A and B, Boston, 2003, 
p. 30. 
45
 Babbie, E, The Practice of Social Research, Thomson and Wadsworth, Belmont, 2007, p. 89. 
46
 See the discussion of this kind of study in Neuman, WL, op. cit., p. 29. 
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Academy.  The framework in the end provides the SANDF with a useful conceptual tool for 
coherent restructuring of education in the SANDF.  The whole study, however, is a descriptive 
analysis and as such is qualitative by nature.   
 
The research was conducted by means of a literature study, document analysis and interviews.  A 
literature overview of primarily secondary sources directed towards outlining the philosophy, focus 
and nature of military education, the need thereof in armed forces and the problems in the provision 
thereof is an important part of the study.  However, it is augmented through document analysis: 
research of primary sources focusing on an analysis of primary documents containing information 
on education within the SANDF.  The focus is on primary documents that direct and/or underpin 
education in the SANDF in general and at the South African Military Academy in particular, such as 
policy documents from the national level and from within the SANDF.  The curricula and other 
educational documents of the different SANDF institutions that are involved in education, training 
and development are also included in the document analysis.  This is expanded to include 
unstructured interviews with officers and other officials involved in the education of the military in 
South Africa.  Please note that the decision to interview particular individuals in the SANDF was 
based on the position or post they held within the organisation and not on considerations such as 
gender, rank or race.   
 
The use of interviews is notorious for their high value but also the dangers they contain.  The 
entrapments of interviews are well documented and the author has familiarise himself with these 
challenges as they are described in a number of publications on research methodology.  The 
interviewer is in a unique position since he is also a member of the military and the Military 
Academy.  This provides the interviewer with a sound understanding of the organisation and 
institution to be able to design effective interviews.  However, most of the members who are 
interviewed are older, have more experience and are higher in rank than the interviewer.  Getting 
access to these people for interviews is a problem.  Military bureaucracy remains a problem and 
several “gatekeepers” need to be overcome in an effort to interview senior officers.  The need for 
confidentiality of the interviewees’ identity is a requirement by the SANDF.  All interviews are 
recorded and transcribed to ensure effective capturing of data.        
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1.10 ETHICAL STATEMENT 
 
The research and study were done with the written informed consent of the South African National 
Defence Force.  The conduct of the study within the Defence Force in particular was cleared with 
the Chief of Defence Intelligence.  His concurrence forms part of the letter of informed consent that 
was received from the Chief of the Joint Training Division.  It should be noted that the Defence 
Force insisted on the anonymity of all the defence force personnel that was interviewed for 
purposes of this study.  Consequently, particular views and specific facts provided by military 
personnel during interviews were not attributed to these individuals in the text.  This does not apply 
to serving and retired members of the Faculty of Military Sciences of the University of Stellenbosch 
that were interviewed.  The names of Defence Force personnel who were interviewed are listed in 
the final bibliography.  Though it is impossible to predict the outcome of a study like this, the 
intention was never to harm the general image of the Defence Force in any way through the results 
of the study.  In cases where anomalies or irregularities are highlighted it is done in order to make 
recommendations about what should be done to rectify the problems that were identified.  
 
1.11 CHAPTER BREAKDOWN 
 
The chapter breakdown of the study was done by means of very specific questions.  The 
introductory chapter is an exposition of the focus and nature of the study, as well as an explanation 
of the methodological features of the study.  The second chapter addresses the reasons why 
militaries need to be educated.  Chapter Three represents an effort to find an answer to two very 
specific questions: What should be the focus of military education and how should education be 
presented within militaries?  The in-depth discussion of these two matters led to a general synopsis 
of education in armed forces that are used as a framework for analysis of education, training and 
development in the SANDF in Chapter Four.  The purpose of the fourth chapter is to answer the 
question: What are the nature, structure and philosophy of education, training and development in 
the SANDF?  This discussion provides a broad introduction and background to Chapter Five in 
which an effort is made to explore the debate about the role of the Military Academy in the 
education, training and development of the SANDF since 1994.  The purpose of Chapter Five, 
more specifically, is to highlight the issues that have underpinned the debate concerning the future 
role of the Military Academy over the last ten years.  These issues are taken one step further in 
Chapter Six.  Chapter Six addresses the following question: How can the structure, focus and 
functioning of the South African Military Academy be optimised to provide quality education, training 
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and development to young candidate officers in the SANDF?  The chapter consequently explores 
the unique civil-military relations between the Defence Force and University of Stellenbosch; the 
challenges that are facing the Military Academy at present; and ways in which these challenges can 
be dealt with.  The last chapter contains a synthesis and conclusion of the most important 
recommendations of the study.   
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CHAPTER 2 
 
PHILOSOPHY OF OFFICER PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT: 
PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EXPERTISE AND THE NEED FOR 
EDUCATION IN ARMED FORCES 
 
Who is this that darkens counsel by words without knowledge? 
Job 38:2 
2.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
The attention of the world’s media is currently (2006) focused on the wars in the Middle East – Iraq 
and Lebanon to be specific.  Thus, it will not be wrong to argue that the interest in military and 
strategic affairs is at present as deep or as strong as it has ever been.  Galvin, however, pointed 
out that it is ironic and even disappointing that virtually all the reputed “experts” on strategic and 
military affairs familiar to the public are civilian academics, consultants, and journalists.  He argues 
that the great military minds of our day are too busy to care about what is happening in the world 
around them.1  In line with this view, Foster is of the opinion that military professionals work 
extremely hard and feel good about it, though most of their work is far more consumptive than 
productive.  Though military professionals put great effort into their work, Foster points out, they 
leave in the end little more in their wake than new work for others.2  Yet, for the military to be 
effective in the strategic realm it has to produce its own strategic thinkers – people who care about 
what is going on in the world around them.  This demands an institutional commitment to education 
that includes serious and sustained attention to study, research and writing in the domain of military 
and strategic affairs.  This, though, is something that militaries do not always give much attention to 
in the development of military strategists.  Galvin outlines the problem by indicating that  
 
… the wealth of literature on strategy makes the discussion on how we beget strategists 
all the more puzzling, for surely the development of military strategists is a vital 
important issue which should be subjected to the interchange of ideas and constructive 
critiques, just like strategy itself.  Strange that it is not.3 
 
                                                
1
 Galvin, JR, “What's the Matter with Being a Strategist?”, Parameters, Summer 1995, p. 161.  
2
 Foster, GD, “Research, Writing, and the Mind of the Strategist”, Joint Forces Quarterly, No 11, Spring 1996, 
p. 115. 
3
 Galvin, JR, op. cit., p. 161.  
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The question needs to be asked whether militaries are concerned about this particular issue.  
Furthermore, why do militaries steer away from the use of education as a developmental tool?  
Opinions about what needs to be done to prepare military strategists for their very challenging task, 
differ.  There are even conflicting political views in this regard with which the military has to 
contend.  Those on the left of the political spectrum, for example, might fear that an educated 
military would dominate the national security domain and the policies that flow from that.  Those on 
the right might argue that military officers who are taught in the classroom to question and analyse 
security and defence policy cannot be depended upon to carry it out on the battlefield.4  
 
It is often said that people are the most critical element in the military.5  This is, to some extent, in 
contrast with the current very prominent debates about the so-called “Revolution in Military Affairs” 
and the accompanying prominence of technology in societies in general and within militaries in 
particular.  In the end, the emphasis on technology should be balanced with the need for highly 
schooled people within militaries.  Technology provides the military with the tools to do what ought 
to be done.  Military strategists should optimise the use of military technological and other means to 
be successful in whatever is required from the military.  Some argue that classical military strategy 
has been overtaken by technology.  Settlement by war of a dispute between two (industrialised) 
societies has lost its political sense.  In addition, nation-states are no longer in a position to 
guarantee their own security in isolation, and are dependent upon a security system often in a 
framework of regional alliances.  Solidarity within the regional security system now very often takes 
the place of the assertion of the interests of the nation-state.6  In short, the role of the military 
strategist is becoming increasingly more complicated.  
 
The aim of this chapter is to demarcate the need for and challenge of education in armed forces 
from a philosophical and theoretical perspective. The discussion is introduced with a brief overview 
of the history of education in modern armed forces.  It is followed by a discussion of the nature of 
the military profession and the need for education that flows from that.  The central theme is that 
militaries cannot be professional without being educated.  The need for education in militaries is 
considered within the context of the preparation and development of military forces through training, 
education and experience. The idea of a military mind – a unique military way of thinking – and its 
                                                
4
 Taylor, WJ & Bletz, DF, "A Case for Officer Graduate Education", Journal of Political and Military Sociology, 
Vol 2, Fall 1974, p. 265. 
5
 Kelley, JW, "Brilliant Warriors", Joint Forces Quarterly, No 11, Spring 1996, p. 104 and Snider, DM & 
Watkins, GL, “Introduction”, In Snider, DM & Watkins, G (eds.), The Future of the Army Profession, 
McGraw-Hill, New York, 2002, p. 3. 
6
 Baudissin, WG, "Officer Education and the Officer's Career", Adelphi Papers 103, 1973, p. 38. 
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influence on the education of armed forces is also analysed.  The discussion concludes with an 
analysis of the institutional, cultural and other challenges that have to be overcome in order to 
educate the military.  The discussion centres on the education of military officers and in particular 
their education for their future role as military strategists.  The words officer and (military) strategist 
are, thus, used interchangeably in the discussion. 
 
Before commencing with a discussion of education in armed forces it needs to be emphasised that 
there is a school of thought that claims that an armed force can be professional, and that it can 
acquire all the knowledge and skills it needs to be professional through thorough training.  Mileham 
argues that until recently most British officers viewed the military profession in terms of “… a career 
in soldiering”.7  Mileham is of the opinion that the British Army used to view itself as an organisation 
whose function is largely practical and based on common sense, not necessarily on intellectual 
activity.8  Strachan also argues that the military profession is not primarily a literate or an academic 
one.  He points out that it is the challenge of out-door life, not that of desk-bound theory, that 
attracts young people to the military profession.9  This is also the view of the well-known Israeli 
military historian and theorist, Martin van Creveld.  Van Creveld, in his book The Training of 
Officers: From Military Professionalism to Irrelevance, uses the armed forces of Israel and Vietnam 
as examples to argue that armed forces need to focus on training in preparing officers as military 
professionals.10  Without looking at the specific arguments of this particular school of thought, an 
effort will be made to outline the reasons why officers – in their capacity as military strategists – 
should be educated.  The discussion will provide a general understanding for the need of education 
in armed forces, but not to the detriment of the need for training. 
2.2 THE HISTORICAL ROOTS OF MODERN MILITARY EDUCATION  
 
Conflict and war is a defining characteristic of mankind.  The role of military force, though, has 
altered throughout recorded history by virtue of changing political and other demands.  However, 
the emergence of the professional military officer in the 19th century has to a large extent 
regularised that role.  The idea of a professional military officer can be traced to a Prussian 
government proclamation of 6 August 1808 declaring that: 
                                                
7
 Mileham, P, “Fifty Years of British Army Officership 1960-2010. Part 1: Retrospective”, Defence & Security 
Analysis, Vol 20, No 1, March 2004, p. 80. 
8
 Ibid., pp. 71-72.  
9
 Strachan, H, European Armies and the Conduct of War, Unwin Hyman, London, 1983, p. 1. 
10
 Van Creveld, M, The Training of Officers: From Military Professionalism to Irrelevance, Free Press, New 
York, 1990. pp. 2-3.  
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The only title to an officer's commission shall be, in time of peace, education and 
professional knowledge; in time of war, distinguished valor and perception.  From the 
entire nation, therefore, all individuals who possess these qualities are eligible for the 
highest military posts.  All previously existing class preference in the military 
establishment is abolished, and every man, without regard to his origins, has equal 
duties and rights.11 [emphasis added] 
 
The intention of the proclamation was to ensure that officer commissions would in future be based 
on professional military knowledge and competence.12  The proclamation was not fully observed in 
Prussia.  Yet, its formulation marked an abrupt end to the hereto scarcely questioned assumption 
that only by noble birth was a man entitled to claim military command, or endowed with the intuitive 
capacity to exercise it.  The proclamation led to the development of the so-called "Jena" model of 
officer education. in reaction to the Prussian defeat at Jena in 1806.13  The smashing Prussian 
victories of 1864-1871 in the end convinced most of Europe’s armed forces of the need for military 
education.  In Britain, for example, the debacle of the Crimea in the 1850s and the successes of the 
Prussian Army in the 1860s led to a realisation that "… the British officer corps sorely needed the 
professionalism that only promotion by merit, not money, could secure."14  Thus, before 1800 there 
was virtually no such thing as an educated professional officer corps anywhere.  After 1900 no 
sovereign power of any significance was without one.15   
 
Hackett pointed out that a number of conditions favoured the growth of military professionalism and 
education in the 19th century.  This includes: 
 
• the great increase in the complexity of the military skills required; 
• the growing economic strength and competitiveness of the major nation states; 
• the growth in power of the middle class at the expense of landed aristocracy; and 
                                                
11
 Radbruch, HE, "From Scharnhorst to Schmidt: The System of Education and Training in the German 
Bundeswehr", Armed Forces and Society, Vol 5, 1978-79, p. 607. 
12
 Pocklington, JH, "Professionalism and the Canadian Military", Air University Review, March-April 1976. 
Available at: http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1976/mar-apr/pocklington.html 
[16 Nov 2004] 
13
 Foot, P, "European Military Education Today", Baltic Defence Review, No 5, Vol 2001, p. 13. 
14
 Moorcraft, PL, "Clausewitz and Sandhurst: Officer Training in Britain", Militaria, Vol 8, No 1, 1978, p. 25. 
15
 Hackett, J, The Profession of Arms, Macmillan, New York, 1983, p. 99. 
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• the development of democratic political institutions which demanded a more responsive 
articulation in armed forces.16 
 
The professional development of military officers grew to maturity within the context of three 19th 
century revolutions, all of which come to fruition by the beginning of the First World War.  The 
political, industrial and military revolutions of the late 18th and early 19th century made possible the 
mobilisation of an unprecedented amount of human and material resources to support a war effort.  
To be specific, the political revolution of the 19th century gave people a voice in governmental 
decisions.  In return, military service became a duty since people had the obligation to support and 
defend the nation-state and its policies.  In this way, the nation’s total resources became available 
for the conduct of war.17  The industrial revolution meant that the human and material resources 
could be processed and utilised to equip mass armies.  In addition, the application of steam and 
steel to transportation by means of railways and steamships meant that the mass armies could be 
transported to wherever they were needed.  The sustained support that was needed by the mass 
armies and the availability of mechanised transport revolutionised not only logistics, but also the 
whole conduct of war.  These armies had to be recruited, equipped, trained, transported, fed and 
commanded during battles.  This led to a military revolution and particularly the creation of special 
general staff systems for thinking about and preparing for war in peacetime; as well as the conduct 
of war during times of conflict.18  High command consequently became much more than a question 
of leading troops in the field.  Instead, it became a matter of mobilising, deploying and transporting 
large mass armies.  This, according to Van Creveld, could best be done with the aid of a large-
scale map situated in a well-equipped office complex.  The result was that by the end of the 19th 
century, fundamental changes had occurred in the manner Western nations made war.19   
 
The political, industrial and military revolutions of the 19th century thus blended elements of modern 
society into a potent military structure where it was no longer possible to distinguish between war 
and home front.  Military strategists needed as much knowledge and understanding of politics and 
civil society as they did of warfighting proper.  The need for well-trained and highly educated 
military staffs for the preparation and conduct of war was obvious.20  The introduction of a general 
staff system as a means through which educated and capable staff officers could provide a free 
                                                
16
 Ibid., pp. 133-135.   
17
 Baucom, DR, “Historical Framework for the Concept of Strategy”, Military Review, March 1987, pp. 5-6. 
18
 Ibid.   
19
 Van Creveld, M, The Training of Officers: From Military Professionalism to Irrelevance, op. cit., p. 99. 
20
 Mills, W, Arms and Men: A Study in American Military History, GP Putnam’s Sons, New York 1956, p. 206. 
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and steady flow of ideas throughout the armed force "institutionalised excellence" within the 
military.21  
 
The removal of the class barrier and the 19th century revolutionary changes brought the need for a 
liberally educated body of officers (ein gebildetes Offizierkorps) to the fore.  This was followed by 
the need for a professionally educated body of officers (ein berufsgebildetes Offizierkorps) with a 
structure of promotion in which criteria of competence predominates.22  These developments – the 
creation of a professionally educated body of officers and the entrance of professional and scientific 
knowledge into the military and strategic spheres – were rooted in two 19th century phases of 
philosophical thought.  The era of Enlightenment, emphasising rational objective scientific analysis 
and search for clarity, was followed by an era in which German idealists and romantic thinkers 
focused on the psychological, emotional, subjective and intuitive dimensions.  Within the military, 
the Swiss Antonie Henri Jomini (1779-1869) embodied the Enlightenment in his search for certain 
and fixed principles in the use of force.  The Prussian Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831), however, 
combined the best of the Enlightenment and the German Romantic tradition in his writings.23  Mills 
explains the outcome of these developments as follows: “War was now in the hands, not simply of 
professionals, but of highly trained, technical expert professionals who could in crisis levy upon 
every industrial and manpower resource of the now highly integrated state.”24  
 
Until 1945, the Prussian (German) Kriegsakademie (war academy) embodied the idea of military 
education and excellence.25  For a very long time the Kriegsakademie, established in 1810 in 
Berlin, was the only institution in Europe for the advanced study of war (ein berufsgebildetes 
Offizierkorps) and the higher education of officers in non-warlike disciplines (ein gebildetes 
Offizierkorps).  In Prussia, attendance at the academy became a prerequisite for high command.26 
Character and intellect underpinned the German approach towards the military profession.27  The 
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 Hackett, J, op. cit., p. 103.  
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Routledge, New York, 1999, pp. 17-18. 
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Germans, however, did not have a monopoly on an understanding of military theory or the ability to 
analyse operational experience.  Nor did they have a monopoly on military competence.  However, 
what they did have was a monopoly on consistently reliable and excellent performance throughout 
the army in accordance with well-developed military doctrine and theory.28  The Kriegsakademie 
was at the heart of these doctrinal and theoretical developments in the German Army.  A number of 
factors, Van Creveld points out, led to the success of the Kriegsakademie, namely – 
 
• the rigorous system for selecting students; 
• the three-year integrated curriculum, which for all the changes it underwent never lost 
sight of the fact that its overriding function was to prepare officers for conducting war in 
the field; 
• the high status – and pay – enjoyed by the faculty, both in the army at large and vis-à-vis 
the students; 
• the system whereby the academy itself served as a vehicle for selection – that is, not all 
those who graduated were taken into the general staff; 
• the preferred promotion given to graduates; and 
• the high social prestige enjoyed by the army in general, which meant that study at the 
academy was considered at least on a par with attendance at any civilian university.29 
 
The German Kriegsakademie embodied the "Jena" model of officer education.  The basic motto of 
the "Jena" model of officer education is, Foot argues, "Never Again" – referring to the 1806 Battle of 
Jena.  Foot argues that the idea of "never again" implies that: 
 
• unintended war should not occur;  
• defeat should not happen;  
• the military leadership should have access to strategic decisions; 
• military leadership and proper planning have to ensure success;  
• military forces have to be properly trained;  
• enemies have to be deterred through the robustness of the military forces; and 
• should deterrence fail, the capability to enforce their will through war should guarantee 
success.30 
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 Dupuy, TN, op. cit., p. 302.  
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 Van Creveld, M, The Training of Officers: From Military Professionalism to Irrelevance, op. cit., p. 101. 
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 Foot, P, op. cit., p. 13.  
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Foot argues that such a system of officer education works well in a stable strategic context, a 
legitimate political culture and a highly professional officer corps.  It is seen as an in-house option 
for military education.  The established assumption is that the military profession, or specific 
service, should be taught by its most talented officers – those fast-tracked, uniformed individuals 
who embody the professional attributes and personal virtues held to be most militarily valuable for 
the officer corps.  Participation in training and education is seen as essential for promotion, and 
being on the directing staff of the institutions of higher learning is itself evidence of a special set of 
career expectations.  The role of civilian academics, bureaucrats and policy-makers is minimised, 
although they still participate in exercises and lectures.  However, the weight of activity is military-
specific and inward-looking.  The quality of thought among students is mostly admired when it 
conforms to "staff solutions" or a set of answers drafted by, and for, the military.31  Consequently, 
the "Jena" model of officer education is rooted in professional military education and training (ein 
berufsgebildetes Offizierkorps) provided by the military itself.  
 
A number of factors led to the development of education in armed forces in the 20th century.  The 
globalisation of conflict and technology was an important driver.  Van Creveld in particular argues 
that the education of military professionals since 1945 was dominated by the significant expansion 
of civilian higher education and the shifting definition of war.  A number of considerations underpin 
the upsurge in higher education in armed forces since 1945.  The first of these was the adoption by 
most armed forces of an “up or out” personnel management system.  Increasingly officers were 
expected to retire at a relatively young age.  Most of them experienced difficulty in securing second 
careers.  Foot, for example, pointed out that  
 
… as marriages happened, children appear and years seem to pass more rapidly, 
attention shifts marginally to what time spent in the military will produce by way of 
preparations for the next stage of an individual's career, beginning roughly any time 
from ages 30 to 50.32   
 
Consequently officers increasingly began to look for pathways to prepare themselves for second 
careers while they were still serving in the armed forces.  A recognisable academic qualification 
provided the most direct and obvious route into a second career.33   
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The post-Second World War introduction of nuclear weapons and the arrival of the age of 
deterrence led to a de-militarisation of war in which the military dimensions of armed conflict were 
de-emphasised in favour of the non-military dimensions.  An understanding of the wider security 
ramifications and implications of the use of force became necessary.34  The fear that the use of 
conventional weapons could lead to or escalate into a nuclear war brought to the fore a limitation 
on the use of force in a conventional manner.  This was one of the contributing factors in the rise of 
low-intensity conflicts – the so-called wars of national liberation.  The political-strategic emphasis 
and nature of these conflicts led to the re-invention of a “new” military strategic school of thought: 
counter-insurgency.  In most theories about revolutionary wars and counter-insurgency, the military 
dimensions of conflict are de-emphasised in favour of the political, economic, and psychological 
dimensions of the struggle.35   
 
The rise of irregular warfare was accompanied by an increasing emphasis, first, on defence and, 
later, on the security of the state.  Ministries of Defence replaced Ministries of War while defence 
policies and later security policies replaced military policies.  The role of armed forces was 
extended to peacetime.  The introduction of the notion of security presupposed an extension of 
defence and military-related matters to other spheres of society.  Within the framework of the Cold 
War, almost every conceivable aspect of human existence was securitised.  The role of academic 
education and the concomitant need to conceptualise these matters was almost self-evident.   
 
Van Creveld argues that the post-1945 geo-strategic situation necessitated that armed forces all 
over the world retained disproportionally large numbers of middle-ranking officers in service.  These 
officers constituted a pool of experience for an accelerated mobilisation process in case war broke 
out.  In the strategic context of the Cold War, such an eventuality was always a possibility.  Over 
time, the numbers of these officers rose to a point were it became a serious problem for armed 
forces.  Questions were being raised about how to keep officers busy in a constructive manner.  
Higher education as a solution to these and other problems seemed to be distinctly economic.  
Officers who studied, Van Creveld argued, required neither units to command nor equipment to run 
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down.  Sending officers to study was cheaper than almost anything else they could be made to 
do.36    
 
The limitations of the "Jena" model of military education – professional military education – became 
increasingly more evident during the latter stages of the Cold War.  In the new geo-strategic and 
geo-political environments, what militaries did could not to be divorced from the social, educational, 
economic and political contexts.  The need to expose the officer corps to a wider agenda of security 
thought became obvious during the 1980s.  It brought the need for graduate and post-graduate 
education in defence- and security-related matters to the fore.37  This need was accompanied by a 
growth in military bureaucracy and the necessity for officers to understand their role as modern civil 
servants.  Modernisation and globalisation reiterated the necessity and the need for increasingly 
refined expertise and education.  Militaries, however, lagged in their appreciation of these 
developments' pertinence to the military profession.  Reddel argues that this is due to arguments 
about “… the relative virtues of brain and brawn, about the value of education over training, and 
about the need for independent decision-makers vs disciplined subordinates”.38   
 
To conclude, the Prussian military educational system served as the example for the development 
of military education in Europe in the 19th century.  The German successes in a number of 
19th century wars ensured the assimilation of the idea of professional military education by most 
armed forces.  Since 1945 education has been an established feature of the military systems of 
most countries of the world.  However, political, social, cultural, technological, and other forces 
have influenced officer formation from the time that systematic preparation originated in 17th and 
18th century Europe to the present day.  The rate of advance in professionalising the armed forces 
in different countries depended on the degree to which national security was threatened or was 
thought to be threatened.39  This is an extremely important notion, since it emphasises the intimate 
relationship between military professionalism and the accompanied need for education on the one 
hand, and a particular country's approach to the understanding and management of its own 
security on the other hand.  With the widening of the security agenda in the wake of the Cold War – 
emphasising the non-military dimensions of security – military professionalism, like military security, 
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moved to the periphery of the agenda.  Academic education likewise became more prominent than 
professional military education and training in the schooling of armed forces. 
2.3 MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM AND THE NEED FOR EDUCATION 
 
A better understanding of the military profession and its educational needs necessitates conceptual 
comprehension of the idea of a profession as well as the link between military professionalism and 
the need for education. 
2.3.1 Defining the military as a profession 
 
Dickenson and Joyce40 contend that modern societies view the idea of professionalism in a positive 
light.  Defining people, practices and concepts as being professional, Dickenson and Joyce pointed 
out, suggest that they are considered as moral, upright and virtuous.  The use of the word 
professional, as in "professional status", ”professional standards", and "professional courtesy", 
provides good examples.  The Oxford Paperback Dictionary defines a profession inter alia as an 
occupation that "… involves knowledge and training in a branch of advanced learning".41  The 
Verklarende Handwoordeboek van die Afrikaanse Taal42 defines “professie” (profession) inter alia 
as "… ‘n beroep – veral gebruik vir werk van intellektuele aard."43  Under the entry "professional" in 
most thesauri, sub-lists are listed under the titles "proficient", "capable", "expert", “specialist”, 
“authority” and "scholastic."  The Canadian Department of Defence defines a profession as  
 
… an exclusive group of people who possess and apply a systematically acquired body 
of knowledge derived from extensive research, education, training and experience.  
Members of a profession have a special responsibility to fulfil their function competently 
and objectively for the benefit of society.  Professionals are governed by a code of 
ethics that establishes standards of conduct while defining and regulating their work. 
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This code of ethics is enforced by the members themselves and contains values that 
are widely accepted as legitimate by society at large.44 [emphasis added]   
 
The Canadian perspective on this matter is particularly important since the Canadian armed forces 
went through a rigorous process of professionalisation since the early 1990s.45   
 
Downes identifies eight “enduring characteristics” that distinguish professions from other 
occupational groups.  She pointed out that: 
 
• the profession maintains a monopolistic control over a body of defined theoretical 
knowledge and the practical abilities that accompany such knowledge; 
• aspirants to the profession must undertake intensive, lengthy, formal and practical 
education and training; on completion of which, their performance, learned 
competencies and skills are assessed by qualified practitioners through formal 
examinations, which lead to the award of a professionally- and societally-recognised 
qualification; 
• the activities of the profession are located areas of vital concern to humankind; 
• the relationship between the profession and society, between practitioner and client, is 
based upon altruistic service by the former to the latter; 
• the profession retains a considerable degree of autonomy over matters such as 
recruitment and training practices, the behaviour expected of its members, and the 
maintenance of professional standards; 
• the profession is organised into a form of community, with an occupational 
consciousness expressed often through a professional association; 
• the profession is seen as a full-time, permanent career-oriented form of occupation; and 
• society sanctions the activities of the profession as morally praise-worthy and accords to 
the professions a status of high esteem, respect, confidence, prestige and, not 
infrequently, privilege.46 
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If the military profession is analysed by means of the criteria laid down for professions, it is clear 
that "… it possesses to the greatest degree the characteristics usually cited for a profession.”47  
There is no reason to believe that the military is not a profession in the true sense of the word.  
However, definitions vary as to what constitutes modern military professionalism.  It is believed, 
though, that every individual soldier or armed force would like to view itself as being professional, if 
only for the positive view of professionalism in society.  For Foster, Edmunds and Cottey, 
professional soldiers are those who  
 
… accept their role is to fulfil the demands of the (civilian) government of the state 
(rather than themselves engaging in domestic politics or seeking to determine the 
overall direction of defence policy), who focus on conducting their professional 
military activities in an effective and efficient manner and whose organisation and 
internal structures reflect these twin assumptions.48   
 
Sarkesian and Connor specifically argue that, firstly, the military profession has a defined area of 
competence based on expert knowledge and, secondly, there is a system of continuing education 
designed to maintain professional competence.49 
   
Thus, Huntington explains: “The modern officer corps is a professional body and the modern 
military officer a professional man”.50  The military professional, he pointed out,  is an expert with 
specialised knowledge and skill in a significant field of human endeavour.  The military professional 
is furthermore a responsible expert, working in a social context and performing a service that is 
essential to the functioning of society.  The military professional is, lastly, a member of a corporate 
group, who shares a unique social responsibility and who considers himself apart from other groups 
or members of society.  A distinct sphere of military competence exists, which is common to most 
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officers and which distinguishes them from civilians.51  Huntington argues that the military body of 
knowledge is ingrained in Harold Lasswell’s phrase “… the management of violence”52 or as 
Hackett explains "… the ordered application of force."53  From the idea of the management of 
violence flows the function and duties of the military officer.  This, Huntington explains, is the 
direction, operation, and control of a human organisation whose primary function is the application 
of violence.  Huntington specifically emphasises that the expertise of the officer is the management 
of violence, not the application thereof. 54 
 
Huntington is of the opinion that the military function requires a level of expertise that can only be 
acquired through considerable “training and experience”.  His use of the word training draws 
specific attention.  He outlines and explains the context within which the term is used by arguing 
that the expertise of the officer is neither a craft – which is primarily mechanical – nor is it an art – 
which requires unique and non-transferable talent.  Rather, it is in his view “… an extraordinary 
complex intellectual skill requiring comprehensive study and training” [emphasis added].55  
Huntington’s definition of the expertise of the military profession can be criticised as being very 
narrow, focusing only on the warfighting role of military forces.  There is, however, no reason to 
question his idea that the expertise of the profession is of an intellectual nature and that it can only 
be acquired through in-depth and prolonged study and training.  This need, according to 
Huntington, is rooted, firstly, in the limited opportunity of the officer to acquire his expertise through 
practical experience and, secondly, in the extreme complexity of military expertise.56  
 
Writing after the publication of Huntington’s work, Janowitz simply took for granted that the military 
is a profession marked by expert skill acquired over time.57  He distinguishes between two types of 
military professionals: firstly, the “absolutists”: those members of the military who think in terms of 
the traditional conceptions of warfighting and military victory on the battlefield, and secondly, the 
“pragmatists”: members of the military concerned with the measured application of military force 
and its political consequences, also in situations short of war.58  He argues that the latter downplay 
their role as “heroic warriors” in pursuit of absolute military victory to emphasise their roles as 
pragmatic managers of force necessary to achieve political settlements and to maintain viable 
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international relations.  The outcome of the interplay between these two schools of thought is a 
convergence of the civilian and military organisation in what Janowitz calls a constabulary force; the 
interpenetration of the civilian and the military resources of the state in preparing for and dealing 
with complex emergencies.59  It becomes appropriate to speak of the “civilianisation” of the military 
profession.60 Consequently, the boundaries between the military and the political spheres are 
blurred by the changing nature of war.  This, Janowitz maintains, will eventually “politicise” military 
officers and challenge the idea of civilian supremacy.  How should professional militaries deal with 
this challenge?  Janowitz argues that educational programmes that link professional knowledge to 
national and trans-national purposes provide the only way in which the commitment of professional 
soldiers to civilian control can be strengthened.61 
 
Burk62 is of the opinion that the armed forces’ claim to expert military knowledge is a foundation of 
its professional identity.  He argues that security is no longer only a function of military strength.  
The role of the military and thus its professional knowledge is widening.  The military professional is 
still centrally concerned with the management of violence between armed forces in a situation of 
war.  The role and function of military forces were, however, expanded in the era after the Second 
World War to the management of defence and, after the Cold War, the management of peace.63  In 
the management of defence the aim is to avoid the outbreak of general war through a strategy of 
deterrence.  The military’s management of peace – not alone, but with others – aims at limiting 
armed conflict and using the absolute minimum of force to promote a political settlement of 
differences, maintain respect for human rights, and provide humanitarian relief.  The challenge is 
that the military does not have the same abstract knowledge about how to deter war and conduct 
humanitarian missions that it has for waging war.  In addition, the military does not and cannot 
pretend to possess a monopoly of expert knowledge relevant for success in the management of 
defence and peace.  These roles require the military profession to co-operate and compete with 
other professions to be successful in its missions.64   
 
The ideas of Huntington, Janowitz and Burk – representing only three particular views – give a 
clear demarcation of the nature of the military profession in general and its body of knowledge in 
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particular.  Yet it is clear that the military body of knowledge is dynamic in nature having, in Burk’s 
opinion, expanded from the management of violence to the management of defence to the 
management of peace.  Two remarks are necessary in this regard.  Firstly, the dynamic nature of 
the military body of knowledge by implication necessitates a higher order understanding thereof.  
This is particularly true if the military (officer corps) wants to be an active partner in the expansion 
of the military body of knowledge through research and other means.  The higher order 
understanding and the expansion of the military body of knowledge can only be attained through 
prolonged academic study.  Secondly, the nature of future military endeavours – from warfighting to 
humanitarian missions – will necessitate greater cognitive flexibility from officers than in the past 
when the emphasis was primarily on warfighting in which training was deemed to be adequate 
preparation.  
 
It is interesting to note how the balance and interaction between the need for the military to prepare 
itself for warfighting and the need for the military to prepare for so-called peace missions have led 
to a debate about the nature of the modern officer corps.  Academics such as Moskos have gone 
so far as to refer to the post-modern nature of the officer corps.  Academics have in particular 
highlighted the way in which the military profession has become more vocational than institutional 
by nature.  The debates about the military in this regard are discussed in Chapter 3. 
2.3.2 The fundamental nature of the military profession 
 
Two fundamental considerations shape military professionalism and its required expertise.  Indeed, 
any serious examination or analysis of military organisations and the employment of military 
force(s) is rooted in these two assumptions.  These considerations are not always very explicit, but 
their influence is nonetheless exceptional.  These two characteristics distinguish the military 
profession from other professions and from society in general.   
 
The first of these fundamental considerations may be politically unpopular but fundamental to the 
existence of force and the use thereof.  Militaries are created as instruments of war and should at 
all times prepare themselves realistically for that role.  They need to prepare to apply force 
whenever they are called upon to do so.  In short, the reason d’être of the military is to fight and win 
wars.  Throughout modern history the general characteristics of the military profession and its body 
of knowledge have been shaped by this primary purpose of the military.  What has changed over 
time is the concept of what constitutes war, of the successful use of armed force(s), and of the 
military’s relationship with society.  It is this fundamental nature of military force that Gray has in 
33 
 
mind when he warns that it is possible to shift the decent, liberal and scholarly focus on strategy 
and security too far from the battlefield.65  The existence of militaries to fight and to win wars gave 
rise to a characteristic that is very unique to the military profession: the military professional, unlike 
other professionals, should prepare and be inclined to give his or her life if necessary to achieve 
professional goals.  This consideration underpins the specific culture and ethos of the military 
profession, the natural inclination of the military profession towards the practical dimensions of 
soldiering, as well as the natural tension between military commanders, politicians, military staff 
officers and military theorists.66 
 
The second fundamental consideration about military organisations and power is the driving 
principle that the military have to serve society.  In a democratic society, military power should at all 
times be employed rationally, for a public purpose and with public consent.67  Without this 
imperative the military organisation and the use of military power become an end in itself and a self-
destructive instrument of power.  This is the essential difference between violence and the use of 
military force.  Reynolds68 describes this notion in philosophical terms when he argues that 
"… violence is either evil or irrational as a means of achieving political ends … when it escapes 
control and becomes indiscriminate."  Consequently, the state is not only the controlling authority of 
armed force; it also provides armed forces with a rationale for existence.  Clausewitz refers to this 
fundamental truth as the logic of war.69  In short, the state provides the environment within which 
the military profession must function: 
 
An army is an emanation of the nation it serves, reflecting social, political, and 
technological foundations.  To study an army is to gain insights into the nation it serves 
because a nation and its army are interdependent.  An army is not a mirror image of the 
nation, nor a microcosm – the nation writ small; it is in organization, purposes, attitudes, 
and behavior conditioned by the sustaining state.70  
 
Thus the profession of arms should at all times be examined in the context of the political, 
economic and societal system from which it evolves.  The values, principles and character of the 
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political system within a country serve as the mould for the universal principles of military 
professionalism within a particular country.  The fundamental truth is that, unlike other professions, 
the military profession has only one client: the state. 
 
The role of militaries as instruments of war in service of society demarcates the parameters and 
primary focus of professional military expertise and the challenge of education in armed forces.  In 
the modern era, the military profession is confronted by a variety of challenges.  One of the most 
critical of these challenges is the rising scepticism from the polity regarding issues of national 
security.71  In a situation where there is a clearly defined (external) threat, the armed forces have a 
clear purpose that reinforces and expands the notion of a military profession committed to the 
service of a country.  In a situation where the military is faced with a variety of complex and difficult 
issues arising from the domestic and international environments, that sense of purpose falls by the 
wayside.  In such a situation, the military serves as a reservoir of national skills and should provide 
the intellectual skills for a variety of ill-defined threats and challenges.72  Thus, the fog of peace – to 
explain this challenge in Clausewitzian terms – could well be much more demanding to the military 
profession than the reality of armed conflict.  
 
The real challenge is that the importance of higher education, the reality of second careers and 
military-social issues have become important parts of military professionalism.73  Notwithstanding 
the fundamental nature of military forces, fighting skills are not enough for the military professional 
to respond to the new challenges the military as a profession is facing.  The warfighting ability of 
armed forces will not be enough to ensure the continuing relevance of military power in the 
contemporary era.  To limit military professional competence to fighting skills will deny the military 
professional the ability to understand, analyse and respond to the contemporary conflict and 
security environment.  It is an environment that is becoming more complex by the day and which is 
shaped by a variety of non-military considerations.   
 
To conclude, historians, sociologists, political scientists and sometimes even military practitioners 
openly debate the question of what the constituent elements of a profession are.  There seems, 
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though, to be general agreement among academics and theorists that expertise – a body of 
theoretical and practical knowledge and skills – is one of the defining characteristics of a 
profession, including the military profession.  It can, thus, be argued that military professionalism is 
the systematic creation of a class of people for whom the management of violence, deterrence and 
peace is a profession, and who pursue general and sub-specialisations in the art and science of 
conflict and peace management.  The term military profession applies primarily to the officer corps 
of the armed forces as a collective.  It is mostly the officer corps that interacts with civilian groups 
and institutions, shaping civil-military relations in a particular country.  It is also the officer corps that 
is accountable and responsible for military effectiveness and the institutional character of the 
military.  In the words of Caforio: “The officer corps has always been a vital component of the 
armed forces: it is their leadership, it possesses and imparts professional expertise, it determines 
the military mind set, and it upholds and revises the military ethic.”74  In short, it is the officer corps 
that ought to be educated.  
2.4 MILITARY TRAINING AND EDUCATION: UNDERSTANDING THE DIFFERENCE 
 
Military expertise has a body of defined theoretical knowledge and practical skills.  The difference 
and interaction between theoretical knowledge and practical skills is rooted in the interaction 
between action and reflection; and between experience on the one hand and training and education 
on the other.  To re-phrase this idea, the blueprint for the development of military leaders has three 
key ingredients: training, education, and experience.  Military experience – the application of 
knowledge and skills – is rooted in the military realities of the past.  Training – the development of 
military skills – is underpinned by the military realities of the present.  Education – the expansion of 
knowledge – prepares soldiers to deal with the military realities of the future.  (See Figure 2.1)  This 
means that officers need to be historically-minded in order to deal with present realities and 
challenges.  Yet, they have to deal with present realities in such a manner that they shape the 
future.  Radbruch75 consequently points out that a professional military educational system should 
be a dichotomy between ideal and reality, between theory and practice, and between present and 
past. 
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The “making of officers” – their training, education and experience – is rooted in military 
socialisation.76  Military socialisation aims at providing people within the military with the right 
values, norms and attitudes.  (See Figure 2.1)  Military socialisation is a higher order notion than 
military training and education since it encompasses much more than these two notions.  Military 
training and education, however, cannot be done without military socialisation.  Military socialisation 
ties the three considerations – experience, training and education – together and provides cohesion 
to the making of officers.  In considering military socialisation, it is important to keep in mind that the 
schooling of people in the military is not directed towards the provision of jobs or adventure.  The 
aim is to develop them into effective managers of organised force to ensure successful strategic 
effect.  If this is not done in a proper manner, people die.77   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure. 2.1 Military training, education and experience 
 
For militaries, it is important to understand the difference and tension between training and 
education because they have to cope with it.78  The military cannot afford to neglect either the 
training or education of its forces since each has its own importance underpinned by its own 
                                                
76
 Lawson, K, “Introduction: The Concepts of 'Training' and 'Education' in a Military Context”, In Stephens, MD 
(ed.), The Educating of Armies, St Martin's Press, New York, 1989, p. 4. 
77
 Kelley, JW, op. cit., p. 104.  
78
 It is necessary to have a pragmatic approach in understanding the difference.  The Commandant of the 
Irish Reserve Forces, Cmdt Frank McGoldrick, for example pointed out that it is easy to understand the 
difference if you ask someone whether he or she wants his/her daughter to be sexually trained or 
educated!  Conversation with McGoldbrick, Bucharest, Romania, 12 August 2003. 
Military training 
Present realities 
Skills 
Military education 
Future realities 
Knowledge 
Military experience 
Past realities 
Application 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Military socialisation                                                                                Military socialisation 
Norms, values and attitudes                                                      Norms, values and attitudes 
37 
 
domain.  It is after all possible to lose a war without losing a single battle.  This is the military world 
of tactics where the training of forces is decisive.  Becoming involved in dangerous conflicts in a 
war-torn continent like Africa because of bad strategic choices, can also be disastrous.  This is the 
world of strategy where education is essential.  Consequently, military training and education 
should receive an equal amount of attention, time and resources within militaries.  It is also 
important for militaries to understand that, though military training is the exclusive domain of the 
military, it is not necessarily the case with military and strategic education.  Since the Second World 
War, an increasing number of civilians have busied themselves with the study of strategic and 
military affairs.  Indeed, the most well known strategic experts and theorists in the world today are 
civilians.79  Their role is of critical importance in and for any democratic country and the education 
of its military.    
 
Militaries often experience difficulty in drawing a distinction between military education and training.  
Militaries in fact often approach the problem by ignoring the difference.  The underlying philosophy 
and the fundamental aims and objectives of education, to be precise, clash with those of the 
military in general and military training in particular.  Thus, there is an inherent tension between 
military training and education.  Mason delineates this tension: 
 
Inevitably, there are the seeds of tension when conformity and questioning are being 
taught side by side.  It should come as no surprise that military education can 
occasionally give rise to uneasiness within the military as a whole.  There are many 
apparent incompatible objectives: discipline and individuality, conformity and initiative, 
responding and innovating, determination and flexibility, imagination and objectivity, fire 
and dispassion.80        
 
Drawing a distinction between education and training is difficult because in everyday conversation, 
people often use the terms interchangeably.  The best way of understanding the difference 
between education and training is to focus on the three domains of learning: psychomotor or doing, 
cognitive or thinking and affective or feeling.  Training places the focus on the psychomotor domain 
of learning.  In the military domain, that means that training is required to provide soldiers with the 
mental and physical skills and discipline required to be good at fighting and to succeed in the face 
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of great danger, uncertainty and confusion on the battlefield and in situations of conflict.81  In the 
realm of peace missions, the skills required from individual peacekeepers are also rooted in 
training.  Training that is done in the cognitive domain is generally at the knowledge level and the 
lower part of the comprehension level.  Education, on the other hand, teaches a minimum of 
psychomotor skills, but instead concentrates on the higher cognitive levels of comprehension and 
above.  Affective learning – the inculcation of values, norms and attitudes – is a product of both 
training and education.82  Thus, the environment within which military education takes place at 
institutions of higher learning should promote military values and norms.83  It is important though, 
not to confuse the need for military socialisation and a military regimental influence at military 
academic institutions with military domination of the academic curricula of such institutions.   
2.4.1 Military training: Teaching officers what to think 
 
Training is often associated with "narrow" forms of learning as the direct opposite of "broad" forms 
of learning which are regarded as education.  This does not degrade learning in the training milieu 
to the level of irrelevance.  The "narrowness" of training is a description of its limited range of 
applications.  What is learned during training is specific to a given type of situation and there is little 
cognitive understanding involved.84  (See Table 2.1)  In the military, training is rooted in the 
disciplined execution of drills – as in weapon, fighting and other drills – as well as standard 
operational procedures.85  Criterion objectives are most appropriate for training.  Normally these 
objectives require that under a given set of conditions a student will exhibit a specific behaviour to a 
certain predetermined level of standard.86  The trained response to orders is immediate and 
precise, and instructions are followed implicitly.87  A trained man, Moorcraft88 points out, does what 
he is told to do.  Training does not teach the officer "how to think" but rather "what to think".89  Thus, 
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good training produces officers who will respond instinctively in anticipated, recognisable 
circumstances in a manner circumscribed by their training. 
 
Training is, therefore, a closed system since the trained individual is easily recognised as knowing 
the "right answers", and doing things the "approved way", or arriving at the "right solution".  The 
results of each trained individual in every situation can be expected to look the same.90  There are 
correct and incorrect ways of doing things and the distinction between right and wrong is clearly 
defined.  Training allows little room for variation in movements, or procedures.91  In military training, 
in particular, the need to be functionally relevant and job-specific dominates.  Or, as Kelley92 
explains, training creates competence in using machines or tools required for tasks.  Training 
focuses on matters that are known.  It tends to be group-orientated, requiring the individual to 
subject his personal identity, needs and wants to that of the group.  The emphasis is on teamwork 
and immediate, co-ordinated obedience to externally imposed directives.  Military training methods 
usually involve verbal instruction and demonstration93 with an emphasis on conformity, constraint 
and order to ensure that "… fear is instilled, aggression evoked, and disorder prevented.”94  
 
Training, according to Bashista,95 refers to technical and tactical competence of military leaders on 
all levels.  Training may also be used to inculcate a particular institutional culture or ethos.  One 
example in this regard is the efforts from most armed forces in the world today to use their training 
resources as a tool for the cultivation of Auftragstaktik.  Auftragstaktik – mission tactics – is 
generally considered one of the building blocks of the successful pre-1945 German field army.  It 
emphasises a culture of decentralised command in armed forces and is considered an 
indispensable organising and operational element in modern armed forces, especially on lower 
command levels.96  
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Auftragstaktik requires that the training of officers be well grounded in the workings of their own 
technical branch’s capabilities as well as the capabilities of other branches.97  Officers need to 
understand the application of all battlefield operating systems and should be able to synchronise all 
available combat multipliers.  Training in armed forces can only be effective if it focuses on 
“combined arms” warfare.98  The training of military personnel, therefore, goes beyond training in 
the specifics of their particular tasks or jobs.  Training in the co-ordination of those specific tasks as 
part of a larger unit or formation is also necessary.99   
 
Military training should be done in a way that highlights the importance of obedience, independence 
of action and self-esteem.  Obedience in this context refers to the importance of strict adherence to 
the intention of the higher commander, expressed in terms of purpose (what ought to be done) and 
end-state (what it will look like once it has been done).  Within the context of the higher 
commander’s intention, the subordinate should be allowed to exploit the initiative through 
independence of action.  Training should focus on the development of the self-confidence and self-
esteem of all subordinate leaders.  Without self-esteem there will be no initiative on the part of the 
individual, and therefore no independent action.  Thus, military training has to be done in such a 
manner that subordinates are not made to see it as a failure if they exploit initiative and are not 
successful.100 
 
Military training is a continuous process that not only includes the learning or acquisition of initial 
skills, knowledge, attitudes and understanding necessary for the performance of tasks and roles, 
but also frequent rehearsals and practice.  The daily life of soldiers, airmen and sailors is itself a 
process of training in which they simultaneously do their job and learn to improve their 
performance.  There is frequent change and development in doctrine, procedures, technology and 
roles.  Military training thus involves not only frequent retraining, but also periodic rehearsals and 
exercises.101  Periodic military exercises – manoeuvres, as it is called in some countries – are a 
well-established feature of the training of armed forces in combined arms warfare. 
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An important characteristic of particularly military training, Lawson102 argues, is that it does not 
conceptually require that the ends it serve to be morally good, though it may be good.  The classic 
example of this particular idea, Lawson points out, is that of weapons training: "… the purpose of all 
weapons training is to kill the enemy".  In short, it is not required of trainers to make moral 
judgements about the worthwhileness of the ends which they serve.  The trainer can therefore be 
regarded as a technician judging the effectiveness of the training he provides and not the purpose it 
serves.  Though, as an individual he may have doubts about the moral justification of the task in 
which he is engaged. 
2.4.2 Military education: Teaching officers how to think 
 
In the education of armed forces, a distinction is made between academic education and 
professional military education.  For the purposes of this discussion, though, the emphasis is on an 
understanding of education as a concept in a military context.  Education, Micewshi103 argues, 
should be understood within the framework of three considerations: 
 
• the fulfilment of an occupational qualification; 
• a continuous and in itself never-ending process by which an individual develops 
mentally and finds autonomous realisation; and 
• the acquisition of knowledge characteristic of a certain culture or society. 
 
Elements of all three considerations are contained in the idea of military education.  Military 
education prepares military members for higher rank and responsibility.  In that sense, education is 
done for the fulfilment of occupational qualifications.  People in the military, however, also study for 
reasons of personal growth and the acquisition of professional knowledge of the military culture and 
society.  
 
In education, the focus is on cognitive objectives written at the appropriate level of learning – 
knowledge, comprehension, application, analysis, synthesis, or evaluation – to develop the 
individual's ability to think.104  Foster explains that thinking requires the higher order intellectual 
skills of analysis (dissecting and illuminating concepts), synthesis (combining concepts and 
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generating new ones) and evaluation (establishing criteria and making judgements).105  Education, 
thus, instils the mental flexibility to look beyond the horizon, to anticipate and to shape the future. 
As Moorcraft explains, educating soldiers produces a sharp paradox: officers need to understand 
"… the value of what they may have to destroy".106   
 
Education is an open process in which learning is continuous with no cap or ceiling on how well 
individuals may be prepared to handle new responsibilities.  Right answers and right ways of doing 
things often do not exist in education – only better ones or worse.107  Downes emphasises that the 
underlying philosophy in education supports reflection, reasoning and the communication of ideas 
and thought in both written and verbal format.108  Unlike training where the emphasis is on the 
training of the group, education focuses on individual and personal intellectual growth.  In 
education, it is possible for the individual to shift his development according to current interests and 
aspirations.109  Much of what is studied may often have little functional relevance to the final 
employment pursuit taken up by the individual. Pocklington110 argues that education can be 
distinguished from functional training in that the spectrum of knowledge that is addressed during 
education is applicable to all aspects and spheres of the profession of arms.  Consequently, 
education, for the bigger part, relates to those aspects of military knowledge that has applicability in 
all the different services of the armed forces. 
 
An understanding of the intimate link between education and experience is important.  (See Table 
2.1)  Military experience – a chest full of medal ribbons or a battle scar or two – is highly respected 
in the military as a sign of competence.  This, of course, is not necessarily the whole truth.  There is 
the much quoted example of Frederick the Great in this regard.  He pointed out that his mule 
carried a pack on several campaigns, but has no better understanding of war because of that.111  
One is also reminded of Bismarck's view of "… fools say they learn by experience – I prefer to learn 
by other people's experience".112  Lambert is of the opinion that the lack of practical experience is 
the single greatest driver of the need for military education.  He argues that to learn from the 
                                                
105
 Foster, GD, op. cit., p. 111.  
106
 Moorcraft, PL, op. cit., p. 29.  
107
 Kline, JA, op. cit., p. 1. 
108
 Downes, C, Special Trust and Confidence: The Making of an Officer, op. cit., p. 135.  
109
 Evans, RM, "Military Curriculum Development", Educational Leadership, November 1981, p. 121. 
110
 Pocklington, JH, op. cit. 
111
 Drew, DM, "Educating Air Force Officers: Observations After 20 Years at Air University", op. cit., p. 44.  
112
 Liddell Hart, BH, Why Don't We Learn from History? George Allen and Unwin, London, 1946, p. 10. 
43 
 
experiences of others in the same profession is the only substitute for own experience.113  In the 
case of training, experience provides maturity of judgement.  Education, however, is the provision 
of filtered or analysed experience to broaden an individual's own experience and judgement.  It 
allows individuals to take part in the experiences of others at different times and in far-off places.  
Experience also serves as an important building block for the development of new theory and 
doctrine that may serve as guidance for future action.  Thus, the analysis of experience is of critical 
importance for the education of members of the military.  Reasoned analysis of experience 
develops the ability to think broadly, deeply and critically.114  This, though, is not something that is 
always encouraged in the military.115 
 
Table. 2.1 Summary of the differences between military training and education 
Military training Military education 
Process Process 
Closed process Open process 
Group focus Individual or personal focus 
Disciplined regimental environment Free-thinking environment 
Focus on conformity, constraint and order 
 
Focus on independence, reasoning and 
communication 
Exclusive military domain and focus Integrated military and civilian domain and 
focus 
Done in relative short periods of time Done over protracted periods of time 
Predetermined level of standard No cap or ceiling on how well a student 
may do 
  
Content Content 
Criterion objectives Cognitive objectives 
Focus on action, psychomotor and doing Focus on reflection, cognitive and thinking 
Focus on present realities and the known Focus on future realities and the unknown 
Technical and tactical nature Managerial and strategic nature 
  
Outcome Outcome 
Right or wrong answers Better or worse answers 
Narrow learning: functional relevant and 
job-specific 
Broad learning: general application 
Practical skills Theoretical knowledge 
What to think How to think 
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Within the context of this argument, the reason for the widespread use of military history – the 
academic study of military experiences – as a tool for the education of officers is obvious.116  Prof 
Dennis Showalter recently pointed out that indeed all officers need to be military historians, 
especially those of general rank.  He argued that a historical mind is a well-travelled mind and a 
well-travelled mind is an educated mind.117  Enough, however, has been written about the “… use 
and abuse of military history”.118  One important argument by Howard on the use of military history, 
though, needs to be emphasised.  Howard argues that there are three guidelines that the militaries 
should keep in mind in the “use and abuse” of military history for the education of officers.  Military 
history needs to be studied in width (the way warfare has developed over time), in depth (thorough 
analysis of particular campaigns), and in context (understanding the broader societal environment 
of conflict).119 
2.4.3 Military training and education: The military predisposition 
 
Lawson120 explains that military organisations are unique in that their normal daily preoccupations, 
for much of the time, are focused on training and preparation for action.  Reflection, however, is not 
something that is done on a daily basis.  There are two historical impulses, Reddel argues, that 
push the preparation of military forces towards training with its emphasis on discipline and the 
destructive capabilities of military forces to the detriment of education.  Firstly there is the need of 
military personnel, outlined earlier in this discussion, to be willing to sacrifice life itself for a higher 
cause.  Reddel calls this notion the sine qua non of the military profession.  There is no way, 
Reddel argues, that civilian or military leaders, in either a democracy or autocracy, will compromise 
on this point.121  It is the obligation of the officer, Mason122 argues, to follow orders in the face of an 
enemy and to do his duty despite the risk of death and injury.  It is this operational liability, with the 
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possibility of self-sacrifice accepted by every soldier, which marks the armed forces as being 
essentially different from the rest of society and also predisposes the military towards the training 
environment.  A distinction should however be made between the willingness of the military 
profession to pay the highest price and the the extent to which society at large will accept such 
sacrifice.  High casualties, in situations where the interests of a country are not clearly at stake, are 
increasingly politically unacceptable.123 
 
Secondly, there is a need for military forces to have not only the most advanced technology 
available, but also to be able to optimise its use.  It may be true that war, as George Clemenceau 
remarked, is too important to be left to the generals.  But, the military is primarily responsible for the 
physical conduct of war.  The idea of jus ad bellum124 lies primarily in the sphere of international 
relations and as such is the responsibility of politicians.  Politicians, militaries and societies in 
general consider it unprofessional for soldiers to question in public the reasons behind the use of 
force.  The principle of jus in bello125, however, is rooted in the conduct of war and the role of the 
military in war itself.  Militaries are almost legally responsible to focus on the conduct of war and the 
skills that are required to do that well!126  Soldiers, therefore, see themselves as real-world 
decision-makers who act, not as scholars who ponder127 or politicians who fudge.128  Consequently, 
militaries prefer to train rather than to educate.  This leaves a question concerning the need for 
education in armed forces. 
2.5  WHY MILITARY EDUCATION?  THE NEED FOR EDUCATED ARMED FORCES 
 
The discussion on the need for education in armed forces since 1945 demarcates a number of geo-
strategic and other reasons for the prominence of education within militaries during the Cold War 
era.  This discussion, however, aims at outlining philosophical and theoretical reasons why 
militaries in particular need to be educated.  Gray’s seventeen dimensions of strategy served as a 
framework for the purposes of the discussion.129  The underlying assumption – pointed out earlier in 
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the discussion – is that the military has to produce its own strategic thinkers if it wishes to be 
effective in the strategic realm.  Proficiency in each of the dimensions of strategy contributes to 
overall strategic effectiveness.  Consequently it may be argued that each of these dimensions 
provides a reason why strategists in general and officers in particular need to be educated.   
 
Gray's seventeen dimensions of strategy are clustered into three categories.130  The first category, 
People and Politics, includes 1) people 2) society 3) culture 4) politics and 5) ethics.  The second 
category, Preparation for War, comprises 6) economics and logistics 7) defence organisation 
8) military administration 9) information and intelligence 10) strategic theory and doctrine and 
11) technology.  The last category, War Proper, consists of 12) military operations 13) command 
14) geography 15) friction 16) the adversary and 17) time.  In comparing the different categories, an 
interesting progression is detected – at least from a military perspective.  (See Figure 2.3)  The first 
category is almost on the periphery of the military world.  The focus is on those particular issues 
considered to be part of security.  The second category falls clearly within the realm of defence.  
The emphasis in this category is on those issues usually considered to be part of the defence 
establishment of a country.  The third category is clearly at the centre of all military activities and 
emphasises those issues that are related to the military's primary role – warfighting. 
 
 
Figure. 2.2 Security, defence and military knowledge 
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2.5.1 Security thinking: Comprehension of the Clausewitzian trinity – armed forces, 
people and politics 
 
Education underpins the need for military forces to be prepared at all times and to have the ability 
to adapt to changing strategic and operational environments.  Consequently Hauser, Orndorff and 
Rawls argue that militaries need to study the use of force in the context of the social, political, 
economic, technological and moral factors that influence military institutions and operations.131  In 
this particular argument, the ability to cope with the ever-present threat of conflict and the need to 
minimise the likelihood and severity of international violence forms the bedrock of the need for 
strategic and military knowledge.  With the acceptance of war and violence as constant features of 
the international system, this outlook represents a very realistic view on the need for education and 
knowledge on strategic and military affairs.  Contemplation of these influences is based on horizons 
and perspectives not bound by military considerations, and encompass the view that political, 
psychological, social and economic factors are an integral part of the use or threat to use force.  
The alternative to this intellectual understanding of military affairs is a military isolated from society 
and detached from the realities of the international security landscape.132  This intellectual 
sophistication and development cannot be provided by the military system in any other way than 
through academic studies.  The intellectual expertise and maturity acquired through prolonged 
academic studies is the only vehicle providing the understanding and sensitivity necessary to deal 
with the complex security landscape.  Keeping in mind that education is something that the military 
cannot do on its own, Sarkesian et al. argue that education offers a channel for mutual beneficial 
interaction between the military and the broader society and between the military and the academic 
community in particular.  In the long term, this interaction benefits both the military and society.  In 
particular, it helps breaking down rigid stereotypes in broad society, the academic and the military 
worlds.133  
 
The strategic culture of a nation has a decisive influence on the development of successful 
strategic courses of action – ways to optimise the use of a nation’s resources to ensure its own 
security.  Gray emphasis that “(n)o one and no institution can operate ‘beyond culture’”134 and 
“… culture is as culture does”.135  Strategic culture not only shapes a country’s attitude towards the 
military instrument of power, it also affects decisions about its employment.  Strategic culture, 
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defined as “… the persisting socially transmitted ideas, attitudes, traditions, habits of mind, and 
preferred methods of operation that are more or less specific to a particular geographically-based 
security community that has had a unique historical experience,”136 is the product of the interplay 
between historical experience, geography and political tradition.137  An individual can only become 
historically-minded by means of extensive academic study, thereby developing an in-depth 
understanding of geo-political matters. 
 
Military power will always have a crucial role to play in the security of states and the management 
of its defence – which is not necessarily a warfighting role.  The role of the military from this 
perspective is seen as being constructive – to contribute to peace and security within societies – 
and not as a replacement for peace and security.  The military and strategic knowledge that flows 
from this emphasises the use of military power for the prevention and ending of conflict in the 
international system.  This view of military and strategic affairs is rooted in the quest for knowledge 
on how military power could be used in a positive and responsible manner.  In the 1980s and 
1990s, this line of thought was associated with the peace studies school of thought.  Ideas, such as 
non-offensive defence and non-threatening defence that rose to prominence in Europe and 
elsewhere – also in South Africa – emanate from this school of thought.  These ideas represent an 
inherently idealistic outlook on the need for knowledge on military and strategic affairs.  In view of 
the nature of South African security thinking, this argument alone should feature very prominently in 
an educated SANDF’s need for military and strategic knowledge.138 
 
This more positive role of military force in the security of states is related to the kind of advice that 
militaries provide to governments.  There seems to be a rising need for enhanced military advice to 
governments.  Governments expect militaries to provide better and more imaginative strategic and 
policy alternatives.  This can only be done if militaries have the cognitive flexibility to move beyond 
the traditional paradigm of military advice.  Military and strategic education is the key in this respect.  
Taylor and Bletz describe the traditional paradigm for military advice: 
 
In the past, military professionals have tended to view pessimistically threats to national 
security (the 'worst case syndrome'), to report optimistically on military capabilities to 
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get the job done (the 'can do syndrome'), and to show progress toward achieving 
objectives by whatever measures their civilian masters establish.139 
 
The calibre of advice that military leaders provide should at all times reflect an understanding that 
knowledge and ideas, and the ability to generate them, are more important than weapons, 
economic potential, political acumen or technological advantage.  Foster avers that it is imperative 
to develop, nurture and engage strategic thinkers throughout the whole of the defence force.  He is 
of the opinion that strategic-minded officers are critical, creative, broad-gauged visionaries with the 
intellect to dissect the status quo, grasp the bigger picture, discern important relationships among 
events, generate imaginative possibilities for action, and operate easily in the conceptual realm.  
Thus, he argues, “… any institution that relies on professionals for success and seeks to maintain 
an authentic learning climate for individual growth must require its members to read (to gain 
knowledge and insight), discuss (to appreciate opposing views and subject their own to rigorous 
debate), investigate (to learn how to ask good questions and find defensible answers), and write (to 
structure thoughts and articulate them clearly and coherently)”.140  These notions contain some of 
the essential characteristics of the educational process.  It is impossible to perform these with an 
emphasis on training.  These indispensable elements empower and nurture strategic thinking.  It is 
needed to develop the ability to grapple with the underlying questions of whether, why, and what if.   
 
One of the defining characteristics of a post-modern military is a growing civil-military gap.  
Militaries are becoming increasingly isolated within societies and in the activities in which they 
engage.141  This growing civil-military gap is rooted in a number of considerations.  Most countries 
have done away with conscription, which used to be a vital link between the military and the 
broader society.  The ending of conscription was accompanied by a growing apathy in (Western) 
societies towards political and bureaucratic institutions in general and the military in particular.  With 
the end of the Cold War and the democratisation of a significant number of countries in the world, 
militaries have been scaled down to the extent that people begin to question the need for the 
continued existence of some of these forces.142  Militaries have become increasingly less prominent 
as an instrument of policy in international relations and the domestic environment.  This also holds 
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true for its role in domestic policy-making processes.  It is believed that the events of 9/11 and 
subsequent terrorist threats the world over are due to change this trend.  There may be a return to 
military force being a more prominent instrument of international affairs.  The present wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq are probably the first signs in this regard.   
 
Betts143 argues that civil-military relations will always necessitate an in-depth understanding of the 
checks and balances necessary for healthy relations between society and the military in general 
and between the military and the government in particular.  Feaver144 outlines this as knowledge 
about the need to have protection by the military and the need to have protection from the military.  
A military can never discard its accountability in this regard and should at all times be aware of the 
boundaries of its responsibility in and towards society.  It should, however, also be knowledgeable 
on when and how to actively engage politicians on policy issues and their application that concerns 
the military.  Such interaction should be underpinned by a thorough understanding of the a-
symmetrical but mutually beneficial relationship between the military and the polity.  Knowledge of 
civil-military relations is, therefore, important both within and outside the military for a proper 
understanding of the role of the military within and towards society.  This is especially true of new 
democratic societies like South Africa, situated in a region plagued by bad civil-military relations. 
 
The expertise of senior officers – in other words, military strategists – is not restricted to narrow 
knowledge and arcane technical, tactical and operational detail.  It is also not defined in terms of 
dutiful obedience to authority.  It is clearly rooted in a sophisticated understanding of complex 
security issues and a capacity to influence major events.145  Reddel, referring to the military, argues 
that no other profession incorporates such a wide range of decision-making challenges posing 
profound implications for nations and their societies.146  This holds true for the national, regional 
and international strategic environments.  Military decisions in the contemporary era have a 
potential for ethical, economic, social and political ramifications far beyond those of the nineteenth 
century, when military officers were more narrowly focused on warfighting concerns and when 
weapons were far less lethal than today.   
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The trend of increasing complexity in decision-making is due to continue as military forces are 
faced with advanced military technology, especially chemical, biological and nuclear technologies 
of mass destruction, and rapidly changing and, sometimes, disintegrating societies.  Reddel is thus 
of the opinion that the question is not whether armed forces should be educated.  The question 
should rather be: which education could possibly prepare officers to meet these challenges 
successfully in order to serve the security of society?  Officers need to be educated to deal with the 
demands of changing and complex security environments.  Dealing with these demands requires 
an expertise beyond the scope of battlefield and other traditional skills.  Education is the 
indispensable starting point for acquiring this expertise.147   
2.5.2 Defence thinking: The need to prepare armed forces for action 
 
Education is an essential ingredient of military and operational readiness.  Operational readiness – 
preparation for war – delineates the need of military forces to be prepared at all times to deploy on 
short notice or to react to emergencies that may arise.  The preparation of military forces is rooted 
in the availability of both military hardware and military software.  States normally take great care in 
the procurement or development of military hardware – ships, aircraft, tanks etc.  The software side 
of the coin – military doctrine – is very often neglected.  The need for an updated military doctrine 
and an ethos characterised by a fighting spirit often fall victim to a bureaucratised peacetime 
military.  An educated, informed, and holistic understanding of what is needed for peacetime forces 
to be operationally prepared is thus of paramount importance.148     
 
Military doctrine is rooted in a careful analysis of past operations and military theory.  The need for 
military education, specifically in peacetime, is closely linked to the need for military doctrine and an 
understanding of the role and utility of military and strategic theory.  Why should officers be 
schooled in theory, i.e. the world of ideas?  Gray149 points out that wherever one looks in modern 
strategic history, testimony is found of the influence of ideas.  Clausewitz explains: 
 
Theory cannot equip the mind with formulas for solving problems, nor can it mark the 
narrow path on which the sole solution is supposed to lie by planting a hedge of 
principles on either side.  But it can give the mind insight into the great mass of 
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phenomena and of their relationships, then leave it free to rise into the higher realms 
of action.150   
 
It could be argued that theory serves a useful purpose to the extent that it collects and organises 
the experiences and ideas of other men, and sorts out which of them may have a valid transfer 
value to new and different situations.  It also helps the practitioner to expand his vision in an 
orderly, manageable and useful fashion, and then to apply it to the reality with which he is faced.151  
Military theory, according to Strachan,152 has two purposes. It provides , firstly, an understanding of 
conflict and war, and secondly, insight into the military mind.  In contrast, an intuitive understanding 
of military and strategic matters, as opposed to an educated and analytical understanding thereof, 
negatively influences the military in two ways.  Firstly, it restricts the vision of the strategists.  A 
more general theoretical appreciation provides a wider span to the vision of the strategist and his 
understanding of conflict and war.  Secondly, it blocks the exchange of ideas and almost 
automatically inhibits appreciation of the ideas of others.  "The remarkable thing is not that there is 
so much disagreement in the Pentagon," Wylie points out, "but that there is so much 
agreement."153 
 
Military officers are not strategic theorists; they are rather military and strategic practitioners.  
Officers have to translate strategic theory into workable plans, from the highest strategic and 
operational levels to the lowest tactical and technical levels.  Doctrine is the means by which 
soldiers bridge this gap between theory and reality.  Sound doctrine is the only basis upon which 
large numbers of people can be trained with equipment in standard methods of behaviour to be 
predictable instruments of the military commander.  Doctrine is written for and used throughout the 
military to ensure that military forces are structured, trained and equipped to apply technology.154  
Doctrine needs to be written not only on and for the joint strategic and operational levels, but it is 
also necessary within the different services on tactical and even the lower technical levels.  Officers 
on all levels thus need to be able to contribute to the writing of military doctrine, both in terms of its 
content and its physical writing.  It stands to reason that the officer’s writing and analytical skills are 
of critical importance in this regard.  Writing doctrine is probably one of the most important tasks of 
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an officer.  The importance of doctrinal writing centres on the need for doctrine to be based on the 
correct historical lessons and strategic theories.  Most military disasters occur because of wrong 
lessons being learned, or the right lessons being adhered to long after the lapse of their use-by 
date.155  
 
An armed force’s ability to adapt to changing circumstances and to shape itself for future 
eventualities is rooted in the need and capability for research of contemporary and future security, 
defence and military challenges.  In short, research is needed to incorporate all the relevant 
lessons of the past while preparing the armed forces for current demands and likely future 
eventualities.  This is especially true in rapidly changing technological, political and strategic 
environments.  Fabyanic156 argues that research and writing comprise one of the “… four pillars of 
wisdom” in armed forces.  Without research, Fabyanic declares, there can be no in-depth 
understanding of war.  He argues that the primary objective of research and writing is to put war in 
a clearer focus so that efforts to deter or fight could be made consistent with war as it occurs.  A 
constant re-examination of war is essential for the professional officer for several reasons, the most 
important of which is that “… every age [has] its own kind of war, its own limiting conditions, and its 
own particular preconditions”.157  It is interesting to note how a large number of civilian academics 
and theorists in the strategic studies and security environment have succeeded in influencing 
government and other policies through research and writing.  In South Africa, for example, the two 
Pretoria-based institutes, the Institute for Strategic Studies and the Institute for Security Studies, 
together with the ANC think-tank of the early 1990s, the Military Research Group (MRG), have 
been very prominent in the re-orientation of governmental security and defence thinking in the 
1990s.158  This has happened to the extent that the South African military almost abdicated its 
responsibility in this regard.  There may, however, be a theoretical explanation for this 
phenomenon.  
 
Militaries in general experience some difficulty in redefining themselves professionally, 
institutionally and as individual soldiers in the so-called post-modern military environment.  The 
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notion of post-modern militaries arose in the aftermath of the Cold War.  Academics argue that the 
post-modern nature of military forces has a profound influence on the nature and use of armed 
force.  The progression towards post-modern militaries is reflected in a wide array of issues: threat 
perceptions, force structure, mission definition, the nature or type of the soldier required, public 
attitude towards the military, media relations, and the roles of civilian employees, women, 
homosexuals, military spouses and conscientious objectors.159  This redefinition of military force 
occupies the (political and) military leaders of most countries of the world.  In South Africa in 
particular, it led to an inward organisational focus with an emphasis on issues such as 
transformation, restructuring and professionalisation.  These transitional stresses, brought along by 
the end of the Cold War and democratisation in many countries, led to a search for ways in which 
the military in general and military professional in particular could deal with a wide variety of 
complexities.160  In the past, education has often been an important tool to deal with such 
complexities.  
 
Betts161 emphasises that the nature of defence budgets affects the fiscal, social and foreign affairs 
of a country.  It is, on the one hand, important for the military to have expertise and an 
understanding of these matters at hand.  It is, on the other hand, essential that politicians and 
society involved or interested in these affairs should have a thorough understanding of the military 
and the environment in which it has to operate.  The recent and ongoing debate on the 
procurement of new weapon systems for the South African National Defence Force has again 
brought this point to the fore.  The level of the interest and debate on the strategic weapon 
packages is an important indicator of the need for knowledge about military and strategic affairs in 
the SANDF and the broader South African society.  The nature and impact of defence and military 
decisions are accompanied by a need for management expertise.  Military officers need to manage 
huge defence budgets and sizeable amounts of manpower and material resources in the 
preparation and conduct of military operations.  The only way to inculcate such expertise lies in an 
increasing and urgent need within militaries for education in military and defence management.162 
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2.5.3 Military thinking: The deployment and employment of military force(s) 
 
Military professionals should not only have a higher order understanding of the security and 
defence environments; a higher order understanding of the military instrument and its role is also of 
great importance.  Militaries exist to a large extent for one reason only: controlled and organised 
armed force.  Their immediate task is to understand armed combat, to prepare for it and to prevent 
or deter it.  In fact, the most fundamental and vital task of any professional officer is to understand 
war.  This task, Fabyanic argues, takes precedence over all others.  No officer, whatever his 
military occupation, can be exempted from this responsibility.  Yet, Fabyanic maintains, militaries in 
the contemporary era are confronted with the challenge that "… technical skills (take) precedence 
over the ability to conduct war".163 
 
Betts164 argues that armed conflict or the threat of armed conflict is a permanent characteristic of 
human life.  This is especially true in a war-torn continent like Africa.  According to Betts, this 
reason alone fully justifies "… keeping the flame burning".  Gray165 argues along these same lines 
when he emphasises two particular points: "… bad times will always return" and "… there will 
always be thugs out there".  It is, according to Gray,166 not fashionable to emphasise this particular 
matter, but its political incorrectness renders it unusually important.  There is thus a need to have 
military knowledge and expertise available in the event of conflict recurring.  Obviously, this need 
for the availability of knowledge is underpinned by an understanding of the constantly evolving 
nature of military and strategic doctrine based on changes in technology, political doctrine, geo-
politics, and all factors that may affect the employment of force.  Education is the only appropriate 
vehicle for exploring and preparing for such changes and future eventualities. 
  
Betts167 also highlights the need for knowledge about the role of military forces in non-traditional 
scenarios.  In brief, it is not always clear what the role of the military should be in non-warfighting 
scenarios.  This is becoming increasingly important in an era emphasising the use of military force 
not to bring about peace, but rather to keep the peace that has already been created.  This also 
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holds true for South Africa against the background of a debate concerning the so-called primary168 
and secondary roles of the SANDF over the last decade.169  As Betts explains in the context of the 
USA, "… confusion continues about what U.S. foreign policy should expect military power to do for 
less vital interests".170  With an increasing emphasis on the co-lateral utility of military forces171 
there is also a growing need for education and knowledge about these activities and of the 
environments within which force will be utilised in this regard.  Most militaries do not have wide-
ranging experience in these domains and in most cases a comprehensive doctrine for the 
preparation of forces for these kinds of missions are not yet fully developed.  The only remaining 
alternative is to dispose of a theoretical approach, underpinned by the need for research and 
education. 
 
Dixon172 argues that the employment of force is primarily concerned with two types of activities – 
the delivering of energy and the communication of information.  The former is primarily a 
mechanistic activity based on the warfighting skills of individuals, their use of military hardware and 
their co-operation in the military.  Commanders are responsible to make decisions, based on 
intelligence, about who, where and when to employ the potential energy available in military forces.  
It is important to understand that this refers to both positive (constructive) and negative 
(destructive) energy.173  The decision of the commander is based on a large conglomerate of facts 
– about the strategic, operational and tactical situation, the enemy, own forces, geography and 
weather, to name but a few.  The commander should manage this information in such a way as to 
make an informed, rational and sound decision.  These decisions are rooted in the ability to 
manage large amounts of information, on an institutional (the so-called C3I system174) and 
individual level.   
 
In the operating environment in particular, a set of complete knowledge on which to base decisions 
will never be available.  Officers should make deliberate efforts in peacetime to develop their 
cognitive abilities to process large amounts of information in a short time.  In addition, they need to 
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develop their military intuition and imagination175 to help them to develop a full mental picture of 
situations where complete knowledge is not available.  Leser176 argues that intuition develops the 
officer's ability "… to see the battlefield without knowing all there is to know".  Imagination, however, 
"… is the ability to consider possibilities that intuition does not see".  Whereas academic studies are 
the principal means of acquiring the ability to manage information, the development of a 
fingerspitzengeful, is derived from the interplay between education, training and experience.177   
 
Kohn178 argues that in future military officers will need to be “… broad and deep as well as tough 
and competent – men and women of judgement, wisdom, and balance – to conduct more disparate 
missions”.  He argues that officers should develop the ability to adjust to accelerated change not 
just in technology, but also in concept and strategy.  This will necessitate a larger proportion of 
“… thinkers over doers” in the world’s armed forces.  Kohn also argues that the world is entering a 
post-capitalist age in which knowledge is the only meaningful resource.  In this era, the decisions of 
officers, particularly senior officers, will be the determining factor in the use of armed force, more so 
than in the past. 
  
To conclude, officers need to be well schooled in the skills and knowledge of the use of force.  They 
should be able to assist in all matters of strategy, policy, resource allocation and operations.  
Officers, in particular, need to be military leaders and skilled military specialists, open-minded and 
adaptable, knowledgeable about military history and the armed forces of the world, and well-versed 
in the complexities of bureaucratic decision-making and the interests of the country.  Furthermore, if 
military officers refrain from joining the public dialogue on defence matters, and specifically if they 
fail to write for publications, they abdicate the shaping of the military's future to civilians.179  This is 
indeed what had happened in South Africa!  In fact, South African views on the need for military 
education besides that of the South African Military Academy in general and of the writings of 
Visser180 in particular, are simply non-existent.  The military will only be able to fulfil their proper and 
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full role if they are well-educated.  The education of the military though has to contend with one 
very particular issue – a phenomenon that is often referred to as "the military mind". 
2.6 THE ABILITY TO THINK?  UNDERSTANDING THE MILITARY MIND 
 
Understanding the military’s disposition towards knowledge and expertise in general and education 
in particular, requires an understanding of the military way of thinking.  It is a way of thinking that 
has often been described as a “military mind”.  Huntington, 181 for example, argues that there are 
three ways of understanding the military mind.  The first is a reflection on the ability or quality of the 
military mind.  Huntington argues: "The intelligence, scope, and imagination of the professional 
soldier have been compared unfavourably to the intelligence, scope, and imagination of the lawyer, 
the businessman, [and] the politician".182  However, it would be difficult to justify these kinds of 
claims.  The second understanding defines the attributes or qualities constituting a military mind or 
personality.  The military mind is thought to be "… disciplined, rigid, logical [and] scientific" but not 
"… flexible, tolerant, intuitive [and] emotional”.183  The military mind, Foster maintains, largely 
discourages independent thought and critical inquiry.  He is of the opinion that pervasive doctrine, 
regulations and operating procedures breed an orthodoxy in the military that dispels any need for 
originality.  Military officers are seen as victims of a system that values non-objective advocacy, 
adheres to routine staff procedures, and relies on rigid protocols.184  A third definition of the military 
mind focuses on the attitudes, values and views of military men.  To be specific, it defines the 
distinctive and persistent habits of thought that have developed within the military over a very long 
period of time.  This places the emphasis on the intellectual roots, the sources of the military mind.  
The question arises as to whether it is possible to demarcate the intellectual roots of the military 
way of thinking. 
 
Baylis and Wirtz185 argue that all the scholars, soldiers and policy-makers who study strategy have 
the same intellectual roots and, consequently, belong to the same intellectual tradition.  They share 
a set of philosophical underpinnings and assumptions about the nature of international political life, 
and the kind of reasoning that could best handle political-military problems.  These philosophical 
underpinnings and assumptions are rooted in the conservative realist school of thought.  The realist 
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approach to international politics could be summarised as a theory, which holds that states struggle 
for power and security in an anarchical environment.186  This means that realists are pessimistic 
about human nature, seeing people as “… inherently destructive, selfish, competitive and 
aggressive”.187  In their view, war is not something that can be eradicated.  Rather the ever-present 
threat of conflict should be dealt with by minimising the likelihood and severity of international 
violence.  The harsh realities of world politics are emphasised, and the power and interests of 
states feature prominently in the realists’ view of the world.  They also have a pessimistic view of 
world politics, with states being involved in a relentless competitive struggle.  Might is right in 
international relations, realists argue.  Thus, realists contend that international and regional 
institutions have only a limited capacity to prevent international conflict.  Realists claim that the 
history of these institutions shows that when it really mattered, they were not able or capable of 
acting against the interest of their member states.188 
 
Drew and Snow189 outline a number of characteristics underpinning realist military thinking.  Firstly, 
military thinking has a fundamental nature.  To be precise, armed forces have as its primary 
objective the military security and protection of a country and its citizens from those with harmful 
intentions.  Every citizen has an interest in this basic purpose.  Failure to live up to expectations in 
this regard may well be fatal for a nation as a whole.190  In the political realm, this issue translates 
into the so-called guns vs butter debate.191  It concerns the question regarding what percentage of 
the national budget needs to be spent on defence to secure the nation and how the military should 
utilise its budget to optimise its capabilities.   
 
Secondly, the external or foreign nature of its task directs realist military thinking.  Drew and 
Snow192 argue that it is "… generally directed towards foreign problems rather than domestics 
priorities".  The foreign nature of the task is influenced by a lack of knowledge of this realm.  
Defence officials are likely to be less knowledgeable about the motives and influences of foreign 
governments and non-governmental groups than is the case vis-à-vis domestic policies.  This is 
even more so in situations where that particular government or non-governmental group is a 
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potential adversary.  The task is complicated by the fact that militaries do not have control over 
events outside their country's borders and can only hope to influence foreign governments and 
groups.193  The external nature of (traditional) military missions also places support from the 
general public for such missions under the spotlight, since the public may well have even less 
knowledge of particular foreign issues and the role their military may be able to play in resolving 
these issues. 
 
Thirdly, the negative nature of the objectives that are pursued influences realist military thinking.194  
It is negative to the extent that the purpose is not so much to promote positive goals as it is to 
prevent others from engaging in hostile, harmful actions.  It remains a question, for example, 
whether the absence of conflict in Burundi could be ascribed solely to the presence of the South 
African peace mission contingent.  In short, it is difficult to demonstrate the success of negative 
objectives.  Positive objectives are relatively easy to measure.  An example would be encouraging 
other states to become democracies.  In other words, they have to conform to your expectations.   
 
Realist military thinking is, fourthly, characterised by "… a built-in conservative bias".195  Military 
thinking is influenced by the possible negative consequences of what may flow from a military 
miscalculation.  The conservative nature of military thinking tends to manifest itself in the political 
strategic domain as realist thinking.  In the operational realm it reveals itself as the well-known 
worst-case planning syndrome.  In most instances, the worst-case planning syndrome leads to an 
exaggeration of the threat beyond what it may actually be.  This may indeed have negative 
consequences if the worst-case preparations exceed the capabilities and intentions of an adversary 
and, instead, become provocation.  Worst-case planning could also be very expensive and may 
lead to a focus on one particular scenario – conventional war planning, for example.196  
 
On a lower level, the military mind is also characterised by a paradoxical nature: discipline and 
disunity.197  Discipline flows from the subordination of the military to governmental policy and the 
need to execute such policy, while disunity is rooted in inter-service rivalry between the different 
services and organisational entities.  In South Africa at present, for example, the problem of 
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discipline is manifested in a follow-the-leader mentality.  This mentality has it roots in political 
affiliations (support for the ruling ANC to be specific), on the one hand, and the need to have so-
called “struggle credentials”, on the other.198  Any form of criticism, initiative and originality is looked 
upon with disapproval.  This problem, however, is typical of transforming states.  These states are 
inclined to make political appointments to the high command in order to ensure "… the regime's 
political security rather than the professional competence of its military forces"199 and these states 
then suffer the consequences when those commanders face their first real test. 
 
Inter-service rivalry, however, is rooted in the difference in strategic outlook of soldiers, airmen and 
sailors. The best known arguments in this regard are those of Wylie.200  He argues that two factors 
shape the soldier's conception of strategy: geography – terrain in particular – and the soldier's 
continuous and direct relationship with combat.  Armies are confined and constrained by the harsh 
realities of the terrain, which limit their speed and manoeuvrability.  Moreover, in war their central 
problem is often immediate because the enemy is right in front of them.  As a result, the soldier's 
conception of war and strategy is sharply constrained, often limited to the immediate (battlefield) 
problem.  The worldview of maritime forces is constrained only by the shorelines of the world's 
oceans.  The air force's view of the world is limit only by the capabilities of its equipment and has 
expanded over time, as capabilities have expanded.201  As a consequence, the land power 
strategist thinks in terms of theatres, campaigns and battles,202 while the air power and maritime 
strategists tend to think in terms of the whole world.203     
 
The services also differ in their experience and conception of combat.  Airmen and sailors 
experience war as a separate series of encounters from which they withdraw or pursue as 
appropriate.  Pilots would typically drink cold beer every night and navy officers would dress up for 
dinner!  Once engaged, the soldier, however, tends to stay in contact with the enemy.  Each piece 
of terrain is gained at the cost of life and effort.  While the sailor and airman tend to move through 
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their respective geographical mediums of water and air, their medium plays a relatively small role in 
the actual use of force.  For this reason, navies and air forces seek to exercise control over their 
mediums while land power occupies its medium.204  The soldier's conception of war and battle is 
very much Clausewitzian by nature: the occupation of terrain and the destruction of the enemy in 
battle in order to bring the war as rapidly as possible to a decisive end.  The destruction of forces 
and occupation of terrain takes place on the tactical and technical levels of war.205  Consequently, 
soldiers have a natural inclination to master the tactical domain with its emphasis on the 
development of military skills through training.  Considering the worldviews of navies and air forces, 
as well as their respective focuses on strategic blockade and strategic bombing, they have a 
natural inclination towards the higher levels of war and concomitantly a focus on education. 
 
This reality is further underlined by the nature of the different forces.  Land power is a people-
centred instrument of military power.  “Land power” Johnsen206 argues, "more than the other 
components of military power, depends on human interaction or innovation”.  Maritime and air 
power, on the other hand, are technologically-based instruments of power.  As Johnsen explains, 
“[a]ir and sea forces essentially are built around weapon systems or support platforms”.207  One 
cannot exercise any air power if there are no aircraft, and one cannot dispose of maritime power in 
the absence of ships.  Personnel are needed to operate these technological platforms.  However, 
personnel alone does not provide power in these domains that could typically be expressed in 
terms of an example of a country with a navy of 50 ships or an air force of 500 aircraft but an army 
of one million men.  In itself, this reflects something of the nature and difference between the armed 
services.  From an educational point of view though it is understandable why sailors and airmen are 
more interested in technological-related education and soldiers more in the so-called soft or human 
sciences.  
 
There is also a difference in the role of land, air and maritime power in the development of strategic 
effect.  "The land matters most," Gray208 argues, and “defeat on land equals victory or defeat in 
war”.  Underlying this argument is the Clausewitzian notion of war being an act of violence to 
compel your enemies to do your will.209  These enemies live on land.  Consequently, strategic effect 
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or strategic leverage is needed on land and only land power can occupy terrain.  Yarger argues that 
“... ultimately the resolution of armed conflict among nation states is always predicated on land 
armies defeating the opposing armies and physically occupying or threatening to occupy the 
enemy’s territory, thereby controlling its government and its ability to resist one’s will”.210  This is 
highlighted by the reality that no war has ever been won by maritime and air power on their own.  
Maritime and air power in their purest forms are only enabling instruments – “… navies and air 
forces are in support roles delivering men, supplies, and fire support or creating conditions allowing 
land power to be applied”.211  This does not mean that air and maritime power is not of the utmost 
importance as indirect coercive instruments.  The reality, however, is that each of the different 
services has its own strategic outlook and importance.  This is demonstrated by the geo-strategic 
inclination of countries to be either continental or maritime powers – France and Germany 
traditionally being continental powers and Britain, a traditional maritime power.  South Africa is also 
viewed as a continental power. 
 
The education of military strategists has to contend with these differences in thought and outlook 
that more often than not underpin the inter-service rivalry in armed forces.  It is rooted in the 
difference in strategic outlook or worldview, the difference in outlook on combat, and the differences 
and unity in the strategic effect of the different instruments of military power.  In the end, military 
education should reflect an understanding that the military, theoretical and strategic outlook of 
soldiers, sailors and airmen respectively is coloured by a green, white or blue lens.  
 
On a more positive note, Richardson212 argues that militaries have to develop these different views 
and be military-minded if they seek the proficiency that will first keep the peace and then prevail, 
should war occur.  The military or anyone else should not see the existence, development and 
nature of a military mind as a negative trait.  It ought to be actively developed and pursued by 
militaries in a positive manner.  The real question concerns the nature of the military mind that 
needs to be cultivated.  Richardson213 is of the opinion that it should be 
 
… a mind steeped in the methods, procedures and fundamentals of the profession, but 
bold, original and creative in their application; a mind that is tactically competent and 
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technological current yet sensitive to the variable and incalculable human factors in war; 
a mind that understands the uses of knowledge and intelligence, the importance of 
fitness and the power of good character.  It must be a mind tempered by systematic 
training broadened by progressive education and deepened by increasing experience, 
both real and vicarious.  In short, it must be a mind that rigorously and continuously 
pursues mastery of the art of war.214 [emphasis added] 
 
From this discussion, it should be clear that militaries share a common framework of thinking about 
the world that surrounds them, and more particularly the role of military force and forces in the 
world.  Militaries have a unique approach in thinking about their task in a world characterised by 
complexity and change.  It is a way of thinking that tends to be conservative and to a certain extent 
also dogmatic.  However, the uniqueness of the military mind does not mean that it cannot or 
should not be educated.  It remains a question how to educate in order to inculcate the military 
mindset that is a necessary phenomenon, as Richardson would call it, but also develop the ability 
to "think outside the box" if need be. 
2.7 CHALLENGES IN EDUCATING THE MILITARY MIND 
 
Garnet215 points out that no other issue in the study of international relations has attracted as much 
interest than questions concerning the use of armed force.  The reason for this, Garnet argues, is 
because war is generally considered a human disaster, a source of misery on a catastrophic scale, 
and in the nuclear age, a threat to the entire human race.  One of the biggest challenges in 
studying the use of force, though, is the use of the term war itself.  War, Garnet216 argues, is a 
blanket term that is used to describe a very wide range of diverse activities.  These activities 
include total and limited wars, regional and world wars, nuclear, conventional, low-intensity and 
community wars, high technology and low technology wars, inter-state and civil wars, insurgency 
and ethnic wars.  In short, all wars are exceptional – their exceptionalism is what links them 
together.  It is difficult to study such a wide rage of activities that are linked only through the fact 
that they are concerned with organised military violence.  The irony is that civilian scientists have 
done most of the studies that have been conducted on war.  As Brodie217 points out: “Soldiers have 
always cherished the image of themselves as men of action rather than as intellectuals, and they 
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have not been very much given to writing analytical inquiries into their own art”.  In fact, Brodie 
argues that military men have in the past turned a certain degree of obloquy on those of their 
colleagues who were in their eyes too scholarly about war. 
 
Gray218 points out that it is difficult, if not impossible, to develop someone to become a strategist.  
According to Gray, "… no educational system puts in what nature leaves out”.219  One of the 
reasons why the education of strategists is a contentious but not a debated issue should, thus, be 
sought in the nature of strategy itself.  Strategy concerns neither strictly political nor strictly military 
issues.  Rather, it bridges the gap between the political and military worlds.220  The fundamental 
question about the education of strategists, therefore, concerns the crossing of the bridge between 
the political and military worlds and what is influencing this interactive process.  This problem is 
furthermore accentuated through the uneasiness of the political world with military-minded or 
military sensitive politicians and the uneasiness of the military world with politically-minded or 
politically sensitive officers.221  
 
The study of military and strategic affairs is also complicated by the pragmatic and practical nature 
of military theory and strategy – "strategic theory is a theory of action," argues Brodie.222  He points 
out that military strategists have to deal with one fundamental question: Will the idea work?  The 
study of military and strategic affairs is therefore a "how to do it" study, a guide to accomplishing 
something and doing it efficiently.223  “Strategic studies,” according to Gray,224 “is a practical subject 
and not a fine art”.  The pragmatic and practical nature of military force and strategy often leads to 
critique that the study thereof is not a scholarly subject but rather a pseudo-science, using apparent 
scientific methods to give it a spurious air of legitimacy.  In addition, because of the practical nature 
of strategy and because strategists often advise governments, strategists are criticised for 
operating in a manner incompatible with the integrity of scholarship.  This particular point of 
criticism is taken one step further when strategists are criticised for being involved in policy 
advocacy.  Strategists are seen as being an appendage of government on account of the fact that 
they spend their time either providing governments with advice on how to achieve policies or 
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justifying dubious objectives.225  The study of military and strategic affairs is therefore often 
impeded by questions about the legitimacy of the particular field of study. 
 
The making of officers is also made difficult by the fact that strategy, the employment and the utility 
of military force are best studied from an interdisciplinary approach and perspective.  Gray’s226 idea 
concerning the different dimensions of strategy has been discussed.  Howard227 also identifies four 
so-called "forgotten dimensions of strategy": the operational, the logistical, the social and the 
technological.  The dimensions of strategy as outlined by different authors brought to the fore the 
complex nature of war and strategy.  In order to acquire an in-depth understanding of military 
strategy and war, it is necessary to know something about all those factors that may have an 
influence on the use or the threat to use military force.  In thinking about military and strategic 
education and the making of strategists, it is therefore important to keep this diverse nature of 
military force and strategy in mind.  It is understandable though why academics are uncomfortable 
with a field of study that does not neatly fit into their world of compartmentalised academic 
disciplines.  It leads to insinuations about military education being “… a mile wide and an inch 
deep”228 or that it is "… more a shock treatment than a broadening of intellectual horizons".229  
 
The education of officers is also tremendously complicated by the nature of the military itself.  To be 
specific, the bureaucratic nature of armed forces makes it not very receptive for academic studies.  
Firstly, the compartmentalisation that is a necessary outcome of military secrecy often makes it 
difficult to engage in a free exchange of ideas.  The cloud of secrecy usually associated with all 
military activities inhibits free debate about contentious strategic and military affairs within and 
outside the military.  Secondly, military organisations by definition are designed to operate in a 
medium of very great uncertainty, namely armed conflict.  The need to be successful in such an 
uncertain environment has always caused militaries to put a premium on subordination, discipline, 
hierarchy and rigid social structures, all of which represent the direct opposite of flexibility.  This is 
not really an organisational culture and climate that is conducive for academic studies.  Thirdly, the 
need to operate in highly uncertain, confused, and stressful environments has caused armed forces 
through the ages to invent their own form of communication.  It is a form of communication that is, 
as far as possible, stripped of ambiguity and redundancy.  The military, for example, is well known 
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for their use of acronyms.  Militaries, in general, try to create a form of language that is the opposite 
of what the academic world consider as indispensable for free, undirected thought.230  Finally, the 
responsibility to be operationally capable – the need to prepare for present challenges – often 
promotes negative attitudes within the military towards education.  Being short of money, 
manpower and equipment, the military often views education as a luxury.  The education of 
militaries then often falls victim of “short-termism” and “a flavour of the week mentality".231  
 
The problem with the military educational system does not end with “short-termism” and “a flavour 
of the week mentality”.  Education of officers is also complicated by the nature of the military 
education system.  Some are of the opinion that officers entrusted with delivering professional 
military education are not always capable of defining and implementing a true educational system.  
Even in the contemporary era, whenever officers are gathered together for the purpose of 
education, some elements of training are imposed into the curriculum.  In most cases, this is done 
for no other reason than to remind learners that they are part of a military establishment and not 
just members of the general population.  The result in most cases is that the idea of training 
predominates and the overall effort to educate in a "pure" fashion is eroded and compromised.  
This results in an officer corps that has not been able to prepare properly for their task in 
peacetime.  During times of conflict they then fail very often because of their inability to think 
effectively.232 
 
The education of officers is also complicated by the military need to use education for specific 
purposes.  Academics argued that “… practical experience reveals, however, as has often been the 
case throughout the history of military education, that what has been taught in civilian universities 
has been corrupted at military schools to fit the ‘needs’ of the military”.233  This influence, together 
with distortion via a dictated curriculum, moving standards of pass/fail, and a host of other “client- or 
patron”-led differences, marks the traditional differences between military and civilian educational 
institutions.  It is these influences, together with the demand from the military for a better “product”, 
which has distorted the fabric of the educational process at military educational institutions.  Civilian 
educators always have an indispensable role in pointing the military in the right direction and being 
a vital part of the success of the whole educational process.  It is maintained that the military often 
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forget that education is all about people and ideas and bringing the two notions together in an 
environment that encourages the free flow of ideas between people.234  It is obvious that the military 
in general accept that education is necessary but then do not do justice to it.  The real challenge is 
thus not only resistance to education by the military but, rather, either bad or superficial education 
or credentialism instead of the real thing. 
 
Brodie,235 in his book War and Politics, recounts the story of how Marshall Maurice de Saxe 
remarked that most commanding generals displayed the utmost confusion on the battlefield.  He 
asked himself: "How does this happen?" and then continued to answer himself: "It is because very 
few men occupy themselves with the higher conduct of war.  They pass their lives drilling troops 
and believe that this is the only branch of military art.  When they arrive at the command of armies 
they are totally ignorant, and in default of knowing what should be done, they do what they know".  
It is however understandable why military forces world-wide are more interested in the training of 
their forces than their education.  The reason is obvious.  Training tends to focus on tactical level 
issues – the execution of drills. Failure in the realm of tactics by loosing a battle is immediately 
visible and the result disastrous in terms of the destruction and losses to a nation and its armed 
forces.  Losing a war, however, allows the armed forces the scope to blame someone or something 
else.  That we have seen in Germany after World War I and to a certain extent also in the United 
States of America after the war in Vietnam.  Losing battles and engagements, however, cannot be 
blamed on anyone but the military.  Militaries, thus, take greater care of their preparation to fight.     
 
The last factor that complicates military education is a restricted budget.  Money will always be a 
factor in all environments.  Yet, in the education of officers it sometimes becomes the single 
determining factor.  This often leads to a restriction and narrowing of the skills and knowledge that 
are required from officers to permit the contraction of many programmes, the sabotage and non-
expansion of others, and the “introduction” of new schemes through the retrenchment and 
abandonment of others.  It is a matter of robbing Paul to pay Peter, Downes explains, since the 
money has most often been used to procure new equipment or to deploy forces on operational 
duty.  The military itself does not realise that equipment can only be of value if they know how to 
use it.  In the education of officers, a minimalist budgetary approach often centred on three 
activities: 
• quantifying the minimum competencies required by members in the service; 
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• establishing the minimum time required to learn these skills, knowledge and attitudes; 
and 
• determining the minimum number of staff required to impart these competencies.236 
2.8 CONCLUSIONS 
 
This chapter tried to find an answer to the question regarding why militaries need to be educated.  
The question led to a wide number of considerations.  The history of modern war is rooted in the 
need for knowledge.  Indeed, the need for knowledge about military and strategic affairs is one of 
the building blocks of the modern military profession.  The military profession does not differ in any 
way in this regard from any other profession in modern society.  A body of professional expertise is 
a defining characteristic of any profession – also of the military profession.   
 
Professional expertise consists of a body of defined theoretical knowledge and practical skills.  This 
body of theoretical knowledge can only be mastered through prolonged and in-depth study, while 
practical skills are acquired through training.  Thus, professional military competence is reflected to 
the extent to which the individual has, firstly, been trained in tactical and other military skills, and 
secondly, mastered the body of theoretical military knowledge through education.  Militaries have a 
natural preference for the training environment and with that the development of their military skills.  
The military is the only role-player in the training of its forces.  The education of the military, 
however, has to be done in co-operation with the general academic community.  The military, thus, 
does not have full control over the education of its members.  This is one of the reasons why 
militaries in general are uncomfortable with education and the educational environment.     
 
Two very specific factors define the uniqueness, the focus and the parameters of the military 
profession and its quest for knowledge.  The first is the unique purpose of the military profession – 
warfighting.  The military profession is the only legitimate instrument in society for the ordered 
application of force.  This consideration is rooted in the idea of unlimited liability – the military 
professional should be willing to sacrifice his life in the achievement of professional goals.  The 
military professional does not get the opportunity to apply his professional competence very often, 
and if he gets the opportunity to do so, it may be the only or the last opportunity.  In short, 
professional expertise cannot only be developed through actual combat.  The only way, besides 
warfighting, by which the military professional can build up its own professional competence and 
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expertise is through military training and education.  This particular need for education is rooted in 
the idea of ein berufsgebildetes Offizierskorps or a professional military education.  This need is 
rooted in the need for knowledge about the military and its own professional task.  It is almost an 
inward-looking need for education.  In addition to the provision of technical skills and professional 
knowledge, the military should also focus on the development of qualities such as judgement, 
intuition, imagination and instinct. 
 
The second defining characteristic of professional military knowledge is the need for military forces 
and force to be of service to the whole society.  Military power should at all times be employed in a 
rational manner and with the consent and in the interest of the whole society.  The military should, 
thus, have an in-depth and unique understanding of its own society and the place and role of the 
state it serves in a world of other states. This particular need for education is rooted in the idea of 
ein gebildetes Offizierskorps or a broad liberal/general scientific education.  This requirement is 
rooted in the need for knowledge about society and the world(s) within which the military exists. 
From a military perspective, this is an outward-looking need for knowledge.  The military 
professional should develop an understanding of the world and issues that surround the military 
profession. 
 
These two factors also influence the military way of thinking and its search for knowledge.  More 
specifically, the nature of their task requires a unique approach from military forces.  It is an 
approach that is rooted in discipline, and that is characterised by a conservative – almost dogmatic 
– realistic appreciation of the military's role in society, of society itself and of the interaction 
between society and the rest of the world.  Such an approach manifests itself in a focus on current 
realities.  Militaries deal with current realities by having well-trained forces available at all times. 
This, once again, reiterates the military's natural preference for training.  A need to shape future 
realities and to prepare itself for future realities is not an institutional characteristic of the military.  In 
fact, it is often said that militaries always prepare for the previous war.  The only way in which the 
military can ensure that it shapes itself for the future, is through education. 
 
There are, however, a number of challenges that have to be overcome in the education of military 
forces.  These obstacles are diverse, ranging from cultural reasons (they see themselves as men of 
action), to institutional reasons (militaries are huge bureaucracies), to theoretical reasons (an 
interdisciplinary approach is needed), to budgetary reasons (education is seen as a nice-to-have).  
These reasons should not, however, overshadow the need for education in armed forces.  The 
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need of the military to deal with higher order security issues, to be proactive, effective and efficient 
in defence planning and to be properly prepared for its main and other tasks, underpins the 
importance of education in modern armed forces.  Thus, the real question is not why the military 
has to be educated, but rather, how to educate the armed forces of a state. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
EDUCATION IN ARMED FORCES: A PROPOSAL ON THE CONTENT AND 
STRUCTURE OF OFFICER EDUCATION 
 
The nation that will insist on drawing a broad line of demarcation between the 
fighting man and the thinking man is liable to find its fighting done by fools and its 
thinking by cowards.  
Sir William Francis Butler1 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Armed forces are unique institutions with specific characteristics.  As instruments of war they enjoy 
a virtual monopoly of weaponry and substantial coercive power that make their loyalty a necessity 
for state survival.  Militaries are modelled as tightly organised and highly disciplined entities 
characterised by a hierarchy of ranks and a culture of obedience.  Viewed from this perspective, 
they are highly effective bureaucratic organisations, even to the extent that they may breed 
inflexibility and discourage innovation and initiative.  In addition, militaries are characterised by a 
unique culture, a set of values, and an esprit de corps that prepares their members to fight, kill, and 
possibly, die.  Armed forces are often seen, and regard themselves, as being above politics – a-
political in nature – since they are the repository of the national interest. They guarantee the 
security and integrity of the state, not that of the government of the day.2   
 
As institutions, armed forces have to operate in an environment of ambiguity and uncertainty.  Their 
uniqueness as institutions and the environments within which militaries operate likewise necessitate 
a unique approach to the education of their members.  Their preparation should provide officers 
with the requisite cognitive skills to understand the military's uniqueness as institution and to 
navigate, at an individual and organisational level, in an environment of near anarchy.  Ultimately, 
the use of military force and the employment of armed forces for various purposes are something 
that is done by people.  Like politics, the use of force is a practical endeavour and, like politics, also 
an art and a science.  Hence successful application of force relies on the one hand on knowledge 
of the science of war, described by Strachan as “… what is technically feasible”,3 and on the other 
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hand, an intuitive understanding of the art of war, linking primarily with the Clausewitzian notion of 
military genius4. 
 
The education of members of armed forces and the study of military art and science link the military 
and academic worlds.  Two particular questions are of central concern in the link between the two 
worlds.  Firstly, what ought to be the focus of academic and military professional studies if a military 
wants to master the art and science of war – i.e. what should officers study?  Secondly, when in the 
career-path of officers do militaries have to educate them to ensure that they become 
knowledgeable about war and the use of force – i.e. when should officers study?  This chapter aims 
at finding an answer to these two particular questions.  It should be noted at the beginning of this 
chapter that two features of general intellectual competency are of specific relevance to the military 
in general.  The first of these is scientific methodology, which is of great value both in the analysis 
of the use of force and in solving complex or complicated military tactical, operation or strategic 
problems.  The second is the management of information.  Information is of primary concern to both 
the academic and the military worlds.  The academic world processes information into knowledge.  
The military world converts information into intelligence.5  Both these notions, the ability to solve 
complex problems and the need for intelligence, underpin the contemporary era of 'knowledge-
intensive warfare'.6 
 
3.2 WHAT TO LEARN: IDENTIFYING CORE EDUCATIONAL REQUIREMENTS 
 
Academic institutions responsible for the education of the military at all times have to deal with the 
necessity that their education should be relevant to the military.  This need for relevancy is often 
rooted a short-term military requirement that military education should be need- and task-driven.  In 
most cases, this translates into a military quest that the educational system should "… produce the 
right product"7 for immediate employment.  The military does not always appreciate the long-term 
benefits of a general academic education.  The demand for the right product shoves the more 
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comprehensive and holistic approach of a general scientific education into the technical and tactical 
considerations of the military training environment.8  In contrast, a long-term educational view 
emphasises the universal intellectual competencies that are of relevance to the military in general.  
 
The central question that flows from this is – What should be the focus of officer education?  Surely, 
it would not be erroneous to argue that mastery of the art and science of war constitutes the 
essence of professional military knowledge.  War (the use of armed coercion) has so many different 
dimensions and is influenced by such a diverse range of factors that almost any academic 
discipline may be justified in the education of officers.9  The question then arises as to what the 
areas of knowledge are that all officers should be educated in except, maybe, for a small minority of 
dual professionals, such as military lawyers and doctors.  Is it possible to determine this at all?  
Asking the military what their needs are tend to produce lists covering almost every imaginable 
subject.  This said, it is argued in this discussion that all officers should dispose of at least a basic 
knowledge and understanding in four core areas: 
 
• the external (security) environment; 
• the armed forces as an organisation; 
• the employment of armed force(s); and 
• the physical operating environment of armed forces. 
 
3.2.1 Understanding the external environment: Security as the defining purpose of armed 
 forces 
 
The need to clarify the external context within which armed forces operate is one of the important 
challenges military leaders traditionally face.  To ensure strategic effect and effective defence 
management officers need to have a thorough grasp of the security and strategic context of the 
armed forces and the state.  This context critically affects the nature of military knowledge and its 
use in the application of armed force.  National security policy, strategic culture and the principles 
that govern a country’s strategic choices demarcate this context.10  Strategic and military matters 
                                                
8
 Ibid. 
9
 See for example the exposition by Gray of the different dimensions of war and strategy in Gray, CS, Modern 
Strategy, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999, pp. 23-47. 
10
 Kaufman, DJ, “Military Undergraduate Security Education for the New Millennium”, In Smith, JM et al., 
"Educating International Security Practitioners: Preparing to Face the Demands of the 21st Century 
International Security Environment", Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) Monograph, Strategic Studies 
Institute, US Army War College, July 2001, p. 8. 
 75 
are always intertwined with a wide range of non-military elements and cannot be considered in 
isolation.  Even tactical situations require an understanding of the wider social, cultural, political and 
economic context.  At the higher strategic levels, the extent and span of the required understanding 
are even broader.  Furthermore, the military has a responsibility to explain to the community what it 
is about, for its own benefit and as a duty to society.11   
 
Snyder is correct in arguing “… one cannot simply study the military implications of war without 
understanding the roots of the rivalry between actors, such as considerations of power, status, 
ideology and wealth".12  As an academic field of study, the study of strategic and military affairs fits 
into a wider conceptual framework of political sciences and international politics.  Snyder, in 
addition, pointed out that "… the broad scope of security studies provides academic legitimacy 
while strategic studies provide intellectual coherence to the military core"13.  Moreover, it is 
accepted that the study of military history is an important part of war and military studies. (See 
Figure 3.1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: The meta-theoretical environment of military studies14 
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Since the end of the Cold War there has been an increasing shift in emphasis away from the centre 
to the periphery; from military and also strategic studies towards the study of security.  The 
underlying assumption is that a focus on strategic and military studies is too narrow and 
increasingly less relevant in an era when major wars are declining and threats to political, 
economic, social and environmental security interests are increasing.  Security is seen as a better 
organising framework for understanding the complex, multi-dimensional threat environment of the 
contemporary era.15  The developing regions of the world, also sub-Sahara Africa, seem to provide 
fertile ground for the development of these thoughts.16   
 
Security, the idea of security studies in particular, is a vague concept.  "I am not hostile to security 
studies," Gray argues for example, "but I do not know exactly what they are or how I would proceed 
to find out."17  However, security studies are of critical importance from both a military educational 
as well as a military operational point of view.  Security provides the higher order theoretical 
framework for the study of strategic and military affairs and also the "bigger picture" within which 
military professionals operate.  Security links the military affairs of a country to all other state affairs 
as well as national and international policy considerations.  Linking military education to security 
ensures at all times a reflection on the part of officers of the global, regional and national changes 
in security thinking and construction.  Security also ties the armed forces to the other two notions of 
the Clausewitzian trinity: government and society.18  
 
Baylis and Wirtz19 warn that security in general and security policy in particular require a careful 
consideration of military affairs.  “Military power,” they contend, “remains a crucial part of security 
and those who ignore war to concentrate on non-military threats to security do so at their peril." Yet, 
the shift in emphasis from military and strategic affairs to security issues is accompanied by a need 
for a better or higher order understanding of those aspects that relate to the security of a country.  It 
may be possible to some extent to become knowledgeable about military affairs by means of an 
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exclusive focus on military training.  A clear understanding of the higher order conception of 
security, including its non-military dimensions, without any education is almost impossible.   
 
The nature of security in the post-Cold War era and its emphasis on non-military threats suggests 
threats to the security of the state and the international system is much more obscure.  To be 
precise, shifting international political and security domains resist easy classification and 
management.  Hence, armed forces in the post-Cold War era need to prepare for a wider array of 
possible threats and dangers than ever before.20  This is also true of their cognitive preparation to 
deal with these threats and dangers.  Militaries are increasingly called upon to take on new roles of 
military humanitarianism, crime fighting, drug control and peacekeeping.21  This translates into a 
need for officers to display greater mental flexibility in order to deal with the complex security 
environment and the nature of the threats that arise.  It suggests the need for greater emphasis on 
academic education versus military training as the foundation of life-long learning and adaptation 
within armed forces.22  Therefore, security ─ within its international relations and political context ─ 
is the first important domain that should be focused upon in the education of officers. 
 
An understanding of security, particularly the non-military dimensions of security, is of even greater 
importance in the African context.  This view corresponds with Dandeker’s argument that global 
security looks and feels differently depending upon the regional context.23  In the case of Africa ─ 
sub-Sahara Africa in particular ─ there is a critical need for militaries to have a higher order 
understanding of Africa's military and security problems and the role of African armed forces in 
society.  Officers, irrespective of what armed force they belong to, will not be able to operate 
successfully on the African continent if they do not have a solid theoretical understanding of Africa's 
military and security problems.  Almost all of Africa's security problems are of a non-military nature.  
In fact, the traditional Western definition of security with its external orientation and military bias is 
almost of no use in the African context.24  Furthermore, in Africa the military itself is often part of the 
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problem.25  The security of African states is to a large extent shaped by their own vulnerabilities.  
Consequently the education of officers should provide them with insight into the subtle differences 
between the security of the developed states of the (Western) world and the security of the 
developing states of the African continent.  The most elementary conclusion is that African officers 
should be educated in order to have a thorough understanding of the macro environment within 
which they have to operate, within which the military as an organisation has to exist, and within 
which military force will be used to secure the state, the African continent and the global 
environment.   
 
3.2.2 Understanding the internal environment: Armed forces as organisations 
 
The study of security, strategic and military affairs is embedded in the study of military strategy.  
Strategy is a complex decision-making process aimed at finding pathways to balance the political, 
security, military and operational objectives of states with their available resources.  Gray defines it 
as the "… theory and practice of the use, and the threat of use, of organised force for political 
purposes".26  Lykke expresses this complexity in a very simple equation: strategy = ends + ways + 
means.27  The role of the military strategists is to find ways – i.e. courses of action – in which the 
use of scarce military resources can be optimised to attain politically defined security and other 
objectives.  The underlying notion is that officers, irrespective of the level at which they operate, 
should have the mental flexibility to: 
 
• manage the ends-ways-and-means process; 
• deal with the conglomerate of influences on the management of this particular process; and 
• understand their own positions on the continuum in terms of higher and lower processes 
and how the different levels of strategy interact. 
 
The management of the ends-ways-and-means process, though, is more complicated than it 
seems at first glance.  On the military strategic level, for example, decisions about military means – 
the size, nature and readiness of military resources – are made in the domestic political realm.  The 
domestic political realm is the world of interest groups, political parties, and social dynamics.  This 
necessitates a higher order understanding of the domestic political, policy and policy decision-
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making environment.  In particular, it necessitates an active participating role by military strategists 
in structural decisions about what military resources should be procured, developed, prepared and 
mobilised.  In contrast, decisions about the pursuit of specific security and military objectives are 
usually made within the context of international politics – in other words, the world of power politics, 
alliances and national interests.  Strategic decisions made in this realm directly affect the 
responsibility of armed forces, their deployment and employment.28  Strategy then becomes the art 
of linking structural decisions made in the domestic context with strategic decisions in the (mainly) 
international context. 
 
The military's orchestration of the interplay between the attainment of strategic objectives and the 
availability of strategic resources underpins the need for academic education in a number of ways.  
Firstly, military strategists need to understand both the structural and the strategic environments – 
the worlds of domestic and international politics.  In the military realm, structural issues inform the 
development of so-called force development or force preparation strategies.  Strategic decisions, 
however, are linked to the development of so-called force employment strategies.  The higher order 
understanding of these particular milieus can only be acquired through in-depth and prolonged 
academic studies.  Secondly, the challenge, nature and importance of integration, orchestration 
and equilibrium between the structural (force development) and strategic (force employment) 
environments needs to be understood.  Military strategies characterised by controversy and change 
(if not failure) are usually those in which resources and responsibilities are not aligned with each 
other.29  In the military context, this is seen as a strategic planning gap – disequilibrium between the 
force development and force employment strategies.30  The military strategist should develop his 
intuitive ability – through theory and practise – to know where to accept the risk of a strategic 
planning gap through stretching of the resources or risking of objectives or both.  Academic studies 
constitute an important part of the development of this discerning ability.    
 
The dual nature of strategy provides for an interesting interaction on military organisational level; 
giving militaries a Janus31-like appearance.  Armed forces are, on the one hand, vocational 
professions focused on developing expert knowledge on the use of force and, on the other hand, 
hierarchical bureaucracies focused on applying routine knowledge through operating routines, 
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procedures and checklists.  Officers are, therefore, always confronted with a duality.  They have to 
be true professionals in the profession of arms while ─ since the profession of arms is also a state 
bureaucracy ─ they also need to be good bureaucrats.  (See Table 3.1)  Unlike professions, 
bureaucracies focus on routine applications of non-expert knowledge, usually through rigid policies 
and regulations, more than through the professional expertise of their employees.  Indeed 
bureaucracies usually invest very little in the professional expertise of their employees.32  Military 
professional expertise, on the contrary, is underpinned by the ability to think and act creatively in 
the employment of military power.33  
 
Table 3.1: The bureaucratic and professional military worlds 
 
 
 
 
Bureaucratic Military World 
• Managerial focus 
• Structural decisions 
• Internal efficiency 
• Budget-driven 
• Routine expert knowledge 
• Availability and management 
of military resources 
• Driven by a need to centralise 
• Occupational approach 
Professional Military World 
• Command focus 
• Strategic decisions 
• External effectiveness 
• Interests-driven 
• Professional knowledge 
• Employment and 
utilisation of military 
resources 
• Driven by a need to 
decentralise 
• Institutional approach 
 
According to Snider,34 the dual nature of military forces is unavoidable.  When the bureaucratic 
military world becomes more prominent than the strategic realm, there is cause for immense 
tensions for individual professionals and for the military as a whole.  Armed forces that do not 
resolve this tension in favour of the strategic or professional side could indeed "die" in the 
professional sense.  If bureaucracy continues to dominate the defence force of a country, as in 
South Africa at present, military professionals are squeezed into bureaucratic moulds, becoming 
mere employees and obedient military bureaucrats.  This may well lead to a situation in which the 
defence force becomes so entangled with bureaucracy that the military loses its professional ability 
– the ability to employ military force.  In short, it becomes an organisation unto itself with no value 
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to the greater society.  Education, together with training, is the principal means of focusing military 
forces on professional issues – ensuring it does not "die". 
 
Peacetime militaries, to be specific, have a natural tendency to become more bureaucratic – to 
emphasise routine expert knowledge and not professional knowledge.  This gives rise to a very 
unique military problem: 
 
It is a remarkable yet explicable phenomenon, that precisely in those armies where the 
commander is afforded the fewest opportunities to acquire practical experience, the 
number of those is great who imagine that they were intended for generals, and who 
consider the practice of this vocation easy.  But in the school of golden practice such 
impressions are, or course, quickly rectified through experience of failure, difficulties, 
and misfortune.35 
 
In operational circumstances, i.e. times of war, commanders are evaluated in terms of their 
operational effectiveness as military leaders and their professional capability – not necessarily their 
efficient management of resources.  This leads to a logical conclusion about the nature of the 
education of armed forces.  There is a need for both bureaucratic and professional military 
knowledge and education in armed forces.  Officers should be able to operate with ease in both 
realms.  Professional military education within armed forces should reflect this reality.  There should 
be a balance between bureaucratic and professional military education of officers.  One form of 
education should never be neglected in favour of the other.  However, since peacetime militaries 
have a natural tendency to become bureaucratic and officers are not given the opportunity to gain 
professional military experience, a deliberate effort should be made in peacetime to educate 
officers in the professional realm – the study of war.    
 
In addition, military organisations, though bureaucratic, have to adapt to geo-strategic and other 
changes in war and peace.  Consider for example the wide range of organisational changes that 
were required in the South African National Defence Force since democratisation in 1994.  Military 
organisations have to align themselves with their social role and operational responsibility.  It is 
something of which military professionals should be aware and which they should be able to 
manage.  The changes in the post-Cold War geo-strategic environment had a tremendous impact 
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on the nature of military organisations and the use of military force in this era.  Two noticeable 
changes are, firstly, the end of conscription and the movement to small professional armed forces 
and, secondly, the need for armed forces to prepare for a whole spectrum of possible activities i.e. 
the need for flexible forces.  Taken together, these changes pushed manpower costs up and 
reduced popular identification with the military.36  Moreover, questions are being raised about the 
need for militaries to change their warrior culture to perform non-warfighting military missions.37  
Military force structures were changed in the post-Cold War era to execute these types of missions. 
 
The emphasis on military diplomacy, military humanitarianism and non-military missions 
significantly changes the role of the military professional.  The dominant need for the military 
professional to be a good military bureaucrat and skilled military technician or war-fighter is 
increasingly augmented by the need for a soldier-diplomat and soldier-scholar.  "What has changed 
for the soldier in recent times," Smith contends, "is the greater need for knowledge of the wider 
circumstances in which military action occurs."38  This is an important shift in emphasis and 
something that was not traditionally reflected in the schooling programmes of militaries.  The 
underlying notion is that militaries cannot be successful in the contemporary strategic environment 
without well-educated soldiers that fit easily into the role of military-diplomat.39  The changes in 
military organisation in the post-modern environment reiterate the need for soldiers to study the 
nature and management of public organisations also.  This, though, should never be done to the 
detriment of the study of the professional role of armed forces in society.  
 
3.2.3 Understanding the professional military environment: War as the central focus of 
military forces 
 
Militaries are called upon to execute a wide variety of missions.  None of these missions is as 
demanding as the use of armed force for the purpose of war.  Thus the immediate task of the 
military is often defined in terms of the need to understand, prepare for and, ultimately, to wage war 
appropriately and successfully across the broad spectrum of conflict.  In short, warfighting – the 
defence of the nation against foreign conventional threats – remains the central focus of most 
militaries, irrespective of their size and nature.  Consequently, militaries most often see and define 
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warfighting as their primary purpose.  Even in Africa the emphasis is often on the preparation for 
external warfighting in an effort not to divide the military along ethnic and other societal divisions.  
Interestingly, though, comprehension of the nature of war does not appear to be the sine qua non 
of the professional officer corps – a predicament widely recognised by astute observers within and 
without the officer corps.40  
 
This particular predicament is brought about by a number of specific challenges armed forces face 
in the study of war.  Firstly, how to balance the need to prepare for conventional warfighting with 
the need to be prepared for unconventional, low-intensity, revolutionary warfare.  Secondly, how to 
balance the need to understand and prepare for war with the demands to understand and prepare 
for missions other than war.  These missions are often described as secondary tasks or non-
traditional roles.  This does not mean that these missions are less important, but rather that 
militaries often view them as subordinate to their primary purpose of warfighting.  In fact, there is an 
increasing emphasis on the so-called dual role militaries.  Lastly, though it is accepted that the 
basic function of peacetime militaries is to prepare for war, technical skill almost always takes 
precedence over the ability to conduct war.41  Militaries prefer to train for battle, not to study war. 
  
War between developed states and democracies is not something that occurs very often in the 
contemporary strategic era.  However, the consequences of such an occurrence, which is always 
possible, may be devastating in terms of the destruction that is brought about.  Dandeker42 thus 
argues that states have to prepare for war and should base their organisations on that prime 
purpose, even if paradoxically interstate wars are the least likely scenarios they will face in future.  
In contrast, militaries frequently deploy in military operations other than war, though if something 
goes wrong in these kinds of operations – and it often does – the outcome for the state is not as 
fatal.  Hence there is an interesting interplay between the frequency and the intensity or 
consequences of the warfighting and non-warfighting roles of armed forces. (See Table 3.2)  For 
militaries, it is prudent to prepare for war since such a possibility can never be discounted entirely.  
The capacity to respond to the need for a warfighting capacity cannot be built up overnight.  During 
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peace missions, soldiers also often face potentially very dangerous warfighting scenarios, to which 
they have to respond appropriately.43   
 
Table 3.2: The frequency and intensity of military operations44 
 Frequency Intensity 
Warfighting 
 
 
Non-warfighting 
Low 
 
 
High 
High 
 
 
Low 
 
How should armed forces go about studying war?  The logical answer is that it should be done 
through a consideration of the nature of war.  However, not all things in war are logical and it is 
extremely difficult to define the nature of war.  There are no quick and easy approaches to the 
study of war.  Fabyanic45 argues that if an officer truly wants to understand war and make it part of 
his thought process it should be grasped at two different levels.  The first level is that of rational 
intellectual thought; the other, which is of equal importance, is the level of intuition and imagination 
or what the Germans refer to as fingerspitzengefühl.46  Clausewitz, the German military 
philosopher, provides the best example of an understanding of the nature of war through a 
consideration of both its intellectual and its intuitive dimensions.47  
 
In addition, a study of the changing nature of war prepares armed forces in general and officers in 
particular for future war.  The future is by definition unknown.  Thus, the general tendency amongst 
armed forces is to prepare for the previous war.  However, by focusing on the changing nature of 
war it is possible to identify trends of change that could direct the preparation of armed forces for 
the future.  It was through the identification of such trends that the current very prominent debate 
concerning the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) rose to prominence.  The RMA debate 
was triggered by the convergence of a number of very prominent trends or revolutions.  These 
include inter alia the technological revolution, the information revolution and the communications 
revolution.  There is not a single future scenario for which one could confidently prepare.  Instead, 
the key is to recognise that multiple future scenarios are possible and likely to occur 
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simultaneously.  In this vein, Roxborough and Eyre argue that the future is never one-dimensional, 
but always multi-dimensional.48  
 
At present, the changing nature of war is, on the one hand, characterised by a technological and 
information-driven RMA and, on the other hand, by anarchic conflict – so-called "community 
wars".49  This problem is not new though.  Soldiers throughout the ages were confronted with the 
duality of having to study contemporary conventional war and unconventional, low-intensity war.  
The only difference is that the probability that conventional war will manifest itself in future is 
diminishing, while there is a rise in the frequency of anarchic conflict.  In addition, in Africa, the 
changes that officers will have to deal with the low-intensity end of the spectrum of conflict are 
much higher than the opposite.  The need for African officers to clearly understand changes at the 
lower end of the conflict spectrum is thus clearly of critical importance.  Paradoxically all the 
different advocates of change are correct, and consequently the challenge for armed forces is to 
design forces and force structures in such a way that armed forces are prepared for all possible 
future eventualities.  Officers should prepare themselves mentally and intellectually, irrespective of 
the changes that manifest themselves in the nature of war.   
 
3.2.4 Understanding the operating environment: The defining features of the battlefield 
 
The operating environment of military professionals is defined by a large number of factors that 
may influence the outcome of battle or the success of military action in operations short of war.  
The notion of an “operating environment” is used to describe the physical environment of the 
battlefield or other places where the officers will have to operate.  Five specific factors are important 
for the cognitive preparation of officers for the operating environment: 
 
• tactics; 
• geography; 
• leadership and command; 
• technology; 
• cohesion and morale.  
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Tactics, "the use of armed forces in battle",50 defines the use of force in the operating environment.  
In general, tactics is described as a continuous search for better ways for setting up or deploying 
forces and equipment in order to gain the maximum benefit from the available forces and 
equipment.51  Needless to say, this also includes the physical deployment and use of force in 
situations short of war, including military humanitarian operations.  Officers ─ especially those 
working on the lower levels of command ─ have to be masters of tactics.  They need to have a 
detailed knowledge and understanding of current tactical doctrine.  Officers have to study the 
tactical doctrine and train themselves in its execution.  They also need to busy themselves with (a) 
continuous (re)search for better ways to employ forces and equipment in the operating 
environment. 
  
Geography "speaks" to soldiers in a number of ways: "to mind and imagination, as well as to eye 
and limb".52 The influence of geography on what Clausewitz refers to as the grammar of war is 
inescapable.  Military professionals always have to contend with physical geography in the 
operating environment.  This includes considerations of space, distance, time, terrain, vegetation 
and weather.53  The dilemma regarding geography, Gray points out, is that its influence is both 
everywhere, yet discernible nowhere.54  A rising geographical issue in the tactical realm, for 
example, is the impact of military operations on the geography of the environment.  Environmental 
responsible defence55 in itself has become an issue of strategic importance in the post-modern 
military context.  A higher order understanding of geographical matters underpins the success or 
failure of all military endeavours.  Africa's harsh geographical nature and lack of infrastructure will 
always define the nature of operations on this continent.  No military practitioner can ignore this 
reality in the study of the use of armed forces, irrespective of the level of such deployment.  
 
Direct and physical command and leadership are essential elements of success in the operating 
environment.  The command and control56 of armed forces are as old as war itself and remain 
essential for their successful employment.  Command, specifically battle or operational command, 
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is a subject that traditionally attracts significant scholarly attention and a large number of books and 
articles have been produced on the topic.  Scholarly discussions of command seem to fall into three 
categories – all of which are important in the study thereof: an analysis of the processes and 
procedures involved in the command and control of armed forces; an analysis of the responsibilities 
of a commander; and an analysis of "… all those gifts of mind and temperament that in combination 
bear on military activity".57 [Emphasis added]  The point is simple – there are a considerable 
number of qualities that commanders ought to develop if they wish to be successful on the 
battlefield.  Most of these attributes relate to the cognitive development of the military professional.  
As military professionals, officers should have a thorough understanding of all the elements of 
command.  This means that officers should make a thorough study of the processes, procedures 
and responsibilities of command.  Yet, officers should also deepen their understanding of command 
through physical experience; a study of the nature of command at all levels; and by a deliberate 
effort to develop the personal traits deemed to be important for command. 
 
Military equipment and technology are an important part of the battlefield experience of military 
professionals.  In fact, we tend to think of our age as a technological age par excellence.  Van 
Creveld argues that "… behind military hardware there is hardware in general, and behind that 
again there is technology as a certain kind of knowhow [sic], as a way of looking at the world and 
coping with its problems".58  In the military, the very prominent debate concerning the RMA (or the 
Revolution in Military Technology59) is placing renewed emphasis on technology on the battlefield 
and, more specifically, the shift in emphasis from industrialised or mechanised warfare to 
knowledge-intensive warfare.60  The military professional studying the role of technology in war has 
to contend with two opposing views.  There are on the one hand the generic critics, as Gray calls 
them, who at all times "… champion the virtues of the warrior over the purported power of 
machines".  The generic enthusiasts, on the other hand, discern the solution to every human 
problem in new marvels of science and engineering.61  In an era where, as Quincy Write62 already 
in 1942 pointed out, technology is the principle shaper of war, military officers need to have a 
thorough understanding of the role of technology in the operating environment.  This requirement 
transcends the ability to be skilful in the use and employment of technology in war, which, needless 
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to say, is also of critical importance.  What is needed is a holistic understanding of technology in 
war; what technology is capable of and what not.  
 
Military theorists and soldiers have for centuries recognised the importance of cohesion and 
morale on the battlefield.  These traits are closely linked to the presence of a particular military or 
fighting ethos.  It is difficult to demarcate the influence of these intangible factors on the outcome of 
battle.  As Keating argues, military ethos is difficult to quantify and put into monetary terms, but it 
counts most when the preparation of forces has stopped and operations begin.  Keating explains 
that "[o]perational capability not only has to be developed, but fielded when it counts, and ethos 
contributes significantly on the day – regardless of the training cost".63  There are a host of factors 
that encourage action and discourage apathy in armed forces.  Officers should not only study the 
influence of intangible factors in the operating environment, but should also develop a feeling 
thereof in order to instil this in their own subordinates.  
 
To conclude, this discussion delineates the core educational requirements for the education of 
members of the armed forces.  This represents one view of how to structure a cohesive academic 
educational programme for officers.  The underlying argument is that a multi-layered approach is 
needed in the education of officers.  Such an approach should prepare officers to firstly clarify the 
external environment within which armed forces operate.  This should be done by providing officers 
with a thorough understanding of the political, security and other higher order environments in 
which the military finds itself.  Their education should, secondly, empower officers to facilitate the 
organisational development of armed forces and their professional employment.  Consequently 
there should be thorough understanding of the need for bureaucratic and professional military 
knowledge within the military organisation itself.  Most importantly, the education of officers should 
in particular enable them to be masters of the operational environment in which military force is 
used for strategic effect.  This should focus specifically on an understanding of the nature of and 
changes in war.  Lastly, soldiers should have an in-depth academic understanding of their lower 
order-operating environment – the battlefield.  This should be done inter alia through an analysis 
and study of tactics, the influence of geography, military technology, command and leadership, and 
cohesion and morale.  It is possible to explain these four meta-theoretical knowledge clusters by 
means of a sketch. (See Figure 3.2) 
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Figure 3.2: The cognitive domains of officers' education 
 
It needs to be emphasised that, like the character and context of war, the importance and the 
content of each core educational requirement will vary over time and from one military to the next.  
If these core educational requirements are considered in the context of academic disciplines it is 
obvious that they are not totally self-contained and that specific academic disciplines will cover 
more than one core education requirement.  A study of military technology, for example, will provide 
insight into all four educational areas.  The same could be said about history.  The usefulness of a 
study of military management, on the other hand, will be more limited.  Clearly, the knowledge 
required to become a master of war is diverse.  Yet, the overall balance favours the study of the so-
called "soft sciences".  This is a reflection, Smith64 argues, of the fact that war is fought between 
people and not machines.  War, in Clausewitzian terms, is after all a political activity and politics is 
in essence a characteristic of human life.    
 
The question, though, is whether there are other ways to structure the knowledge that is required 
from officers. 
 
3.2.5 Identifying core educational requirements: A view from abroad 
 
This section aims at providing a broad overview of military knowledge clusters as identified by 
different armed forces and scholars.  The underlying question is whether the ideas of different 
armed forces and scholars on this particular matter coincide or, more importantly, affirm the view 
that the education of officers should be dealt with by way of the external, organisational, 
professional and operating environments.   
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The U.S. Army identifies three elements in the development of military leaders at all levels: 
 
• military leadership begins with what the leader must be: the values and attributes that shape 
a leader's character; 
• the competence of the leader is defined in terms of the things that he must know: 
competencies that are required for leadership on a direct, organisational and strategic level; 
and 
• the military leader should, lastly, have the attributes to do what is required: actions are seen 
as the essence of military leadership.65 
 
The abilities to be, to know, and to do are intimately connected through education.  Only through 
education can the personal values and attributes be developed to be a leader and to teach those 
values and attributes to subordinates.  The U.S. Army Field Manual 22-100 explains the role of 
knowledge as the link between character (knowing the right thing to do) and leadership (doing or 
influencing your people to do the right thing).66  This link requires competency in four knowledge 
areas: 
 
• Interpersonal skills: knowledge of people and how to work with them.  The educated 
officer should be able to coach, teach, counsel, motivate and empower people with whom 
he comes into contact. 
• Conceptual skills: the ability to develop, understand and apply doctrine and other ideas 
needed by military professionals to do their jobs.  The central focus is the ability to handle 
ideas.  Sound judgement as well as the ability to think creatively and reason analytically, 
critically and ethically is required. 
• Technical skills: the ability to use equipment.  The focus is on basic soldier skills and the 
expertise necessary to accomplish assigned tasks and functions. 
• Tactical skills: the ability to make decisions about the employment of military resources.  
Tactical skills in its purest form solve tactical problems, that is, the employment of military 
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units in combat.  In the broader understanding of this notion it is interpreted as the ability to 
solve military problems.67 
 
Table 3.3: The U.S. Army knowledge skills of military leaders. 
Political-military level 
 
 ICTT*  
Organisational level 
 
 ICTT*  
Direct level 
 
 ICTT*  
 To Be To Know To Do 
*Interpersonal; Conceptual; Technical; Tactical 
 
According to the U.S. Army Field Manual 22-100, these four knowledge areas correspond with what 
military leaders at all levels should know in order to be successful.  Three specific levels are 
identified: direct, organisational and strategic.  The direct level is defined as first-line military 
leadership where the military leader functions on a face-to-face basis with subordinates and 
colleagues.68  The organisational level emphasises the competencies and actions to be a 
successful leader at an institutional level.69  The strategic level highlights the highest level of 
thinkers, war-fighters and political-military experts in a military organisation.70  The relationship 
between these levels and the knowledge areas can be explained by means of a sketch. (See Table 
3.3) 
 
The political-military level corresponds to a large extent with the external knowledge cluster; the 
organisational level with the internal organisational knowledge cluster; and the direct level with the 
operating environment knowledge cluster.  The four domains – interpersonal, conceptual, technical 
and tactical – are closely related to what we include in the operating environment.  It can, therefore, 
be argued that there is a large amount of congruity between the focus that is proposed and that of 
the U.S. Army.    
 
In Britain at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, the intellectual development of officers is the 
responsibility of only three academic departments: 
 
• the Department of Communication and Management Studies; 
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• the Department of Defence and International Affairs; and 
• the Department of War Studies.71 
 
The specific departments provide insight into the academic emphasis on the education of officers at 
the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst.  An analysis of the emphasis and kind of education that 
each department provides is proof of a very practical approach to the education of officers in the 
British Army. The Department of Communication and Management Studies is responsible for the 
schooling of future army officers in communication skills and techniques, including media 
awareness, media interviews, negotiation in the military environment, personnel interviewing skills, 
and presentational and written skills.  This department also provides awareness raising in 
management themes and issues such as equal opportunities, leadership theories, change 
management and diversity, stress management, the nature of teams and individuals, and resource 
management.72  The Department of Defence and International Affairs provides an awareness, 
knowledge and understanding of the international, political and strategic context in which the British 
Army operates through “tertiary level education in defence and international affairs.”73  The 
Department of War Studies defines as its most important function, the provision of tertiary level 
education in the study of war and modern military history.74 
 
Most officers recruited by the British Army are in possession of an academic qualification.  The 
British Army, therefore, focuses its whole effort on professional military education and not on 
academic education per se.  The four knowledge clusters as identified above are thus much more 
comprehensive than the British approach at the Royal Military Academy.  Though, there is still 
some correlation between the external knowledge cluster and defence and international affairs; the 
internal organisational cluster and management studies; and the professional knowledge cluster 
and war studies. 
 
In Australia, the educational focus of the armed forces is on three particular areas, namely "… the 
nature of the actor, the physical nature of military action and the purpose for which action is 
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taken".75  Smith argues that knowledge of this kind is relevant to any war or any situation in which 
action is taken.76  Four topics of education are identified in each of the above-mentioned areas: 
 
1. Armed forces   
The nature and character of the armed forces and their business, namely the application 
of force: 
• nature of war and strategy (history/politics); 
• Australia's military history (history); 
• leadership and behaviour studies (sociology/psychology); and 
• standards of individual behaviour (ethics/law) 
2. Physical elements of war  
The physical elements of war, including force itself: 
• weapons and weapons systems (science/engineering); 
• management of materiel (management/logistics) 
• management of information (information sciences); and 
• physical environment (geography/engineering). 
3. Purpose of armed forces  
The nature of Australian society and its political system in a global context: 
• Australian society and politics (economics/sociology/politics/history); 
• Australian defence and foreign policy (politics/history/economics); 
• Australia's region (politics/history/economics); and 
• the global politico-economic system (politics/history/economics).77 
 
The Australian approach is interesting and unique.  However, it is possible to argue that the idea of 
the “purpose of armed force” forms part of the security knowledge cluster, that the notion of “armed 
forces” is part of the military organisational knowledge cluster, and that the “physical elements of 
war” are contained in the knowledge cluster of the military operating environment.  From this 
perspective, the four knowledge clusters is all-encompassing framework for the education of armed 
forces.  
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Warfighting 
(military technical knowledge) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Clusters of expert military knowledge 
 
The views of a number of academics on the education of officers are also of interest.  Snider78 and 
Lacquement,79 for example, argue that officers have four roles to fulfil and that each role requires a 
particular domain of knowledge from the modern officer.  The four roles identified are that of: 
 
• war-fighter;  
• leader of character; 
• member of the profession of arms; and  
• servant of the nation. 
 
Each role has a unique “cluster of expert knowledge”.  (See Figure 3.3)  For the officer to fulfil the 
role of war-fighter, he needs to be schooled in military-technical knowledge.  The officer as a leader 
of character needs to be schooled in military ethics.  Knowledge of human development will help 
the officer to be a member of the military profession, since he has to develop individual practitioners 
capable of applying their expert knowledge when and where possible.  The last role, servant of the 
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nation, highlights the need for political-social knowledge in order to ensure that the armed forces 
are resourced and serve the interests of the nation as a whole.  Snider,80 however, reiterates the 
basic tasks of armed forces: “… prepare to kill, kill, prepare to die and, if necessary, die”.  Thus, he 
concludes, a society needs soldiers who are well schooled and effective in the art of warfighting.  
With this notion, Snider advances the simple truth that warfighting constitutes the essence of the 
military profession.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4: The three tiers of military knowledge 
 
Sarkesian and Connor81 also identify three tiers comprising – in their view – the totality of the 
military profession.  Each of the tiers constitutes a sub-domain of the totality of the military 
professional body of knowledge. (See Figure 3.4) The first tier is the military orbit at the highest 
levels and relationships to the society in general.  This tier is rooted in the need for military 
members to be well acquainted with the values, the nature and the functioning of society at large 
and its political apparatus in particular.  The second tier is military professionalism as it is viewed 
and practised within the military system in general.  It is accepted that this tier focuses on the 
professional nature and task of the military organisation in general, i.e. warfighting and the use of 
military forces for various purposes.  The third tier defines military professionalism as it functions 
within the immediate local unit and as it is reflected within the local command structure and 
immediate military community.  The individual soldier, sailor and airman constitute the totality of 
military professionalism at this level.  It is the aggregate of these relationships and tiers that 
encapsulate the totality of the modern military profession and its knowledge base, Sarkesian and 
Connor argue. 
 
                                                
80
 Snider, DM, op. cit., p. 5. 
81
 Sarkesian, SC & Connor, RE, The US Military Profession into the Twenty-First Century: War, Peace and 
Politics, Frank Cass, London, 1999, pp. 23-24. 
1. Politico – military interaction 
2. Systemic military professionalism 
3. Basic military knowledge and skills 
 96 
There is great correspondence between the ideas of, firstly, Snider and Lacquement and, secondly, 
Sarkesian and Conner and the notion put forward of four different knowledge clusters. (See Figure 
3.2)  The importance of the ethical dimension of an officer career stands out in the ideas of Snider 
and Lacquement.  However, the moral development of officers is an important by-product of both 
academic and professional military education.  Ethical knowledge is important to the extent that it 
underpins all the different knowledge clusters.  However, ethical knowledge is of particular 
importance in the operating environment.  Morale and cohesion – to a large extent – are rooted in 
ethical behaviour and knowledge.  The ideas of Sarkesian and Connor compare favourably with the 
idea of four different focus areas in the education of officers as outlined above.  There are, 
however, two important differences.  Firstly, the idea of an external environment is much more 
comprehensive than the political-military interaction outlined by Sarkesian and Connor.  Secondly, 
the notion of an operating environment is much more knowledge-based than the basic military 
knowledge and skills of the micro military environment outlined by Sarkesian and Connor.  It is also 
important to distinguish between the military professional and operating environments.  Yet, it is 
clear that there is a great deal of congruence between different scholars on the nature of 
knowledge on which the education of military officers should focus.  Using an idea of four clusters 
of military knowledge as the basis for such a discussion and the development of a comprehensive 
framework on military education is in line with international thinking about military education.  How 
can one then integrate the views on military knowledge clusters into the educational system of 
military forces?  
 
3.3 HOW TO LEARN: A FRAMEWORK FOR OFFICER EDUCATION IN THE POST-
MODERN WORLD 
 
Most military educational systems provide three types of education to officers: 
 
• pre-commissioned basic military education; 
• military doctrinal education; and 
• politico-military education. 
 
Each of these areas has a unique purpose and outcome.  Implicit in this categorisation is the 
recognition that education, training and experience are all important in the making of an officer, but 
also that this does not necessarily take place at the same institution and at the same time.  Indeed, 
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professional military education is rooted in a process of progression with the aim of providing the 
officer with the education that is needed at a particular point in time in his career.   
 
The military educational system is often compared with a pyramid. (See Figure 3.5)  Pre-
commissioned basic education provides the broad base at the lower end of the pyramid.  Moving 
upwards towards the apex of the pyramid, it narrows from the pre-commissioned base indicating 
that fewer officers need to progress through the more advanced levels of education.  At the broad 
base at the lower end of the pyramid the officer's understanding of the military as a bureaucracy 
and a profession, as well as his ability to employ specific military technologies and small units in the 
operating environment, is emphasised.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.5: The levels of military education 
 
On the higher levels, a broader approach is required.  Movement towards the higher levels in the 
military command sphere requires from the officer to become less of a specialist and more of a 
generalist.  Experience also becomes more important as the officer functions at a higher level.  The 
mid-level ranks in particular require from officers an understanding of a wide range of military 
functions, capabilities and technologies to make possible the orchestration of complex military 
operations and campaigns as part of a major war effort or of military humanitarian deployment.  The 
highest level focuses on the weaving of military expertise into the politico-military equation.  The 
politico-military level emphasises what is to be done with military power in the resolution of some 
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national problem, as opposed to the how.82  Clausewitz, for example, argues that "[t]he influence of 
the great diversity of intellectual qualities is felt chiefly in the higher ranks, and increases as one 
goes up the ladder".83 The development of these intellectual qualities should commence at a very 
early stage in the career of an officer to allow him to manage his acquired experience in a manner 
that would benefit both the organisation and the individual. 
 
3.3.1 The making of lieutenants 
 
The first step in the development of professional military officers is a process referred to as “the 
making of lieutenants”.84  This involves a process whereby recruits are brought into the military and 
the schooling they receive to become commissioned officers.  This schooling is rooted in the 
provision of the appropriate military skills, knowledge and attitudes for candidate officers to be 
commissioned into one of the services.  As such, three processes underpin the making of 
lieutenants. (See Figure 3.6)   
 
Firstly, attitudes: candidate officers need to embrace the military ethos and become military-minded 
– a process that sociologists refer to as secondary socialisation.85  These candidate officers have to 
learn to think and act like soldiers and officers. Individual officers need to be inculcated with and 
accept the military ethos and ethics as a way of living. In fact, there are different levels of ethos with 
which the young officers should become acquainted. This includes inter alia the military ethos, a 
service specific ethos and, in most cases, also a regimental or corps ethos.86 Caforio points out that 
on this level special procedures are used in order to induce strong normative compliance, such as 
community life, discipline, hierarchical authority, rules of public and private behaviour, as well as a 
system of sanctions.87  The example of mentors and other role models within the military is of 
critical importance in this regard.  It can be argued that military socialisation aimed at providing 
candidate officers with a "military mind" – a unique way of thinking.   
 
Secondly, military skills: candidate officers, whether in the army, navy or air force, have to be 
prepared for their primary function as military professionals.  They will serve as junior leaders in 
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one of the services and should be prepared for their primary function in that service.  These 
functions are diverse, ranging from combat pilots to weapons officers on ships to infantry platoon 
leaders.  This requires an emphasis on the training domain to equip these candidate officers with 
the necessary basic military skills to operate as junior leaders in their respective geographical 
domains – land, air or sea.   
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.6: The making of lieutenants 
 
Thirdly, professional knowledge: candidate officers need to acquire the ability to understand the 
military profession, its role in society and the role of military force in the resolution of national 
security problems.  In short, they have to learn to think conceptually about higher order military and 
strategic issues – war – and how to deal with it.  This necessity is rooted in a need for education.  
Bletz88 argues that it is important to understand the necessity for education on this level.  This 
provides the newly commissioned officer with a broad undergraduate background as a meaningful 
intellectual base upon which the individual can build a career.  Already in 1964, Fergusson89 
expressed the opinion that at an early point in their careers, officers should be encouraged to think 
and write on strategy and military affairs.  This does not mean that they are strategists.  Rather, it is 
an indication that they have the ability to think strategically, even in tactical situations. 
 
Undergraduate education in particular is necessary to provide officers with the intellectual 
foundation necessary to carry out the responsibilities of a commissioned officer.  Such education 
should prepare officers with an understanding of the world and society, as well as the 
organisational environment in which they will serve.  Kaufman90 argues that pre-commissioned 
education should be directed by two fundamental questions: Firstly, what should officers be able to 
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do in future?  Secondly, how does pre-commissioned education contribute to the development of 
officers who reflect the attitudes that are deemed to be important for the military?  Needless to say, 
the education that emanates from the above is dependent upon how wide one defines what officers 
should be capable of and which attributes they would need to have.  An overview of the attributes 
that the U.S Military Academy deemed as important reflects a liberal approach towards education 
on pre-commissioned level.  This includes inter alia the ability to think and act creatively, to develop 
thought processes, to communicate effectively (verbally and in writing), and to demonstrate the 
capability for and a willingness to pursue progressive and continued educational development.91 
  
There are interesting tensions in the making of lieutenants.  The most obvious is the traditional 
strain between education and training.  An emphasis on education at the pre-commission level 
reflects a long-term strategic focus.  It necessitates a high capital investment, but lays the 
foundation for a long-term military career.  In contrast, emphasis on training reflects a short-term 
tactical focus, is less capital intensive and prepares junior officers for their first assignments as 
junior leaders.  In the case of the education of officers on this level, there is an increasing emphasis 
on the broadening and liberalising of the curricula.  The training of lieutenants, however, is 
traditionally very narrow and concentrates on special military skills and techniques and the 
technical aspects of military life and operations.92  The inherent tension between the convergence 
of the training process and the divergence of the educational process is obvious.   
 
This is especially true at institutions that should provide both the training and the education of these 
candidates.  Military socialisation plays a critical role in bringing these two processes together.  If 
training and education are done at different institutions, as in South Africa at present, the potential 
for disequilibrium in the ethos of the different institutions is very high.  The training institution usually 
places a high emphasis on the development of a military regimental ethos characterised by military 
hierarchy and discipline.  The educational institution, however, prefers an academic ethos 
characterised by intellectual creativity and freedom of thought.  The disorientation of the young 
officer in this regard may have dangerous consequences at a critically important time in the 
development of officers.   
 
A great deal can be learned from the Canadian Forces and their military educational transformation 
towards broad liberal education in the aftermath of the 1993 Somalian incident.  The danger, 
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Haycock points out, is that changes in the education of armed forces are usually driven by the 
“… last traumatic experience”.93  In the Canadian Forces, the emphasis on training was rooted in a 
variety of considerations.  A chronic criticism by the military was the notion that the educational 
costs at a military academic institution (i.e. a military academy) were much higher than in civilian 
circles.  This, Haycock argues, turned out to be a very oversimplified charge that was made very 
often.  There was a related charge from the operational branches of the military that they were not 
getting the candidate officers soon enough and “… that they knew too few military things” for having 
spent such a long time in the educational environment.  The military argued that academic 
institutions had to put the military back in military education since the candidate officers were 
arrogant and “… did not fit into the appropriate military culture”.94  In short, the military complained 
that the military educational institutions did not deliver “the right product”.  There was also no 
overarching departmental policy to guide and integrate military education into the armed forces, 
resulting in frequent rumours that one or more of the educational institutions would be closed for 
financial reasons.  In the Canadian Forces, many well-educated officers simply left the services 
because of an “... institutional anti-intellectualism” that developed over time.  The personnel 
management system did not know how to utilise or employ officers to take advantage of their 
education while senior officers did not know “how to use their brain trust”.95 
 
Another tension in the making of lieutenants concerns the nature of the education itself.  Firstly, 
officer education requires both a liberal education (ein gebildetes Offizierkorps) and a military 
professionally education (ein berufsgebildetes Offizierkorps).96  This often leads to a tension in 
military educational institutions – military academies in particular – between the provision of a broad 
liberal education and the provision of a professional military education.  Smith describes it as a 
tension between academic education and professional studies.97  Broad liberal education at 
undergraduate level is fundamental for the development of generic intellectual competence, while 
professional military education is the key to military effectiveness on higher levels.98  In this regard, 
Caforio points out that two main orientations today are prevalent at military academies throughout 
the world.  The one presupposes a typical military education, with less space for general university 
culture.99  The other brings officer education closer to the national university system, including the 
                                                
93
 Haycock, RG, op. cit., p. 168. 
94
 Ibid., p. 179. 
95
 Ibid., pp. 177-178.   
96
 Hackett, J, The Profession of Arms, Macmillan, New York, 1983, p. 103. 
97
 Smith, H, op. cit., pp. 153-154. 
98
 Ibid., pp. 155 & 160. 
99
 Associated with a divergence between military education and the general or national educational system. 
 102 
awarding of a true university degree with value on the civilian market.100  There are a number of 
general reasons why defence forces opt for the latter orientation.  It is argued that such an 
educational experience: 
 
• better integrates the officer into the context of the surrounding society and facilitates 
his collaboration with officials and agents of other institutional sectors; 
• provides the officer with cultural knowledge that makes him better prepared for 
operating in non-traditional military missions; 
• better position the officer for a second career; and 
• enhances the prestige, status and attractiveness of the military by awarding the 
officer a more widely recognised degree in the national environment.101 
 
However, even in countries where there is a general movement towards the provision of a more 
broad liberal education, military academic education is still provided in an environment that is quite 
different from that of civilian universities.  In this regard, Caforio describes military academies as 
total institutions characterised by: 
 
• a rational orientation towards a goal – it is a rational means towards an end that 
otherwise would be realised with difficulty; 
• the presence of (physical and psychological) barriers between the institution and the 
outside world; 
• the work and private life of the students are integrated; 
• all activities are scheduled; and 
• students and staff are segregated.102 
 
The value of a broad liberal academic education in the making of lieutenants, though, is 
undeniable.  Lacquement103 argues that it is impossible to continue with any form of education in 
armed forces if young officers do not receive a liberal education at the beginning of their 
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professional careers.  Thus – no military doctrinal education and politico-military education (i.e. 
professional studies) – are possible without some form of liberal education at a pre-commissioned 
level.  In the education of lieutenants, relevance to the military career should take second place to 
the critical aim of academic education, namely that of developing general intellectual skills and to 
inculcate the ethical values inherent in education.   
 
Cowan agrees with Lacquement and outlines three specific reasons why liberal education is 
necessary in the making of lieutenants.104 Firstly, in most democracies the public has come to view 
any significant failure of judgement within the profession of arms as a genuine catastrophe.  Junior 
officers in command of small groups or formations make most in-action decisions in the operating 
environment.  The public opinion cannot be dismissed as merely an anti-military bias and an 
appetite for scandal.  Instead, it should be seen as inextricably tied to the rising emphasis on 
human rights issues in both foreign and domestic policy in most democracies of the world.  
Secondly, the remarkable acceleration of technological change and the virtual explosion of 
knowledge have the potential to be a vast force multiplier of numerically small forces.  This fact 
amplifies the need for complexity of thought and maturity of judgement to avert catastrophe and it 
drives that requirement further down the chain of command than ever before.  The necessity for 
education on the lower levels of command that flows from the above is obvious.  Lastly Cowan 
argues that the military tendency to view training as the preferred way to avert catastrophe is 
misplaced.  Skills are not sufficient since judgement is required.  In Cowan's words, judgement is 
"… that odd distillate of education".  Judgement is what remains once memorised facts have been 
forgotten or have been smoothed into a point of view.  It cannot be taught directly, but has to be 
learned.  As Cowan explains:  
 
Without the mature judgement that flows from education, we fall back on reflexes, which 
are damned fine things for handling known challenges, but are manifestly unreliable in 
the face of new ones. And there will be new ones.105 
 
The underlying notion that should also be grasped in the "making of lieutenants" is that liberal 
education is an important first step in the making of military strategists and the preparation of 
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officers for high command.  Lambert106 in particular points out that officers can only benefit from 
professional education if they have a broad liberal education to provide the context within which 
their particular expertise will be applied.  If something goes awry in the provision of a liberal 
academic education, the whole military professional education, training and development process is 
distorted.  In a recent study done in the U.S. on strategic leadership competencies, a specific 
recommendation was made in this regard: "Begin growing strategic leader capability on 
precommissioned level".107  It was argued that several of the strategic leadership competencies 
begin with the seeds sown during pre-commissioned education.  A liberal education on this level 
empowers junior officers with the ability to participate in their own development through 
participation in a wide variety of (also civilian) activities, reading (not only military works but also, for 
example, books about the corporate world) and exploitation of other knowledge pathways (the 
internet for example).   
 
3.3.2 The making of colonels 
 
Smith argues that a liberal education on pre-commissioned level empowers the individual officer to 
take responsibility for his professional studies.  Professional studies "… occupy a position between 
academic education and military training".108  Professional studies relate to the core of being a 
military professional since it includes areas of learning that all officers need to know about, at least 
at a basic level.  The individual officer should focus in his own professional studies on topics such 
as the law of armed conflict, leadership, military history, current affairs and military ethics.  
Professional studies, Smith maintains, need to be practical while resting on a sound intellectual 
foundation.109  Chances are slim that this intellectual foundation would develop without a broad 
liberal academic education on pre-commissioned level.  Professional studies are the essence of 
military doctrinal education – "the making of colonels", in the words of Crackel.110  Indeed, it is 
argued that the making of colonels and the processes required for doing so constitute the most 
critical phase in the development of officers.  In most armed forces of the world, this represents the 
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highest level at which the majority of officers participate in formal professional education.  This is 
often referred to as the command and staff level.111 
 
A discussion of military doctrinal education necessitates an understanding of the nature and role of 
military doctrine.  The pliability of the word doctrine though makes it difficult to define.  The nature 
of a specific doctrine is often qualified: political-military doctrine; strategic doctrine; or operative 
warfighting doctrine.  Grant's definition of military doctrine has as its essence what military doctrinal 
education is all about:  
 
Doctrine is a formal expression of military knowledge and thought, that the Army112 
accepts as being relevant at a given time, which covers the nature of current and future 
conflicts, the preparation of the Army for such conflicts and the methods of engaging in 
them to achieve success.113 
 
Clearly, military doctrinal education should provide officers with an in-depth understanding of both 
national and international current knowledge and thought about the employment of military force.  
In addition, military doctrinal education should provide officers with a platform for considering the 
current and future use of force and the preparation of the armed forces for future employment and 
conflict.  Thus, Viotti argues, military doctrine is not only a body of theory that describes the 
environment within which the armed forces must operate, but it also prescribes the methods and 
circumstances of their employment.114  This descriptive and prescriptive nature of doctrine serves 
as the starting point of military doctrinal education.  The nature of military doctrine as the bridge 
between thought and action defines the nature of military doctrinal education.  Military doctrine has 
traditionally been concerned with the employment of military forces for the purposes of warfighting.  
In typical post-modern fashion, military doctrine is also described as the military software that is 
necessary for the effective employment of military hardware.  Doctrine, in short, interprets the 
higher conceptualisation of war, embodied in strategic theories and operational plans, into working 
guidelines for action.  This results in a complex process in which many different influences combine 
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to produce a standard operating procedure.115  In the modern era, military doctrine has been 
widened to incorporate the use of the military in so-called military operations other than war 
(MOOTW). 
 
The educational value of military doctrine is imbedded in three particular characteristics.116  
Doctrine, firstly, has an intellectual component.  This component draws principles from the 
experiences of earlier successful armed forces, their use and their commanders.  The study of 
military history is, therefore, a critical element in professional studies and military doctrinal 
education.117  The challenge is not to fall into the trap of using the lessons of history to win the last 
war!  Evans, for example, argues that the interplay between past, present and future in military 
education makes the use of military history an important part of professional studies and officer 
development.118  Doctrine, secondly, has a practical and dynamic component.  It interprets the 
experiences of the past in the light of current circumstances to ensure armed forces are properly 
prepared in peacetime, and has the guidance they need to make the best use of their forces during 
operations.  From this perspective, doctrine focuses on the employment of existing military 
capability.  Consequently, this component of doctrine is rooted in a detailed understanding of 
current doctrine and the need for officers to develop judgement in its application.  Doctrine, lastly, 
has a predictive component since it develops and prepares forces for the future.  Consequently, 
doctrine has to look towards the future to determine how military force and forces might be used in 
times to come.  From this perspective, doctrine not only guides, to some extent, the development of 
technology, but it also influences the development of the armed forces in such a manner that they 
are able to meet future challenges.119  Like the incremental introduction of new military capabilities, 
the development of new doctrine is incremental in nature.  Armed forces – though – need to focus 
on the development of new doctrine at all times.  Militaries need to indoctrinate all its members to 
have a full comprehensive and detailed understanding of existing doctrine.  The officers in a 
particular armed force should be able to apply its doctrine judiciously when called upon to do so.    
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The purpose of military doctrinal education is to provide officers with all the competencies they 
need to deploy and employ military formations from platoon to whatever size forces are needed in 
accordance with military doctrine.  To be more specific, the aim is to school officers to be 
tactically120 and operationally-minded121 and to operate with ease in these realms.  Tactics ensure 
success in the operating environment.  Operational art underpins the success of major military 
operations and campaigns.  Operational doctrine links tactical successes to strategic effect. 
 
Military doctrinal education should in the first instance provide officers with all the doctrinal and 
other expertise that is required from a leader and his staff to be successful in battle.  The doctrinal 
schooling of officers should, in the second instance, culminate in the ability of the officer to be a 
campaign planner and/or an operational commander.  At this level, the officer is also exposed to 
the roles and missions of the other services and the fundamentals of joint and combined 
operations.122  The making of colonels is – thus – a process with two elements: the development, 
firstly, of the officer as a tactician and, secondly, as a campaign level staff officer or commander.  
While military training is the most appropriate tool for the development of tacticians, professional 
education underpins the development of campaign level staff officers or commanders.  Because of 
the emphasis on training and professional military education, as well as the employment of military 
officers in this particular phase in their careers, there is some doubt as to the availability of time to 
engage in any serious academic education.   
 
The essence of military doctrinal schooling is the development of the ability of military leadership on 
tactical and operational level to solve complex military problems irrespective of whether those 
problems are faced on a battlefield, in a military humanitarian environment, or in a military 
organisational context.  The making of colonels, therefore, covers a wide range of military training 
and professional education – from platoon level tactics to formation level operational art.  
Consequently, there needs to be a gradual shift or progression from training towards professional 
education as the primary and appropriate vehicle for the transfer of tactical and operational skills, 
knowledge and attitudes in the making of colonels.  Whereas training is the most appropriate tool 
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for doctrinal schooling on the lower tactical levels of command, professional education becomes 
increasingly more important at the higher levels of command. (See Figure 3.7)  
 
Armed forces experience a range of difficulties in the provision of professional education at this 
level.  Firstly, Van Creveld123 argues that participation in military doctrinal education on the higher 
command and staff level depends on candidates' general career pattern.  In most cases, the 
colleges responsible for military doctrinal education have no say in the selection of those who will 
participate in the training and educational programs, nor do the proven academic records of the 
candidates play a role.  There are no clearly identifiable selection criteria.  To state it bluntly, it is a 
free-for-all at this level.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.7: Military doctrinal education 
 
Secondly, the duration of the professional education programmes at command and staff colleges is 
relatively short – usually a year or less.  Hence the amount of time that students have to spend in 
class attending lectures, seminars, workshops and exercises make in-depth study virtually 
impossible.  The education is mostly group-oriented and not individualised, as is the case in liberal 
educational institutions.124   
 
Thirdly, command and staff colleges often experience a great deal of tension in the presentation of 
their programmes.  In most cases it is the result of questions about the amount of time that needs 
to be spent on joint or service-specific education, as well as the amount of time spent in learning 
about combat, combat support or combat service support functions.  There are also different views 
pertaining to the amount of time that should be spent on the preparation for warfighting proper and 
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the time spent on low-intensity and military humanitarian operations.  The consequence is 
programmes and curricula that change annually.125   
 
Fourthly, the standard of these programmes is in doubt.  In the words of Van Creveld "… nowhere 
are those who take the examinations failed, or those who submit a thesis rejected".126  Haycock 
also points out that the time of students is jammed “… with visiting speakers, and there is little mind 
stretching, in terms of in-depth reading and writing”.  In addition, Haycock argues that syndicate 
discussions often demand little in academic preparation.127  The underlying argument is that the 
military will not terminate the career of an officer whose training, as a pilot for example, has cost 
them a lot of money simply because he has failed a military college examination.  Consequently, 
Van Creveld argues, the atmosphere at most of these colleges is very different from that of first-rate 
academic institutions.  The point is that if insufficient time and energy are put into professional 
studies, studies cease to be relevant and thought-provoking, becoming instead routine exercises, 
reluctantly undertaken and reluctantly taught.128  Haycock summed it up as, “… no papers, no 
heavy reading; just one visiting expert after another and occasional group reports on problems 
looked into between junkets to the Far North, East and South and a whopper to Europe and the 
Middle East”.129   
 
Fifthly, it is not clear on what basis the instructors at most of these colleges are selected.  They 
have no real expertise as teachers and in most cases are not part of a distinct elite.  The amount of 
time they spend with the students in class also does not afford them an opportunity for any serious 
research or academic studies.  Students do not see their instructors as role models.  Indeed, 
questions about the absence of the authority and knowledge relationships that characterise 
academic institutions could well be posed.  In combination these factors lead to a situation where 
most command and staff colleges in the world are not accredited and do not have the ability to 
present military doctrinal education at a post-graduate level.  They provide professional education 
of an academic nature, not academic education.130    
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3.3.3 The making of generals 
 
The careers of most officers up to the rank of colonel are restricted to the purely military 
environment.  As generals, however, these officers have to operate almost exclusively in the 
politico-military sphere.  The purpose of politico-military schooling is therefore to assist officers to 
prepare themselves for high command.  Whereas basic military and doctrinal schooling is directed 
at the making of lieutenants and colonels, politico-military schooling aims at the making of generals, 
which in turn focuses on the need for senior officers to become strategically and politically-minded.  
Generals have to be prepared to work with leading defence officials and political office bearers in 
managing and controlling the country's military resources in accordance with the security needs of 
the country and in subordination to the polity.131  In most cases, schooling on this level is not only 
joint and combined, i.e. includes officers from all the different services and different nations, but 
civilian public service officials also participate.   
 
The adjective "politico-military" should be seen as the convergence of the purely political and the 
purely military points of view.  This is the level at which the ultimate concern is military and national 
strategy.  At this level, the bridge between the military and political worlds is built in the name of 
strategy.  In the Clausewitzian paradigm, it could be argued that this is the environment within 
which the logic of politics and the grammar of war are brought together for the purposes of war.132  
This is also the level of command at which officers become strategists in the true meaning of the 
word.  Strategic leaders are those leaders who are entrusted with increased responsibility for an 
organisation as a whole, who are concerned with internal as well as external spheres of influence, 
and who are surrounded by ambiguity and complexity.133  The careers of senior officers are based 
on the provision of the necessary experience as well as tactical and operational knowledge to be 
the “military experts” in the national strategic context.  At the politico-military level, all the different 
dimensions of strategy come into play.134  At this level, the education of officers should culminate in 
an understanding of all the dimensions of strategy.  It will not be too far-fetched to argue that this 
level benefits from practical experience, military training, academic and professional military 
education that the officer has received throughout his career.  Learning through experience, training 
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and education combine to provide officers with insight into all the different dimensions of strategy.  
On the strategic level, the pen and the mind really become mightier than the sword.135  
    
The ultimate aim of the politico-military world, Bletz argues, is to effect the integration of a nation's 
foreign and defence policy.  Consideration of a country’s domestic and financial policies though is 
also of critical importance in the politico-military realm.  The notion of a politico-military world 
suggests the appropriate insertion of political and military considerations into the thought process in 
a given security and political situation in light of all factors relevant to that situation.136  The 
consideration of all the factors affecting a particular situation is important from an educational point 
of view.  Since the end of the Second World War there has been a gradual increase of participation 
of the military in the formulation and the implementation of the foreign policy process of most 
nations.137  This process received renewed impetus since the end of the Cold War and the increase 
in so-called military operations other than war.  This is especially true in situations where the role of 
the military is not to create peace, but to sustain the peace that has already been created – stability 
and military humanitarian operations in particular. 
 
Politico-military education should confirm the ability of the officer to read and write on strategic and 
military matters.  In most cases, politico-military education is associated with the completion of a 
post-graduate qualification.138  Indeed, in most armed forces of the developed world, and in some 
instances also the developing world (India, for example), it has to some extent become an accepted 
norm for general officers to have at least a masters qualification.  The logic behind this is very 
obvious.  Academic studies are the only way by which officers can prepare themselves for the 
complexity with which they will have to deal in the politico-military environment.  
 
3.3.4 A possible framework for the education of officers 
 
The different levels of military education need to be considered in the framework of the relevant 
emphasis on each level.  In the making of lieutenants, the emphasis is on a broad liberal education, 
basic military training and the inculcation of military ethics, values and norms.  The latter is 
achieved through both military training and academic education, though it is accepted that 
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professional education may also be of value in this regard.  In the words of Smith, "[t]he value of 
education lies not simply in contributing to expertise but also in developing ethical values that are 
conductive [sic] to effective cooperation within an organisation".139  The primary emphasis in the 
making of lieutenants, though, is on military training and academic education.  The making of 
colonels comprises two processes: training of tacticians; and training and (professional) education 
of operational level commanders and staff officers.  The making of generals is rooted in education: 
mostly of an academic nature but also professional education. 
 
It is possible to use a 5-point scale to illustrate the emphasis between military training, professional 
military education and broad liberal academic education in the making of officers and military 
strategists. (See Table 3.4)  The distribution of the five points at each particular level (represented 
by XXXXX) represents the educational and training focus at that level.  It is an indication of whether 
the main or the secondary focus is on academic or military professional education or military 
training.  
 
Two considerations are of particular interest.  The first is the need for a skills, attitude and 
knowledge foundation on pre-commissioned level.  Without such a foundation further training and 
education, specifically professional education, is almost impossible.  This foundation is rooted in a 
general truth, pointed out by Downes, namely that "… it is more difficult for the trained man to gain 
a liberal education than it is for the educated man to undergo military training".140  Downes argues 
that in the military, the trained man is socialised to expect and require order, discipline and 
direction.  In gaining a liberal education, he has to step outside the bounds of these fundamental 
tenets.  A broad liberal education, "… in its effort to develop a broad-based, flexible and 
questioning framework of thinking and attitudes in a person, can challenge the very foundations of 
the trained person’s identity and his relationship to his peers, superiors and subordinates".141  The 
fundamental truth about the making of officers and military strategists, though, is that it should be 
rooted in a solid foundation of military training and academic education without which no 
professional education is possible. 
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Table 3.4: Military training, professional and academic education 
 Military training Professional 
education 
Liberal academic 
education 
The making of 
generals: 
politico-military 
education 
 
  
 
XX 
 
 
XXX 
The making of 
colonels: 
military doctrinal 
education: operational 
 
 
XX 
 
 
XXX 
 
 
The making of 
colonels: 
military doctrinal 
education: tactical 
 
 
 
XXX 
 
 
XX 
 
 
The making of 
Lieutenants: 
pre-commissioned 
basic education 
 
 
 
XX 
 
 
X 
(Military socialisation) 
 
 
XX 
 
In this context, another important matter concerning the making of lieutenants is brought to the fore: 
how to structure the need for military training, academic education and the inculcation of military 
values and norms given the difference in ethos between the training and academic worlds.  There 
is greater conformity between the values and norms of the military and the training worlds.  In fact, 
the training role is performed by the military itself, while an external institution usually provides 
academic education.  From this perspective, it makes more sense to complete the academic 
education of candidate officers before they begin with training to become commissioned officers.  
This will not only operationalise the notion of education before training, but will also ensure 
congruence of the values and norms of the training and the military worlds.  This does not exclude 
a short military orientation before the commencement of academic studies. 
 
Another point of interest in the figure is the gradual shift in emphasis from training to professional 
education to academic education in the careers of commissioned officers, i.e. after completion of 
pre-commissioned basic military education.  This shift in emphasis is a result of the difference in 
organisational needs at the different levels.  This is a reflection, to put it another way, of what is 
expected of the individual on the different levels of command from within and outside the military – 
from an organisational and professional point of view.  In the conventional warfighting paradigm, 
the shift reflects the need to prepare the individual for command in battle, campaign and war as he 
progresses through his career. 
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The training and education of officers should also be considered within the framework of the 
different clusters of knowledge.  Four different clusters of knowledge were identified: the security 
knowledge cluster, the military organisational knowledge cluster, the military professional 
knowledge cluster, and the military operating knowledge cluster.  (See p. 85.)  An integration of the 
four clusters of knowledge and the three levels of military education (See pp. 93 & 94.) make 
possible the development of a framework for the education of officers.  This framework should be 
viewed within the framework of military training and professional and academic education as 
outlined above.  (See pp. 108 & 109)  In fact, an in-depth understanding of the three considerations 
(the different levels [pp. 93 & 94], the knowledge clusters [p. 85] and the need for training and 
education [Chapter 2]) require a juxtaposing of Table 3.4 and Figure 3.2. 
 
A number of particular important considerations need to be pointed out. (See Figure 3.8)  Firstly, 
the traditional tension between education and training is particularly noticeable at the lower levels 
of command where military training is of particular importance, specifically at the pre-
commissioned and the tactical doctrinal levels.  On the operational doctrinal and the politico-
military levels where the educational content dominates, the tension between military training and 
education is almost non-existent.  In addition, the tension between training and education is less 
prominent where the emphasis is on professional military education rather than on a broad liberal 
education.  This results in a particular high level of tension at the pre-commissioned level where 
the emphasis needs to be on military training and a broad liberal education.   
 
Secondly, military training, professional education and liberal education are needed in making 
officers knowledgeable about the different clusters of knowledge, though, the emphasis may differ 
from cluster to cluster.  For example, training may be a very effective tool for introducing officers to, 
and providing them with insight into, the operating environment.  A balance of military training and 
professional and liberal education may be the best suited to gain expertise in the internal 
organisational knowledge cluster.  Liberal education, though, is the probably the best pathway to 
knowledge in the external security knowledge cluster.   
 
Lastly, there will always be factors in the military that shove military education away from its focus 
on security, strategic and defence related matters.  A particular danger is a need from the military 
itself that military education becomes “need- and task-driven”, thus concerning itself mainly with 
technical and tactical considerations rather than being comprehensive and holistic in nature.  In 
liberal democracies, new ones in particular, militaries will always be faced with societies and 
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governments emphasising national development and social programmes.  There is no reason to 
question this focus even though it restricts military budgets and very often leads to a bureaucratic 
emphasis within the armed forces.  The end result is an emphasis on business or public 
administration – the bureaucratic military world – as the central focus in officer education.  This 
usually culminates in what Haycock refers to as a “… lack of command intellect”.142 
 
3.4 CONCLUSIONS 
 
This chapter was aimed at finding answers to two specific questions.  Firstly, what ought to be the 
focus of academic and professional studies in the quest to master the art and science of war?  
Secondly, how should militaries educate their leadership in order to ensure that they become 
knowledgeable about the art and science of war – the use of armed force(s)?  The answers to 
these questions should content with two specific considerations:  
 
• the uniqueness of the armed forces and military institutions as well as the unique 
environments within which they exist and operate; and 
• the unique nature of the military’s primary task – the defence of society – if need be through 
warfighting.   
Warfighting, being an art and a science, can only be mastered partially through academic and 
professional studies.  Consequently, in seeking an answer to the questions what and how to study 
the art and science of war, the training and experience of armed forces cannot be ignored.  
 
What should officers be studying?  The unique nature of the art and science of war justifies almost 
every conceivable subject in the education of officers.  Militaries themselves cannot translate their 
educational needs into coherent academic areas of focus.  Thus, it was argued that armed forces 
should study at least four core areas:  
 
• security as the defining higher order environment within which armed forces operate;  
• the bureaucratic and professional nature of military organisations;  
• war as the primary activity of armed forces; and  
• the battlefield and other operating environments within which military force are 
operationalised.   
 
                                                
142
 Haycock, RG, op. cit., p. 177. 
 117 
A broad overview of the educational focus of armed forces from different parts of the world 
confirms the need to focus on these four core educational requirements. 
 
To ensure that armed force is utilised for strategic effect and that the defence management of a 
nation, state, region or alliance is done in an efficient and effective manner, military leadership 
needs to clarify and understand the external context within which it needs to operate.  Security is 
the defining notion in the military’s understanding of their external environment.  It not only links the 
military to social, political and economic affairs, but also allows for sub-state, state, trans-state and 
global consideration thereof.  At the most basic theoretical level, security is probably the most 
important link in the Clausewitzian trinity – linking the military, the government and society.  An 
understanding of security provides officers with a unique understanding of the role of military force 
in support of society and under instruction of the polity. 
 
Traditionally, foreign threats, military capability and the decision-making capacity of states are at 
the heart of security.  Such an approach does not provide sufficient explanation for the African 
security problematique.  Any armed force who wants to be effective in Africa needs to educate its 
officers not only in the traditional understanding of security, but also the distinct feature of the 
African security environment.  It is an environment within which states and the military itself are 
often a central part of the security problematique; within which the social and economic challenges 
predominate; and within which the role of foreigners is usually destructive.  Education is the 
cardinal means for the development of the sensitivities and needs to ensure successful utilisation 
of armed forces in such a complex and challenging region. 
 
Education should also provide officers with an understanding of the careful organisational balance 
between the military as a bureaucracy and the military as a profession.  The military educational 
system should develop officers as military bureaucrats in order to ensure military organisations are 
well managed and efficient.  This is the only way through which the capacity for military force can 
be developed.  Military educational systems should develop officers, however, as military 
professionals in order to ensure military forces are well led and commanded, and are effective in 
doing what is required from military force in a strategic context.  This is the only way armed forces 
can ensure strategic effect through the employment of their inherent capability. 
  
As organisations, militaries are also confronted with very unique challenges in the post-modern 
environment.  The most outstanding is the rise to prominence of the need for so-called flexible 
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forces – dual role militaries – in an era in which the size (and capability) of military forces and 
budgets is declining.  The need for flexible forces is rooted in the increasing utilisation of the 
military in humanitarian, diplomacy and other missions – generally known as military operations 
other than war (MOOTW).  These missions are executed in view of rising public scepticism and 
apathy towards the military.  In all, these challenges brought to the fore the need for officers to take 
on the role of soldier-diplomats or soldier-scholars.  The need for soldier-diplomats or soldier-
scholars is rooted in a need for officers to approach the nature of their tasks in a more cognitive 
manner.  The internal management of military organisations is also much more complex since 
officers have to contend with challenges such as declining budgets and rising operational 
responsibilities, the outsourcing of certain military capabilities to civilian contractors and 
professions, and the integration of women, minorities and homosexuals into the military.  The 
academic preparation of officers is in the contemporary era, thus, not something that is in any 
doubt. 
 
Officers, though, cannot neglect the cognitive preparation for their primary role of warfighting.  
Militaries in particular should make an effort to steer away from their natural inclination to prepare 
for battle and to neglect the study of war.  This is not supposed to mean that militaries should 
neglect the training for battle.  Instead, the strategic success of the armed forces is as much 
dependent on the education of its leaders as on the training of those who are led.  The education 
of officers for war should be focused on an understanding of the nature thereof – an understanding 
of both its tangible and intangible, its mutable and immutable nature.  In short, officers should study 
both the science and the art of war. 
 
On the lower levels of command, a critical holistic understanding of the battlefield and physical 
operating environments should be the primary focus of officer education.  The academic 
preparation of officers for the operating environment should specifically focus on an understanding 
and development of tactics and technology; the study of geography, leadership and command; and 
the importance of cohesion and morale.  These are some of the most important elements that 
underpin a cognitive understanding of military forces on the lower levels of war. 
 
The second question addressed in this chapter concerned the way in which officers should be 
educated.  It was argued that there should be three specific focal points for education in the career 
path of officers: pre-commissioned basic military education, military doctrinal education and 
politico-military education.  In pre-commissioned basic military education, the focus needs to be on 
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training and academic education in preparation of a military career.  Once the officer has been 
commissioned, he needs to become an expert on military doctrine.  This requires the training of the 
officer in the tactical doctrine for success in the operating environment and the professional 
education of the officer in the operational doctrine to prepare him for operational staff or command.  
The last phase of officer education is the preparation of the officer for high command.  At this level, 
the focus should be on education, particularly academic education, to prepare the officer for the 
complexities with which he will have to deal with in the politico-military environment.  These 
different focal points in the making of officers made possible a meaningful integration of education, 
training and experience to equip officers with the necessary expertise needed at specific junctures 
in their careers.   
 
Furthermore, bringing the what to learn and the how to learn together, it is possible to develop a 
useable framework for the education, training and development of officers in armed forces.  Such a 
framework allows for the education of officers at a pre-commissioned level before they are trained, 
while at a doctrinal level it necessitates the training of members before they begin with professional 
military education.  Through the sequencing of these activities and a focus on the four core 
educational requirements that were identified, it is believed that the military will receive the “right” 
product from its educational system.  It will be a product that is well educated and trained and also 
rooted in the ethos, values and norms of the military profession.  The question that flows from this 
is whether the South African National Defence Force makes use of a well-structured educational 
framework, and if not, what should be done to bring the education, training and development of its 
officers in line with this particular framework?  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
THE PHILOSOPHY, STRUCTURE AND NATURE OF EDUCATION, 
TRAINING AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN NATIONAL 
DEFENCE FORCE  
 
I thought it was splendid, excellent.   
Thinking back the only thing they didn't teach us much about was soldiering 
Lt Col MRL Grove1 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In 2004, South Africa celebrated ten years of democracy and the South African National 
Defence Force (SANDF) looked back on ten years of “defence in a democracy” as outlined in 
the 1996 White Paper on Defence.2  Approved in May 1996, this White Paper aimed, inter alia, 
at the restoration of the military to its rightful place in society.  This required the simultaneous 
implementation of two seemingly divergent notions.  The military had to become less prominent 
in policy-making and societal processes, while at the same time, restore its legitimacy within the 
South African society.  Both these notions are contained in the traditional understanding of 
military professionalism and embedded in an educated military's understanding of its position 
and role in a democratic society.  This was no easy task as the former South African Defence 
Force (SADF) featured prominently in the preservation of the policy of apartheid.  At the same 
time, anti-apartheid revolutionary movements such as Umkhonto we Sizwe and Azanian 
People’s Liberation Army (APLA), who were outspokenly political and ideological instruments in 
service of revolutionary movements (the ANC and PAC respectively), had to reorient 
themselves as well.  
 
In the implementation of these notions the South African military had to shift its focus from a 
force with an offensive posture organised for defence of South Africa's territorial integrity to one 
with a defensive posture – becoming as Lindy Heinecken puts it, “… a military literally in search 
of a mission”.3  This shift was rooted in a debate concerning the dichotomy facing the SANDF: 
to what extent with its limited resources should it be directed towards maintaining the capability 
to execute the so-called primary function (warfighting), versus the necessity to execute so-called 
secondary functions (military operations other than war [MOOTW]).  This led Heinecken to the 
                                                
1
 A remark by a British officer reflecting on his military training and education before the Second World 
War.  See French, D, "Officer Education and Training in the British Regular Army, 1919-39", In 
Kennedy, GC & Nielson, K (eds.), Military Education: Past, Present, and Future, Praeger, 
Westport, 2002, p. 123. 
2
 South African Department of Defence, "Defence in a Democracy", South African White Paper on 
Defence, as approved by Parliament on 14 May 1996, 1 Military Printing Regiment. 
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question about the most traumatic process for the SANDF since 1994: redesigning the forces to 
cope with the new strategic environment, or adapting to the new political climate?4 
 
Since its inception in 1994, the SANDF has focused almost exclusively on structural issues.  
This included the integration of pre-1994 belligerent forces into a cohesive defence force, the 
transformation of the military to reflect the democratic ethos of society, organisational 
restructuring to fit a declining defence budget, and doctrinal changes to reflect South Africa's 
new role on the African continent.  The doctrinal changes, in particular, were augmented on the 
basis of a rising need in the SANDF to understand South Africa's new geo-strategic position and 
role, which included an understanding of Africa, of South Africa's interests and those of its 
partners in the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and the African Union (AU), 
and of the threats to these interests and the constraints on South Africa's ability to deal with the 
threats.  This took place against the background of a realisation of the importance to balance 
representivity in the SANDF, while retaining expertise and professionalism. 
 
This chapter aims at providing a broad introductory overview of the nature, structure and 
philosophy of Education, Training and Development (ETD) in the South African National 
Defence Force.  The discussion is introduced with an overview of educational, geo-strategic and 
policy changes and challenges in South Africa in general and the SANDF in particular.  This is 
followed by an in-depth discussion of the history of education in the South African military in 
general from both a statutory and non-statutory perspective.  The chapter, lastly, provides a 
broad outline of the process and structure of education in the SANDF at present by making use 
of the framework presented in the previous chapter.  The discussion does not aim at providing 
an in-depth analysis of the curriculum of the different institutions.  Rather, an effort is made to 
highlight the changes that were made in the curriculum of these institutions since 1994.  The 
chapter concludes with an analysis of (some of) the factors or issues that have driven and 
influenced ETD in the South African military since 1994.   
 
The discussion serves as a broad background and general introduction for an analysis of the 
position and role of the South African Military Academy in the next two chapters.  The chapter 
follows the international division of armed forces as consisting of land, maritime and air forces.  
The South African Medical Service (SAMS) is thus deliberately excluded from the discussion.5  
The critical approach that is followed throughout the discussion is not intended to be negative.  
                                                                                                                                                          
3
 Heinecken, L, “South Africa’s Armed forces in Transition: Adapting to the New Strategic and Political 
Environment”, Society in Transition, Vol 36, No 1, 2005, p. 2. 
4
 Ibid., pp. 1 & 3. 
5
 Most of the ETD that is done in the SAMS relates to professional education of medical personnel, i.e. 
doctors and nurses. 
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Rather, it is believed that the criticism will, as Churchill believed, serve the same function as 
pain in the sense that it hurts, but more importantly, that it identifies that which needs attention. 
 
4.2 THE SOUTH AFRICAN EDUCATIONAL ENVIRONMENT: DEMARCATING THE 
CHALLENGE OF EDUCATION, TRAINING AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE SANDF 
 
The history of education in South Africa in general and in the military is complex.  During the 
apartheid era, education in South Africa in general was conditioned by two considerations.  The 
whole system of apartheid, on the one hand, was designed largely to serve the interests of the 
white minority.6  Consequently, the apartheid state “… limit[ed] African education to the needs of 
the white community”,7 so-called “gutter education”.8  A very prominent South African historian, 
Herman Giliomee, argued that, “… by modernizing the provision of education to the 
subordinates (black South Africans), however incomplete, the apartheid state was sowing the 
seeds of its own destruction” [emphasis added].9  It should, however, also be noted that 
irrespective of the use of black education for its own purposes, the apartheid state did improve 
the general educational situation of the South African black population.  In 1948, only 24 
percent of blacks of school-going age were enrolled in schools compared to 84 percent in 1994.  
The revolutionaries fighting the apartheid government, on the other hand, used education to 
mobilise the masses with the idea of liberation before education.  Mobilisation of the youth of 
school-going age was an important part of the internal dimension of the struggle against 
apartheid.  A whole generation of people in the aftermath of the 1976 Soweto riots refused to 
return to school or attended only intermittently and had difficulty assuring work in the formal 
economy.  This so-called “lost generation” was due to become an (educational) problem for the 
pre- and post-1994 governments in South Africa.10   
 
It is thus no wonder that education in South Africa during the first ten years of democracy was 
one of the most controversial (political) issues in society as the government tried to give as 
great a proportion as possible of the South African society access to quality education.  This 
transformation was undertaken against an international change in student populations that was 
seen as a revolution in itself.  Indeed, the traditional character and culture of higher education 
world-wide changed dramatically over the last decade or more.  The digital revolution and 
globalisation created for the first time a new world of education and knowledge without borders.  
                                                
6
 Meredith, M, The State of Africa: A History of Fifty Years of Independence, Jonathan Ball, 
Johannesburg, 2005, p. 647. 
7
 Ibid., p. 419. 
8
 Giliomee, H, The Afrikaners: Biography of a People, Tafelberg, Cape Town, 2003, p. 509. 
9
 Ibid., p. 507. 
10
 Ibid., p. 613. 
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Together with the lifting of academic sanctions against South Africa, these trends provided new 
momentum to change.  In South Africa, these changes were brought about without any serious 
or major (racial) turbulence on any of its campuses.11     
 
The post-1994 government inherited a fragmented educational system based on race, ethnicity 
and language.  South Africa had a scientific system of relative high quality with South African 
academics and scientists respected internationally.  The system was, however, mainly directed 
towards the social well-being of white South Africans in general and defence research in 
particular.  There was an urgent need in the educational sphere since 1994 to redeploy, re-
equip, re-plan, and reconstruct.12  Since 1994, the trend has been towards the reintegration of 
South African higher education with global trends.  Key milestones have been the publication of 
the report of the National Commission on Higher Education in 199613, the White Paper14 and 
Higher Education Act of 199715, and the release of the National Plan for Higher Education in 
2001.16  The 1997 White Paper and Higher Education Act of 1997 form the basis for the creation 
of a single, national, co-ordinated system of education instead of the 15 independent structures 
under apartheid.17   
 
Jansen, however, pointed out that managerial, cultural, behavioural, and symbolic changes in 
the South African educational system needed to be balanced with the necessity for universities 
to be world-class research institutions embedded in a curriculum and culture that is global, 
inclusive and competitive in orientation towards national, regional and continental 
developmental problems.18  Smit argues that sound educational policies were not always 
producing the required outcomes: “Gebrek aan ervaring en kapasiteit het egter veroorsaak dat 
die komplekse beleidsvoorstelle, sterk uit die buiteland beïnvloed en deur intellektuele burokrate 
ontwerp, moeilik toegepas word”.19  The idea of outcome-based education seems to be a good 
example in this regard.   
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 Smit, F, “Hoër Onderwys kry A’s en E’s.  Baie Vernuwing, Maar Oorhastige Besluite Rig Skade Aan”, 
Die Burger, 5 March 2005, p. 15. 
12
 De Vries, A, “SA Skole sal so moet herskik, herbeplan”, Rapport, Vol 36, No 29, 17 July 2005, p. 4. 
13
 South African Ministry of Education, National Commission on Higher Education, Report: A Framework 
for Transformation, HSRC Publications, Pretoria, 1996. 
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 South African Ministry of Education, White Paper on Higher Education Transformation, Pretoria, 1996. 
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 South African Ministry of Education, Higher Education Act No. 101 of 1997, Government Gazette No. 
18515, Notice 1655, Government Printers, Pretoria, 19 December 1997. 
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 South African Ministry of Education, National Plan for Higher Education, Pretoria, 2001. 
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 South African Ministry of Education, Higher Education Act No. 101 of 1997, Government Gazette No. 
18515, Notice 1655, Government Printers, Pretoria, 19 December 1997. 
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 Jansen, J, “Die Verhaal van Twee Kampusse – Een Wit, die Ander Swart”, Rapport Perspektief, 6 
March 2005, p. vi. 
19
 Smit, F, “Hoër Onderwys kry A’s en E’s.  Baie Vernuwing, Maar Oorhastige Besluite Rig Skade Aan”, 
op. cit. 
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Changes in the higher education and scientific systems had to be directed towards the main 
objectives of transformation: creating a better standard of living for all the inhabitants of South 
Africa and raising the country’s international competitiveness.  The need to give a greater 
number of South Africans from disadvantaged societies access to higher education was 
probably the biggest driver in the transformation process.  By 2000 the percentage of black 
students attending university has risen from 32 percent of the total number of university 
students in South Africa in 1990, to 60 percent.  At technicons20, it changed from 32 percent in 
1990 to 72 percent in 2000.  The number of white students decreased with 60 000 between 
1993 and 1999.  This figure is even higher for 1994.  However, it is an open question whether 
these changes were brought about through governmental policy measures or through the 
initiatives of educational institutions themselves.  Some academics are of the opinion that the 
higher educational institutions contributed more to these changes than did government policy.21  
In addition, these figures were augmented through a natural progression of students from 
previous disadvantaged (black) educational institutions to the traditional white institutions that 
were seen as having a higher standard of education.   
 
Financial challenges – the need to do more with less – were also one of the primary drivers 
behind the restructuring of education and the provision of specifically higher education.  
Financial considerations were linked to two very specific questions concerning higher education 
in South Africa: firstly, to what extent should higher education be of a general formative nature 
(algemeen vormende aard) and, secondly, should universities be responsible for vocational-
oriented courses (beroepsgerigte kursusse)?22  This is precisely the challenge that militaries 
face in the education of their personnel.  Needless to say that in society in general vocational-
oriented education is demand- and market-driven.  However, academics in the more traditional 
formative sciences – languages, history, philosophy, mathematics – are increasingly concerned 
about the “de-scientification” of universities.  Burger,23 for example, argued that the monetary 
value of knowledge became increasingly more important with the academic freedom associated 
with universities under pressure and being questioned.  In the long run this emphasised the 
need for research that is of immediate value and utility – so-called contract research – at tertiary 
institutions.  Thus, he warns, research will in future only be directed at those with money to 
make even more money.  The course content at universities similarly will be determined through 
the interest of those with money.   
 
                                                
20
 All the technicons in South African have been transformed over the last four years into what is now 
known as Universities of Technology. 
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 Ibid. 
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 De Vries, A, “Eers Huiswerk, Dán Studeer”, Rapport, 23 October 2005, p. 19. 
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 Burger, W, “Strewe na Wins nie Universiteit se Doel”, Rapport Perspektief, 20 February 2005, p. i. 
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All these changes did not necessarily create a more effective educational system in South 
Africa.  Smit specifically points out that the South African research output is declining with a rise 
in the research output of academics older that 50.  This, he argues, is the result of a number of 
factors including a rising lecturing burden for academics, a general brain drain from South Africa 
in general since the early 1990s, salary handicaps that result in more academic personnel doing 
contract research, research of questionable quality being done by some academics, and a 
number of specifically young white academics who do not see a future for themselves in the 
South African academic and scientific environment.  Since 1992, South Africa has dropped 19 
places on the world competitive index with the country’s contribution to scientific journals that 
was surpassed by 12 other countries.  No other country in the world has seen such a decline.24 
 
The number of participating registered students in the higher education system as a percentage 
of the total number of the population aged 20 to 24 has declined from 17 percent in 1993 to 16 
percent in 2000.  The target of 20 percent that the South African government has set for itself 
has not been reached.  The ability to keep students in the system has also declined.  
Approximately 40 percent of all first-year students fail while only 15 percent of all students 
graduate annually.  If the target of 20 percent graduation is reached, 30 000 more students will 
graduate from the system.  The objective of directing more students towards science, 
engineering and technology is not reached, with only 26 percent of all students graduating from 
these fields of study.  More than 52 percent of all students still graduate from human science 
fields of study while unemployment of graduates has became a new phenomenon in the South 
African labour market.  This is especially true of graduates from the historically black universities 
in South Africa.25 
 
A recent research report prepared for the Council of Higher Education noted that contemporary 
South African higher education has lost some of its notoriously unique characteristics that 
defined it during the apartheid era.  While the major post-apartheid challenges of access and 
equity remain, current South African debates about educational governance mirror the issues 
that are currently more generally in higher education and, in particular, the concern to develop 
appropriate models of governance at the institutional level, and appropriate relationships 
between the state and the higher education sector as a whole.26 
    
                                                
24
 Smit, F, “Verdwyn SA agter Internasional Wetenskap Horison?”, Die Burger, 8 December 2004, p. 15. 
25
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In this regard, it is important to emphasise the role of education in the broader South African 
society as it relates to education in the military.  Education plays a fundamental role in the 
interplay between the military and the broader society.  As Showalter27 explains, education 
provides credibility at all levels of society at large as a mark of merit.  In short, education in the 
SANDF – and with that the role of the military as an educator – underpins the standing of the 
military in the eyes of the broader South African society.  This is an extremely important notion 
in South Africa, since unequal access to jobs and education and, consequently, extreme levels 
of income inequality were among the defining characteristics of apartheid.28  As a result, the 
provision of military education will determine the success of the SANDF in the same manner 
that the provision of education in general is at the heart of a successful New South Africa.  
 
4.3 EDUCATING THE SANDF WITHIN A CHANGING GEO-STRATEGIC AND POLICY 
ENVIRONMENT 
 
From a politico-strategic perspective, the world has been transformed over the last two 
decades.  The end of the Cold War and the 9/11 attacks stand out as defining moments 
ushering in eras of rethinking and reorientating security.  New technology has accelerated 
globalisation, while regionalism has offered new alternatives for states in the international 
arena.  New threats have emerged, expanding the continuum of conflict.  The demise of 
superpower influence and the end of apartheid in Africa have removed ideological boundaries, 
producing fertile circumstances for power struggles along tribal, ethical and religious grounds.  
Wars over resources and warlordism have risen to prominence.  Thus, intra-state conflicts with 
surprisingly little inter-state conflict still characterise the battlefields of the African continent.29     
 
As in most new democracies, the first democratic government in South Africa has had to deal 
with a vast array of problems.  Very few, if any, of these problems were of a military nature. 
South Africa did not face any significant traditional direct (military) threat from either the 
international or domestic environment.  South African political, security and strategic thought 
and approaches therefore tended to be idealistic in nature.  There was a deliberate effort to 
steer away from a more competitive, realist, nationalistic outlook on domestic and international 
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security affairs.30  Ferreira and Henk specifically point out that South Africa has strenuously 
eschewed any appearance of unilateralism in the use of its military forces and that the country 
has gone the “extra mile” to depict itself as a cooperative regional partner.31  Such an approach 
is understandable, given apartheid South Africa’s history of the securocratisation32 and 
militarisation of society and the cancerous role of the apartheid government’s security forces in 
the region.33   
 
A great number of policy documents outlining the government’s approach in dealing with 
security and military affairs have been produced since 1994.  Most noticeable are the White 
Papers on Defence, Defence Related Industries in South Africa, and South African Participation 
in International Peace Missions.  These documents were created in the aftermath of the 
publication of the 1993 and 1994 annual Human Development Reports of the United Nations 
Development Programme that promulgated the “human security” paradigm.34  The idea of 
human security was quickly embraced by a South Africa in search of a new security paradigm.  
As a result, most of the South African security-related policy documents were rooted in the idea 
of human security in general and non-offensive defence or non-threatening defence in 
particular.35  This actually translates into a human security approach domestically and a 
collaborative security approach externally.36  These notions, Ferreira and Henk argues, direct 
attention away from the military and other traditional security instruments towards those that 
most directly promote development, opportunity and well-being of local communities and 
individual citizens.37    
 
It is, however, important to note that it is extremely difficult to “operationalise” human and 
collaborative security and to translate such complex, ambitious concepts into policy that 
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mobilises institutions, instruments and sectors.38  Thus, even in a scenario where human 
security seems to be the overarching organising idea, military power maintains its characteristic 
as the last option instrument of security.  This line of reasoning most probably explains the 
recognition by the South African government that, irrespective of its very idealistic policy outlook 
on peace and security, “bad times will return”.39  The underlying argument is that even peace 
has to be secured on a war-torn continent like Africa and that the best way to do this is to have 
a professional, competent military force at hand.  As Gray points out, there are rare occasions 
when force, and only force, can satisfy the security needs of a nation.  This view is closely 
linked to the German view that you always have an army on your soil – either your own or 
someone else’s.  From this perspective, armed forces are like an airbag in your car – generally 
unneeded but life-preserving on that one day in a thousand when the peril is truly acute.40  This 
need for and role of well-prepared professional military forces in society are not always well 
understood in Africa.41   
 
It is also critical for the New South Africa to recognise the importance of understanding, 
articulating and debating the complexities of security, strategic, defence and military affairs in a 
democratic society – especially if security is structured around such an ambiguous notion like 
human security.  Underlying this notion is the importance of a public discourse on security, 
defence and military matters guided by informed assumptions.  In any democratic society, new 
ones like South Africa in particular, this is an especially important notion, since it is driven by the 
need to foster a culture of transparency, and of free and open debate on security, defence and 
military matters.  Such a debate is in itself an important component of the human security 
agenda.  Not only should the military be an important locus of such a discourse, it should also 
be an active participant in the debate.  The record that the SANDF has built up in this regard 
over the last ten years is not very positive.42   
 
The South African Constitution, adopted by Parliament on 8 May 1996, identifies education in 
the preamble as a national imperative by indicating that one of the purposes of the constitution 
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is to “… improve the quality of life of all citizens and free the potential of each person”.  Chapter 
11 dictates that "[t]he security services must act, and must teach43 and require their members to 
act in accordance with the Constitution and the Law, including customary international law and 
international agreements binding on the Republic" [emphasis added].44  The Constitution also 
states that the SANDF should be structured and managed as a disciplined force.  Its primary 
object is to defend and protect the Republic, its territorial integrity and its people in accordance 
with the Constitution and the principles of international law.  It is obvious that the Constitution 
requires SANDF members to have a higher order understanding of their operating environment 
than that which is normally provided through training.  This includes inter alia an understanding 
of the Constitution itself, an in-depth knowledge of South Africa and its people, and geo-
strategic insights into national and international laws that govern South Africa as part of the 
global union of nations.   
 
The 1996 South African White Paper on Defence was titled “Defence in a Democracy”.45  The 
title itself provides some indication of what is expected from the SANDF in general and its officer 
cadre in particular: a higher order comprehension of both the ideas of defence and democracy 
and how these two concepts relate to one another.  This is only possible if the officer corps is 
educated in a holistic understanding of both notions and of what is required in order to 
operationalise these notions within the South African military.  The South African White Paper 
on Defence, under a heading titled "Education and Training", also indicates that education and 
training are cardinal means of building and maintaining a high level of professionalism in the 
armed forces.46  The White Paper furthermore stipulates that the SANDF should be capable of 
executing its tasks effectively and efficiently.  The need for the SANDF to be a well-educated 
armed force is implicit in these provisions.  The use of the words “effective” and “efficient” in the 
military context is also important since it highlights the bureaucratic and the professional nature 
of the South African military (see Chapter 3).  The stipulation in the South African White Paper 
on Defence therefore emphasises the need for bureaucratic and professional military education 
in the SANDF as a policy imperative. 
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To a large extent, the White Paper on Defence also laid the foundation for the role of the military 
in South Africa’s foreign policy, i.e. foreign policy largely demarcates the responsibilities of the 
armed forces of a country.47  This means that an analysis of the foreign policy of a country may 
provide a good indication of what its military should prepare for, as well as how and for what it 
should educate and train.  
 
Since 1994, the South African foreign policy in general was rooted in a quest for a truly African 
identity on account of its role in the post-apartheid era and in a search for a sense of belonging 
and legitimacy on the African continent.  This gave rise to a broad range of Afro-centric foreign 
policies and the SANDF being an instrument for the enhancement of South Africa's influence 
and prestige on the continent.  The enhanced credibility serves as “… a great source of political 
leverage on the continental bargaining table”.48  This manifests itself inter alia in South Africa 
being named as the seat for the African Parliament, South Africa playing a prominent role in the 
African Union, and in support for South Africa’s bid for a permanent seat in the United Nations 
Security Council.  These initiatives were backed by South African endeavours to create peace 
and stability on a war-torn continent and were rooted in South Africa’s belief that a strong and 
safe Africa will translate in its own strength and safety.   
 
President Thabo Mbeki, like Nelson Mandela before him, personified South African foreign 
policy.49  In international affairs, Nathan argues, Mbeki is as much an ideologist as a pragmatist.  
Ideologically, Mbeki’s outlook is rooted in three paradigms: democracy, Africanism and anti-
imperialism.  Lathan argues that the Africanist and anti-imperialist paradigms are seldom if ever 
in conflict with one another.  However, it is maintained that both these notions are often in 
conflict with the democratic paradigm, and in most cases democracy falls by the wayside if 
tension arises.50  The decision to become involved in Lesotho, Burundi and the DRC but not in 
Zimbabwe, is a prime example of such an inconsistency.  An emphasis on conflict-resolution, 
peacekeeping, good governance, and the promotion of national interests conditioned foreign 
policy under Mbeki from a more pragmatic realist perspective.51  It was these more practical 
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features of the South African foreign policy that conditioned the SANDF’s external involvement 
in Africa in particular.   
 
It is clear from South African foreign policy initiatives that the demands placed on the leaders of 
the SANDF since its inception has grown in scope and intensity.  These demands extend well 
beyond the traditional responsibility of preparing forces for and executing combat and other 
types of operations.  Since 1994, the SANDF has had to deal with unique internal structural and 
external strategic challenges.  Yet, the history of the post-apartheid period in South and 
Southern Africa has reinforced the need for military officers who are not only technically and 
tactically proficient, but also well versed in strategy, history, geo-politics and, in particular, in the 
complex cultures and politics of the African continent.  In broad, the higher order policy 
environment confronted the SANDF from an educational perspective with two particular sets of 
simultaneous challenges, namely – 
 
 the need to promote greater representivity and therefore to accommodate a larger 
and more diverse student population; and 
 the need for a well balanced, modern, affordable and technologically advanced 
military force, capable of executing a wide range of tasks effectively and efficiently in 
a very fluid (human?) security environment like the African continent.52 
 
4.4 THE HISTORICAL LEGACIES OF EDUCATION IN THE INTEGRATED ARMED 
FORCES: A DISDAIN FOR EDUCATION 
 
No comprehension of ETD in the SANDF is possible without taking note of the history of 
education in the old South African military and in the guerrilla forces that were brought together 
in the new South African military.  This discussion aims at giving a brief exposition of education 
in these forces as well as the need for education in the SANDF since 1994. 
 
4.4.1 Education in the South African Defence Force 
 
The Union Defence Force (1912-1961) and the South African Defence Force (1961-1994) were 
born out of the struggle for political and cultural domination between the two white races in 
South Africa – the Afrikaners (Boers) and the English.  The widely divergent military traditions of 
the English and the Afrikaners had to be reconciled in thinking, organisation and training in the 
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development of these forces.53  The organisational culture of the Union and the South African 
Defence Force (SADF) was, thus, an interesting blend of British military regimentalism and Boer 
frontierism.  By 1994, the SADF was the largest, most up-to-date, and most organisationally 
sophisticated military force in Southern Africa.54  The collective memory of this force was 
shaped primarily by its participation in three wars – the First and Second World Wars and in 
what in South Africa became known as the “Border War”.55  However, the military were 
employed within the country’s borders on various occasions since the early 1960s and almost 
permanently since the early 1980s.  It conducted these operations with reluctance and saw the 
South African Police as the primary actor in this drama.  The SADF was strongly influenced by 
the French experience, specifically in Algeria, and it can be argued that the military was afraid of 
political contamination through participation in internal operations.56  In the 1970s and 1980s, 
the SADF as an organisation focused primarily on what it considered to be its focus of main 
effort – the external campaign against the ANC, the counter-insurgency campaign in Namibia, 
and its conventional operations in support of UNITA57 in Angola.   
 
The military nonetheless featured very prominently in sustaining the apartheid system and, 
though it was professional and effective by international standards, became politically 
contaminated.  The SADF employed non-whites in various roles.  Its leaders, however, in 
general were unwilling to mobilise the non-white South African majority to fight the country’s 
regional and internal wars.  The idea of part-time soldiering (the nation-in-arms concept), 
characteristic of most frontier societies in the world, was an important part of the history of the 
white (Afrikaner) population and determined to a large extent the composition of the SADF.  
Hence, structurally the SADF was organised around part-time, (possibly better educated) white 
regimentalised citizen-soldiers.  Huge numbers of university graduates were conscripted each 
year, while senior academics, industrialists and business people served in the reserve force 
regiments and commandoes – mostly in a leadership capacity.  This interaction with the broader 
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well-educated part of the South African society positively influenced the intellectual 
organisational climate in the SADF in general.58 
 
This, however, was truncated by another characteristic of frontier societies – the can-do 
mentality.  In the SADF, this characteristic was institutionalised through the well-known 
Afrikaans notion of “’n boer maak ‘n plan”.59  The influence of well-educated reserve forces with 
a can-do mentality had a profound defining influence on the organisational culture and climate 
of the SADF.  The can-do mentality emphasising training and experience in particular 
transformed the SADF into a very tactically and operationally minded force.   
 
In general, education in the SADF was seen as a “nice to have”.  Education was never an 
integral part of the career paths of its officers.  The SADF, in essence, was a warfighting force 
with an emphasis on operational and tactical matters,60 or, as Seegers explains, “military 
experience counted more than intellectual or staff ability” and “the action was in the line”.61  The 
SADF favoured tactical training and experience.  Only a few members of the SADF (the 
generals sitting on the State Security Council, in particular) involved themselves with the 
broader political, strategic and economic challenges of the apartheid state.  For the greater part 
of the SADF it was a matter of focusing on the immediate operational and tactical challenges 
with which it was confronted.  Indeed, it can be argued that this attitude was reflected in the 
findings of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa.  The SADF, in short, had 
no real culture of military education.  Visser, for example, points out that by June 1991 only 
about 37% of the SADF officers with the rank of Brigadier General and higher were graduates of 
the Military Academy and very few had any post-graduate qualifications.62  The Military 
Academy did not even offer a course in strategy until 1991.  In fact, no military-related subjects 
were compulsory for any student at the Military Academy.63  This made it possible to graduate 
from the Academy without any military-related education – almost like a medical school where 
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graduates have not received any medical education!  Officers in the SADF who were seen as 
being too academically inclined were considered unsuitable for command positions.64   
 
It is interesting to note that the well-known South African military commentator, Helmoed-Römer 
Heitman, published an article in Militaria in 1980 titled “Is the Army Literate?”65  Heitman 
concluded that the SADF neither read nor wrote and that it was suffering from mental 
stagnation.  He identified three possible reasons for officers in the SADF neither reading nor 
writing:  
 
• the bureaucratic process to obtain security clearance for anything that was written;  
• the absence of suitable local military journals; and  
• the absence of any professional, financial or other form of incentive.   
 
In the end, the emphasis on training and experience in the SADF, together with a can-do-
mentality, resulted in a very tactically minded force, even to the extent that regular officers in 
general were politically very naive.66  It can be argued that such an approach suited the 
strategic purposes of the time.67  However, since the officers did not read or write, professional 
(military) knowledge was not widely shared within and outside the SADF and, in fact, had very 
little depth.  One analyst, for example, pointed out that officers in the SADF “… spent far more 
time discussing the sport field than the battlefield”.68  Moorcraft in particular argues that there 
was “… a dearth of competent strategic studies specialists in South Africa” during that time.  He 
compares South Africa with Israel, a country whose security also did not allow for much 
manoeuvring during the 1980s but where strategic studies specialists flourished.69  
 
4.4.2 Education of the non-statutory forces that fought the apartheid state 
 
What about the non-statutory forces70 that fought the apartheid state’s military machine and 
became part of the SANDF after 1994?  Most of these non-statutory forces came from a 
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revolutionary environment.  Revolutionary wars by nature necessitate a political and strategic 
orientation.  Revolutionaries do not become politically and strategically minded through training 
and tactical experience in warfighting.  World-wide and throughout history, revolutionary armies 
have been known for their political education or rather political indoctrination.  Liebenberg, for 
example, argues that revolutionary soldiers do not only “… have a broader understanding of the 
political world” but they are also “… more analytical, creative, adaptive, and pragmatic”.71  This 
was indeed the case in South Africa.  However, given that military expertise is the result of the 
interplay between military experience, training and education, military education – through 
political indoctrination – alone does not epitomise real professional military knowledge.   
 
The ideological basis of the struggle against apartheid included a strong element of Marxism 
that was reinforced by training in communist countries.72  The non-statutory forces who were 
integrated into the SANDF were highly politicised73 and very “streetwise”.74  For decades, part of 
their ingrained culture had been to resist, defy, test, protest and challenge official authority.  
Thus, questions should be asked about their military training, expertise and experience.  Some 
of these forces were trained and (in some cases) educated in various places in the world.75  
This provided them with a broader worldview than most of their colleagues from the SADF.  A 
senior officer from one of the armed forces of the former Warsaw Pact though pointed out that 
these countries did not always have a clear understanding of what kind of military training to 
give to these cadres from Africa.  The result was, he explained, that they concentrated in most 
cases on the political indoctrination of these forces.76    
 
Meredith maintains that the value of the armed struggle against the apartheid state was rooted 
in its high propaganda value aimed at re-establishing a political following among the black 
population and raising its morale.  Though it may be that Meredith confuses the aim of the 
struggle with its outcome, he nonetheless argues that the purpose of the armed struggle was 
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not to threaten the South African economy or white security.77  Consequently, Crocker argues, 
the ANC’s “armed struggle” never amounted to anything more than a costly inconvenience to 
the security forces of the apartheid state.  This inconvenience, Crocker maintains, was gradually 
eliminated during the course of the 1980s.78  Alden, thus, describes the armed struggle against 
the apartheid regime as nothing more than a campaign of “armed propaganda.”79  The reality of 
the military struggle against the apartheid state was rooted in the difficulty of confronting the 
(relative effective) apartheid military machine and its offensive approach in which the SADF tried 
to take the fight to foreign soil – South Africa's neighbouring states to be specific.  There should, 
thus, be serious doubts about the real tactical warfighting experience of the majority of the non-
statutory force members who were integrated into the SANDF.  It is accepted, though, that 
some non-statutory force members were trained and gained tactical experience in fighting 
revolutionary wars in places like Angola.   
 
Perlmutter and Bennet explain the challenge that revolutionary forces, like the non-statutory 
forces that were integrated into the SANDF, pose to a professional armed force: 
  
The dilemma of the military in postrevolutionary times is that the revolutionary 
soldiers must be politically disarmed and professionally re-armed.  The transition for 
revolutionary soldiers is difficult, especially for those officers who become romantic 
and nostalgic for the heady revolutionary days.  Soldiers, like party ideologists who 
find themselves bored and impatient with the mundane chores of government, 
become political liabilities for the regime.  On the whole, government finds 
alternative roles for them; but if they insist on continued military service, they must 
submit to the professionalization and routinization process that engulfs the military in 
the postrevolutionary period.  Ideally, the postrevolutionary army should become 
routinized, depoliticized, and professionalized.80   
 
The revolutionary forces’ lack of knowledge and experience of the nature and functioning of a 
bureaucratised military was recognised by the ANC’s Umkhonto we Sizwe when they began 
their discussions and negotiations with the SADF after the disbanding of the ANC in 1990.  This 
was, for example, one of the primary reasons for the creation of the Military Research Group 
(MRG) before 1994.  As Cawthra points out, the MRG filled the need in the ANC in terms of a 
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defence transformation planning capacity and many of its recommendations were used (almost 
verbatim) in negations with the SADF and government, for ANC conferences and, after the ANC 
came to power, for policy documents.81  Furthermore, Umkhonto we Sizwe’s inclination to 
consider anyone a member who claimed to be so, baffled the bureaucratised military planners 
of the SADF/SANDF.82  This bureaucratic impecuniousness was also clearly evident from the 
inability of the revolutionary forces to produce a Certified Personnel Register in 1993, although, 
it should be added that, for obvious political and other reasons they were probably reluctant to 
place such a register in the hands of the South African military of the time.83  Frankel in addition 
points out that Umkhonto we Sizwe did not have the “administrative capacity” to provide full 
details of its arms – stored or hidden – whilst it also accepted the strategic planning process in 
use by the SANF.84  In fact, Cawthra argues it will be more correct to talk about the absorption 
of the guerrilla forces into the bureaucratised South African military than to talk about the 
integration of the different forces into one statutory armed force.  These forces had problems 
accommodating themselves to a conventional (bureaucratised) armed force.85    
 
To conclude, the argument by Perlmutter and Bennet was as true of the non-statutory forces in 
South Africa as it is for any other revolutionary soldiers.  Indeed, some analysts are of the 
opinion that most of the non-statutory forces personnel “… were not suitable for a modern 
conventional army”.86  Others, like Liebenberg, argued that they were more intellectually inclined 
and “… greatly enrich[ed] the conventional defence community”.87  It is nevertheless true that 
these forces were not used to operating in and as a professional bureaucratised military force.  
The former non-statutory members that became part of the SANDF after 1994, thus, not only 
had to be professionalised; they also had to be bureaucratised.  The training and education they 
received were very ad hoc and not rooted in a process of progression, correlation and cohesion 
throughout the whole of their careers.  This is probably the core characteristic of the framework 
of academic and professional military education and training outlined in Chapter 3.  There is 
thus no doubt that the integration of these former revolutionary soldiers into the newly created 
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SANDF required a high emphasis on ETD in an effort to “… disarm them politically and re-arm 
them professionally”.88   
 
The history of education and training in both the former statutory and non-statutory forces in 
South Africa highlights the reality that the SANDF in world terms lags behind most modern 
bureaucratic armed forces in terms of the educational profile of its officers.89  Although these 
forces were well trained and (sometimes) effective, neither the SADF nor the guerrilla forces 
that fought the apartheid state had an intellectual foundation rooted in a strong tradition of 
military education.  Since 1994, the new military in South Africa had to deal with these 
challenges in the development of its human resources. 
 
4.4.3 Education in the South African National Defence Force: Quo vadis? 
 
Cawthra points out there was in reality a very high level of continuity between the SANDF90 and 
the SADF.91  After 1994, the tradition of education as a “nice to have” was carried over to the 
SANDF.  One analyst pointed out that the SANDF, like the SADF, did not commission officers – 
it “… trained functionaries, uniformed civil servants”.92  Education is still not an integral part of 
the career of an officer in terms of being institutionalised and thus a requirement to become an 
officer or for promotion to higher rank.  There are, though, a noticeable number of officers who 
have embarked on academic studies at tertiary institutions throughout the country since 1994.93  
The 2003/2004 annual report of the Department of Defence gave an indication of the number of 
its members who had involved themselves during that particular year with some form of 
academic studies: 
 
• full-time tertiary studies at military institutions (like the Military Academy): 434 
• full-time tertiary studies at external academic institutions: 717 
• part-time tertiary studies at military institutions (like the Military Academy): 225 
• part-time tertiary studies at external academic institutions: 3 33494 
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It is impossible to tell how many of these students are in fact uniformed members of the 
Department of Defence and how many are officers in the SANDF.  Taking into account the total 
strength of the SANDF, it is clear that not a large percentage of members are engaged in 
academic studies – about 6,2 percent.95  It should also be kept in mind that the majority of these 
studies fall outside the realm of the study of security, strategic and military affairs.  One analyst, 
for example, indicates that the SANDF has an “… MBA culture” and that “… many of the 
military’s generals … seem to have an unhealthy obsession with the management sciences”.96  
This view should be linked to the fact that academic qualifications are not held in high regard 
and are not a requirement for promotion in the SANDF as yet.97  From this perspective it seems 
as if most of the studying in the SANDF is done by credential-craving opportunistic individuals. 
 
Since 1994, professional military education in the South African military was required to unite 
and build a single cohesive defence force, to redress the wrongs of the past and to restructure 
and transform the defence force for the future.  These, primarily, were the needs that brought 
members of the different pre-1994 belligerent forces together in the classrooms of the newly 
created SANDF.  It was primarily in the classrooms of the different ETD institutions that most of 
the members of the pre-1994 belligerent forces were introduced to each other for the first time.  
It was in these institutions that they were first confronted by their fears, where prejudices and 
old views were challenged and where a new team spirit was developed.98  These ETD 
institutions, therefore, needed to be robust enough not only to provide ETD in the traditional 
sense of the word, but also to address and facilitate a completely different set of dynamics 
before and as part of the educational process.  The South African Military Psychological 
Institute played a cardinal role in helping ETD institutions to deal with these processes.99    
 
The South African government placed a very high premium on the availability of military forces 
for peace missions as visible proof of its collaborative security agenda in and commitment to 
Africa.  This had a profound influence on force preparation in the SANDF.  Thus, the need to 
prepare for peace missions was a prominent driver of ETD in the SANDF since 1994.  
Neethling, for example, highlighted the fact that the ETD of SANDF officers continued to focus 
on conventional warfighting but also commented that there was a growing emphasis on the 
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preparation for so-called Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW).100  The South African 
Minister of Defence specifically pointed out that the SANDF needs “… a professional body of 
men and women, schooled in the arts of defence, who can use their skills in peacekeeping roles 
and post-conflict reconstruction and development”.  He further argued that “… the key to 
successful peacekeeping was to provide multi-disciplinary training (sic) for our officer corps”.101   
 
The White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Missions specifically 
stipulates that South African forces participating in international peace missions should be well 
equipped and trained “… to the highest standards”.  The White Paper also indicates that the 
development of personnel should be encouraged through attendance of peacekeeping-related 
courses in foreign countries with the aim of building up a pool of knowledge and expertise 
among officers and soldiers to enrich the quality of existing and planned training programmes 
for peace operations.102  It should be noted that education is an important tool in providing 
officers with the political, cultural, linguistic, geographical and other knowledge that is needed 
for successful peace missions.  This should, however, be augmented with a rigorous training 
programme to inculcate the military and other skills required for the execution of typical peace 
support tasks: cease-fire monitoring and maintenance, check-point operations, crowd control, 
the apprehension of criminals, mediation and negotiation skills, and consensus-building skills – 
to name but a few.   
 
The demands of the information age and the Revolution in Military Affairs also shaped the 
training and educational needs of the SANDF.  The idea of information age technology in the 
African context may be seen as far-fetched until problems that high technology forces may face 
in this harsh continent and the islands of high technology that they may encounter in Africa, are 
taken into account.  This became increasingly important with the wide range of new 
technologies procured for the SANDF since 1994 of which some has not yet been delivered.  
Training and education not only concern the employment of these technologies, but also the 
maintenance and operation of these systems by the SANDF. 
 
The requirement for the SANDF to develop a more flexible personnel system in which 
employment within the military does not necessarily translate into a long-term career also 
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influences its education and training.  It was argued that alternative career opportunities should 
be identified “… for SANDF members who do not have further career advancement prospects 
because of advanced age and other factors leading to their stagnation in the ranks”,103  This 
emphasised the necessity for the SANDF to gear itself to fall in line with national training and 
educational policies and requirements.  These policies and requirements are rooted in the 
philosophy of skills development and the accreditation of courses outlined in the National 
Qualifications Framework (NQF) contemplated in the South African Qualifications Authority 
Act.104  
  
The nature of a nation’s armed forces is to a large extent the result of its experience, training 
and education.  To put it differently – much can be learnt about the nature of a country’s armed 
forces through an analysis of its training and education.  Moreover, the attitude of military 
members towards their profession is to a large extent shaped through their training and 
education.  The South African military faces an array of challenges in the training and education 
of its members.  The way in which they address these will to a large extent determine the future 
nature of the South African military.  How did the SANDF structure the ETD of its officers to 
overcome these obstacles and to shape the attitude of its members towards the military 
profession? 
 
4.5 EDUCATION, TRAINING AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE SANDF: UNDERSTANDING 
THE PHILOSOPHY AND STRUCTURE  
 
An officer from the Chief Joint Training Formation in the SANDF recently expressed the view 
that nobody in the Department of Defence has a holistic view of ETD within the department and, 
also, that it is very difficult to develop such a perspective.105  It is accepted that this opinion 
relates to the totality of ETD that is done in the department.  Yet, in some instances – like that of 
the making of officers – it is indeed possible to trace the process and to develop a more holistic 
understanding thereof.  Like most defence forces, the SANDF provides a wide variety of ETD 
opportunities to its officers.  For the purpose of this study, the nature of ETD in the SANDF 
since 1994 will be analysed by means of the framework for the education of officers discussed 
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in Chapter 3.106  The analysis is introduced with a broad overview of the role of the Chief Joint 
Training Formation in the SANDF. 
 
4.5.1 The role of the Joint Training Formation of the South African National Defence 
Force 
 
The role of the Joint Training Formation should be seen, on the one hand, within the framework 
of the mission of the Department of Defence – “To provide, manage, prepare and employ 
defence capabilities commensurate with the needs of South Africa as regulated by the 
Constitution, national legislation, and Parliamentary and Executive direction”.107  ETD in the 
department forms part of the preparation of the defence capabilities, including its manpower 
capability.  The role of the Joint Training Formation and the general approach and philosophy of 
the SANDF towards ETD is based upon a broad general military strategy that was designed to 
translate government policy concerning the nature and use of the South African armed forces 
into tangible objectives, resources and processes (Strategy = Ends + Ways + Means).  This 
strategy was an important tool for the SANDF to address the dichotomy it faces: warfighting or 
MOOTW.  It is essentially a difficulty that all armed forces need to address, but which is more 
pertinent in a small defence force where scarce resources are the primary decision-making 
driver.  For the SANDF, the decision boils down to a choice between the need to be a deterrent 
force rooted in an ability to mobilise itself as an effective warfighting force versus the need to be 
a stabilising force rooted in an ability to mobilise itself as an effective force-projection force for 
the execution of military operations other than war within South Africa itself and in what the 
SANDF often refers to as “the African battle space”. 
 
The SANFD uses a “mission-based approach” in the development of its military strategy.  All the 
missions that the SANDF foresee it will fulfil in future are configured around three objectives: 
 
 Defence against aggression.  The provision of self-defence in accordance with 
international law against any external aggression that may endanger the stability 
of South Africa. 
 
 Promoting security.  The provision of external deployment or support to enhance 
the security in support of decisions by the political office bearers in South Africa. 
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 Supporting the people of South Africa.  Supporting the population of South Africa 
by means of operations other that war, during periods when the responsible state 
departments do not have the capacity to do so.108 
 
The military strategy is very specific in demarcating the missions that are expected from the 
SANDF and in linking it to the above-mentioned objectives.  (See Table 4.1)  In pursuing these 
different objectives, the SANDF does not allot them the same priority.  In the 2003-2004 annual 
report of the Department of Defence, for example, it is clearly stipulated that the promotion of 
regional security is the primary concern of the Minister of Defence and, thus, of the SANDF.  
The promotion of regional security should be aimed, it is argued, at securing a collective 
approach to defence in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and also 
effective participation of the Department of Defence in the New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development (NEPAD) programmes.  Whereas previously the SANDF was extensively involved 
in internal security and support to the people of South Africa, the aim is to reduce this role 
systematically to a zero level.109  Consequently, there is gradual shift from internal support for 
the police and border patrol duties towards the promotion of security in the region through South 
African foreign policy initiatives – peace and humanitarian missions in the rest of Africa.  This is 
clearly illustrated through the declared intention of the South African government that the 
SANDF should be a senior partner and that it should have a major role in the development of 
the African Standby Force.  This force should provide Africa with its own ability to intervene 
rapidly in future to avert conflict of the nature that occurred over a decade ago and is still 
troubling the Great Lakes region.110 
 
Underlying this shift in emphasis is the necessity for the SANDF to transform itself from an 
internal stability force – or a force in search of a mission – to a force that has all the attributes 
required for force projection over long distances in a continent that is characterised by a lack of 
infrastructure.  It is possible to argue that there is some similarity in the nature of the internal 
stability operations executed by the SADF/SANDF over many years within the borders of South 
Africa, on the one hand, and humanitarian and peace missions that the SANDF participate in 
regionally, on the other.  The skills that are required from individual soldiers are more or less the 
same in both kinds of operations.  This specifically concerns the requirements of impartiality and 
minimum force.  Yet, there are structural and other differences between an internal stability 
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force and an expeditionary force for peace missions that cannot be ignored.  One of the most 
prominent features in this regard is the need for a higher order understanding and knowledge of 
the particular situation that necessitates the operation.  This is usually a blend of historical, geo-
political, cultural and, very often, also religious factors.  An educated mind is an indispensable 
requirement in such a scenario.  This underlying argument demarcates the critical role of the 
Joint Training Formation of the SANDF in the SANDF’s ability to promote regional security. 
 
Table 4.1: Mission classification and priorities in the SANDF military strategy111 
Defence against aggression Promoting security Supporting the people of 
South Africa 
 Defence against biological 
and chemical onslaught 
 Pre-emptive operations 
 International peace-making 
 Regional peace observers 
 Repelling conventional 
onslaught 
 International peace-
enforcement 
 International peace-
building 
 International disaster relief 
and humanitarian 
assistance 
 International search and 
rescue 
 International observers 
 Regional peace-building 
 Regional humanitarian 
intervention 
 Repelling non-conventional 
onslaught 
 Presidential tasks 
 Regional disaster relief 
and humanitarian 
assistance 
 Show of force 
 Protection of foreign 
assets 
 Regional peace 
enforcement 
 Search and rescue 
 Regional search and 
rescue 
 Repelling unconventional 
onslaught 
 Co-operation with the 
South African Police 
Services 
 Borderline control 
 Supporting military 
diplomacy 
 Special operations 
 Disaster relief and 
humanitarian assistance 
 Defence against an 
information onslaught 
 Maritime support 
 VIP transport 
 Regional peacekeeping 
 Support to government 
departments 
 
The work of the Joint Training Formation is rooted in the “… shared values of the DOD”, 
professionalism, human dignity, integrity, leadership, accountability, loyalty, and patriotism.112  It 
is interesting to note that all these values relate to what the SANDF, and specifically its 
members, should be.  The values do not necessarily concern what the SANDF should do or 
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how it should do it.  Since the core values of the SANDF focus primary on what its members 
should be, it should be seen as important drivers of both the process and the nature of ETD in 
the SANDF.  This specifically relates to the notions of professionalism and leadership.  In the 
human resources strategy of the SANDF, the level of training and education of personnel is 
recognised as one of the factors that determine the “… human resources quality dimension”.113 
 
The human resources strategy specifically points out that there is at present a mismatch 
between the quality of education of most school leavers and the educational qualifications 
required by the SANDF as a technology-based employer.  In addition, the SANDF faces the 
reality that many highly trained and experienced personnel leave the force, whilst top 
performing school leavers do not necessarily join the SANDF.114  It is argued that the personnel 
needs of the SANDF are rooted in the necessity to have a “Flexible Service System” (FSS) 
which is responsive to the needs of the individual, the military and the society.  This system 
should be designed in such a way that “… working people have to undergo life-long learning 
and continuous re-skilling to enable them to migrate through a number of career changes, whilst 
adding value – bmo (sic) enhanced competency – to each successive career”.  Such a system, 
it is maintained, will re-direct the current emphasis on a long-term career in the regular forces to 
one in which military service is a “… launch pad to acquire valuable skills and experience which 
they then profitably apply in civilian society”.  It is recognised that such a system necessitates 
processes (“enablers”) such as vocational ETD that will enable military personnel to re-integrate 
into civilian society as productive citizens.115  This is an important argument for the SANDF to 
consider in the effort to find a balance between broad liberal education and professional military 
education in the ETD of its officers. 
 
The Secretary of Defence, as Head of the Department, in cooperation with the Chief of the 
SANDF is responsible and accountable for ETD in the Department of Defence.  The “ETD 
System” of the department consists of an “ETD System Owner” component, a “Delivery System” 
component, and a “Systems Integrity” component.  The Joint Training Formation is the “ETD 
System Owner” and as such it is in control of the whole process.116  Joint Training Formation 
falls under the direction of the Joint Support Division of the SANDF.  The Chief of Joint Training, 
as delegated by the Chief of the SANDF through the Chief of Joint Support, fulfil its role with the 
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help of the Training Staff Council.  Certain ETD institutions fall directly under the command of 
the Chief of Joint Training because of the “jointness” of the institutions.  The Chief of Joint 
Training is responsible for ETD in which members of all the services participate.  These 
institutions include inter alia the Military Academy, the National Defence College, the National 
War College, and the College for Educational Technology (COLET).  ETD that is service- or 
division117-specific is the responsibility of the different services or divisions.118  The ETD that is 
done by the different services, however, is still guided by the policies, directives and strategies 
of the Joint Training Formation.  The Chief of the Joint Training Formation of the SANDF defines 
its responsibility as follows: 
 
 Providing ETD strategic direction, corporate ETD policy, advice and corporate ETD 
plans and reports to the Department of Defence.  This should comply with national 
legislation, customary international law and international agreements binding on the 
RSA. 
 Negotiating, coordinating and maintaining training agreements between the South 
African Department of Defence and other military forces.  
 Creating and maintaining liaison with the statutory ETD and related bodies in order to 
ensure alignment of Department of Defence ETD policies, strategies and doctrine with 
the national framework.  These bodies include inter alia the Education and Training 
Quality Assurer (ETQAs), the South African Qualification Authority (SAQA) and the 
National Standards Body (NSB). 
 Providing Department of Defence with ETD information regarding training for internal, 
external and foreign training providers. 
 Managing the ETD component – the learning programmes – of the South African 
Department of Defence foreign relation’s policies and strategies. 
 Providing specifications, with which ETD practitioners are to comply in order to ensure 
that they are suitable, qualified and registered in alignment with national legislation. 
 Managing the development, the compilation and the implementation of both common 
and joint curricula for assessable official professional ETD programmes. 
 Providing guidelines for Civic Education for all professional development learning 
opportunities. 
 Managing special, common, joint and multinational ETD projects in the South African 
Department of Defence. 
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 Creating and maintaining an ETD management information database in the Department 
of Defence with all the relevant information required for reporting and planning purposes. 
 Establishing, managing and maintaining a research and development capability for the 
Department of Defence. 
 Providing advice on ETD to higher authorities in the Department of Defence. 
 Monitoring the compliance of subordinate and other divisions in the Department of 
Defence with ETD instructions and regulations.119  
 
All these responsibilities culminate in a number of outcomes pursued by the Joint Training 
Formation.  These outcomes are written as, what the military refers to, “endstates”.  An endstate 
is a description of what an objective will look like once it has been achieved.120  The following 
endstates are defined for the Joint Training Formation in the Department of Defence: 
 
 all ETD systems and processes are well established and characterised by professional 
service delivery and integrity, which is aligned with national and international best 
practices and legal prescripts; 
 the ETD requirements of the department are satisfied by accredited educational, 
functional and developmental learning opportunities; 
 the ETD in the department is strategically directed; 
 jointness and interoperability are enhanced through ETD initiatives; 
 the department optimises all ETD initiatives, interoperability and multi-nationalism to 
promote regional peace, security and stability; 
 efficient resource management and allocation ensure the effective, efficient and 
economical achievement of the ETD objectives and commitments; and 
 appropriately qualified and “registered” ETD practitioners are available for ETD in the 
department.121 
 
The “Delivery System” makes provision for the creation of environments within ETD institutions 
that are conducive for learning, provide facilitators for the learning programme (directing staff), 
and create the learning opportunities for the “learner body”.  The “Systems Integrity” component 
is responsible for the quality, integrity, vitality and sustainability of ETD in the DOD.  This 
                                                
119
 Ibid., pp. 2-3. 
120
 This is a technical military concept that has its roots in the warfighting environment where 
commanders should be able to provide subordinate commanders with precise descriptions of the 
features of the battlefield – how the battlefield will look like – once an objective was achieved. 
121
 Department of Defence Instruction on Overarching Policy for Education Training and Development in 
the Department of Defence, op. cit., p. 3. 
 148 
includes on the one hand an evaluation of the ETD system itself and, on the other, an 
assessment of the product of the system.122 
  
In an analysis of these three systems and their objectives, a number of characteristics, or rather 
current thoughts about the nature of ETD in the SANDF, are clearly visible.  It is, firstly, very 
obvious that there is an effort to provide focused ETD.  All ETD in the SANDF should, 
consequently, be guided by the higher order policies and strategies – and missions – of the 
Department of Defence in general and the SANDF in particular.  This is clearly visible in the 
emphasis on the provision of strategic guidance.  This requirement is linked to a second need, 
namely that all ETD in the SANDF should form part of a larger process.  There should be 
“method in the madness” to the extent that there should be progress in the development of 
individuals in the SANDF.  Thirdly, there is clearly an effort to align ETD in the Department of 
Defence and the SANDF with broad governmental and international policies and requirements, 
in particular regarding educational policies.  This requirement is clearly rooted in the need to 
accredit all ETD that is done in the SANDF and to give it a broader application – so-called 
“transferability of skills”.  The need for a dynamic personnel system is clearly visible in this 
thinking.  Fourthly, there is a recognition of the importance of “training the trainers”.  The only 
way through which the SANDF can ensure high-quality ETD is through an effort to address the 
competency level of its ETD practitioners.  It is possible to argue that the depth and nature of 
military thought in the SANDF is directly linked to the quality of the trainers and educators in the 
system.  Thus, if the SANDF wants to lay the foundations for the transformation of the military to 
become more intellectually minded (versus being operationally minded) it needs to begin with its 
ETD practitioners.  Lastly, ETD in the SANDF is clearly infused with the need to be efficient and 
to do more with less.  A senior member of the Joint Training Formation recently pointed out that 
there is an “urgent need” to professionalise ETD in the Department of Defence.  Yet, the lack of 
resources has a definite detrimental effect on efforts to bring about this change.123 
 
4.5.2 The making of lieutenants in the South African National Defence Force 
 
The first step in the process of the making of professional military officers, as was pointed out in 
Chapter 3, is the provision of a basic, professional military ETD, or "… the making of 
lieutenants".124  This involves the process through which recruits are brought into the services 
and the schooling they receive to become commissioned officers.  Three processes underpin 
the making of lieutenants – socialisation, military training and academic education.   
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In the SANDF, the first two processes are the primary focus of the Naval College and the Air 
Force and Army Gymnasiums.125  At present, one year is utilised for the initial military training 
and socialisation.  At the Army Gymnasium in particular, the emphasis is on the provision of a 
solid infantry grounding as a foundation for corps training.  Being military minded also implies an 
understanding by candidate officers of the notion of "defence in a democracy" and of 
"developing the political and ethical dimensions of military professionalism" as outlined in the 
South African White Paper on Defence.126  Insight into these higher order conceptions can only 
be acquired through academic study, defining the vital role of academic studies at the South 
African Military Academy.  After one year of military training and regimentalised socialisation at 
the junior leader training institutions, the candidate officers are transferred to the Military 
Academy where the bulk of their time is taken up by academic studies.  Ideally, officers should 
graduate with a first degree and a commission as a lieutenant in a particular service after one 
year of training and three years of study. (See Figure 4.1)  
 
The duration of a specific individual's tenure of study at the South African Military Academy, 
however, depends on the graduate’s own record of achievement and the needs of the services.  
The ideal is that as many as possible of the candidate officers should stay at the Military 
Academy for three years of study.  After three years, the potential officer is commissioned with a 
long-term contract from the Department of Defence.  If not, the candidate officer may choose or 
be directed towards a one-year certificate in military studies at the South African Military 
Academy with an accompanying short- or medium-term contract.  In such a case, completion of 
studies through correspondence or distance education and switching to a long-term contract 
remains a possibility.127  
 
The role of jointness in the making of lieutenants in the SANDF has to be emphasised.  
Whereas the training and initial socialisation is service- and even corps-specific, education at 
the South African Military Academy is a joint endeavour.  Unlike most of the world's armed 
forces, South African officers are bred in jointness.  The advantages and disadvantages of such 
an approach are open for debate.  The emphasis on jointness, for example, has an erosive 
effect on the service-specific military socialisation of the first year of training.  This is an 
especially thorny issue considering the fact that the South African Military Academy has an 
academic rather than a military regimental ethos. 
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Figure 4.1 Education and training in the South African National Defence Force 
 
What has changed since 1994?  Firstly, there was a deliberate effort by the different services to 
develop a single curriculum for the first year of training offered to candidate officers at the 
different institutions.  This single curriculum makes provision for service-specific socialisation 
and training, but ensures that the same standard is adhered to throughout.128  Secondly, 
whereas, in the case of the army, each corps school used to train its own officers, a single 
training institution – the Army Gymnasium – was given responsibility for the initial training of all 
the candidate officers of the army after 1994.  Thirdly, since the recruitment of the Defence 
Force is now specifically directed towards communities that were to some extent excluded from 
service in the past, there is a deliberate effort to give people from previously disadvantaged 
communities an opportunity to acquire a basic tertiary education at the Military Academy.  
Within the SANDF there has, therefore, been an increasing need for and emphasis on 
education since 1994.  As a developmental tool, education has become increasingly important.  
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In some circles, there are even visions of a first degree as a prerequisite for entrance into the 
officer corps.129 
 
4.5.3 The making of colonels in the South African National Defence Force 
 
The purpose of military doctrinal ETD is to give officers all the competencies they need to 
deploy and employ military formations from a platoon to, in the case of South Africa, a division.  
The aim is to school officers to be tactically and operationally minded and to operate with ease 
in these realms.  The doctrinal ETD of officers culminates in the ability of the officer to be a 
campaign-level staff officer or planner and an operational commander.  Crackel refers to ETD at 
this level as the "making of colonels".130  Important to understand, though, is that the making of 
a colonel starts as soon as the officer receives his commission – or even before that. 
 
Two (types of) institutions are primarily responsible for doctrinal ETD in the SANDF: the different 
service colleges131 and the South African National War College (SANWC). (See Figure 4.1)  
The different service colleges are the main tactical ETD institutions in the SANDF.  These 
colleges have a service-specific focus in their ETD, since the aim is to give officers a thorough 
schooling in the tactics of land, maritime and air warfare and the use of land, naval and air 
power in military operations other than war (MOOTW).  In the case of the army, the course is 
split into a distance education phase of six months and a residential phase of twenty-four 
weeks.132  Officers attending these so-called "Junior Command and Staff Programmes" (JCSP) 
are senior majors – lieutenant-commanders in the case of the Navy.133   
 
The newly created SANWC offers lieutenant-colonels a twelve-month "Joint Senior Command 
and Staff Programme" (JSCSP).134  The programme focuses on campaign level warfare and 
prepares students to be operational level staff officers and commanders.135  To be specific: the 
programme aims at preparing “… selected officers for senior appointments at the operational 
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level by developing their command, staff and analytical skills, and by broadening their 
professional understanding of single-service, joint and combined operations, the management 
of defence and the wider aspects of conflict".136  The programme consists of four main modules: 
core military studies, advanced military studies, defence management studies, and strategic 
studies.  These four modules are split up into 21 main subjects such as: operational art in joint 
and combined operations, military history, leadership and command, campaign planning, 
national security, operations other than war, civil-military relations, technology, human, financial 
and logistics management, international security, global conflict, regional security, and land, sea 
and air power.137 
 
The biggest and most obvious change since 1994 has been the creation of the SANWC, 
officially opened on 28 January 2002, and the introduction of the JSCSP.138  Whereas each 
service previously presented its own “senior staff course”, the emphasis at the SANWC is on 
jointness.  In 1994, the “senior staff course”, inherited from the old SADF, had an almost 
exclusive focus on the tactical level with an accompanying emphasis on training.  Not only has 
the emphasis since 1994 shifted towards the operational level of war, but the curriculum now 
also reflects a developmental and educational methodology.  The study of military history 
features very prominently in this regard.139  The larger emphasis on education necessitated a 
greater input from academics into the development and presentation of the course.  As from 
1997, a military historian with doctoral qualifications has been appointed at the South African 
Army College.  He is not only responsible for teaching military history at the SANWC and the 
Army College at present, but also facilitates an annual staff ride for SANWC students to the 
most important battlefields of the Anglo-Zulu and the Anglo-Boer Wars in northern KwaZulu-
Natal.140 
 
A number of other important changes are also noticeable.  One is the provision for military 
bureaucratic education in the curricula of the different colleges.  In the past, the emphasis was 
almost exclusively on military professional education.  In the case of the SANWC, this has been 
formalised through an agreement with the Tshwane University of Technology concerning the 
presentation of a diploma in military management as part of JSCSP.141  A second very important 
change has been the interaction with foreign staff colleges from all over the globe, Africa in 
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particular, since 1994.  These interactions not only had a formative influence on the curricula of 
the colleges; it also led to the exchange of students and directing staff.  This has become an 
important part of military diplomacy in the SANDF, especially in its relationship with other 
defence forces on the African continent.142  A third change comprised a shift from a high 
emphasis on training at the different service colleges to a more educational approach in the 
presentation of the different JCSPs.  Such an approach is understandable, to some extent, in 
the case of the navy and air force because of the nature of their tasks and the worldviews of 
sailors and airmen (see Chapter 3).  In the case of the army, though, this is not necessarily a 
positive change.  If officers who are primarily responsible for battlefield and other tactics are not 
being trained during the primary tactical course of the army, the question may indeed be asked 
whether they are trained at all.  Where do these officers learn the skills to command an all-arms 
battle formation if they are not trained to do it at the Army College?  These skills cannot be 
inculcated through professional or liberal education.  Training is necessary.143 However, 
scepticism about the Army's ability at present to provide training at this level became noticeable.  
Questions are indeed being asked about the availability of officers in the South African Army 
with the necessary experience and skills to present this kind of training.144  The experience of 
army officers in combined arms operations is also minimalised through the dismantling of 
combined arms units, such as 61 Mechanised Battalion Group and the down-scaling of 
conventional exercises at the SA Army Combat Training Centre at Lohathla.145    
 
4.5.4 The making of generals in the South African National Defence Force   
 
The purpose of politico-military ETD is to assist officers to prepare themselves for high 
command.  Whereas basic military and doctrinal ETD is directed towards the making of 
lieutenants and colonels, politico-military ETD aims at the making of generals.  The making of 
generals focuses on the need for senior officers to become strategically and politically minded.  
They have to be prepared to work with leading defence officials and political office bearers in 
managing and controlling the country's military resources in accordance with the security needs 
of the country and in subordination to the polity.146 
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The South African National Defence College (SANDC) offers the "Executive National Security 
Programme" (ENSP) to colonels earmarked for promotion to general. (See Figure 4.1)  Prior to 
the introduction of the ENSP, the SANDC presented the "Joint Staff Course" aimed at 
"… educating, primarily, senior SANDF officers, at the military strategic level".147  Due to the 
changed political, geo-strategic and other circumstances in South Africa, a need was identified 
for officers to be exposed to the national strategic level and to become acquainted with the 
functioning of other state departments, foreign defence perspectives and the civilian sector.  In 
particular, officers had to develop an understanding of human security.  The ENSP focuses on 
national security issues in a regional and African context against the background of global 
issues.  The central theme, however, is national security.148   
 
Though the decision to migrate from the joint staff course to the ENSP was sound, some 
problems seem to emerge.  The first is rooted in the difference between an educational and a 
training approach in the presentation of the programme.  To be specific, the programme at 
present does not make provision for an active educational process and the students do not 
necessarily go through a process of internalising newly acquired knowledge.  Haycock 
described a similar situation in 1976 at the Canadian National Defence College: “… no papers, 
no heavy reading; just one visiting expert after another and occasional group reports on 
problems looked into between junkets to the Far North, East and South and a whopper to 
Europe and the Middle East”.149  It should be emphasised that the ENSP is an excellent 
compact programme, comparable to similar programmes elsewhere.  The problem concerns the 
way in which it is presented, since the internalisation of knowledge is time-intensive.  Compared 
to similar programmes presented elsewhere, there is not enough time to debate the issues 
addressed to the extent that is required for analysis.  Students need more time to debate, 
disagree, argue, criticise and adjust opinions with regard to particular issues.  Not enough 
emphasis is placed on the cultivation and development of a personal informed opinion.  Though 
the scope of the programme is extensive, its academic depth is under suspicion.150  This 
particular point is rooted in the lack of a formal process of evaluation.  At present, nomination to 
attend the programme is all that is needed to pass.151  As Van Creveld explains, career-
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conscious officers are not “… necessarily motivated to serious study in an institution where 
there is no competition and from which everybody who enters is certain to graduate”.152  
 
A second problem concerns the level at which the programme is focused.  At present, the 
SANWC focuses on the operational level of war in its presentation of the JSCSP, whilst the 
SANDC focuses on national security in the presentation of the ENSP.  It is clear that the military 
strategic level is not addressed in any depth in any of these programmes.153  A senior officer, in 
fact, was very explicit recently in stating that “the management of defence” is not addressed in 
any of the programmes of the Department of Defence.154  Whether this ought to be the 
responsibility of the SANWC or the SANDC is open to debate.  The issue is further complicated 
by the fact that the average officer has already spent a vast amount of time on formal ETD by 
the time he reaches general rank, and, secondly, that there is a need to extend the time spent 
on the ENSP.  Thus, not only is it not clear where the responsibility for military strategic ETD 
should be located, but where to find the time to address the dilemma, is also a problem.  Taking 
into account that the military is primarily responsible for the military component of national 
security, the military strategic level of war is not something that can be discarded or overlooked.  
World-wide – also in Africa – it seems as if there is a return to the more traditional 
understanding of security, with the military holding a more prominent position in the provision of 
security.  But more than that, though it is important for officers to understand the higher order 
conceptions of security, their main business remains the role of the military in addressing the 
security needs of society.  Military strategic issues can never be neglected by the military. 
 
The challenge of addressing the military strategic level of war became an even bigger challenge 
with the acceptance of human security as the organising conception of South African security.  
As was noted earlier, human security is not only difficult to operationalise, but also directs 
attention away from the military as an instrument of security.  The SANDC's use of civilian 
academic guest lecturers, primarily from the political sciences domain, further compounds the 
problem.  These academics are usually well acquainted with the higher order political dimension 
of security and human security in particular.  However, questions need to be asked about their 
knowledge and expertise in operationalising the military domain of human security and in 
addressing the management of defence in support of human security.155 
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4.6 FACTORS INFLUENCING AND CHARACTERISING EDUCATION, TRAINING AND 
DEVELOPMENT IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN NATIONAL DEFENCE FORCE SINCE 1994 
 
It is not easy to outline all the factors that influence ETD in a particular armed force and at any 
specific time.  There are, though, a number of very definite considerations, some more obvious 
than others, that influence ETD in the SANDF at present and which have influenced it since 
1994.  However, it should be noted that it is difficult to determine the precise extent to which 
these factors have influenced the ETD system in the SANDF.  The list of influencing factors is, 
thus, far from complete.   
 
4.6.1 Education, training and development as a singular idea   
 
The first real training and educational challenge the SANDF faces is the use of the term ETD – 
Education, Training and Development.  Grouping together training, education and development 
in one organising idea gives rise to the danger that the military does not differentiate between 
these different notions and that neither training, nor education, or development is being done 
well.  Most ETD institutions in the SANDF should, in the words of the Deputy Chief of the South 
African Army, “… be refined to allow better education and development” to complement the 
training that is done.156  Thus, the majority of the senior ETD institutions in the SANDF – the 
exception being the Military Academy – at present aspire towards the development of an 
educational capacity.  Some do it through outsourcing of sections of its academic programme.  
This may be an indication that they question their own capacity to educate.157  The attributes 
that are needed at these institutions for an educational ethos are lacking.  In fact, most ETD 
institutions in the SANDF at present lack the ability to present students with a real educational 
experience.  One senior SA Army general describes the nature of the ETD in the SANDF as 
“mechanistic” and points out that it is “mark sheet-driven”.158  This is a clear indication of the 
emphasis on training in the schooling activities of the SANDF.   
 
The absence of academic faculties at the ETD institutions in the SANDF is noticeable.  At 
present there is, for example, only one PhD-qualified officer responsible for military history 
education at the National War College, who is also responsible for military history education at 
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the Army College, the Warrant Officers Academy and the Army Formative Course.159  The 
presence of a suitably qualified (civilian) academic faculty has become the norm at staff 
colleges and institutions of higher military education globally.  With the exception of the Military 
Academy, no institution of higher learning in the SANDF has any such academic faculty.  In 
addition, Cawthra points out, the level of consultation by the SANDF with civil society in general 
and academics in particular has declined over the last number of years.160  At the Military 
Academy, for example, civilian guest lecturers and speakers are no longer welcome – especially 
if they are white and from the developed countries of the Western world.  The difficult 
bureaucratic process for inviting and paying such people further aggravates the situation.161 
 
A noticeable challenge that almost all the ETD institutions in the SANDF face, is the lack of 
academically qualified directing staff.  Most of the officers serving on the directing staff of ETD 
institutions – the Military Academy once again being the exception – do not have suitable 
graduate and post-graduate academic qualifications.  In a study that was done in 1997, for 
example, it was found that 69,23 percent of the directing staff members of the Senior Command 
Course had a (3-year) B degree and 7,69 percent a (4-year) Honours degree.  In the Junior 
Command and Staff Course, only 20 percent of the directing staff had a B degree and on the 
Joint Staff Course 15 percent had a Masters and 33 percent a B degree.162  There is no reason 
to believe that this situation has changed fundamentally at the time of writing.   
 
The result is that most of the ETD institutions in the SANDF are faced with a situation of 
institutional paralysis: a willingness to be an academic institution, but an inability to become 
that.  At present, the directing staff at these ETD institutions does not busy themselves with the 
kind of activities with which academics normally occupy themselves, namely teaching, research 
and writing.  Members of the directing staff are nothing more than glorified administrators and 
bureaucrats, their days being filled by all kinds of organising activities to keep the different 
programmes running.163  This leaves them with very little time for constructive research and 
development, the lifeblood of any academic institution.  This in turn gives rise to a situation 
where the military runs the risk of, in the words of the Deputy Chief of the South African army, 
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“… letting urgencies override priorities and even of falling into an activity trap”.164  Thus, there is 
a real danger that the ETD institutions of the SANDF are neither institutions of training or of 
educational or of developmental excellence.    
 
4.6.2 The quality of experienced professional directing staff   
 
One of the primary problems concerning education and training in the SANDF is the lack of a 
body of professional directing staff at ETD institutions.165  In the case of professional officers 
serving as directing staff members, the rotation of officers is often too quick for individual 
officers to become professional trainers and educators.  Most directing staff members serve for 
no more than two to three years in that capacity.  Often members who are appointed on the 
directing staff have not yet built up a comprehensive body of professional military and 
bureaucratic knowledge and experience required for educating and training members of the 
military.  Knowledge and expertise about teaching and learning are not even brought into the 
picture.  The SANDF appoints members to the directing staff at a too early stage in their careers 
at a time at which they are not as yet developed as specialists.  In addition, there is a lack of 
programmes in the SANDF to “train the trainers” and to develop them into “ETD 
practitioners”.166  Bless argues that this absence of programmes to train the trainers is rooted in 
a number of considerations: 
 
• there is a lack of awareness and appreciation of the relevance and effect that such 
programmes may have on the eventual end product; 
• there is also a lack of information on learning opportunities that are provided in this 
regard by the SANDF through the College for Educational Technology (COLET); 
• time to attend the training and developmental courses will always be a problem for 
trainers, instructors and educators; 
• a lack of funds and the availability of specialists to offer this kind of learning 
opportunity in the SANDF are a serious challenge.167  
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The result is a lowering of both the productivity of the directing staff and the depth and quality of 
the training and education.  A foreign member of the directing staff of a senior ETD institution in 
the SANDF, for example, contends that he will run the same programme on the same standard 
with a much smaller number of people if they work on the productivity and knowledge level that 
is accepted as the norm at most of the staff colleges of the (Western) world.168 
 
Officers in the SANDF are commissioned at a very young age.  Their corresponding immaturity 
and lack of life skills could be linked to the relative ease with which senior non-commissioned 
and warrant officers can become senior officers and the lack of an officer culture in the 
SANDF.169  In combination, these factors have a detrimental effect on experience in the 
SANDF.  Most often, for example, officers who excel in a particular course are appointed on the 
directing staff of that same institution for the next course.  It therefore often happens that a 
student has absolutely no operational or bureaucratic experience, but has excelled 
academically on a course and is thus considered good quality directing staff material.  In 1997, 
for example, 79,92 percent of the directing staff members responsible for the Junior, Senior, 
and Joint Command and Staff Course indicated that they were appointed directly after 
completion of the course they were directing at that stage.170  Members who excel in the 
working and operational environments are not very often taken out of their positions to serve as 
members of the directing staff of the ETD institutions.  In addition, the SANDF have no clear 
career path for the development of individual officers to expose them to particular working and 
operational environments in order to appoint them as directing staff members at these 
institutions later.171  It seems as if it might be safe to conclude that “non-performers” often end 
up as members of the directing staff at ETD institutions.   
 
The lack of experience in the training and educational system is compounded by the up-or-out 
personnel systems of the SANDF – though it should be noted that the SANDF has some 
problems with the “out” part of the system; “getting rid of the troublemakers and underachievers 
in its midst”.172  In addition, the different military ranks in the SANDF are linked to specific 
                                                
168
 Interview with a European officer serving on the directing staff of a senior military ETD institution in 
Pretoria, 22 June 2005. 
169
 Engelbrecht, L, “‘Going Ballistic’ – The SANDF Six Years On”, op. cit. 
170
 Die Uitdagings wat die Departement van Verdediging die Hoof moet bied tydens die Onderrigproses 
met die Aanbied van Hoër Onderwys binne die Raamwerk van die Suid-Afrikaanse Grondwet, die 
Heropbou en Ontwikkelingsprogram, die Wet op die Kwalifikasie Outoriteit en die Witskrif op 
Verdediging, op. cit., p. 21. 
171
 A brigadier-general on the joint training staff of the SANDF specifically referred to the example of 
Kenya where potential directing staff members for their staff college are identified and a particular 
two- to three-year career path for the individual is developed in preparation of his appointment at 
the staff college.  Interviewed in Pretoria, 21 June 2005.  
172
 Engelbrecht, L, “‘Going Ballistic’ – The SANDF Six Years On”, op. cit.  It is a widely known fact that the 
SANDF has problems in retiring personnel that are supernumerary because of the protection of 
 160 
(public service commission) salary levels.  This implies that the only way by which an individual 
can better his own personal financial position is by acquiring a higher rank.173  Such a system 
usually leads to rank inflation within a military system, while it also tends to draw some of the 
most experienced and professional non-commissioned officers – the backbone of any armed 
force – into the officer corps.  There is no tradition like that of the British Army, for example, 
through which experienced and well-trained individuals are kept in the system at relatively low 
rank (lieutenant colonel) but with increased salary, pension and other benefits.  Employment of 
retired military officers as civilians in the training and educational environment, like the U.S. 
armed forces, is another effective way of capturing experience and feeding it into the system.174  
A retired general that also has the relevant academic qualifications, for example, is an ideal 
candidate to serve as a member of the directing staff of an ETD institution.  Yet, nowhere does 
the South African military employ such people.175   
 
To make matters worse, there are almost no incentives for any member of the SANDF to serve 
as a directing staff member at ETD institutions.  At most military training and educational 
institutions in the world, appointment as a directing staff member often implies that the armed 
force recognises the quality of the specific individual and that the appointment opens a whole 
new career path in terms of promotion and appointments for the individual officer.  At present an 
instructor’s allowance (R522,50 per month) is paid to the directing staff members of (some) ETD 
institutions.  Yet, there is no correlation between the amount being paid and the extra 
responsibility and efforts that are demanded from the directing staff of these institutions.176   
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4.6.3 Balancing representivity and affirmative action   
 
It is argued that politics in the New South Africa is often viewed through the lens of the liberation 
struggle with racism as the basic problem and black solidarity as the only answer.177  Racism is 
indeed a serious problem in the SANDF.178  Yet, the general approach towards racism in the 
SANDF, and at the ETD institutions in particular, seems to be one of “… do not prosecute, do 
not punish, do not forgive, and, above all, do not forget”.179  An unnatural (but politically 
necessary) emphasis on the need for representivity and affirmative action led to race being very 
prominent in the appointment of directing staff and the composition of the learner body at ETD 
institutions in the SANDF.  In the initial period after 1994, the biggest driving factor behind this 
phenomenon at ETD institutions was the requirement to address representivity at higher levels 
of command in the SANDF without delay.  To ensure representivity in the command and staff 
echelons of the SANDF a large number of (black) statutory force180 and non-statutory force 
members had to be qualified at these ETD institutions as quickly as possible.  The discrepancy 
between the composition of the learner body (mainly black and former non-statutory forces) and 
the directing staff (mainly white and former statutory forces) specifically heightened racial 
tension at ETD institutions in the initial period after 1994.   
 
This racial tension was accentuated by suspicion and distrust between the different integrated 
armed groupings.  When the SANDF started to appoint members of the non-statutory forces as 
members of the directing staff at ETD institutions, another form of disequilibrium was created.  
On the whole, these former non-statutory force members had very little bureaucratic military 
experience and they often found it difficult to understand the nature and functioning of a 
bureaucratised professional military.  They very often did not have much conventional military 
experience either.  However, the majority of the former statutory force members grew up in a 
bureaucratised military and were well-trained (or at least exercised) in conventional warfighting.  
Thus, the non-statutory members of the directing staff often were perceived by previous 
members of the SADF as not having much legitimacy as directing staff at ETD institutions.   
 
ETD institutions also experience pressure from higher authorities to present “user-friendly” 
courses.  Financial constrains necessitate cost-effectiveness – there is no money for members 
to repeat courses in which they were not successful.  There was also a big back-log of SANDF 
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members who had to do these courses.  Problems further arose as a result of perceptions by 
former statutory force members of the directing staff that everything was blamed on racism if 
members of the learner body did not adhere to the required standard and it was pointed out as 
such.  The result was a brain-drain since a large number of well-trained, often well-educated 
and experienced members left the military.181  The exodus of people from the SANDF, though, 
was welcomed in the name of downsizing, representivity and affirmative action.  
 
It is interesting to note that some analysts draw historic parallels between what is happening in 
the defence force at present and what happened when the National Party assumed power in 
1948.  Experienced English-speaking officers were driven out of the defence force in very much 
the same manner as that in which the post-1994 defence force got rid of white soldiers.  
Engelbrecht, for example argues: 
 
What we have now is an “oak tree” defence force: despite healthy outward 
appearances, it is weak and hollow in the middle.  Indeed, there is growing opinion 
that we are back to the bleak days of the 1950s – the time after the infamous 
“Erasmus purges”.  Then defence minister Frans Erasmus had stripped the Union 
Defence Force (UDF) of much of its capacity by sacking capable English-speaking 
(sic) officers and replacing them with indifferent Afrikaners, often newly-promoted 
sergeants.182    
 
However, a positive spin-off of the emphasis on affirmative action and representivity was the 
cultural sensitivity and understanding for differences that it brought along.  As one officer 
pointed out, it is only through his experience of differences that he built up a recognition and 
appreciation for his own uniqueness.183  One of the defining characteristics of apartheid was 
ideological, physical and emotional separation of the South African society.  As Owen pointed 
out in 1986, “White South Africans tend to profess an undying love for a country they hardly 
know, whose people often frighten them, and whose stark beauty they constantly try to change 
in imitation of Europe”.184 Thus, an appreciation was developed by members of the South 
African military for the depth and richness of the South African society.  This in itself was a very 
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educational experience for especially white members of the SANDF, who for a very long time 
isolated themselves from the broader South African society.  
  
4.6.4 A skewed education, training and development budget   
 
Budgetary constraints will always remain a challenging reality for armed forces in general and 
for their ETD in particular.  In the SANDF, this is an especially thorny issue with the military in 
the New South Africa struggling with an egregious lack of resources to meet its minimum 
requirements.  In general, the lack of resources is associated with three particular 
considerations.  There was, firstly, a clear shift in government priorities.  The South African 
national budget has a clear welfare focus aimed at increasing the standard of living of the 
average South African.  Defence spending was one of the areas that were eroded to finance the 
welfare-focused budget.  The Department of Defence budget allocation for the financial year 
(FY) 89/90 was 3.9% of the gross national product (GNP).  In the FY 94/95, this was reduced to 
2.2% and in the FY 00/01, it was further reduced to 1.5% of the GNP.185  In 2003, Tanzania was 
the only country in the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) with a lower military 
expenditure as a percentage of GDP than South Africa: 1,5 percent versus the South African 
1,6 percent.186  In the FY 04/05, South African defence spending was 1,4 percent of GDP.187  
Secondly, the enormous cost of integrating and downsizing the human resources of the SANDF 
in the wake of the 1994 democratisation exacerbated the challenge of coping with a shrinking 
defence budget.  Lastly, the South African government utilised the military extensively for 
advancing its visions of an African Renaissance and participation in the New Partnership for 
Africa’s Development (NEPAD).  South Africa’s participation in regional peace missions in 
particular strained the financial resources of the SANDF.188  From this perspective the real 
challenge was not how to deal with the shrinking budget but rather how to cope with the rising 
operational commitments of the SANDF in view of the smaller budget.  This led to a situation 
where the financial allocations to the different internal SANDF structures were eroded and 
minimised in order to keep up with operational commitments.189  Increasingly questions were 
being asked about combat readiness in the SANDF.190   
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There is no doubt that the cutbacks of the ETD budget over a period of time have affected the 
quality of ETD in the SANDF.191  The budget allocation for the Joint Training Formation for the 
FY 04/05 was R101 108 m.  With a funding requirement of R133 621 m, this implied that the 
Formation was only 75 percent funded.192  An amount of R132 465 m was required for the FY 
05/06 of which only R107 672 m was allocated, i.e. 81 percent of the required funding.193  A 
senior member of the SA Army College also pointed out that they at all times experience 
pressure from higher headquarters to be “… as affordable as possible” in the running of the 
programme.194  The lack of funding is further exacerbated by the existence of four service 
colleges, the War College and the Defence College – 6 colleges to qualify SANDF officers from 
tacticians to strategists.  A country like Britain, for example, has beside the Royal Military 
Academy only one ETD institution that is responsible for officer training and education on all 
levels.  The Chief Joint Training of the SANDF is very explicit in indicating that the under-
funding of ETD in the South African military should be seen in a very serious light as the impact 
thereof will only become visible in the medium to long term.  “As the under-funding relates 
directly to the professional development of the members and employees of the DOD,” it is 
stated, “the situation will arise whereby the DOD might not have competent personnel as 
required by the Constitution and other legislation.”195  It is also pointed out that the shortage of 
funds means that posts that are vacant will remain vacant until additional funding has been 
allocated.  The upgrading of ETD facilities, in particular, seems to be a major problem.  
 
4.6.5 Doctrinal development in the South African National Defence Force   
 
Major military doctrinal changes influenced ETD in the SANDF since 1994. Three changes 
featured prominently in this regard.196  The first of these was the recognition that future military 
operations will require an increased joint and multi-national focus – operations in which the 
ability of more than one of the services and more than one country will be needed.  An 
emphasis on jointness always has a positive effect on the problem of inter-service rivalry.  This, 
for example, led to the creation of the National War College at which not only officers from 
different services were trained together, but where the presence of foreign officers also became 
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the rule rather than the exception.  The increased need for military diplomacy and for the South 
African military to be an active role player on the African continent in support of governmental 
initiatives and visions were the dominant drivers in the development of this emphasis.   
 
The defence force, secondly, has had to adapt itself to project force over very large distances.  
Strategic and operational force projection was and still is a very unique challenge in the African 
theatre of operations with its lack of infrastructure.  The extent to which this challenge has 
influenced military thinking and education, if at all, is not clear.  Its influence on the SANDF's 
ability to conduct operations is, however, beyond any doubt.  It was also a driving factor in 
recent decisions by the South African government on the procurement of new equipment for the 
South African military.  For example, the decision to buy new transport aircraft, replacing the 
aging South African Air Force fleet of C130s, is directly related to the need to deploy and 
sustain forces over long distances in Africa.   
 
Lastly, the need to use military forces in so-called non-traditional roles became important and 
was reflected in new doctrine and in the curricula of the ETD institutions.  Indeed, this became a 
debated issue, even in academic circles, with questions being asked about how primary the 
primary mission of the SANDF really is.197  It has since been accepted that the secondary 
roles198 – MOOTW – will be an important part of the job description of the South African armed 
forces in future.  In particular, the use of military power not to create peace but to keep the 
peace that has already been created features very prominently on the operational agenda of the 
SANDF in Africa.  
 
The need for new doctrine in the SANDF also emphasised the need to equip experienced 
members with the ability to develop such doctrine.  Doctrinal writing is an active process, “… a 
cocktail – often mixed by relatively junior officers”.199  The development of doctrine is rooted in 
the interplay between experience (military history), active debate (about military futures) and 
(theoretical) academic writing (about military tactical, operational, strategic and other issues).  
The ability to develop well-rounded doctrine is, thus, to a large extent rooted in the intellectual 
capacity and nature of a specific military.  To put it differently, the quality of a military’s doctrine 
is a reflection of the quality of its thinking.  This in turn will be a reflection of its operational 
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ability.  In the words of Gooch, “… the way an army acts … is determined to a very considerable 
degree by the way it thinks”.200  There is serious doubt about the institutional capacity of the 
SANDF for quality doctrinal development.  Consider, for example, the small number of South 
African officers who actively engage in any serious research and writing, the general anti-
intellectual organisational culture in the SANDF, the obvious lack of debate and interest of 
anything military within and without the military in South Africa, and the tendency to copy foreign 
doctrine.201   
 
A senior army general pointed out that the writing of doctrine in the SANDF in general and in the 
SA Army in particular is impeded by the lack of strategic guidance from the political environment 
on what is required from the military in future.  There is no clear governmental security policy,202 
whilst operationalising idealised political ideas like human and collaborative security into 
concrete military concepts and roles also presents a problem.  The result was a difficulty to 
identify clearly what the military should prepare for in future.  There was thus no lower order 
vision within the services of what they should look like or how they should operate (fight) in 
future.  From a doctrinal perspective, the problem is accentuated by a tendency in the SANDF 
to have a bottom-up approach in the writing of doctrine – a legacy from the SADF – a tendency 
that was rooted in the notion that new technology is the primary driver in doctrinal change.203 
 
Another factor in the development of doctrine in the SANDF is the lack of a dedicated institution 
or command with the responsibility to write doctrine.  At present, it is the responsibility of 
different commands and formations.  The Joint Operations Division, for example, is responsible 
for the writing of joint doctrine, while the individual services are responsible for service-unique 
doctrine.  Doctrine is further fragmented within the services.  In the SA Army, for example, 
Infantry Formation is responsible for infantry doctrine and Armour Formation for armour 
doctrine.  The doctrinal directorates within the different headquarters have to manage the 
development of the doctrine that is produced by these different commands and institutions.   
 
A number of remarks need to be made in this regard.  Doctrine, firstly, is not the primary 
responsibility of these formations and commands.  Needless to say, in the military context a 
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secondary responsibility is mostly only dealt with if there is time available – which is almost 
never the case.  One officer responsible for doctrinal writing in the SA Army, for example, 
pointed out that his biggest challenge is”… finding people with the ability to write”.204  A mid-
ranking naval officer also pointed out that there is “… no shortage of good ideas and opinions in 
the Navy, but (that) there is an unwillingness (or inability) to write it down” (emphasis added).205  
Secondly, there is almost no interaction between the ETD institutions and those responsible for 
new doctrine, as is the case in most modern armed forces.  This leads to questions about the 
practicability or feasibility of the doctrine that is written; whether it is “tested”, in war games for 
example, before it becomes official doctrine.  War games, or “battle simulation” as it is referred 
to in the SANDF, focus primarily on the planning of military operations and not on the testing of 
doctrine.206  Therefore, questions need to be raised about whether new doctrine in the SANDF 
is put through a process of debate and critique to ensure it is refined.  Lastly, the management 
process for the development and promulgation of new doctrine is very bureaucratic.  It is an 
accepted fact that the more bureaucratic a process, the less room there is for professional 
critique and debate about the changes that are proposed and the more difficult it is to make that 
changes in a quick and efficient manner.207         
 
4.6.6 The two worlds of military discipline 
 
The birth of the New South Africa with its roots in the negotiated settlement of 1994 had a 
profound impact on the nature of military authority and discipline.  This change and impact were 
brought about (inter alia) by the integration of the different forces and their accompanying 
cultures in the SANDF.  There has been a clear move away from authoritarian domination 
towards a reliance on explanation, persuasion, negotiation and group consensus.208  Observed 
from within the organisation and compared to the period immediately before 1994, members of 
the military at present appear to be inclined to be more considerate and to practise caution and 
prudence to avoid misunderstandings, tension and ill feeling.  On a personal level, they are 
called upon to use diplomatic skill, to seek compromises by means of consensus and to be 
tolerant of others.  These are also the attributes that underpin a true educational and 
professional ethos.  The attributes encourage debate, critical questioning and diverse views, 
and challenges old paradigms.  This approach to discipline is enshrined in the South African 
Constitution. 
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However, this approach to discipline and education is questioned within conservative circles 
among both the former non-statutory and the statutory forces.  The central concern is whether it 
will be a suitable approach in the warfighting milieu.  Indeed, discipline is identified as one of a 
number of serious challenges the SANDF is facing at present.209  This doubt is also rooted in 
the seemingly inability of the SANDF to clearly demarcate the line between professional military 
discipline and misplaced loyalty to higher (party-political and military) authority – finding the right 
balance between military and civilian societal cultures.210  Professional military discipline is 
inherent undemocratic in nature.  Inevitably, tensions arise because democratic states have to 
rely on undemocratic institutions in order to protect democracy.  It is, however, important for 
democratic states to distinguish between the need to tolerate undemocratic security institutions 
and the need to manage these institutions in a democratic manner.    
 
The cohesion and other attributes that are required for military forces to be successful in the 
application of force require a unique approach to discipline that sometimes may be the direct 
opposite of the norm and approach to discipline in democratic civilian societies.  Langston, for 
example, pointed out that the American public admires their armed forces for their “… famously 
non-democratic organisational culture”.211  In short, the military should have a disciplined 
understanding of the (conservative) organisational values that are required to protect (liberal) 
societal values.  Such an approach seems to be absent in the SANDF.  It is interesting, for 
example, to note that in a report in 2001 by the commander of the British Military Advisory 
Training Team some of the problems in the SANDF that were pointed out specifically relate to 
discipline.  These include inter alia: 
 
 the standards had dropped, discipline had suffered and the effectiveness and 
deployability of the SANDF was lower than it should have been; 
 as many as 8 000 members were awaiting court martial; 
 the unwillingness to accept responsibility and the dubious level of staff work 
between the levels of lieutenant colonel and major general; 
 the most common grievance in units was frustration about promotion, because the 
complainants wanted additional pay but not the responsibility associated with it;  
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 the SANDF was too accommodating to individual circumstances, for example, to 
uncommitted members who regard the military as a day job and not a career 
commitment; and 
 too many of the officers and non-commissioned officers had become wary of 
imposing discipline in case they were going to be accused of being racist.212 
 
The training and educational system of a military is the only available “tool” for the inculcation of 
a culture of discipline and an understanding of the nature of military discipline.  The ETD 
institutions of the SANDF should be the leaders in this regard.  At present, it is unfortunately not 
the case. 
 
4.6.7 English as the language of command 
 
Another factor that influenced the nature of ETD in the SANDF was the acceptance of English 
as its language of command.213  The decision was clearly based on operational needs and the 
necessity to have one language as a command and operating language.  This need is 
understandable and there is no reason to question the decision.  It is however important to 
recognise that a multilingual environment always complicates training and education.214  This is 
especially true in a country that has eleven official languages.215  Training and educating people 
in an environment where English is neither the first language of the trainees nor of the trainers 
and educators, will certainly have a detrimental impact on the quality of the education.  
Instructors, directing staff and educators at ETD institutions often express the need for the 
development of English language skills, particularly writing skills, in the SANDF.  
 
4.6.8 The anti-intellectual organisational climate   
 
Quality ETD is not possible without research, and quality research forms the bedrock of an 
intellectual organisational climate and quality training and education.  Research is being done at 
a number of centres and organisations within the SANDF.  One such institution is the Centre for 
Military Studies.  For a variety of reasons, however, the research output of the Centre for 
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Military Studies has declined remarkably over the last number of years.216  Indeed, research and 
writing are not seen as part of the professional make-up of officers in the SANDF.  The dualism 
between doers and thinkers in the SANDF may provide some understanding of this 
problematique.217   
 
In the SANDF, the operationally inclined culture that was inherited from the SADF – the 
predominance of the doers – has been enforced by a number of factors.  There is, for instance, 
no academically-oriented journal that encourages officers to write and debate doctrinal and 
other issues.218  There is also no incentive for officers to engage in serious research and writing, 
and security is a controversial issue.219  Reading, the basis for any form of research, is not 
“… the in thing” at all, and there is no “… habit of reading” in the South African military.220  This 
stands in stark contrast to the defence force of a country like Ghana, for example, where officer 
cadets are required to read about 20 books as part of their education.  They have to purchase 
these books out of their own salaries as the basis of their professional libraries.221 
 
There is no co-ordinating body and budget for research in the SANDF, while the SANDF often 
interferes in the research output of academics in the military system.222  The result is that most 
of what has been written about the SANDF was done by (sometimes uninformed) academics 
and journalists outside the defence force.  In principle, there is nothing wrong with academics 
and other researchers outside the military writing about the SANDF.  A problem arises however 
when most of the prescribed literature of a defence force is acquired from outside sources, with 
officers not debating the issues that concern the heart of their profession.223   
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The lack of a culture of research is rooted in an anti-intellectual organisational climate that 
predominates in the SANDF, and the reality of the SANDF not being a learning organisation.  
One of the directing staff members of the SANWC, for example, explains the nature of this 
problem by indicating that the SANDF has these “excellent ETD institutions”.  However, periods 
between visits to these centres are times of intellectual death for the majority of officers simply 
because they do not engage in any military reading or debating of higher order military issues at 
an intellectual level.224  Another officer describes the SANDF as being “conceptually 
bankrupt”.225  In a recent study done by Heinecken, it was found that 14,8 percent of the SANDF 
officers attending programmes at the Army and War Colleges have a degree and 9,4 percent a 
post-graduate qualification.  In the United Kingdom, the corresponding percentages are 21,9 
and 52,8, in Germany 54,7 and 37,2, and in Canada 61,2 and 28,2 respectively.226  In an 
investigation into operational level staff courses that eventually led to the creation of the 
National War College, it was noted that “… a more practical and competency-based approach is 
required, with learners exiting the course with a set of competencies as opposed to a large 
amount of conceptual knowledge.  Thus the focus should be at the level of skills acquisition, 
with the final evaluation of the acquired competence occurring within the workplace or possibly 
within an assessment centre”.227  The emphasis on a skills-driven and not an intellectually 
based approach on such a senior course reflects the general attitude of the SANDF towards 
knowledge.    
 
A senior general of the SA Army pointed out that the lack of intellectualism and the challenge of 
the SANDF not being a learning organisation need to be seen as a strategic problem within the 
organisation, a problem that requires the attention of the highest command levels in the 
SANDF.  However, most of the senior officers in the SANDF, i.e. those from both the previous 
non-statutory and statutory forces, grew up in organisations that were operationally inclined and 
anti-intellectual by nature.  One analyst explains it in computeristic terms by indicating that 
“… senior officers, warrant officers and NCOs [in the SANDF] have been programmed with 
corrupt software in their earlier careers”.228  Members with a background in the non-statutory 
forces – thus the majority of the current SANDF leadership – have an even bigger disadvantage 
since they have no in-depth experience, knowledge and understanding of the inherent nature of 
a bureaucratised professional armed force and its operations.  Consequently, it will be correct to 
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conclude that the SANDF at present does not have an understanding firstly of what the 
constituent elements of a learning organisation are, and secondly what is required to transform 
the SANDF into a learning and more intellectual type of organisation.229   
 
4.6.9 The bureaucratic nature of the South African military 
 
There seems to be a general agreement amongst analysts that the SANDF has become 
increasingly more bureaucratised and operationally impotent since 1994, in other words, it has 
become a staff-driven and not a command-driven defence force.  There are multiple and diverse 
reasons for this phenomenon; some more obvious than others.  The auditing firm-driven 
reorganisation of the SANDF in the mid-1990s does feature as a prominent reason.  The 
absence of a culture and ethos of regimentalised military leadership and traditions is another 
prominent reason.  The principle of commanders reporting to commanders and staff officers to 
staff officers was not operationalised in the restructuring of the SANDF, thus creating a 
vagueness concerning command and control.  In many of the training and education 
programmes, management is presented as a separate subject.  Military or defence leadership, 
however, does not feature in any of the programmes as a clearly demarcated component.  This 
translates into a defence force with one of the highest tooth-to-tail ratios in the world – huge 
number of generals, staff officers and higher headquarters in relation to commanders and 
employable formations.  The presence of an occupational and not an institutional approach in 
the management of personnel transforms the SANDF in another 9-5 employment agency.  In a 
recent study done by Heinecken 29,9 percent of the officers who were questioned in the 
SANDF indicated that they joined the military because they wanted a job with regular working 
hours and good fringe benefits.  This is in stark contrast to the 6,1 percent in the United 
Kingdom, 16,5 percent in Canada, and 10,3 percent in Germany.230     
 
In the mid-1990s, the SANDF initiated a programme to foster a mission-driven approach to 
command in the SANDF.  This so-called Leadership, Command and Management Programme 
(LCAMP), however, itself became a victim of the highly centralised directive approach to 
command in the SANDF.  The reliance on a directive and not a mission-driven approach in the 
SANDF is the result of two considerations.  As in all defence forces, the SANDF cannot sustain 
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a mission-driven command approach if there is any doubt about, firstly, the trust between and, 
secondly, the competency of its members.  There is indeed serious doubt about the level of trust 
in the SANDF – between the members themselves and between leaders and subordinates.  
One of the root causes for this is the high level of crime in South Africa in general and in the 
SANDF in particular.  This is nowhere more visible than in the control measures that are used in 
the SANDF to ensure that money is spent in an appropriate manner.  Stringent control 
measures make it almost impossible for formations, units and individuals to spend budgets. 
 
The problem is that bureaucracy has staying power – once established, it is difficult to get rid of 
it again.  It will be extremely difficult to change the prevalent culture of management through 
consensus in the SANDF into one of sound military leadership, the current structure of 
undecodable command affiliations into clear command and control arrangements, and the 
current logistical system that has spawned personal fiefdoms into one of “just-in-time” 
delivery?231  The current bureaucratised nature of the SANDF influenced its training and 
education in two ways.  Firstly, bureaucracies always reflect a resistance to change.  Therefore, 
the more bureaucratised the SANDF, the more difficult will it be to make the changes necessary 
for a rigorous ETD system.  Secondly, the ETD system provides an important pathway for 
change from a bureaucratised organisational culture to a command-driven strategic culture.  
This necessitates an urgent appreciation of the curricula of the different colleges to find the right 
balance between management to command. 
 
4.6.10 Politics and merit in the South African National Defence Force 
 
Since 1994, the political and strategic leadership of the military in South Africa has been 
transformed to the extent that the Minister of Defence, his deputy, the Secretary of Defence and 
the chief of defence all come from the same political party and liberation movement 
background.232  This may contribute to political stability and ensuring the subordination of the 
military.  However, it has the potential of creating a brotherhood culture.  The SANDF indeed did 
not escape the higher order political culture that developed within South Africa since 1994.  This 
culture is rooted in a number of considerations.   
 
Loyalty to higher political authorities and struggle credentials became increasingly more 
important in the SANDF than individual competency, skill and expertise.  This misplaced loyalty 
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is augmented by a tendency to see everything through a racial lens.233  Herbst, for example, 
argues that, according to the world-view of Thabo Mbeki and the ANC – formed by years of 
struggle and unaffected by over a decade of democratic politics – racism is still the driving force 
behind all social dynamics, and racial solidarity is still the only answer to many of the basic 
problems in South Africa.234  Underlying this argument is the view that Euro-Africans (white 
South Africans) do not and cannot understand the African way of doing.  Euro-Africans are seen 
as still feeling disempowered, having lost the political power in South Africa and, in general, 
they are regarded as biased in their view of the ability of their fellow (black) South Africans to 
manage and govern.  Misplaced loyalty and racism are, thirdly, justified through an uncritical 
acceptance of the fact that apartheid was evil and the struggle noble – without any nuance in 
the understanding of any of the notions.235   
 
The challenge is that these accepted wisdoms have been raised to an ideology and, as always, 
there will be ideologists who take things too far.  It is also a fact that the more ideologically 
infused a specific process is, the less room there is for finding pragmatic solutions to 
complicated problems.  In short, political expediency has become an important consideration 
and in some instances it has replaced merit in the SANDF.  The politically inclined 
organisational culture of the non-statutory forces has to a large extent replaced the meritocracy 
of the SADF in the newly formed SANDF.236  This, without a doubt, had a profound influence on 
training and education in the SANDF, particularly as regards who are allowed to attend courses 
and for what reason and which views are tolerated and which not.237  This, in turn, had an 
influence on the learning experience provided to the students.  The question can indeed be 
asked whether anything has changed in this regard in the South African military since the 
1980s, that is except the political authorities and the kind of topics that are allowed for 
discussion.  
 
Most of the SANDF ETD programmes available to officers have no criteria for admission, except 
appropriate rank and a nomination that is done based on a list of seniority – the exception being 
the Military Academy, which requires a formal application, proper screening and an acceptance 
by a selection board.  The point, though, is that there is no testing of the intellectual, 
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professional and other abilities of candidates prior to any programme.  The directing staff of the 
different institutions has, therefore, no indication whatsoever about a specific individual’s ability 
to be successful in a specific programme.  This is a vital challenge if the diverse nature of the 
people within the officer corps at present is considered in terms of backgrounds, educational 
qualifications and professional standards.  This is an even bigger challenge if the expectation – 
indirect pressure – from higher headquarters of a 100 percent success rate is taken into 
account.  Academic qualifications did not feature prominently during the integration process and 
the creation of the SANDF, an arrangement that served the political requirements of the period 
immediately after 1994.  Experience and training were the only factors that were considered.  
The result is a huge discrepancy in the educational qualifications of individual officers of the 
same rank and to the extent that some officers have PhDs while others doing the same course 
have only basic literacy – to use an extreme example.  This is not an optimal condition for the 
development of a learning curve for all members on course.238   
 
It seems as if the SANDF is aware of most of these shortcomings.  The South African Minister 
of Defence, Mr Mosiuoa Lekota, recently stated, “[s]ome of our efforts must now focus on the 
transformation of our training.  This review must encompass the syllabi and different methods of 
training.  Attention must also be given to our military training institutions, which need to be 
properly equipped, maintained and in many cases renovated”.239  A senior officer in the SANDF 
outlined some of the problems that need to be addressed.  He indicated the following problems: 
 
• certain ETD institutions (providers) and facilities are not optimally utilised due to their 
dispersed location;  
• there is a lack of coordination and a shortage of qualified and current ETD practitioners; 
• the professional development of the reserve forces is being neglected; 
• ETD facilities are not sustained or upgradeable;  
• there is little or no focus on research and development;  
• there is a lack of compliance with the NQF (SAQA-recognised qualifications and 
accreditation); 
• a lack of capacity for the education of non-commissioned and warrant officers as well as 
civilian employees of the DOD is being experienced; 
• training is not outcome-based; and 
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• there is a lack of “common and joint ETD”.240  
 
4.7 CONCLUSIONS 
 
Education in South Africa has a long history of turmoil and friction.  Since 1994, this translated 
into an urgent need to transform education in South Africa in an effort to allow more people 
access to the system.  This process of change was driven by important policy changes as 
contained in various White Papers.  However, the transformation had to face a number of 
tensions that threatened to derail the process of transformation.  The lack of financial resources 
is an important consideration in this regard.  Competency and other capacity issues also 
negatively affect the implementation of the policies.  It is against this background of need for 
education, on the one hand, and challenges in the presentation thereof, on the other, that the 
need for military education in South Africa should be understood and discussed. 
 
The geo-strategic and policy environment of the SANDF has changed dramatically since 1994.  
These changes were to a large extent driven by, on an external strategic level, the notion of 
collaborative security and, on an internal policy level, human security.  Not only has the foreign 
and domestic external environment of the SANDF been changed.  Internal organisational 
changes were required in an effort to amalgamate previously belligerent forces, to ensure 
representivity at all levels, to downscale the SANDF, and to adapt the SANDF to a shrinking 
defence budget and changed defensive posture.  In all, the SANDF was confronted with an 
agenda of transformation from a wide spectrum of environments. 
 
The SANDF faced momentous difficulties from an ETD perspective.  None of the previous 
belligerent forces had an organisational culture or tradition of education.  The SANDF, thus, 
turned out to be anti-intellectual by nature and is struggling to transform itself into a learning 
organisation.  Yet, much time and vast resources have been spent on ETD in the SANDF over 
the past ten years. At a practical level, it was in the classrooms of the different ETD institutions 
of the SANDF that most of the members of the former belligerent groups were first brought 
together in a formal environment.  Thus, ETD institutions in the SANDF provided the platform for 
the creation of a single cohesive armed force in South Africa.  There is little doubt that the 
nature of the future of the SANDF will also be moulded primarily in the classrooms of its 
different ETD institutions. 
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The SANDF, however, is very far from the dream of a truly professional force.  There are ETD 
challenges that the SANDF needs to address on its path to a higher level of professionalism.  
The most challenging in this regard is the anti-intellectualism prevalent in the SANDF.  The 
current anti-intellectual organisational climate impedes the transformation of the SANDF into a 
real learning organisation.  Addressing the anti-intellectual climate in the SANDF will go a long 
way towards promoting education as the true vehicle for transformation and professionalism in 
the SANDF.  An important first step in this regard would be to afford education a standing of its 
own instead of integrating it with training and development.  Another step will be to 
professionalise SANDF education through the creation of academic faculties at the different 
colleges or to at least ensure that the directing staff is academically educated.  These faculties 
should not be overburdened with organisational and administrative tasks, as is the case with the 
directing staff at present.  Other important steps would be to broaden the interaction between 
the SANDF and the academic community and the exchange of staff and students with foreign 
armed forces.  The vision of an educated officer corps should be actively pursued.  An important 
first step in this regard would be to start at the lowest levels and to optimise the role, capabilities 
and contribution of the South African Military Academy with its Faculty of Military Science.  This 
will be the focus of the next two chapters. 
 
 
 178 
CHAPTER 5 
 
UNCHARTED PATHS, UNCERTAIN VISION: DEBATING THE MAKING 
OF LIEUTENANTS AT THE SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY ACADEMY, 
1994 TO THE PRESENT   
 
The future will be high technology, plus appropriate education, 
plus military service in the name of democracy 
Ronnie Kasrils1 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
By 1994, the South African Military Academy was a de facto military university.  In its existence 
of almost 50 years, though, the Academy went through different phases of institutional 
development.  At times, it developed into an archetype military academy; at other times, it 
reflected the attributes of a typical military university.  In 1969, for example, the Malan reforms 
were introduced.  This transformed the institution into a typical archetype military academy with 
a clear function to train, educate and socialise officers as a prerequisite for entering the defence 
force as commissioned officers.  The need for junior officers, because of South Africa’s 
involvement in South West Africa/Namibia, changed this situation to the extent that from 1976 
onwards the Military Academy developed once again into the direction of a military university. 
 
These institutional changes that characterised the Military Academy’s whole existence as an 
institution were and still are a reason for concern and a reflection of an absence of a clearly 
demarcated vision of its role and function in the education, training and development of officers 
for the South African military.  Since 1994, the pendulum once again started swinging towards 
the transformation of the Military Academy into an archetype military academy.  It can indeed be 
argued that nothing has changed in terms of the clarity of vision with which the Military 
Academy fulfils its function in a transformed South African democracy and military.  The South 
African Military Academy is indeed an institution beset with many challenges and difficulties.  It 
is still an institution in search of a clear vision and role in the education, training and 
development of officers of the South African military.2 
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This chapter is not intended and should not be seen as a historical narrative of the Military 
Academy since 1994.  Rather, it provides a broad overview of the institutional debate and 
development of the Military Academy during the specific timeframe in an effort to identify the 
most salient drivers or ideas of the debate and the eventual development that took place.  An 
effort is made to identify those underlying factors that need to be addressed if the role of the 
Military Academy is to be brought in line with the framework of military education, training and 
socialisation of military officers outlined in the previous chapters.   
 
This chapter comprise the analysis of four specific themes.  The discussion is introduced by an 
analysis of the influence of a MMil thesis by Mark Malan in 1994.  During the 1994 transition, 
the thesis led to a debate on the role of the Military Academy in a newly transformed South 
African military and society.  The debate culminated in 1995 at a conference on the future of the 
Military Academy.  As a result, the second part of the discussion highlights the contributions of 
the different participants at the conference in an effort to provide an exposition of the ideas that 
were raised.  The third part of the chapter focuses on the underlying issues that were addressed 
in the Potgieter Report of the late 1990s.  Specific proposals made in the report led to important 
changes at the Military Academy.  As a result, the last part of the chapter is an analysis of the 
proposals that led to the development of new academic offerings at the Military Academy.  
5.2 THE MALAN THESIS: INTRODUCING A DEBATE ON THE FUTURE OF THE 
 MILITARY ACADEMY 
 
In 1994, a debate developed on the future of the Military Academy.  Such a debate could have 
been expected given the broader political and other changes that were taking place, not only in 
the broader South African society, but also within the Defence Force.  The debate also took 
place in the aftermath of two investigations regarding the Military Academy in the latter half of 
the 1980s.  These two investigations, Project Kingsrow in 1987 and Project Wimpole in 1989, 
both highlighted the lack of clarity on the nature and role of the Military Academy in the 
development of officers for the South African military.3  The primary reason for the unfolding of a 
debate on the future of the Military Academy was, however, a study that was done on civil-
military relations in a democracy and the important role of an educated officer corps in this 
regard. 
 
In September 1994, Mark Malan completed a thesis titled “Civilian Supremacy over the Military: 
Guidelines for Embryonic Democracies” in the Faculty of Military Science of the University of 
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Stellenbosch.4  The study was done under the supervision of Prof WJ Breytenbach from the 
Political Science Department of the University of Stellenbosch and Prof C Nelson, a professor in 
Political Science at the Faculty of Military Science.  In 1996, Nelson became the Dean of 
Military Science.5  He was a key figure in the development of the debate concerning the future 
of the Military Academy before taking up the post of the Dean of Military Science.   
 
The idea of “embryonic democracies” in the title of the study is of great importance, given the 
date of completion of the study and the historic realities that unfolded in South Africa at the time.  
In 1994, South Africa was, and it still is, a good (if not the best) example of an embryonic 
democracy.  For the South African military in general and for the Military Academy in particular, 
it was a time of great uncertainty, turmoil and debate.  On the one hand, the military was an 
important instrument of stability in a drastically changing South Africa and its transitional 
society.  On the other hand, though, it was seen as one of the important pillars of the apartheid 
regime that needed to be transformed itself.  An understanding of the content of the Malan 
thesis as it concerns military education is of importance for an understanding of the debate that 
eventually unfolded on the future of the Military Academy.  
 
5.2.1 The contribution of the Malan thesis to the debate on the future of the Military 
 Academy 
 
In his study, Malan argued that stable civil-military relations are critical in the process of 
democratisation.  For developing nations in particular, sound civil-military relations ensure 
civilian supremacy over its military during an era of transition.  Consequently, one of the aims of 
the study was a critical investigation into the measures that have to be implemented to remove 
the most salient threats to civilian political supremacy in democratic societies.6  The measures 
concern the structure and role of the military, the culture of military organisations, and the 
relationship between the polity and the military.  Chapter seven of Malan’s study specifically 
focuses on guidelines for reducing the dissonance between the military mind and the principle 
of civil supremacy.  Malan analysed and discussed military education as an important tool for 
the reconciliation of democratic and military values in order to reduce this dissonance.  This 
discussion of the importance of education for sound civil-military relations in emerging 
democracies eventually served as an important academic framework for the ensuing debate 
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concerning the role of the Military Academy.  In the discussion, Malan touched upon the 
demanding nature of officership, the necessity for higher education, and the vehicle for and 
content of officer education. 
 
Malan argued that sound civil-military relations in a democracy call for a clear distinction 
between military organisational and political culture.  Military organisational culture is based on 
universal military values: discipline, stamina, skill, loyalty, duty, courage, selfless service, 
integrity, and commitment.  These are values, Malan argued, with no intrinsic threat to the 
survival of a democracy.  “It is only when military values are promoted through the deliberate or 
implicit denigration of alternative values,” he pointed out, “that the military becomes intolerant of 
the political process.”7  Thus, he noted, in the interest of cohesion and compliance in a 
democracy soldiers have to internalise the clear set of values encapsulated in the military 
culture.  In addition, and in the interest of external integration, officers have to understand and 
accept the values inherent in the political culture towards which civil society is striving.  In 1994, 
the nature of this political culture was an issue of contention – a subject of debate at all levels in 
the South African society. 
 
Malan emphasised that the internalisation of military organisational values is done through a 
process of military training and socialisation.  However, the comprehension and acceptance of 
societal values that underpin the political culture in a democracy is more problematic because 
civilian control lies ultimately in the minds of the military.8  In an embryonic society like South 
Africa, the matter is even more complex “… because the fairness and virtues of a democratic 
political system will not become apparent through the mere observation of a civil society as it 
struggles with the process of democratic transition”.9  This brought to the fore the need for the 
process of military training and socialisation to be supplemented – though not supplanted – by 
some form of “… broad political socialisation” to inculcate these democratic societal values.  
This should not be confused with political indoctrination to accept party political doctrine that 
does not have legitimacy and the support of the society in general.  The process of general 
democratic socialisation should ensure that the military is strongly committed to the basic 
assumptions of a democratic polity.  It is the task of civic education in the military establishment 
to satisfy this requirement.  Malan emphasised that this process of general socialisation – the 
inculcation of broad societal values – should take place at an early stage of the officer’s career 
since officers’ attitudes tend to harden during the advanced stages of their careers.10      
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Malan uses the philosophy of Innere Führung in the German Bundeswehr as an example to 
elucidate his ideas regarding the inculcation of officers with democratic societal values.  The 
purpose of Innere Führung, Malan argues, “… is to illustrate that the basic order of the state and 
its constitution are worthy of protection”.11  Malan quotes Wittman who pointed out that Innere 
Führung promotes the ability of military personnel to recognise and reflect on their role in state 
and society.  Innere Führung furthermore guides military personnel in asserting their civil rights, 
to recognise the political importance of their duties and to act accordingly.12 
 
In his discussion of the demanding nature of officership in a democracy, Malan pointed out that 
officers are affected – personally and corporately – by societal politics and that all officers will 
have certain political preferences and attitudes.  Thus, an understanding of the political system, 
its values and democratic theory is essential if officers are to perform their role effectively in an 
emerging democracy, whilst remaining disengaged from political activity, which is beyond the 
scope and level, which is acceptable in society.13  In addition to these intellectual demands, 
Malan also highlighted the unique moral burdens that confront the career officer in a 
democracy: 
 
 the ability to control a vast potential for destruction and the will to use it if necessary; 
 the tension between the “rationality” of the techniques of destruction and the total 
irrationality of modern warfare; 
 learning to resolve conflicts with violence in a society that has as one of its central norms 
that conflict should be resolved without violence; 
 the constant testing of military strength without being allowed to posit an enemy; 
 the defence of a form of society which is distinguished not only by positives but also 
clearly by antagonisms and disorder; 
 being the object of public scrutiny; 
 the pressure to legitimate prescribed authoritarian behaviour within the military while 
participatory behaviour is generally highly valued in society; 
 the readiness to internalise norms oriented to the common good and to express these 
norms through one’s behaviour in a society in which the main overt values are organised 
around the pursuit of personal gain; and 
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 special sacrifices inherent to the nature of military service.14 
 
Malan concluded that the intellectual and moral demands of officership are a clear indication 
that a democratic society depends not only upon the functional skills of the officer (acquired 
through training and experience), but also upon his intellectual advancement.15  He pointed out 
that the general calibre of a nation’s resources, budgetary constraints, and military manpower 
needs may combine to create an overwhelming temptation among defence planners to 
commission and promote the type of people who are incapable of meeting the demands, which 
should be met by military officers in a democratic polity.  The members of a society, Malan 
maintained, who possess the qualities of moral and intellectual competence, talent, and 
vocational fulfilment are normally those who have had a sound upbringing, including some form 
of higher education.16     
 
In his analysis of the necessity for higher education, Malan highlighted several factors that guide 
the need for the education of officers.  Firstly, it is only through a tertiary education that officers 
acquire the necessary background to understand both the domestic and international political 
environment, and through which they develop the necessary insight to comprehend the nature 
and limits of defence policy and military operations.  Secondly, tertiary education plays an 
important role in developing the capacity for independent thought.  Military training encourages 
a high degree of conformity.  Consequently, Malan pointed out, the military traditionally tends to 
be wary of independents or non-conformists.  It is ironic though that the prevalence of 
conformists within the profession may have deleterious effects for both civilian control and 
military professionalism.  Malan provided an exposition of the dichotomy of traits between 
conforming subjects and those who are inclined towards independent judgement.  (See Table 
5.1)  Thirdly, the education of officers is necessary to maintain corporate balance within the 
military.  Corporate balance, Malan argued, is achieved when the structure of the profession 
adequately reflects its role as a public institution and the solutions to its operational problems.  
Without officer enlightenment, structural adjustments to the military profession are extremely 
difficult to implement.  Fourthly, higher education is necessary to help officers accept public 
criticism of the military, where it is due, as a normal part of the democratic process.  From this 
perspective, the question can indeed be posed as to whether the sensitivity for public criticism 
amongst the leadership cadre of the SANDF at present is a reflection of an anti-intellectual 
organisational climate prevalent within the South African military.  Fifthly, there is also an 
educational imperative to maintain a meaningful distinction between officers and enlisted ranks 
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within the military.  A marked difference in the levels of general education between officers and 
non-commissioned officers upon entry to the service and in the breadth of subsequent 
professional education and training demarcates the difference between these two professional 
groupings.  Lastly, Malan argued that education is necessary for the officer to reconcile the 
necessity for training and education and to be comfortable with both.17    
 
Table 5.1: The dichotomy of traits distinguishing conforming subjects and independent 
judgementalists18 
 
Independents 
 
 are effective leaders; 
 take an ascendant role in their relations 
with others; 
 are persuasive and tend to win other 
people over to their point of view; 
 are turned to for advice and reassurance; 
 are efficient, capable, and able to mobilise 
resources easily and effectively; 
 are active and vigorous; 
 are expressive ebullient people; 
 seek and enjoy aesthetic and sensuous 
impressions; 
 are natural, free from pretence, unaffected; 
and 
 are self-reliant, independent in judgement, 
able to think for themselves. 
Conformists 
 
 with respect to authority, are submissive, 
compliant and overly accepting; 
 are conforming, and tend to do the things 
that are prescribed; 
 have a narrow range of interest; 
 over-control their impulses and are 
inhibited; 
 are unable to make decisions without 
vacillation or delay; 
 become confused, disorganised and un-
adaptive under stress; 
 lack insight into their own motives and 
behaviour; and 
 are suggestible, overly responsive to other 
people’s evaluations rather than their own. 
 
Malan further remarked that there seems to be agreement internationally on the necessity for 
tertiary education but that the vehicle and content of this education vary from country to country.  
Countries often recruit university graduates as officer candidates.  Yet, most developed 
countries have military academies dedicated to educating those soldiers who aspire towards 
commissioned rank but who are not in possession of an academic qualification.  Malan though 
pointed out that precisely what the missions of these institutions should be has long been a 
subject of discussion and argument in military circles.  Of particular concern is the question 
whether these institutions should equip students for their first assignments after graduation, or 
                                                
17
 Ibid., pp. 142-145 
 185 
whether they should prepare them for the challenges of a life-long military career – an inherent 
tension between training and education.19   
 
According to Malan, critics argue that candidate officers can be educated at civilian universities 
at a fraction of the cost if education is liberalised at the expense of military ethics and skills.  
Yet, if functional training and cost-effectiveness are pursued at the expense of a broad liberal 
education, the purpose and academic status of military academies are undermined.20  In a 
developing country, this challenge is further exacerbated through a number of constraints, 
including: 
 
 resource scarcity; 
 a high potential for internal political instability; 
 ethnic imbalances in educational standards; 
 an underdeveloped political culture; 
 a high level of demand for skilled and educated manpower in the civilian sector; and 
 competing national priorities, such as nation-building, reconstruction and development.21 
 
Malan’s biggest contribution to the debate concerning the future of the South African Military 
Academy was his distinction between military academies and military universities as the 
ultimate resolution of the inherent tension between military training and education in the 
development of officers. (See Table 5.2)  Malan highlighted two factors that determine a 
country’s choice with regard to a military academy or university.  Firstly, the archetypical military 
academy is a poor vehicle for broadening the military mind.  However, military universities often 
neglect the training and socialisation of the officer corps.  Secondly, the system of manpower 
provision determines to a large extent whether a particular country will have a military academy, 
or not.  Traditional military academies presuppose a long-term military career since it requires 
(in most cases) a costly four-year induction before commissioning.  The cost and time involved 
make this an unsuitable choice for a defence force that recruits potential officers on short-term 
contracts.  This is very often the case in developing countries.  Such a scenario often requires 
that, once career officers have been identified, initial training and socialisation be supplemented 
by an education provided through a military university.22 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                          
18
 Ibid., p. 143. 
19
 Ibid., p. 145. 
20
 Ibid., p. 146. 
21
 Ibid., pp. 147-148. 
22
  Ibid., p. 149. 
 186 
Table 5.2: Characteristics of military educational institutions23 
Military academy 
 
 develops cadets 
 serves as right of passage for 
commissioning as officer 
 plays fundamental role in military training 
and socialisation 
 awards military degree/qualification: 
academically autonomous 
 enrolment exclusively military 
 curriculum and presentation largely 
determined by military leaders 
 foundation of military education: youthful 
students 
 undergraduate emphasis 
Military university 
 
 educates officers 
 facilitates passage to higher rank 
 
 presents no functional training; peripheral 
socialisation 
 civilian university confers degrees 
 
 civilians may enrol 
 civilians play a leading role in curriculum 
and presentation 
 intermediate military education 
 
 strong post-graduate emphasis 
 
Malan also contributed to the debate about the future of the South African Military Academy by 
pointing out that every officer’s education should at least include concepts associated with the 
following: 
 
 a sense of history; 
 the conflicts within society between individual rights and system imperatives; 
 an understanding of the ideals and actualities of the national political system; 
 the political consequences of military decisions and military actions; 
 the moral and ethical issues of professional service and standards of moral behaviour; 
and 
 the problems of political change and economic development.24 
 
However, Malan argued that it is unlikely that the normal system of university education in a 
developing country would be able to meet these minimal educational requirements in a fairly 
homogeneous fashion for all members of the military profession.  The military corps schools and 
colleges are also unsuitable vehicles for broad liberal education.  Indeed, Malan warns that 
without a strong intellectual base, the inculcation of political ideas and political analysis among 
military leaders may lead to political activities and views resting on oversimplified perceptions of 
                                                
23
 Ibid., p. 148 
 
 187 
democracy and politics.  Malan maintained that the solution to the problem of meeting the 
educational requirements of military officers in a cost-effective manner in developing 
democracies lies in civil-military co-operation.  He proposed three possibilities in this regard: 
 
 creation of a unique educational institution (a military academy or university), which 
caters primarily for military educational needs at university level; 
 
 addition of a civilian-style academic faculty to an existing military educational or training 
institution; or 
 
 accommodation of military students at a civilian university, which is prepared to offer a 
unique curriculum and to accept a measure of military input and oversight with respect to 
course content and the activities of such students. 
 
The South African Military Academy at present reflects a combination of the first two 
possibilities.   
 
5.2.2 The Malan thesis: A critical perspective 
 
What critique can be levelled against the ideas of Malan in his thesis and as expressed in the 
report that was eventually drawn up with the help of his colleagues?  The majority of Malan’s 
ideas were very progressive, well-articulated and very sound.  However, if his ideas and that of 
his colleagues are compared with the framework for the education of officers as outlined in 
Chapter three, a number of remarks are possible.  Malan in his studies has not drawn a clear 
distinction between broad liberal academic education and professional military education.  
Though he emphasised the need for broad, liberal education in general, his neglect to draw a 
proper distinction between these two notions had a very pertinent influence on his ideas as they 
eventually unfolded.  A distinction between these two kinds of education is of critical importance 
for an understanding of the intellectual and professional development of officers and the role of 
academics in the provision thereof.  Academics are involved in both liberal and professional 
education.  In some countries (Britain for example), military academies provide only 
professional military education, training and socialisation.  In such cases, recruitment focuses 
on people who are already liberally educated.  In other countries (Australia for example), military 
academies provide a broad liberal education together (in some instances) with the training and 
socialisation that are required for entrance into the profession of arms.   
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The effect of the neglect to recognise the difference between liberal and professional education 
shaped the misplaced argument about the “professor-general”.  According to Malan, the notion 
of a “professor-general” is an impossibility.  However, it is widely recognised that all military 
forces in the world comprise both “doers” and “thinkers” (or “operators” and “theorists”).  The 
military profession has a need for both these two groups of people.  In all militaries, the role of 
both doers and thinkers is of critical importance.  It is also an accepted fact that doers become 
more prominent and influential in armed forces during times of greater turmoil and high 
operational deployment.  During times of relative peace, the more salient influence of the 
thinkers (professor-generals, in the words of Malan) usually is more visible.   
 
The history of the U.S. Army over the last fifty years is an interesting case study in this regard.  
The “operators” were very prominent during the 1950s and 1960s in the aftermath of the 
Second World War and in fighting the wars in Korea and Vietnam.  However, the outcome of the 
war in Vietnam and the example of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War emphasised the need for new 
innovative conceptual thinking about how the U.S. Armed Forces were to fight in future.  This 
manifested itself in several organisational developments and restructurings.  Some of the most 
important in this regard was the creation of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrinal Command 
(TRADOC) with a senior four-star general in command and the development of the School for 
Advanced Military Studies at the U.S. Army Command and Staff College.25  What was of 
particular significance was the prominence of thinkers in the U.S. Army during the 1970s and 
1980s.  More specifically, education became a very important tool for the transformation of an 
operationally and conceptually bankrupt military in the aftermath of the war in Vietnam.  It 
translates into success in the 1991 Gulf War.  The experience of the U.S. armed forces in Iraq 
since 2003 though led to renewed arguments about a “… Second Learning Revolution”.26  
Against this background, it was interesting to note that a large majority of defence force 
personnel that can be described as “doers” – the so-called “fighters” of the SADF – resigned 
from the SADF/SANDF in the early 1990s.  This was followed by a rise to prominence of more 
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intellectually inclined officers and accompanied by a realisation by some members of the 
SANDF of the importance of having an academic qualification.27   
 
5.2.3 Spreading the message: The impact of the Malan thesis 
 
In what way did Malan contribute to the debate on the future of the Military Academy?  Malan 
made use of a number of forums to propagate his ideas on the nature of military education in 
general and the future of the Military Academy in particular.  Ideas on military education from his 
thesis were published almost verbatim in the African Security Review in an article titled “Officer 
Education: The Democratic Imperative”.28  In another article, Malan emphasised the importance 
of civic education to inculcate a culture of civic consciousness in armed forces.29   
 
Malan’s ideas also appeared in a number of reports within the Faculty of Military Science and 
the Department of Defence.30  The most important was a working paper that was drafted on own 
initiative by Malan and two colleagues, Cdr (Dr) A Roux and Maj H Hurter.31  The paper was 
submitted to a meeting of the Council of the Faculty of Military Science on 7 June 1994.  At a 
meeting of the council on 26 June 1994, it was unanimously accepted as the “… position of the 
Faculty of Military Science on the restructuring of the South African Military Academy”.32  The 
report was signed by both the Dean of Military Science, Col (Prof) JC Kotzé, and the Officer 
Commanding the Military Academy, Brig PO Verbeeck and, thus, should be seen as not only 
the position of the Faculty but as the official view of the Military Academy.  In their report, the 
authors proposed the restructuring of the Military Academy according to, what they referred to 
as, a “Conceptual Model of a SANDF Institute of Professional Military Education”.  The proposal 
for an Institute of Professional Military Education embodied an interesting blend of the 
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characteristics of a military academy and a military university in order to cater for both officer 
cadets and officer students.33    
 
The report also discussed external influences for change at the Military Academy as well as 
factors that contributed to the “… sub-optional functioning of the Military Academy”.  Since these 
influences and factors underpinned the debate that eventually unfolded at the Military Academy 
and elsewhere in the Department of Defence in the era after 1994 about military education in 
general and the role of the Military Academy in particular, it is important to consider these 
briefly.  The following “… external forces for change” were identified: 
 
 the political imperatives for an officer corps which is representative of a broad 
population, reflecting diverse educational backgrounds; 
 
 the greater salience granted at that particular time to the issue of exercising civilian 
control over the military; 
 
 the political primacy granted to the funding of a reconstruction and development 
programme, potentially at the expense of the defence budget; 
 
 the amalgamation and integration of armed forces with widely varying standards of 
military professionalism to form the SANDF; 
 
 the restoration of international legitimacy which creates both opportunities and 
commitments for South Africa, some of which are defence-related (the exchange of 
military technology and the need for South Africa to develop a peacekeeping capacity 
were emphasised in this regard); 
 
 a shift in the system of manpower provisioning from a cadre-conscript system to a 
volunteer system, implying flexible contracts for officers rather than the concept of life-
long service; and 
 
 an extension of the internal mission of the SANDF to include secondary roles related to 
socio-economic upliftment programmes.34 
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The factors that the working paper outlined as contributing to the “… sub-optimal functioning of 
the Military Academy” included the following: 
 
 inconsistency in the system of commissioning and promoting military officers; 
 
 an apparent inability to both understand and reconcile the conflict between education 
and training.  The numerous and sometimes perplexing changes to the format and 
content of both education and training at the Military Academy are symptomatic of this 
issue; 
 
 at times, the Military Academy has displayed the characteristics of an archetypical 
military academy and at others that of a military university; 
 
 the heterogeneous student body in terms of age, rank, functional musterings and military 
experience.  This has led to a high level of internal conflict amongst students, which was 
generated by the status inconsistency, and which has inhibited the development of a 
clear philosophy on military training; 
 
 a heterogeneous lecturing corps has evolved to include male and female civilians, 
military practitioners and “… military university educators”35.  Generally speaking, there 
is no clearly defined relationship between military rank and academic prowess.  
Moreover, avenues for both military and academic promotion are somewhat limited; 
 
 a perception shared by students, members of the Faculty of Military Science, and the 
broader military and academic community that the lecturers at the Military Academy 
have academic profiles that are inferior to those of their counterparts at civilian 
institutions of higher learning; 
 
 the Military Academy has been vulnerable to periodic intervention by the services and 
different corps in respect to the content and conduct of both military training and 
academic studies, resulting in philosophical drift regarding the true nature and meaning 
of the institutional function; 
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 as a result of the concentration of command responsibilities and power in the person of a 
rotating officer commanding, the Faculty of Military Science suffered from a dearth of 
management ability, continuity and experience; 
 
 budgetary constraints that have consistently created conflict between line and support 
functions, often to the detriment of academic excellence within the Faculty of Military 
Science; 
 
 the perception that other academic institutions have embarked upon a process of 
“… hijacking potential Military Academy students” through the presentation of alternative, 
Defence Force-sanctioned higher educational programmes; 
 
 as an academic qualification, the BMil degree has never formed an integral part of the 
system of military qualifications for advancement to higher levels of the military 
hierarchy; and 
 
 although partially addressing the occupational needs of individuals (e.g. preparation for 
a second career), the Military Academy has denied both the existence and desirability of 
these needs.  This conflict will escalate in a possible manpower provisioning system that 
does not offer life-long employment in the SANDF.36 
 
In the end, the report emphasised that these considerations can be condensed into three 
fundamentally principles for planning the education of an armed force.  Firstly, it was argued 
that it is important to take cognisance of the basic distinction between the educational 
philosophy of a military academy and that of a military university.  Secondly, academic 
excellence (as defined by the academic community) and military excellence (as defined by the 
military elite) are mutually exclusive since both demand total focus and dedication to a unique 
set of values.  This is not to say that a soldier cannot be enlightened or that a scholar cannot be 
disciplined, but that the “professor-general” is a myth.  Those soldiers who have achieved 
academic excellence (as defined by the academic community) have either resigned their 
commissions or have retired from the profession of arms.  Any individual in pursuit of excellence 
in both these careers will ultimately have to make a choice between the pen and the sword.  
Thirdly, there is a demonstrated need for a South African system of professional military 
education that satisfies the functions fulfilled by both a military academy and a military 
university.  It was argued that members of the various services have expressed preferences for 
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either one or the other.  Since a military academy and military university serve different needs in 
different modes, utmost care has to be taken when attempting to reconcile these needs within a 
single institution.37 
 
Another important outcome of the Malan thesis was a debate that unfolded amongst the civilian 
members of the Faculty of Military Science concerning the role of civilians in the education of 
officers.  The debate was clearly reflected in two articles published in academic journals by E 
Kotze38 and R Steele39 on the participation of civilian academics in officer education in South 
Africa.  Like in the case of Malan, their arguments highlighted the importance of civilian and 
political control over the armed forces in a democratic society and the role of (civilian) education 
in the provision of behavioural or subjective control measures and conditions for civil-military 
control.  Kotze and Steele identified the following determinants for maintaining and enhancing 
balanced civil-military relations: 
 
 The presence of an informed and assertive civilian populace, well versed in democratic 
values, such as individual freedom, public accountability, responsibility and efficiency, 
effectiveness, probity and honesty in a just and fair society, who associate civilian 
control over the military with the establishment and preservation of freedom. 
 
 The presence of a liberally educated professional officer corps versed in the 
understanding of the population’s social values. 
 
 The presence and availability of university education opportunities to the military officer 
corps at military educational institutions as a professional prerequisite for the inculcation 
of democratic and military values, with the objective of reconciling the latter by 
preventing partisan indoctrination and socialisation of military leaders. 
 
 The importance of civilian participation in military education and leadership development 
may be regarded as a contemporary contribution to the balanced socialisation of military 
leaders.40 
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In considering the need for tertiary education in armed forces, Kotze and Steele argued that a 
general education ensures that officers remain part of their community.  The subsequent 
intellectual development and a common cultural and value system shared by the community 
and the military will ensure the construction of the behavioural and subjective instruments for 
balanced civil-military relations.41  “Liberal education,” though, it is stated, “can never take place 
in an atmosphere where free debate is inhibited”.42  The authors then provide elaborate 
arguments asserting that there is a de facto lack of academic freedom at the South African 
Military Academy.  They subsequently argued that the research and publication record of the 
Faculty of Military Science has become a source of embarrassment for the Faculty and the 
University of Stellenbosch.  This was accentuated, they argued, by the low percentage of 
members of the Faculty in possession of a doctorate.  Kotze and Steele pointed out that the 
identical situation is found at foreign military academies with a low percentage of civilian 
academics.  Consequently, they argued in favour of greater participation of civilian academics in 
the education of officers at the South African Military Academy.43 
 
The Malan thesis and the subsequent debate and reports that emanated from it eventually led 
to a conference and workshop on education in the South African military at the Military 
Academy, presented in co-operation with the Institute for a Democratic Alternative for South 
Africa (IDASA).  This conference was the next important stepping stone in the debate on the 
future of the Military Academy since between 1994.  
5.3 DISCUSSING THE FUTURE OF THE MILITARY ACADEMY AT THE 1995 
 CONFERENCE ON MILITARY EDUCATION 
 
The 1995 conference on “The Future of Military Education in a Democratic South Africa” at the 
Military Academy was nothing but a search by the Faculty of Military Science for its true 
meaning and purpose.  In fact, it was an effort by the Military Academy in general and the 
Faculty of Military Science in particular to mobilise (political) support and energy for a broader 
debate in the military, the University of Stellenbosch and the broader South African society on 
the future role of the Military Academy.  This is obvious if names, positions and knowledge of 
those who were invited to present papers at the conference, are considered.  The programme 
made provision for an academic conference and a workshop in an effort to generate inputs from 
all stakeholders on the future role and function of the Military Academy.       
                                                
41
 Kotze, E & Steele, R, “Civilian Participation in the Education and Development of Officers”, African 
Security Review, op. cit., p. 24. 
42
 Kotze, E & Steele, R, “Behavioural Determinants of Civilian-Military Control: Military Tertiary Education 
and Civilian Educators”, op. cit., p. 61. 
 195 
 
5.3.1 Variety of opinions: The ideas of the participants at the 1995 Conference 
 
Mr Ronnie Kasrils, the South African Deputy Minister of Defence, opened the conference with 
an address that ostensibly was written by Dr Laurie Nathan of the Centre for Conflict Resolution 
in Cape Town.  Kasrils, firstly, emphasised the need for soldiers to be technologically attuned.  
This requires smart soldiers who are educated, Kasrils argued.  However, this education should 
be based on the reality that very often the peasant soldier or urban resistance fighter challenges 
the technologically sophisticated military professional.  Consequently, Kasrils maintained, 
education enhanced the qualities that soldiers require to deal with technological and social 
progress as well as with diversity of people and cultures, uncertainty and ambiguity.44  Kasrils, 
secondly, highlighted the need to develop initiative in armed forces.  Initiative, Kasrils argued, is 
a “… human quality that speaks of a flexibility of mind that a techno-barbarian, imprisoned 
within the misconception that technology is über alles, cannot comprehend”.45  The need for 
initiative, Kasrils warned, should remind the soldier never to scorn grass-roots or people-
oriented creativity, which is a tremendous source of strength and inspiration.  Kasrils, thirdly, 
warned that the duty of the professional soldier in a democracy is deeply rooted in national and 
international law; not in the views of his military commander or political leadership.46  
Educational programmes therefore have to be supplemented by issues such as a code of 
conduct, military disciplinary procedures and the correct attitude of senior officers.  Kasrils 
concluded that four particular myths about military education should be dispelled: 
 
 “Academic freedom is not appropriate or applicable at a military academy.  If an 
academic institution restricts critical thinking on the part of its students and faculty, and if 
it censors or bans the publication of research, then it is engaged in indoctrination rather 
than academic pursuits. 
 
 Education for democracy within the military will undermine the soldier’s will to fight.  The 
educational programme is therefore intended to ensure that military personnel operate at 
all times within the confines of the Constitution, defence legislation and international law 
on armed conflict.  This is a constitutional imperative and not an act of subversion. 
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 Education for democracy will politicise the military.  This argument confuses non-
partisan (which is essential) with apolitical (which are scarcely possible).  The SANDF is 
bound to operate within the parameters of the Constitution, a profoundly political 
document. 
 
 Civilians should not be involved in military education.  This is contrary to international 
practise.  Civilian lecturers are able to inject valuable perspectives into military 
education.  Parliament has a constitutional mandate to investigate and make 
recommendations on military training.”47 
 
Two international scholars were invited to participate in the conference, Dr John Allen Williams 
of the Loyola University of Chicago and Vice-Chairman and Executive Director of the Inter-
University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society and Colonel Friederich-W. Dieckhoff, the 
Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff of the Zentrum Innere Führung in the Federal Republic 
of Germany. 
 
Williams argued that there is no conflict between military professionalism properly understood 
and patriotism, humanism and support for the democratic state.  Military practitioners should 
have a profound appreciation of their professional responsibilities to society in order to defend 
the democratic state and not to run it.  This being said, he argues that even in a democratic 
society the military cannot be completely democratic because of its willingness to risk life and 
limb for the state and to obey the legal orders of lawfully constituted civilian authorities.  This 
requires a broadening educational experience that is vital for the officer corps and for the 
military profession.48 
 
The paper by Dieckhoff outlined the role of Innere Führung in the Bundeswehr as a concept 
which sets the fundamental values of the constitution as a frame of reference for the armed 
forces providing guidance on the way in which they are to fulfil their tasks and missions.  He 
defined the objectives of Innere Führung as: 
 
 to substantiate military service ethically, politically and legally and to convey the mission 
of the armed forces; 
 to integrate the armed forces and the soldier into the state and society; 
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 to encourage the volunteer soldier to serve loyally, to fulfil his military duties, to accept 
responsibility, to co-operate and to maintain discipline in his unit; and 
 to create an internal order in the armed forces which is orientated towards human 
dignity, the order of law, and military efficiency.49 
 
Dieckhoff pointed out that the idea of Innere Führung sets high standards for education in 
armed forces.  Command and leadership on the one hand, and training and education on the 
other, should not be regarded as separate tasks.  Instead, it is one integrated task to be 
performed by one and the same individual.  Consequently, every officer or non-commissioned 
officer entrusted with the responsibility of command does not only lead the soldiers placed 
under his command.  He also executes a training and educational mission aimed firstly at 
providing the necessary qualifications for fulfilling the military requirements.  Secondly, it should 
be so comprehensive that after discharge from the Bundeswehr, former military members 
benefit from their training in civilian vocations.50  Military education and training is also the best 
preparation, Dieckhoff asserts, for the integration of international staffs and the major formations 
of NATO.  “Language skills, training in procedures, and extended knowledge about other 
countries’ people, history, traditions and habits are as important as good manners and polite 
behaviour and tolerance,” he argued.  Dieckhoff emphasised that education represents an 
additional cost burden to the Bundeswehr but that there are very important reasons for its 
continuation, including: 
 
 improvement of military task accomplishment and of military efficiency; 
 attractiveness of military service; and 
 responsibility assumed by the state with regard to the welfare of its servicemen.51 
 
Prof W Claassen, Vice-Rector Academic of the University of Stellenbosch, offered an interesting 
overview at the conference as representative of the “academic partner” of the South African 
Military Academy.  He firstly highlighted some trends in university education.  These include the 
trends towards mass higher education, internationalisation and globalisation, increasing 
cutbacks from governments, increasing competition between institutions of higher learning, and 
an identity crisis in some institutions.  Institutions of higher learning in South Africa in particular 
have to deal with continuing cutbacks in government subsidies to universities, the need for 
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academic development programmes to ensure greater access and support, a higher emphasis 
on the importance of technical training, and the need for greater mobility between institutions of 
higher learning.52 
 
Claassen, secondly, emphasised the need for a close relationship (or symbiosis) between 
teaching and research at universities, as well as the primary focus on education for degree 
purposes.  Claassen explained, “… education leading to a degree is aimed at instilling a 
theoretical and scientific approach to problem solving and at broadening students’ intellectual 
horizons and quickening and refining their understanding, imagination and sense of values”.53  It 
is important for the military to understand that preparation for certain professions does 
constitute an important dimension of the teaching programmes of universities.  However, a 
university in not in the first place "… a vocational school".  Instead, society in general expects 
certain qualities from a person who has received a general scientific/academic formative 
education. (See Table 5.3)  
 
Table 5.3: Attributes of an educated person54 
Scientific Philosophical Personal 
 a respect for facts 
 knowledge of certain basic 
or recognised subject 
fields 
 an interest in knowledge 
and the ability to gather it, 
to master it and to 
generate it 
 the ability to make 
intelligent generalisations 
and to see connections 
between phenomena 
 the ability to reason. 
 The ability to apply 
knowledge and ideas 
outside familiar contexts 
 the insight that all is not as 
it appears to be 
 a healthy scepticism 
 the ability to see things in 
a wider context 
 a skill to analyse ideas 
 skill in the identification 
and handling of values. 
 the disposition to enjoy 
intellectual exertion 
 adherence to general 
civilised norms. 
 a readiness to engage in 
critical dialogue. 
 
Claassen, thirdly, argues that the interaction between these general formative qualities and 
vocational needs is the cause of tension (or ambivalence) in the relationship between 
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universities and professional interest groups such as the military.  Universities are intent upon 
ensuring their autonomy regarding academic matters.  Professions have an interest in 
expanding their ranks by people adequately qualified at universities.55  The autonomy of 
universities is central to their being and existence as academic institutions.  This autonomy is 
closely link to a number of issues: 
 
 control over the admission of students; 
 academic control over curricula and the presentation thereof; 
 control over examinations and the granting of degrees; 
 appointment and dismissal of staff; and 
 internal management – including management of its own budget.56 
 
Claassen considered the military in the same light as the statutory professional councils with 
which universities interact in the provision of professional vocational education.  The interaction 
between these councils and the universities is based on a number of principles.  These 
principles, Claassen argued, should also constitute the foundation of, or inform the interaction 
between the military and the academic community concerning the education of military officers 
in South Africa.  These principles are as follows:  
 
 the autonomy of post-secondary educational institutions, to the extent that it is laid down 
in their Acts, should be respected; 
 the statutory autonomy of the statutory professional councils should be acknowledged; 
 powers granted to the professional councils and the educational institutions should 
relate to their functions; 
 the universities should proceed with their task of general scientific/academic formative 
education in preparation of people for their professional careers; 
 control over subject matter should be exercised both on an interdisciplinary basis within 
the educational institutions and in consultation with the professions; 
 professional education should be directed towards long-term career education; 
 consultation between the educational institutions and the statutory professional councils 
should be based on the assumption that the parties to the discussion are on equal 
statutory footing, but in due recognition of the different functions of each party; and 
 consultation should be continual and structured.57 
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Brig M. Rutsch, the most senior SANDF officer primarily responsible for liaison with the Military 
Academy, presented a paper that provided an overview of military education in the SANDF.  
The paper, however, is to some extent an example of official (SANDF) military writing – a huge 
aggregation of facts without any depth of argumentation or thorough analysis.  Though he 
clearly defines training and education in the introductory part of his paper, the discussion does 
not differentiate between training and education in the SANDF at all.  The paper in essence is 
an overview of, or an effort to demarcate the developmental needs of the SANDF.  Rutsch's 
(mis)understanding of education in general and military education in particular is reflected in his 
opinion that “… no civilian organisation can provide military education for the military (since) it is 
not their trade”.58  He subsequently asserts that military education is interesting for the onus is 
on the military to educate59 itself to norms set by non-military civilians.60  Rutsch outlines the 
“…academic training needs of the SANDF" by arguing that: 
 
 the SANDF has a need for academically qualified officers in professional positions such 
as engineers, doctors and project managers; 
 the SANDF has a need for officers who have the ability to “… exercise their minds at the 
highest level of thinking/reasoning”.  The SANDF, it is argued, is no different than most 
other organisations in this regard; 
 academic education is also an important recruiting incentive, specifically as far as the 
previously disadvantaged communities in South Africa are concerned; and 
 the trend in modern armed forces is for all officers to have some form of tertiary 
education.61 
 
Rutsch furthermore pointed out that it is not at all clear when officers in the SANDF should 
receive such education.  He argued that if such education is provided to junior officers, career-
oriented disciplines with a high emphasis on natural sciences are required.  If the education is 
provided at a later stage in the career of an officer, such education should be rooted in the 
management sciences.  If the education is to prepare officers for a second career, Rutsch 
argued, officers should have a choice as to what to study.62  This argument brings to the fore 
questions about those disciplines that concern the heart of the military profession and that in 
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general fall within the realm of the humanities.  There seems to be general agreement between 
armed forces globally that an emphasis on human sciences – military history, political science, 
security and strategic studies in particular – should be at the heart of officer education.  The 
human sciences, though, do not even feature in Rutsch’s argument.  
   
The Dean of Military Sciences at the time, Col (Prof) JC Kotzé, in his address provided an 
overview of the role of certain foreign military academies and educational institutions that he 
and the Officer Commanding of the South African Military Academy visited during March and 
April 1995.63  Kotzé highlighted the balance between civilians and military personnel at the 
different educational institutions, the focus and content of their academic programmes, and the 
qualifications that are eventually granted by the different institutions.   
 
Kotzé’s general impressions and concluding remarks were of critical importance for the debate 
concerning the future of the Military Academy.  Kotzé argued that most of the institutions visited 
placed a high premium on military training.  It is accepted though that tertiary education, and in 
particular university education, is essential for all future officers – as a solid academic 
foundation for military careers and in preparation for second careers should they leave their 
particular defence forces.  There is thus a very strong emphasis in most European (and U.S.) 
armed forces on military training in conjunction with tertiary education.  Kotzé asserted that 
military training and education are regarded as a national asset in all the countries visited.64 
 
Kotzé highlighted the prominence of physical science disciplines in the curricula of the 
educational institutions together with a noticeable absence of managerial disciplines.  Kotzé 
stressed the need for the Faculty of Military Science at the South African Military Academy to 
make disciplines more militarily applicable.  He asked the question whether a “general” BMil 
degree should not be developed instead of the BMil degree course in the different directions (at 
that time natural, management and human sciences).  Such a development might lead, he 
pointed out, to a reduction in the number of disciplines offered by the Faculty of Military 
Science.  This might necessitate a reconsideration of the status of the BMil.  A demand for 
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greater military professionalism in the SANDF perhaps justifies the introduction of a four-year 
professionally directed degree.  Such a move might, however, have far-reaching financial 
implications that might be difficult to accommodate within the current Defence budget.65   
 
In most countries, student bodies are organised for purposes of control according to military 
custom in companies and battalions.  Much is also done, Kotzé noted, at these foreign 
educational and training institutions to accommodate foreign cadets and students.  Special 
efforts are also made by these countries to recruit the top students of the school system for 
training and education at these military training and educational institutions.  The academic 
faculties of the institutions visited differ in their composition depending on the kind of institution.  
Kotzé noted that it appears as if the more archetype military academies are less inclined to use 
civilian lectures on their staff.66 
 
A number of issues were raised in the workshop that followed on the conference.  Dr Laurie 
Nathan of the Centre for Conflict Resolution in Cape Town reiterated the fact that liberal 
education in armed forces has two purposes: firstly, to inculcate the knowledge required for a 
specific profession and secondly, in a more general sense, to develop “… enquiring minds, 
critical and creative thinking, all of which are regarded as essential for informed decision-
making.67  Nathan noted that liberal education brings with it certain responsibilities, such as 
academic freedom and openness.  He posted the question whether the young soldier should be 
exposed to these values or whether he should first be socialised to accept military values, 
before being subjected to more liberal values.  The purpose of liberal education within the 
armed forces was articulated as follows: 
 
 It provides the impetus for a culture of life-long learning, which is regarded as essential, 
considering the variety of roles and functions the soldier is expected to fulfil during the 
course of his career. 
 It provides the officer with an intellectual basis for his future career.  This is 
indispensable for a military career characterised by a high degree of post rotation and 
the need for a diversity of skills and knowledge. 
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 It develops flexibility in leadership style, the ability to evaluate opinions and to respond 
accordingly and to equip the soldier with the moral courage to deal with complex 
problems. 
 It inculcates the officer with a value system that will enable him to make decisions based 
on the principles outlined in the Constitution.68 
 
Prof Gavin Cawthra from the University of the Witwatersrand, who like Nathan headed one of 
the workshops, noted that the participation of civilian lecturers in military education is a form of 
civilian control over the military.  Civilians are seen, he explained, as people who “… have not 
bought into the system”.69  He argued that civilian institutions that have a vested interest in 
military education institutions should have representation in these institutions.  Control need to 
be exercised over military education through external evaluations by civilian counterparts.  
Civilian insight into military curricula, Cawthra explained, is important to address the fear of 
military indoctrination.70 
 
One of the most interesting features of the conference in general, was the difference in view 
between the contributions of the international and civilian participants at the conference and the 
views of the SANDF.  The official representatives and contributions of the South African military 
were in favour of the militarisation of officer education.71  The SANDF therefore saw a bigger 
role for itself in the education of officers in the Military Academy.72  Stated differently, the 
defence force clearly was not content with the situation at the Military Academy.  “Under this 
scheme,” Brig Rutsch pointed out, “we run the risk of educating potential leavers, with little 
additional advantage for the SANDF.”73  Underlying this view was the inability of the Military 
Academy to provide in the needs of the broader military community in South Africa.  The 
education provided at the Military Academy did not form part of the broader system of education 
and training in the South African military.74  These views were directly the opposite of those 
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expressed by international and civilian participants at the conference.  These participants were 
clearly in favour of the “… democratisation and civilianisation of particular aspects of military 
tertiary education”.75 
 
5.3.2 The impact and result of the conference on the future of the Military Academy 
 
An interesting feature of the debate at the Military Academy about education in the military in 
general and at the Military Academy in particular during the 1990s, was its abrupt end in 1996.  
The most obvious reason for the end of the debate was the resignation and retirement of some 
senior members of the Faculty of Military Science who had been instrumental in the debate 
since the early 1990s.  Mark Malan resigned to take up a post with the Institute of Security 
Studies in Pretoria.  His two co-authors of the report in which a new “Conceptual Model of a 
SANDF Institute of Professional Military Education” was proposed, also resigned from the 
Military Academy.  Cdr (Dr) A Roux later took up the position of Director of the Institute for 
Futures Research at the University of Stellenbosch Business School (USB).  The four most 
senior faculty members who retired in 1995 and 1996 were Col (Prof) JC Kotzé, Col (Prof) JS 
Kotze, Col (Prof) PIJ van Rensburg, and Col (Prof) RA O'Connell.  Col (ret) Prof JS Kotze is of 
the opinion that all the members of the Faculty who had a passion for military education and the 
transformation of the Military Academy to provide quality education to members of the SANDF, 
had left the Military Academy.76  The Military Academy, indeed, lost a huge part of its 
institutional memory when these people resigned and retired in the mid-1990s.   
 
A key individual in the debate, Prof C Nelson, became the Dean of Military Science in 1996.  
During his term of office, important changes were proposed and made regarding the Personnel 
Management Code for Military University Educator” and the educational structure of the Military 
Academy.  The newly appointed Flag Officer Commanding of the Military Academy, Rear Adm 
(jg) PC Potgieter, who replaced Brig PO Verbeeck in 1996 as the Commanding Officer of the 
Military Academy, however, was the key person in these changes. 
 
The conference and the ensuing debate, however, led to a tasking instruction from the Chief of 
Personnel of the SANDF to the Chiefs of Personnel of the Army, the Air Force, the Navy and 
the Medical Service as well as the Intelligence Division on 19 October 1995.77  A number of 
issues were highlighted in the tasking instruction concerning institutional development at the 
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Military Academy.  Firstly, it was noted that a tertiary educational qualification was not required 
from all officers in the officer development programme of the SANDF as is the case in most 
developed countries of the world.78  Secondly, the position of the Military Academy should be 
reconsidered as part of the total officer development programme in the SANDF in terms of its 
cost-effectiveness and officer training and socialisation (generally known in the SANDF as 
“formative training”).  The unique requirements of each service should also be considered as 
part of the officer development programme.79  Lastly, as soon as an agreement has been 
reached within the task group on the role and position of the Military Academy within the officer 
development programme, an additional task group should be created under the auspices of the 
Officer Commanding of the Military Academy.  This task group has to make recommendations 
with regard to changes to the structure of the Military Academy and its academic offerings.80 
5.4 THE POTGIETER REPORT AND REFORMS AT THE MILITARY ACADEMY 
 
During 1996 and 1997, the entire training, educational and development system in the SANDF 
was reconsidered.  This re-appreciation of Education, Training and Development (ETD) in the 
Department of Defence culminated in a number of reports and decisions by the Defence Staff 
Council81 and eventually led to a directive to operationalise the ideas expressed in these 
reports.82  It was noted in this implementation instruction that training and education in South 
Africa and in the Department of Defence are dynamic and undergoing significant and ongoing 
change.  It represented “… the wonderful opportunity for mutual learning and the accreditation 
of appropriate learning opportunities in the Department of Defence”.83  The management 
thereof, though, was (and still is) a considerable challenge for the SANDF.  The instruction 
consequently pointed out that the implementation programme regarding joint training and 
education should seek a systematic integration of all joint and common education and training 
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issues in a sensitive and sensible way.  Decisions in relation to roles, responsibilities, and 
facilities need to be made with particular care.84 
 
This implementation directive led to a number of so-called “sub-project directives” to deal with 
the transformation of specific dimensions of ETD in the Department of Defence.  One such sub-
project directive focuses on tertiary education in the Department of Defence.85  As a result of 
this sub-project directive, a project team was convened under the chairmanship of the Flag 
Officer Commanding of the Military Academy “… to relate tertiary education to the greater 
delivery system for joint and common education, training and development”.86  The project team 
consisted of members of the Faculty of Military Science, representatives of the different 
services, and a representative from each of the Centre of Military Studies (CEMIS), the Military 
Psychological Institute, the reserve forces and civilians in the Department of Defence.  The 
team was to address the following issues: 
 
 military professionalism and ETD against the backdrop of the Higher Education Act; 
 selection methodology and criteria for tertiary education opportunities; 
 tertiary education as acculturation mechanism; 
 tertiary education as influence on military service orientation; 
 tertiary education as foundation for higher level learning and command and staff 
qualifications; 
 tertiary education as enabler for functional training; 
 Department of Defence needs in terms of tertiary education content; 
 the need of the different services in terms of tertiary education content; 
 structural options and scheduling of undergraduate and post-graduate courses; 
 tertiary education and the civilian resource component of the Department of Defence; 
 the outsourcing of the educational needs of the Department of Defence; and 
 any issue relating to tertiary education in the Department of Defence that the project 
team may deem necessary to address.87 
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5.4.1 Considering different systems of military training and education for the future of 
 the Military Academy 
 
The work of the project team culminated in the Report to the Chief of Joint Training on Higher 
Education in the Department of Defence on 8 June 1998.  The report eventually led to 
fundamental changes in the role, structure and academic programmes of the Military Academy.  
It is thus necessary to consider the ideas of this report in more detail as it relates to the future of 
the Military Academy.  In the introduction of the report it is recognised that since tertiary 
education normally spans several years, the timing and content of such education play a 
consequential role in the acculturation or socialisation of military students.  This education 
should be of a universal nature and applicable to all the services.  The report recognised the 
fact that tertiary education forms the foundation for all subsequent functional training provided 
by the different services.  It is stated that tertiary education in the South African Department of 
Defence is not a means unto itself.  It is part of the greater delivery system for joint and common 
education, training and development of the Department’s human resource pool.88   
 
The report noted that an effort should be made by the Department of Defence to promote public 
understanding for the role, function and responsibilities of the military officer towards the nation 
and the state.  In addition, the recruitment and selection of candidate officers should consider 
their intellectual acuity, social representivity, physical ability and commitment to military service.  
Military education and training should be promoted for its intrinsic and market-related value to 
enable smooth transition to civilian life for members leaving the SANDF on expiry of their 
service contracts.  However, caution should be exercised not to over-invest in the education of 
young men and women who are not really committed to a long-term military career.  The report 
pointed out that the normal system of corps schools and military colleges is an unsuitable 
vehicle for providing a liberal education to the officer corps.  It is noted that the solution to the 
problem of meeting the educational demands of the military in a cost-effective manner in 
emerging democracies lies in civil-military co-operation in the education of military officers.89 
 
The report touched on a number of very important issues in higher education in the Department 
of Defence that were not considered in detail in the initial post-1994 debates on the Military 
Academy.  This includes the need for the different services to accept ownership of the 
education of the officers at the Military Academy.  In particular, the services should have a clear 
understanding of their educational needs and should be in continuous interaction with the 
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Military Academy to ensure that these needs are satisfied.  The services should also hold the 
Military Academy responsible for the military socialisation of their junior officers in an academic 
environment.90  The report also highlighted the fact that officer education does not terminate at 
undergraduate level.  It is a continuous process in the officer's progress through the ranks and 
during his entire length of service.  South African staff courses, though, "… have no academic 
standing, are not recognised by any institution of higher education and therefore are not 
accredited nationally".91  By contrast, it was argued that similar studies at foreign military and 
war colleges lead to the awarding of honours, masters and doctoral degrees respectively. 
 
The report analysed a number of “… vehicles for higher education” in the SANDF:92 
 
 outsourcing – through recruitment of graduates from civilian universities;  
 outsourcing – by providing military higher education through scholarships at civilian 
universities; 
 insourcing – through the development of a military university; and 
 insourcing – through the development of a military academy or a combined military 
academy/university. 
 
Each one of the above-mentioned options was evaluated by means of an analysis of both the 
advantages and disadvantages of each structural alternative.  A detailed cost analysis of the 
various options was also done. 
 
The British armed forces was considered as the primary example of a military outsourcing its 
educational needs through the recruitment of graduates who, upon selection, attend a training 
institution such as the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst.  In addition, it is noted that British 
staff courses are linked to post-graduate qualifications provided by a number of British 
universities.  The report argued that in such a system, the locus of military higher education is 
outside the military – the military does not budget or develop the infrastructure for the provision 
of such education.  The individual takes responsibility for his own initial education and the 
payment thereof.  The state may, however, support the individual student with subsidies and 
other forms of grants.93 
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The report maintained that such a system leaves the military vulnerable to market forces.  In 
South Africa in particular, it is argued, a huge number of people from the previously 
disadvantaged communities are excluded from entering the officer corps.  Market forces dictate 
how many students volunteer for military service.  After completion of tertiary studies, most 
people’s value systems and viewpoints are formed to such an extent that military socialisation 
may be a challenge.  In such a system, it was argued, the military have to pay more market-
related salaries especially in those occupational categories where skills are in short supply.  The 
report also expressed the opinion that universities do not necessarily provide the contextualised 
education that is required by the military.  It is argued that pressure on universities to meet the 
needs of the market-place, implies that current university courses are more specifically aimed at 
filling a specific niche in the private or business sector.  In addition, there is no military utilisation 
or exposure during undergraduate study in such a system.  The report argued that graduates 
who have never been exposed to the military but who have legitimate aspirations may be loath 
to serve or function on lower levels of officer responsibility (such as that of an infantry platoon 
commander) where the going is often very hard.94  In short, the way the discussion was done 
reflected an opinion that this option was not suitable in the South African context or that it may 
be difficult to implement in this country. 
 
Militaries may also outsource military higher education to civilian universities, specifying its 
higher educational requirements and requesting universities or colleges to compile programmes 
that would meet the ETD needs of the military.  A big advantage of such a system is that civilian 
students may also enrol for such programmes, thus making a bigger segment of civilian society 
knowledgeable about strategic, defence and military affairs.  Military students benefit from the 
views of and exposure to their civilian colleagues.  A larger pool of academics will provide 
tertiary education to military students giving these students greater intellectual exposure.  In 
addition, a greater diversity of higher education options with regard to subject content and 
courses is available to students under such an approach.  In addition, the Department of 
Defence will no longer have to carry the administration and logistical cost of its own higher 
education institutions.95 
 
Outsourcing military tertiary education to civilian universities also has some disadvantages.  It is 
argued in the report that such an arrangement limits the time for military socialisation.  In 
addition, it exposes military higher education to market forces, changes in higher education and 
the standards of education of the respective institutions.  It is claimed that the retention rate 
after the initial period of service has ended, is lower for graduates from civilian universities than 
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for those who have graduated through a military academy.96  The cost of such a system may 
also be very high.  The military has to consider the accommodation of students, tuition fees or 
scholarships, cost of university educators providing contextualised military education such as 
military history, and the possible establishment, staffing and equipping of Departments of 
Military Science at selected universities.97 
 
The third option considered in the report was insourcing by means of a military university.  The 
report pointed out that the military university option presupposes the existence of other avenues 
of fundamental military socialisation.  It is therefore accepted that the officer should first be 
trained and socialised, and even that he should gain some military experience before entry into 
the military university.  It is pointed out in the report that the system in use within the SANDF (in 
1998) is a de facto military university in that it educates officers and offers limited professional 
development and only peripheral socialisation.  A civilian university degree (albeit 
contextualised) is conferred at present in the South African scenario.  It is primarily focused on 
the occupational needs of the individual and not on the professional requirements of the military.  
The report noted that the system in use differs from the “ideal type” military university in that 
civilians cannot enrol, higher education does not necessarily facilitate passage to higher rank 
and the emphasis is on undergraduate rather than post-graduate studies.  Post-graduate 
studies are voluntary and not linked to professional military staff qualifications.98 
 
The biggest advantage of such a system is the development by the military of its own 
institutions of higher education (and control thereof).  Academic programmes may be tailored to 
the needs of the military.  In addition, the military has control over who enrols and what 
academic qualifications are awarded.  Military staff qualifications are usually linked to the 
academic qualifications.  This however, the report noted, is not the case in South Africa at 
present.  The biggest disadvantage is that the military needs to develop an additional system for 
initial officer training and socialisation, which, in most cases, translates into higher operating 
and other costs.  Within the military system itself, this may lead to divisiveness between officers 
who have such education and those who do not.  This is to a certain degree true of the South 
African military.  It may also take many years for such a military academic institution to establish 
a credible academic reputation – if ever.99          
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The last option that was considered in the report is the insourcing of military education to all 
future officers on a residential basis at a combined military academy/university.  The system 
considered in this regard corresponds to a large extent with the “Conceptual Model of a SANDF 
Institute of Professional Military Education” advocated by Malan and his colleagues in 1994/95.  
Since this system of training and education at a combined military academy/university was 
recommended by the workgroup and eventually accepted and introduced as the preferred 
educational system and training for a military that was essential amidst a process of 
transformation, it needs to be discussed in greater detail. 
 
5.4.2 The proposal for a combined military academy/university system for the South 
African military  
 
The report outlined the fact that military academies make provision for the education, training 
and socialisation of young (candidate) officers and that the education that is provided is 
generally contextualised to meet the needs of the military.  The “… market of the military 
academy”, it is emphasised in the report, “is the military professional” and “… it does not make 
provision for civilian students on undergraduate level because of the need for military 
socialisation”. 100  It is also stated that there are many different kinds of military academies the 
world over, but their value lies in the combination of education, training and socialisation of the 
“… youthful officer corps” as a foundation for their future military careers.  The military 
academy/university system proposed for the SANDF, the report noted, should consider that: 
 
 neither the present schooling, higher education system nor the SANDF, provides a solid 
basis for the type of intellectual and ethical qualities expected of members of the military 
profession;101 
 the resource scarcity currently faced by the South African military given the competing 
national priorities; 
 the present educational imbalances in the education of the different racial groupings in 
South Africa; and 
 the need to foster a political culture that respects civil supremacy over the military.102 
 
The report stated that such a system provides for residential military training and professional 
development as well as a balanced, liberal higher education for all candidate officers of the 
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armed forces.  It also makes provision for post-graduate education to all serving uniformed 
officers (including those of the reserve forces) and civilian personnel by means of distance or 
modular (residential) education.  The latter, it is foreseen, should later be linked to the different 
staff colleges to make provision for post-graduate education on staff college level.  The 
institution, it is noted, will manifest itself on the one hand as an archetypal military academy for 
candidate officers and on the other hand as a non-residential military university for other 
uniformed and civilian personnel in the Department of Defence.103 (See Figure 5.1)     
 
MILITARY ACADEMY AS A NON-RESIDENTIAL MILITARY UNIVERSITY FOR UNIFORMED 
AND CIVILIAN PERSONNEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE 
Post-graduate education linked to staff qualifications at the different levels of war 
Tactical: Junior Staff 
Programme –  
Honours degree 
Operational: Joint Staff 
Programme – 
Masters degree 
Strategic: Executive 
National Security 
Programme – Doctorate 
 
MILITARY ACADEMY FOR CANDIDATE OFFICERS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Military Training and Professional Development (MTPD) and tertiary education will be 
complementary facets of the Military Academy’s overarching goal of academic excellence and 
excellent officership. 
Figure 5.1: The combined military academy/university system104 
 
The system of ETD that was proposed differs in a number of ways from the way in which the 
Military Academy was so far utilised.  The first important difference was the enrolment of 
primarily candidate officers who have just completed the formative training phase of the different 
services.  At the time the report was drawn up (1998), students in most cases first spent some 
time in the military – some of them up to ten years – before commencing with their studies.  The 
result however was a very heterogeneous student body in terms of rank and age.  This had 
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some advantages in terms of the socialisation, command and control, and the responsibility of 
students at the Military Academy since most students had a thorough understanding of the 
military system in general.  There was also a natural mentorship system in place amongst the 
students with the older more experienced students who often exercised control (formal and 
informal) over younger more impetuous students.  Nevertheless, doing constructive military 
training with such a heterogeneous body of students was almost impossible.  Training at the 
Military Academy was therefore almost non-existent.  Taking all the students directly from the 
training institutions, as proposed in the report, meant that a more homogeneous student body 
would allow for a greater training input from the services during the time that young officers 
spend at the Military Academy.  The expansion of the military training staff was therefore 
proposed with the establishment of unique service training wings at the Military Academy 
consisting of officers, instructors and training staff from the different services.105       
 
A second important difference was the different exit levels that were proposed.  In cases where 
students experience difficulty coping with the workload and academic studies on first-year level, 
a student may be requested to end his studies at the Military Academy while being awarded a 
Certificate in Military Studies and a short-term contract in the Department of Defence.  The 
same may happen after two years of study when a medium-term contract and a Diploma in 
Military Studies may be awarded.  Such a system, it was argued, will ensure that only graduate 
students remain as long-term career officers in the military.  The system also made provision for 
an academic development programme during the first year of training at the service training 
institutions.  This would ensure that young officers make a smooth transition from school to 
university education, specifically raising the possibility for successful academic studies for 
candidate officers from previous disadvantaged communities.106   
 
A third change proposed, concerned the academic curriculum of the Military Academy.  An 
analysis was made of the educational imperatives and needs of the Department of Defence in 
general and the different services in particular.107  Based on this analysis, it was proposed that 
the Military Academy moved towards degree courses with a so-called core curriculum.  The 
core curriculum is a compulsory academic component in the curriculum of the degree courses 
at the Military Academy.  All students at the Military Academy, irrespective of the direction of 
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their studies, should enrol for the disciplines prescribed as part of the core curriculum.108  The 
core curriculum proposed for the Military Academy in the report, was structured around three 
very particular notions.  In the first year of studies the emphasis needed to be on what was 
referred to as “Military and Environmental Studies”, in the second year of study on “Military 
Leadership, Command, Management and Public Administration”, and in the third year on 
“Future War”. (See Table 5.4) 
 
Table 5.4: Proposal for a core curriculum to meet the needs of the SANDF109 
Preparatory year 1st year 
Military and 
Environmental 
Studies 
2nd year 
Military Leadership, 
Command, 
Management and 
Public Administration 
3rd year 
Future War 
 
 Compulsory 
modules 
 
 Inter-disciplinary 
academic skills 
 
 Information 
Literacy & 
Computer Skills. 
 
 Language skills. 
 
 Mathematics 
Special. 
 
 Physics Special. 
 
 Law of Armed 
Conflict (LOAC). 
 
 Military 
Leadership. 
 
 War and Politics. 
 
 Military History 
(War and Society) 
 
 Military 
Geography (War 
and Environment) 
 
 Military Strategy 
 
 Public and 
Developmental 
Management 
(War and Public 
Management) 
 
 Accounting 
(Accounting for 
Military 
Practitioners) 
 
 Computer 
Information 
Systems 
(Information 
Management) 
 
 Statistics 
(Statistics for 
Military 
Practitioners) 
 
 Economics (War 
and the Economy) 
 
 
 Military 
Technology 
(Military 
Technology and 
Future War) 
 
 Military Strategy 
(Military Strategy 
in Future War) 
Additional modules  
Three additional 
disciplines offered by 
the Faculty.  The 
Services may specify 
the subject. 
 
Two majors from the 
disciplines offered by 
the Faculty. 
 
Two majors from the 
disciplines offered by 
the Faculty. 
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The report discussed in great detail the advantages and disadvantages of a combined military 
academy/university system.  In terms of advantages, it is pointed out that cost may be saved if 
basic and officer training are “co-located” and academically linked to a subsequent higher 
education.  The military also maintains a high level of autonomy over the provision of educated 
personnel to fill its ranks of leadership and management.  A high level of contextualisation of the 
educational content of the tertiary programmes becomes possible with greater immediate 
relevance to the military milieu.110  Such a system would also make possible the provision of 
some form of accredited higher education by means of a degree, diploma or certificate to all 
officers.   
 
This will meet not only the functional requirements of the SANDF for tertiary education, but will 
also facilitate an easier transfer to civilian life when short- and medium-term contracts are 
terminated.  It is also possible to plan the annual programme of the combined military 
academy/university in such a way that provision is made for academic education and military 
training.  In addition, both military education and training are conducted in an environment that 
is consonant with the military culture.111 
 
The combined military academy/university system makes possible the secondment of military 
practitioners with the necessary educational qualifications to the Military Academy to provide 
functional contextualised training and education if required.  Furthermore, the academic 
programme of such an institution “… is geared specifically for the ‘niche’ of military 
professionals”.112  In addition, such an approach may accommodate members of the reserve 
forces, given the modular nature of the academic programme is presented by means of 
distance education.  The Military Academy may become the alma mater of the complete future 
officer corps of the SANDF if all officers at some stage in their careers passed through the 
Military Academy.  An additional advantage is the possibility of linking all the staff courses in the 
SANDF to some form of post-graduate qualification.  A high level of jointness and common 
reference for officers in the SANDF is also established at a very early stage of their careers.113        
 
A considerable disadvantage of the combined military academy/university system is that the 
cost of higher education is higher than recruiting graduates or sending candidates to a civilian 
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university.  However, if the military training and socialisation function of such an institution is 
considered and benchmarked against international studies in this regard, the return on 
investment for military academy graduates is indisputably higher than that from civilian 
universities.114  It was noted in the report that academic personnel will have to be remunerated 
at a level that commensurate with the remuneration of academics at civilian institutions if they 
are to be retained.  Such a system does not make provision for the enrolment of civilian 
students in undergraduate programmes.  In addition, the participation of the different services 
was required in order to facilitate the introduction of the preparatory academic course at the 
different officers’ training institutions.115       
 
Potgieter’s proposals were presented to the Military Command Council of the SANDF on 17 
May 1999.  At a Faculty Council Meeting at the Military Academy on 5 August 1999, Potgieter 
reported that the proposal for a combined military academy/university system was 
“… favourably accepted” by the different services and that “… the future of the Military Academy 
is thus once more confirmed”.116  In the meantime, however, two other issues had been raised 
to the level that required the urgent attention of the command cadre of the Military Academy.  
The one was the dispensation under which the Military University Educators (MUEs) – the 
academic personnel in the Faculty of Military Science – are employed.  The other was the new 
academic programmes that the Faculty had to develop as an integral part of the process of 
programme development required from the University of Stellenbosch by the South African 
Qualifications Authority (SAQA).   
5.5 THE SERVICE CONDITIONS OF THE MILITARY UNIVERSITY EDUCATORS 
 
Lecturing personnel in the Faculty of Military Science are all employed under supervision and 
control of the SANDF and subject to the approval of the University.  The University is 
responsible for academic supervision and control.  Uniformed members of the academic staff 
are subject to the Military Disciplinary Code of the SANDF while civilian members are subjected 
to the Personnel Code for Civilian Employees in the Public Sector.  The functional status of 
employment of lecturing personnel at the Military Academy is determined by one of three 
categories.  Military members who are appointed from within the SANDF or elsewhere may 
serve in the Faculty as “… military practitioners” – the same dispensation under which all 
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serving officers in the SANDF are appointed.  Civilian academics who are appointed at the 
Military Academy have a choice in being either uniformed MUEs or civilian MUEs.   
 
This complicated system brought along differentiation and disparity regarding salary and other 
benefits, resulting in the civilian option being less beneficial.  Militarised members of the faculty 
sometimes participated in a number of non-academic assignments and administrative tasks that 
could have been be delegated and distributed amongst faculty members.  In addition to 
academic qualifications, some of the faculty members (military practitioners in particular) were 
expected to attend command and staff courses for promotion in the SANDF.  While they were 
attending these courses, their academic workload was distributed between their colleagues in 
the academic department to which they belong.117 
 
Since 1996, a deliberate effort had been made to develop and improve the dispensation under 
which lecturers at the Military Academy are appointed.  This included, inter alia, the introduction 
of some form of flexible working hours, the improvement of the service conditions of MUEs in 
general, the minimisation of the military activities of uniformed MUEs and unit activities of MUEs 
in general, and the restructuring of the leave system to allow MUEs to utilise the recess periods 
more effectively for research and study purposes. 
 
The different post and salary levels in the Faculty of Military Science were linked, for the first 
time in the history of the institution, to the academic rank levels of the University: 
 
 post level MUE 1 on salary level 7and 8 was linked to the university post of junior 
lecturer; 
 post level MUE 2 on salary level 9 was linked to the university post of lecturer; 
 post level MUE 3 on salary level 10 was also linked to the university post of lecturer; 
 post level MUE 4 on salary level 11 was linked to the university post of senior lecturer; 
 post level MUE 4 on salary level 12 was link to the university post of associate professor; 
 post level MUE 4 on salary level 12 was linked to the university post of professor.118 
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Table 5.5: Appointment and promotion criteria for military university educators in the Faculty 
of Military Science119 
Rank level Salary 
level 
Academic qualifications Assessed experience 
Departmental 
assistant 
 
6 Appropriate B degree None 
MUE 1 
 
7 Appropriate honours degree None 
MUE 1 8 Appropriate honours degree A minimum of one year 
assessed experience  
 
MUE 2 9 Appropriate honours degree A minimum of three years’ 
assessed experience after 
obtaining an honours degree  
 
MUE 2 9 Appropriate masters degree None 
 
MUE 3 10 Appropriate masters degree A minimum of six years’ 
assessed experience after 
obtaining an honours degree 
 
MUE 3 10 Appropriate doctorate None 
 
MUE 4 11 Doctorate in an appropriate 
discipline plus limited research 
capability to a minimum weight of 
six points120 
A minimum of eight years 
assessed experience after 
obtaining an honours degree 
 
  
MUE 4 12 Doctorate in an appropriate 
discipline plus limited research 
capability to a minimum weight of 
twenty five points121 
A minimum of eight years 
assessed experience after 
obtaining an honours degree 
 
 
 
Progressive changes were made in the appointment measures, career dispensation and service 
conditions for military university educators.  The different posts for military university educators 
used to be organised in typical bureaucratic hierarchical fashion.  This implied that someone 
had to move out of a post for the next person to be promoted to the next higher level.  This has 
been changed to the extent that all the MUE posts at the Military Academy have been opened 
for promotion to the level of MUE 4 on salary level 12.  Promotion to a higher MUE level is now 
dependent on the individual’s own qualifications, experience and research record.122  Figure 5.6 
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provides an exposition of what is at present required for appointment and promotion in the 
Faculty of Military Science. (See Figure 5.5) 
 
A new merit assessment procedure for the faculty was also developed.  It is based on the 
assumption that desired behavioural output should be assessed and not generalised attitudes 
or inferred personalogical attributes.  The desired behavioural output is defined in terms of the 
strategic priorities and the core business of the University and the Faculty: teaching, research 
and community service. 
 
Table 5.6: Relative weights of research outputs for merit assessment in the Faculty of Military 
Science.123  
Research output Relative weight 
 Article (not refereed) 0,5 
 Article (Not accredited/Refereed) 1 
 Article (Accredited/National journal) 4 
 Article (Accredited/International journal) 5 
 Paper (National conference) 2 
 Paper (International conference) 3 
 Supervision (Masters students)  2 
 Supervision (Doctoral students) 3 
 Chapter in text book 2 
 Complete academic text book 10 
 Publication in subsidised conference proceedings 4 
 Publication in subsidised international conference proceedings 5 
 
The merit assessments are based on a peer rating system within which a defined subgroup of 
peers (a specific MUE level) rate the performance of a faculty member in comparison with that 
of its peers.  Each year a faculty member has to submit a performance list, moderated by the 
chair of his subject group or school, which reflects his performance with respect to teaching 
activities, research, community service and the activities directed at self-development which 
have not been covered in the other three categories.  A relative weight is allocated to each 
activity that has been performed.  In the domain of research, for example, a clear indication is 
provided of the relative value of different research outputs and this guides the faculty member 
towards the pursuit of the most desirable outcomes. (See Figure 5.6)  This procedure, it is 
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argued, not only focuses the attention of faculty members on desired outcomes, but also 
reinforces activities directed toward these outcomes.124   
 
There is no doubt that the service conditions of the academics in the Faculty of Military Science 
are in general far better than it used to be in the era before 1996.  The inability of the Faculty, 
firstly, to maintain the services of academics from previously disadvantaged components of our 
society and, secondly, to fill the posts of particularly scarce, highly competitive or highly paid 
fields of study (statistics and accountancy for example), led to questions about the level of 
remuneration within the Faculty.  In a recent study done by the Staff Development and Service 
Conditions Committee in the Faculty, it was found that the salaries of the faculty have indeed 
fallen behind that which is normally considered to be the norm at universities in South Africa in 
general.  Recommendations have been made to the SANDF and other stakeholders in this 
regard.  However, this has not as yet resulted in any change in the remuneration of faculty 
members of any kind.125   
5.6 THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW DEGREE PROGRAMMES IN THE FACULTY OF 
MILITARY SCIENCE 
 
On 7 August 1998, the Dean of Military Science informed a meeting of the Faculty Council of 
the contents of a letter received from the Vice-Rector (Academic) of the University of 
Stellenbosch regarding the planning and development of new academic programmes in 
accordance with SAQA requirements.  He specifically pointed out that the development of the 
new programmes had to be completed by March 1999 for submission to the Senate of the 
University by April 1999.  The meeting mandated the Curriculum Development Committee of the 
faculty to undertake an evaluation of the existing academic programmes as well as the 
programmes proposed by the Sub-Workgroup on Education and Training in the Department of 
Defence.  The Curriculum Development Committee needed to determine whether these 
programmes satisfy the requirement laid down in the Academic Planning Framework of the 
University, or whether it needed further development.126 
 
At a meeting of the Faculty Council on 5 February 1999, the Dean pointed out that he had 
prepared a document regarding future tuition programmes according to the format prescribed by 
the University of Stellenbosch.  This document made provision for twelve academic 
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programmes at the Faculty of Military Science on under- and post-graduate level.  The basic 
point of departure was to translate the existing academic offering (degrees) of the Faculty of 
Military Science into a programme format.  This approach was followed since the SANDF was 
still undecided regarding the exact nature of future officer training and education.127  In a report 
by the Academic Planning Committee of the University to the Senate on the programme 
developments of faculties for implementation in 2000, it was proposed that these programmes 
of the Faculty of Military Science be accepted as an interim arrangement.  It was expected from 
the faculty to develop and present new academic programmes to the Academic Planning 
Committee for recommendation to the Senate as soon as there was clarity regarding the future 
training and educational needs of the SANDF.128 
 
Following the SANDF’s favourable acceptance of the proposals of the Potgieter Report, about 
which the Flag Officer Commanding the Military Academy informed the Faculty Council on 5 
August 1999, the table was eventually laid for the development of new academic programmes 
in the Faculty of Military Science.  The development of the new programmes became the first 
strategic assignment for the newly appointed Dean of Military Science, Prof DJ Malan, who took 
office in September 1999.  The three themes for the education of officers that were identified by 
the Potgieter Report (See Figure 5.5) served as the theoretical framework for the development 
of the new academic programmes.  Malan described the three themes in terms of an emphasis 
on military technology, military management, and war and society.129 
 
There was, however, a difference between the programmes that were developed by the Faculty 
and the proposals of the Potgieter Report.  The Potgieter Report was based on the idea of a 
core curriculum as a basis for the BMil degree.  This implied that all students in the Faculty of 
Military Science should be exposed to certain military-related subject matter during the duration 
of their studies.130 (See Figure 5.4)  These three themes or focus areas should therefore 
constitute the basis of all academic programmes or be incorporated into all the different 
programmes at the Faculty of Military Science.  The programmes that were eventually 
developed deviated from this central notion to the extent that different programmes were 
developed for each of these theoretical themes.  All the programmes that were developed were 
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linked to either the notion of military technology, military management, or war and society.  
Students who enrolled for the programmes developed in the field of military technology were 
therefore never exposed to the other theoretical themes.  Thus, it did not change the reality of 
the South African Military Academy graduating some students who have never been 
academically exposed to the core disciplines in the study of the military profession.  This 
omission would return to haunt the Faculty in a number of subtle ways in years to come. 
 
In addition, a critical mistake was made in the development of the programmes when the three 
focus areas proposed for the core curriculum in the Potgieter Report were reinterpreted.  The 
proposal for a focus on military and environmental studies was redefined as a focus on war and 
society, while military leadership, command, management and public administration were 
rationalised and compounded to the idea of military management, and the proposal concerning 
an emphasis on future war was reinterpreted as to mean a focus on military technology.  The 
result of this reinterpretation of the proposed focus areas had a fundamental impact on the 
programmes that were eventually developed.  The approach that was followed in the 
development of the new programmes was nothing but a search for ways in which the existing 
academic departments at the Military Academy could be accommodated in the three redefined 
focus areas.  It can indeed be argued that the academic departmental structure at the Military 
Academy led to the redefinition of the three focus areas.  No existing academic disciplines were 
phased out or new disciplines introduced.   
 
The study of military leadership, command, management and public administration, for 
example, necessitates an interdisciplinary approach.  It seems highly unlikely to study military 
leadership, command and management without also including a military historical approach or 
an analysis of the role of command and military leaders in the execution of military strategy or a 
consideration of military ethics.  An inclusion of military ethics in the study would have required, 
for example, the introduction of military sociology as an academic discipline at the Military 
Academy.  In contrast, however, the study of this focus area was restricted to the managerial 
disciplines offered at the Military Academy in the past.  It resulted in a situation where military 
command and leadership, except for peripheral attention in disciplines such as military history 
and strategy, are not studied at the Military Academy at all.  Management is primarily studied 
from a business (MBA) perspective.  It is not that officers should not be exposed to 
management in the broader sense of the word.  However, these students will have to apply their 
knowledge in a particular sphere.  To ignore that sphere totally is also a grave omission in the 
study of (military) management. 
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The proposal on the study of future war in the report provides another good example of 
misinterpretation.  In the development of the new programmes, the emphasis was almost 
exclusively on technology and technology-related disciplines in the study of future war.  
Students will thus never be exposed to the study of future war and the present Revolution in 
Military Affairs as it is studied, for example, in the realm of strategic studies and military history.  
The study of what was redefined as war and society was restricted to the study of military 
history, strategy and politics.  In short, a golden opportunity was lost for the Military Academy to 
develop programmes that really provide in the needs of the SANDF.       
 
Malan maintains that the “learner-readiness” of the students that the Military Academy received 
from the SANDF had an influence on the nature of the programmes that were developed.  The 
idea of a preparatory certificate at the different service colleges as proposed in the Potgieter 
Report did not materialised.  This placed additional pressure on the degree programmes at the 
Military Academy since it became necessary to include academic modules such as basic 
English Language and Computer Skills in all academic programmes.  Malan argues that the 
inclusion of these “generic courses” left very little room for manoeuvring in a three-year 
academic programme already under pressure from the need to allow as much time as possible 
for non-academic military activities as well at the Military Academy.  The general approach that 
was followed in the end, Malan pointed out, was to minimise those kinds of educational 
activities to which the student will be exposed during the course of his career at training 
institutions in the SANDF – before or after his attendance of the Military Academy.131 
 
The critique levelled against the newly developed academic programmes should also be viewed 
against the SAQA requirements for the development of academic programmes through the 
University of Stellenbosch.  Indeed, the nature of the academic programmes of the Military 
Academy that were developed was highly influenced by the requirement from the University for 
a programme-specific focus and academic coherence in the programmes.  Dr Jan Botha from 
the Academic Planning Committee of the University spent considerable time at the Military 
Academy during the development of the programmes to ensure that the programmes adhere to 
the requirements of the University in this regard.  These requirements underpin to a large extent 
the tension between a general scientific/academic formative education and a vocational 
education in the development of the academic programmes.  In short, no balance has been 
reached between these two requirements as regards the development of the new academic 
offerings at the Military Academy with their emphasis primarily on scientific/academic 
education.132   
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Questions should be asked as to why the need for vocational education was ignored in the 
development of academic programmes at the Military Academy.  Could it be that there was no 
adherence to the principles for the interaction between the University and the statutory 
professional councils referred to by Claassen at the 1995 conference at the Military Academy, 
or the interaction between the University of Stellenbosch and the SANDF, in the case of the 
Military Academy?  This led to a question concerning the physical involvement of the SANDF in 
the development of the academic programmes.  Though guidelines have been provided by the 
SANDF by means of the Potgieter Report, the question remains whether these programmes 
were developed in a climate of debate and interaction between the University and the SANDF to 
ensure a balance between broad generalised scientific/academic education and more narrow 
specialised vocational education.        
 
The Faculty Council eventually approved and recommended the following programmes for 
submission to the Programme Evaluation Committee of the University of Stellenbosch: 
 
 a programme in Human and Organisational Development; 
 a programme in Organisational and Resource Development; 
 a programme in Technology; 
 a programme in Security and Africa Studies; 
 a programme in Technology and Management; and 
 a programme in War, Environment and Technology.133 
 
On 5 April 2000, a letter was received from the General Planning Committee of the University 
indicating that the Programme Evaluating Committee had accepted all programmes submitted 
by the Faculty of Military Science on 31 March 2000.  These programmes had also been 
submitted for approval to the Senate of the University of Stellenbosch.134 
 
In addition to and in line with the development of these programmes, a reorganisation process 
was begun within the Faculty whereby the different existing academic departments were 
amalgamated into different schools.  In future, the different schools within the Faculty would 
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consist of different “subject groups”.135  Each school had to select its own chair.  Provision was 
made for the payment of a special allowance to chairs of schools.136  In a meeting by the 
Faculty Council of the Faculty of Military Science, it was agreed that the subject chairs would be 
responsible to the chair of the school for the following duties, apart from assuming responsibility 
for their teaching, research and community service responsibilities: 
 
 planning, supervising and co-ordinating teaching, research and community service within 
the subject group in accordance with policy and standards as laid down; 
 planning, supervision and co-ordination of the preparation, revision and updating of all 
teaching material of the subject group; 
 planning, supervision and co-ordination of the timeous adaptation of the subject-specific 
curricula to keep pace with the needs of the SANDF; 
 planning, supervision and co-ordination of academic support to students enrolled for the 
subject; 
 maintenance of discipline amongst staff and students associated with the subject; 
 planning, supervision and co-ordination of interaction with the comparable departments 
of the University of Stellenbosch and other academic institutions; 
 planning, supervision and co-ordination of external evaluations in collaboration with the 
chair of the school; and 
 clearance and security of mutually shared supplies and equipment issued to the subject 
group.137 
 
The following schools were created from the existing academic departments: 
 
 “School for Technology” from the Physics, Mathematics, Aeronautical Science and 
Military Technology, and Nautical Science Departments; 
 “School for Geospatial Studies and Information Systems” from the Military Geography 
and Computer Information Systems Departments; 
 “School for Security and Africa Studies” from the Military History, Military Strategy and 
Political Science Departments; 
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 “School for Defence Organisation and Resource Management” from the Accounting and 
Auditing, Economics, Military Management, and Public and Development Management 
Departments; and 
 “School for Human, Organisational and Legal Studies” from the Academic Development, 
Industrial Psychology and Commercial and Criminal Law Departments.138 
 
It was indicated that these names were only temporary and that they were to be replaced by 
names selected by the school.139  In February 2001, the name of the “School for Technology” 
changed to the “School for Science and Technology” and the “School for Human, 
Organisational and Legal Studies” to the “School for Resource Development.140 
 
A Programme Co-ordinating Committee was created for each of the programmes in the Faculty.  
These committees were responsible to for ensuring the maintenance of programme identity, 
attainment of the programme goals; successful presentation of the programmes, monitoring of 
student throughput through the different programmes, evaluation of student feedback about the 
programmes, and continuous liaison with representatives of the SANDF about their evaluation 
of and recommendations regarding the programmes.141  
 
The Faculty also applied to the Council on Higher Education (CHE) for the Military Academy to 
be registered as a provider in order to facilitate the eventual SAQA accreditation of the non-
degree qualifications offered by the Faculty of Military Science.  This specifically applied to the 
recommendations of the Potgieter Report for the presentation of a Preparatory Certificate in 
Military Studies, a Certificate in Military Studies, and a Diploma in Military Studies.  This 
application was required since the University of Stellenbosch indicated that it would not be able 
to offer qualifications at undergraduate certificate and diploma level, and it therefore instructed 
the Military Academy to offer these qualifications under its own authority.142  The Council on 
Higher Education referred the application to the University of Stellenbosch with a request that 
the University should give its official support to the application of the Military Academy as a 
service provider, that the Preparatory Certificate in Military Studies be registered as a military 
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qualification, and that the University registered the Preparatory Certificate as an alternative 
admission route.143 
 
In order to broaden the opportunities for serving members of the SANDF as well as the 
Secretariat for Defence to study at the Military Academy, the Faculty Council recommended that 
from 2002, undergraduate programmes for the BMil programme should also be offered by 
means of distance education.  The Faculty Council tasked the Committee for Learning and 
Teaching to investigate the development and implementation of distance education at the 
Military Academy.  The Committee recommended that a Distance Education Office be opened 
at the Military Academy and that a full-time project manager and co-ordinator for distance 
education be appointed at the Military Academy.144 
 
In May 2001, the Faculty Council approved a trial project for the presentation of certain 
undergraduate academic programmes by means of distance education.  The trial project was 
registered to offer the programmes in Organisation and Resource Management, Human and 
Organisation Development, and Security and Africa Studies.  The focus was limited to a target 
group of approximately 30 candidates (10 per programme) who had access to the internet and 
who were geographically centred in an urban locality like Pretoria.  It was noted, though, that 
the commencement of the project depended on the appointment of the required key personnel 
and the availability of funding for the project.145    
 
Small changes have since been made in the programmes that were developed initially.  By 
2006, the academic offerings of the Faculty were structured around five programmes.  The BMil 
Programme in Human and Organisational Development has Industrial Psychology and Public 
and Development Management as its core disciplines.  In the BMil Programme is Organisation 
and Resource Management students are educated in Military Management, Economics, 
Financial Accountancy.   The BMil Programme in War, Environment and Technology requires a 
choice from students in terms of two groups of disciplines: Aeronautical Science, Military 
Geography or Nautical Science on the one hand, and Military History or Military Strategy on the 
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other.146  The BMil Programme in Technology has Military Technology, Military Geography or 
Nautical Science in combination with either Mathematics or Physics as its majors.  In the BMil 
Programme in Security and Africa Studies, the student has to major in at least two disciplines 
from a choice between Military History, Military Strategy and Political Science.147  
5.7 CONCLUSIONS 
 
The discussion in this chapter aimed at providing a broad overview of the institutional debate 
and development of the Military Academy since 1994 in an effort to identify the most salient 
drivers or ideas of the debate and the eventual development that took place.  An effort was 
made to identify those underlying factors or tensions that generated the debate and discussions 
on the Military Academy, and that need to be addressed if the role of the Military Academy is to 
be brought in line with the framework of military education, training and socialisation of military 
officers outlined in the previous chapters.   
 
The debate on the future of the Military Academy since 1994 was in part rooted in the need for 
change that swept through the newly democratised South African society.  However, the 
deliberations were informed by the historical legacy of almost fifty years of doubt and dispute on 
what the proper role of the Military Academy ought to be in the making of South African officers.  
This legacy is rooted in the Military Academy, at times being more of an archetype military 
academy while at other times reflecting the attributes of a military university.  An easy way to 
explain this phenomenon is to argue that it is an inability to reconcile the need for a general 
scientific/academic formative education with the need to provide military students with a military 
vocational education.  This may provide some understanding since the South African Military 
Academy has always placed a higher premium on the occupational needs of the individual 
students than on the professional requirements of the military in general.  In addition, the 
Military Academy in the past has been exposed to incoherent and ill-considered periodic 
intercessions by the military in general in respect to the content and conduct of both military 
training and academic studies, resulting in philosophical drift regarding the true nature and 
meaning of the institutional function. 
 
An interesting feature of the debate about the future of the Military Academy in the early and 
mid-1990s was its inability to attract the attention and interest of the broader South African 
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military and academic worlds, or for that matter, the broad South African society.  The debate 
did not really form part of broader deliberations about the need for an educated officer corps in 
South Africa.  It was a debate in essence restricted to the Military Academy about the Military 
Academy and its continued existence.  The net result of this absence of involvement of the 
broader SANDF and the University of Stellenbosch was that the great amount of positive 
recommendations generated by the debate were never considered or implemented by the 
Defence Force or the University.  The changes that were eventually made were the result of 
processes that were initiated on the part of, firstly, the SANDF and later, driven by the need for 
SAQA programme registrations, the University. 
 
Since 1994, the debate was driven by two particular questions.  Firstly, is there a need for 
graduate study in the SANDF?  Should the SANDF have its own institution for graduating these 
officers?  And what should be the nature of this institution?  Secondly, what should be the 
content and focus of the graduate programme(s) presented to these officers? 
 
In debating the first issue, whether officers in the SANDF should be graduated, there was a 
dualism of views.  The academics at the Military Academy and elsewhere, particularly civilian 
academics, were convinced of the necessity of higher education for officers in general.  Given 
the particular timeframe within which the debate unfolded, academics highlighted the need for 
(civilian) higher education as a means of civil control of the military in a democratic society.  The 
military did not necessarily share this enthusiasm for (civilian) higher education to those in 
uniform.  The military’s traditional aversion for independently and critically minded individuals 
and its preference for conformists can in part explain this lack of enthusiasm.  The South African 
military’s long tradition of anti-intellectualism, outlined in the previous chapter, may also provide 
some explanation.  The views of military officers were also influenced by the rapidly declining 
defence budgets of the 1990s and a search for ways to deal with this lack of funds in the 
SANDF in general and for ETD in particular.  The question that should be answered, though, is 
whether the military’s view reflected a certain amount of dissatisfaction with the Military 
Academy, and what was being done at the institution, or whether it was an aversion of graduate 
studies in the SANDF in general.  In other words, was it an institutional problem or an 
organisational cultural problem? 
 
One of the important outcomes of the Potgieter Report and its recommendations in the late 
1990s and the eventual acceptance thereof by the command cadre of the SANDF, was the 
implicit approval of the Military Academy to be a military academy and not a military university.  
This decision is in line with the framework for the development of officers as proposed in this 
study.  In the case of the SANDF, however, this decision should be well designed and carefully 
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considered.  As was pointed out in the discussion, the system of manpower provision 
determines to a large extent whether a particular country will have a military academy or not.  
Traditional military academies presupposed a long-term military career since it requires (in most 
cases) a costly four-year induction before commissioning.  The cost and time involved make this 
an unsuitable choice for a defence force that recruits potential officers on short-term contracts, 
such as the SANDF.  The question needs to be asked whether a system should not be 
developed for the SANDF whereby career officers should first be identified, trained and 
socialised before they are put through a system of academic education at a military university. 
 
Nevertheless, the decision to develop the Military Academy into an archetype military academy 
has been made.  In spite of this, the South African Military Academy is still very far from being 
such an institution.  The only element of the attributes of such an institution that seems to be in 
place is the educational component.  The Military Academy does not provide any coherent 
career-driven training to the young officers attending the institution, nor does it fulfil its role in 
socialising the officers militarily.  Indeed, as was pointed out in an earlier chapter, there is at 
present disequilibrium between the kind of socialisation that is being done at the training 
institutions attended by students before entering the Military Academy and the way in which 
students are socialised at the Military Academy.  The Military Academy at present is still hardly 
anything more than a military university for very young candidate officers.  In short, there is at 
present an imbalance between the nature of the students and the nature of the institution.  It is 
necessary to answer the question on what should be done in order to transform the institution 
into an archetype military academy.   
 
The result of the decision to transform the institution into a military academy has not in any way 
provided any clarity on the role, position and autonomy of the Faculty of Military Science at the 
Military Academy.  Any academic institution that restricts critical thinking on the part of its 
students and faculty, and that censors or bans the publication of research is engaged in 
indoctrination rather than academic pursuits.  The participation of civilian academics in military 
education, it was pointed out, has became international practise.  Civilian academics are able to 
inject valuable perspectives into military education.  At the South African Military Academy, the 
situation in this regard is dubious with some academics who maintain that there is a de facto 
lack of academic freedom at the South African Military Academy.  The research and publication 
record, as well as the absence of senior doctorated academics in the Faculty of Military 
Science, in particular seems to be a source of embarrassment for some.  This in general gives 
rise to a perception shared by students, members of the Faculty of Military Science, and the 
broader military and academic community that the lecturers at the Military Academy have 
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academic profiles that are inferior to those of their counterparts at civilian institutions of higher 
learning.148 
 
The balance between military and civilian lecturers within the Faculty and the need for academic 
freedom to do the research and to participate in activities that are expected from an academic 
fraternity, are rooted in the issue of autonomy.  The academic autonomy of the Faculty has 
become an increasing source of discontent and embarrassment within the Faculty itself and for 
the University of Stellenbosch.  An issue that is closely linked to the autonomy of the Faculty as 
an academic faculty of the University of Stellenbosch is the position of the Dean of Military 
Science at the Military Academy.  This in particular concerns the position and role definition of 
the Dean of Military Science in its relationship with the Commandant of the Military Academy.  
The Commandant is in command of the institution as a whole.  It has been noted that, as a 
result of the concentration of command responsibilities and power in the person of a rotating 
officer commanding, the Faculty of Military Science often suffered from a dearth of management 
ability, continuity and experience.  In addition, budgetary constraints have consistently created 
conflict between the faculty, the military training branch and the support functions at the Military 
Academy, often to the detriment of academic excellence within the Faculty of Military Science. 
 
In debating the second issue, the content and focus of the graduate programmes at the Military 
Academy, the SANDF did provide much clearer guidance on what should be offered to the 
candidate officers at the Military Academy on the basis of the Potgieter Report.  Once again, the 
underlying question in this regard concerns the balance in the academic offerings between a 
general scientific/academic education and the professional and vocational educational needs of 
the military profession.  The answer in this regard has been clouded by questions about the 
occupational needs of the individual students (e.g. preparation for a second career).  The 
military, by means of the Potgieter Report, tried to resolve the tension through a proposal for a 
core academic curriculum at the Military Academy.   
 
The Military Academy did not fully adhere to the guiding principles that were provided in this 
regard or preferred to ignore these, and developed its new academic programmes in a way that 
was clearly inconsistent with the recommendations of the Potgieter Report.  The guidelines from 
the University of Stellenbosch in terms of the programme-specific focus and the coherence of 
the programme was a significant factor in this regard.  The question that needs to be answered 
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is this: Why did the SANDF allow this gross violation of a direct request – indeed an order – to 
go by unnoticed?  The SANDF did not question the nature of the new academic programmes.  
This is indeed a manifestation of a much larger phenomenon that necessitates further 
investigation: why does it seem as if the SANDF does not take ownership of the Military 
Academy in the same way that it is taking ownership of the National Defence and War Colleges 
and their programmes?  Again, this question should be linked to another question: to what 
extent does the SANDF at large and the services in particular involve themselves with the 
Military Academy to ensure that the product they receive from this institution provide in their 
needs?  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
FROM HERE TO WHERE?  OPTIMISING THE STRUCTURE, FOCUS 
AND FUNCTION OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY ACADEMY 
 
History suggests God is on the side of the bigger battalions –  
unless the smaller battalions have a better idea. 
William Lind1 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Educational institutions are characterised by evolutionary rather that revolutionary change.  
These changes are rooted in what Haycock refers to as “… soul and role introspection”.  Much 
of this is centred on what is taught and what ought to be taught at these institutions.  The 
military’s resistance to change, which is one of the manifestations of its ingrained conservative 
nature, is also well known and described.  Military change is most often based on what Haycock 
refers to as, the “… last traumatic experience”.  No changes will be made until a new traumatic 
experience occurs.2  Change at the South African Military Academy, situated in the nexus 
between the academic and the military worlds, is therefore not something that will be brought 
about easily.   
 
For a variety of historical reasons, most South Africans have little interest in the military in 
general and the South African armed forces in particular.  Indeed, it can be argued that the 
military in the post-apartheid South Africa exists and operates to a large extent in a domestic 
vacuum.  The majority of the white population, after their traumatic experience with the military 
and military service in the 1970s and 1980s, tried to distance themselves as far away from the 
military as possible since 1994.  The military, having been one of the cornerstones of the 
apartheid regime, is still perceived by the majority of the black population with a lot of 
scepticism.3  A small contingent of South African politicians goes so far as to question the need 
for a military in South Africa.4  In addition, there are indications of a growing civil-military gap in 
South Africa that is exacerbated by the inability of the military to communicate effectively with 
the broader South African public via the media and other means.  Indeed, it can be argued that 
most of what is reported by the media on the military in South Africa has negative undertones.5  
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Against this background, it is obvious that there is very little interest from the general public in 
what is happening at the Military Academy.  Although the Military Academy is a public 
institution, whether changes are made at the Military Academy or not will not attract much 
interest from the public in general. 
 
Accompanying the post-1994 increasing disinterest of the general public in the South African 
military, is a rising involvement of the military in Africa’s evolving military and security 
landscape.  Africa is known as a continent steeped in armed conflict and other forms of 
instabilities, the sources of which are both diverse and endemic.  Most of these instabilities are 
intra-state in nature with a high level of anarchy leading to despair, destitution, poverty, disease, 
refugee problems and internally displaced persons.  This anarchy and contingencies attract the 
interest of regional and international role-players.  Militaries on the African continent are 
therefore under increased pressure to participate and prepare themselves for participation in 
conflict resolution, peacekeeping and other positive constructive activities that are needed for 
durable peace, political resolutions and economic development.  For African militaries, it is 
imperative to prepare themselves for participation in these kinds of security operations given the 
close link between security, political stability and economic development on the African 
continent.  The military educational resources of African states are of great significance in this 
regard.  The South African Military Academy, being one of a small number of military 
educational institutions on the African continent, has a unique opportunity to become an 
important role-player in this regard and can be positioned strategically to make this happen.  
The first step, however, is to become a strategically important educational institution for the 
South African National Defence Force (SANDF).  How can this be done?  
 
This chapter aims at providing an exposition of ways in which the structure, focus and 
functioning of the South African Military Academy can be optimised.  The first part of the chapter 
analyses the policy framework within which the Military Academy exists and operates.  Specific 
attention is paid to the relationship between the University of Stellenbosch and the Defence 
Force that determines the nature of the Military Academy.  This is followed by a discussion of 
challenges and problems the Military Academy is facing at present.  The discussion highlights 
problems concerning the budget, lack of organisational ownership and lack of influence on the 
career paths of officers.  The last section of the chapter contain proposals to optimise the 
structure, focus and functioning of the Military Academy as part of Education, Training and 
Development (ETD) in the Defence Force in general. 
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6.2 A UNIQUE CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONSHIP: THE MILITARY ACADEMY’S ROOTS 
OF EXISTENCE 
 
The nature and purpose of the Military Academy are based on a unique civil-military 
arrangement between the University of Stellenbosch, as expressed in the Faculty of Military 
Science, and the South African Department of Defence through the SANDF.  To understand the 
precise role and function of the Military Academy, it is necessary to make an in-depth analysis 
of the agreements that determine this unique civil-military arrangement.  This arrangement is 
rooted in three specific documents: 
 
 the agreement between the Department of Defence and the University of Stellenbosch 
signed on 31 January 1961;6 
 the addendum to this agreement between the Department and the University signed on 
7 December 1999;7and  
 the Department of Defence’s Joint Training Implementation Instruction on the 
Management of the Military Academy signed for implementation by the Chief of Joint 
Training on 1 June 2001.8 
 
The initial agreement between the University and Department signed in 1961 is very brief and 
does not contain much detail on how the relationship between the University and the 
Department at the Military Academy should be structured and directed.  Nor does it contain 
much detail on what the Military Academy as an institution should be doing or how it should be 
organised and operated.  It is stipulated that the Military Academy houses the Faculty of Military 
Science and that all the lecturers are members of a Faculty Council of Military Science of the 
University of Stellenbosch.  This Council functions as a normal committee of the Senate of the 
University and makes recommendations concerning academic affairs in the Faculty to the 
Senate.  The students of the Military Academy are seen as students of the University and as 
such have access to all the facilities the University avails to its students on campus.  An 
important stipulation in the agreement is the clause stating that the Department of Defence is 
fully responsible for the financial demands of the Military Academy, including: 
                                                
6
 South African Department of Defence, Ooreenkoms Tussen die Departement van Verdediging en die 
Universiteit van Stellenbosch, Signed by Prof HB Thom on behalf of the University of Stellenbosch 
and JP de Villiers on behalf of the Department of Defence, 31 January 1961. 
7
 South African Department of Defence, Addendum Supplement to and Exposition of the Agreement 
Between the Department of Defence and the University of Stellenbosch Signed on 31 January 
1961, Signed by Prof AH van Wyk on behalf of the University and Mr JL Gründeling on behalf of the 
Department of Defence, 7 December 1999. 
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 payment of the lecturers; 
 provision of a library and laboratories; and 
 provision of buildings for accommodation and academic purposes. 
 
The Defence Force is obliged, on the one hand, to approve the appointment of lecturers in the 
Faculty of Military Science after their appointments had been deliberated in the university 
context and communicated as a recommendation to Defence Force.  In the appointment of the 
Commanding Officer of the Military Academy, on the other hand, the university has to approve 
the individual earmarked by the Defence Force.  The University exercises control over the 
academic work of the lecturers in the Faculty.  This includes supervision of the University 
regarding: 
 
 content of the academic courses; 
 drafting of examination papers and conducting of exams; and 
 conferring of the necessary degrees and certificates.9 
 
The very broad nature of the 1961 agreement between the University and the Department of 
Defence together with the large amount of societal and other changes in South Africa since the 
signing of this agreement made a revision of the existing agreement in the 1990s imperative.  In 
December 1999, after a period of intense discussion and deliberation between the University 
and the Department, an addendum to the 1961 agreement was signed.  This addendum 
became the basis for the re-positioning and development of the Military Academy for its future 
role in a democratised South Africa.  Under a heading titled “Status, Powers and 
Responsibilities of the Military Academy, Faculty of Military Science, Commandant, Dean and 
Other Members of the Faculty”, it is stated that the Military Academy is a military unit of the 
Department and is under the command of a Commanding Officer – generally known as “The 
Commandant”.10  The Department of Defence is responsible for the provision and maintenance 
of the buildings and other facilities at the Military Academy.  In addition, the Defence Force is 
responsible for all the “… operational needs of the institution”.  The University assumes full 
responsibility for the execution of the academic functions of the Faculty.11 
 
                                                                                                                                                          
8
 South African Department of Defence, Joint Training Formation, Joint Training Implementation 
Instruction on the Management of the Military Academy, DS/TRG/R/103/1/8/2/3, 1 June 2001. 
9
 Ooreenkoms Tussen die Departement van Verdediging en die Universiteit van Stellenbosch, op. cit.  
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 Addendum Supplement to and Exposition of the Agreement Between the Department of Defence and 
the University of Stellenbosch Signed on 31 January 1961, op. cit., p. 3. 
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 Ibid., p. 10. 
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The position of the Faculty of Military Science is defined as an academic faculty of the 
University of Stellenbosch that is accommodated by the Military Academy in Saldanha.  The 
position of the Dean of Military Science is described as the academic head of the Faculty of 
Military Science.  As such, and in line with the general policy laid down by the University, the 
Dean is responsible for teaching, research and community service in the domain of Military 
Science and related subjects.  The Dean, together with all other faculty members, is an 
academic member of the University and, as such, works within the framework of the University’s 
relevant policy, instruction, research and community service in the domain of Military Science.  It 
is the responsibility of the University to ensure that the level of the teaching, research and 
community service in the Faculty is of the quality to which the University strives.  The University 
has to do this through: 
 
 involvement in the appointment and promotion of academic staff in the Faculty; 
 involvement in the activities of academic staff; 
 moderation of the quality of service that the academic staff renders through quality 
assurance measures; 
 approval of the development, institution, adaptation and discontinuance of courses and 
course content in the Faculty, and 
 involvement in the quality of student selection by the Department.12 
 
The addendum also made provision for the creation of a Joint Advisory Committee responsible 
to both the Department of Defence and the University.  The Committee consists of the following 
individuals: 
 
 the Rector and Vice-Chancellor of the University; 
 the Dean of Military Science; 
 the Commandant of the Military Academy; 
 the Vice-Rector (Tuition) of the University; 
 the Vice-Rector (Operations) of the University; 
 two persons nominated by the Faculty of Military Science; and 
 three persons nominated by the Department of Defence. 
 
This committee has to convene at least once a year under the rotating chairmanship of the 
Rector, the Dean and the Commandant.  It acts only in an advisory capacity to advise the 
University and the Department on the policy, management and functioning of the Faculty.  It 
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also advises the Department and University on budgetary and other staff and equipment-related 
issues, as well as issues concerning the maintenance of academic standards.  The committee 
also serves as an instrument of consultation between the University and the Department of 
Defence pertaining to the relationship between the parties in respect of teaching, research and 
service rendering.13 
 
The biggest part of the addendum deals with the handling of personnel matters in the Faculty of 
Military Science.  The 1961 arrangement concerning the appointment of personnel in the 
Faculty of Military Science was maintained.  This implies that all faculty members are appointed 
as members of the Department of Defence and not of the University.  As such, the Department 
accepts responsibility for their remuneration as well as their service conditions and career 
progression.14  The academic promotion of faculty members, however, takes place in 
accordance with the University’s requirements and promotions.15  The agreement makes 
provision for the University to bestow any appropriate academic title on a member in 
collaboration with the Department without necessarily creating financial implications for the 
Department.16   
 
It is noted in the addendum that the Department has to ensure parity as far as possible in the 
service conditions and payment between the academic staff of the Faculty and the academic 
staff of the University.  Applications for appointment as academic staff in the Faculty are 
referred to the Appointments Committee (Senate) of the University for confirmation by the 
rector.  A subcommittee of the Appointments Committee does the initial recommendation to the 
Appointments Committee.  This subcommittee to the Appointments Committee consists of: 
 
 the Dean Of Military Science, who acts as convenor; 
 the Commandant of the Military Academy; 
 at least two members of the Faculty of Military Science; 
 at least two members appointed by the University; 
 at least two members from other faculties of the University; and 
 additional persons as required for the proper filling of a post.17 
 
The appointment of the Dean of Military Science takes place in accordance with the University’s 
requirements and procedures, after which the nominations are recommended to the Department 
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of Defence for approval and appointment, taking into consideration existing Public Service and 
other specific military requirements.18  The University has to be consulted by the Defence Force 
in the appointment of the Commandant.  It should be noted that over time this practise has 
fallen into disuse to the extent that the University was not consulted at all in the appointment of 
recent commandants.  The result, it is noted in a fairly recent report by the Portfolio Committee 
on Defence, is that the University does not have any say in the appointment of the 
Commandant.  This resulted in at least one particular case in which an individual with no 
academic qualifications and no understanding of the need for and nature of the academic world 
was appointed as Commandant.19  The Dean, as academic head of the Faculty, is responsible 
for the management of teaching, research and community service within the Faculty.  The 
Department of Defence liaises directly with the Dean with reference to the management of the 
Faculty.  The Commandant, as representative of the Department, liaises directly with the Dean 
with regard to the management of the Faculty and directly with the Rector with regard to the 
application of the agreement between the University and the Department.20   
 
As far as discipline is concerned, it is stipulated in the addendum that academic staff of the 
Faculty be subjected to the disciplinary codes of the University as far as actions in their 
academic capacity are concerned.  The application of discipline in terms of the University’s 
disciplinary codes, however, takes place in consultation with the Commandant of the Military 
Academy.  In respect to all other disciplinary matters, action is taken in accordance with 
requirements of the Department of Defence.21   
 
The agreement between the University and Department and the addendum to the agreement 
are obviously typical legal documents that allow wide interpretation.  In an effort to provide 
clearance on the overall operation, management and functioning of the Military Academy, the 
Department of Defence through the Chief of Joint Training has put forward the “Joint Training 
Implementation Instruction on the Management of the Military Academy”.  The Instruction was 
obviously drawn up within the framework of the agreement and the addendum to the agreement 
between the University and Department.  At the same time, however, the Instruction provides 
clarity on the detail for the everyday running of the Military Academy.  In particular, the 
instruction aims at regulating the function of the Military Academy with regard to: 
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 delineation of the command, control and support functions governing the management 
of the Military Academy; 
 integration of the Military Academy into the ETD system of the Department of Defence; 
 providing guidelines to the different services and divisions, as well as “… other clients of 
the Military Academy” in terms of their responsibility towards the Military Academy; and 
 furnishing the Military Academy with the required legal and ethical foundation for its 
effective and efficient management. 
 
Under a heading “Philosophical Foundation” in the Instruction, it is argued that the core 
business of universities is evolving and that the Military Academy consequently finds itself 
having to play a greater role in the delivery of life-long learning and the development of “… a 
civic culture among its graduates” at the advent of the 21st century.  At the same time though, 
the Military Academy is functioning in a niche market, having to provide a service to “… a 
specialist client”, and is influenced by a different set of factors compared to other providers of 
higher education.  The first among these, it is pointed out, is the national security context within 
which the Military Academy operates.22 
 
The Instruction points out that the primary focus of the Military Academy is the academic 
development of military officers.  The need for academic development is explained by means of 
Huntington’s argument on military professionalism: a need for expertise, a need for 
responsibility towards society, and a need for a corporate spirit.  Based on Huntington’s view, it 
is maintained in the Instruction that the learning outcomes of the Military Academy cannot be of 
an intellectual nature only.  Instead, the learning outcomes of the Military Academy “… must be 
balanced among the cognitive, affective and psychomotor domains”.23  In particular, it is 
stipulated that the Military Academy should “… assist in internalising the DOD’s value system, 
which should serve as a foundation for its members’/employees’ behaviour in general and for 
the DOD’s operational conduct in particular”.24  Consequently, it is argued that the Military 
Academy differs from other institutions of higher learning in South Africa, since it has to 
participate in the development of the military’s unique organisational culture. 
 
The Instruction defines the aim of the Military Academy as the development of military 
professional competencies of its students through education, training and development 
programmes that are integrated and contextualised.  The vision of the Military Academy – 
“academic excellence in professional military education, training and development” – clearly 
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places the emphasis on the need for academic excellence.25  The emphasis on the academic 
role of the institution is even more clearly highlighted in its mission: 
 
The Military Academy offers contextualised academic programmes at certificate, 
diploma, graduate and postgraduate levels.  Professional development of leaders of 
the DOD and foreign defence forces takes place through technologically supported 
residential and distance education, research is conducted and community service 
for the military and the broader society is performed.26 [emphasis added] 
 
With the emphasis that is placed on the three functions that the Faculty has to fulfil, namely 
teaching, research and community service, the scene is set for an uneven emphasis on 
education in the development of officers at the Military Academy to the detriment of military 
training and professional development.  The arguments on training and the development of a 
corporate spirit are not reflected in the official mission statement of the Military Academy at all. 
 
In the discussion of its functions in the Instruction, it is noted that the Military Academy has to 
provide continued formative training and to facilitate the continued functional training of its 
students at the training units of their respective services and divisions.  All residential students 
of the Military Academy have to: 
 
 be instilled with the appropriate military ethos as expressed in the SANDF’s Code of 
Conduct; 
 remain proficient in conducting regimental and divisional duties characteristic of the 
military units of their respective services; 
 be assisted in the development of general psychomotor skills, physical fitness and the 
maintenance of a healthy military lifestyle; and 
 upon graduation, have to advance to the greatest extent possible in attaining the 
competencies required for a person of his rank and applicable mustering in the relevant 
service.27   
  
The Instruction moreover provides an exposition of the responsibilities that different role-players 
have in the functioning of the Military Academy.  One of the “… command and staff functions” of 
the Chief of Joint Training of the SANDF is to ensure that “… the Academy’s graduates and 
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other products meet the needs and requirements of the DOD”.28  The Chief of Joint Training is 
also responsible for moral, administrative and material support to the Academy.  This makes the 
Chief of Joint Training responsible for, inter alia, the annual budget allocation to the Military 
Academy.  Like the Chief of Joint Training, the different services and division are also 
responsible for the provision of direct advice and management guidelines to the Military 
Academy to ensure that its graduates meet their needs and requirements.  In addition, the 
services and divisions are responsible to ensure the contextual relevance of the academic 
programmes at the Military Academy.  Moreover, the services and divisions need to provide the 
Military Professional Development Branch at the Military Academy with suitable personnel for 
continued formative training of the students of the Military Academy.29 
 
The Instruction provides what it refers to as principles of design for the development of the 
academic programmes at the Military Academy.  It is stated that the so-called principle of depth 
has to be applied in determining the primary focus of the academic programmes in order to 
reflect the emphasis on the primary disciplines within each programme.  The purpose thereof, it 
is argued, is to facilitate articulation with post-graduate programmes.  The so-called principle of 
width has to be applied to ensure that auxiliary disciplines foster the context of the programme.  
The Instruction furthermore emphasises the fact that the curriculum content of the academic 
programmes should be of such a nature that it conforms to national and international norms in 
this regard.  The services and divisions also have a role to play in authorising their respective 
learners’ academic programmes after consideration of their own needs, the specific learner’s 
aptitude and interests, and the recommendations of the Faculty of Military Science.  In addition, 
the services and divisions have to decide which disciplines will be compulsory for their 
respective learners.30 
 
The Military Academy is also instructed to conduct (formative) military training in order to ensure 
that the junior officers at the Military Academy are qualified on completion of their studies for 
their role as military practitioners.  This should be done by means of four specific activities: 
 
 maintaining a regimented military unit routine; 
 conducting physical training, sport and recreation programmes typical of the military; 
 conducting leadership and adventure training exercises; and 
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 appointing, guiding and supervising candidate officers and junior officers in leadership 
positions on student management organisations.31 
 
These four activity areas have to be supported through the employment of candidate officers 
and junior officers during the mid-year recess throughout the SANDF to ensure the 
development of their professional military skills and competencies.  Four priorities apply when 
the employment of students during the mid-year recess has to be decided upon: 
 
 detached duty for conducting functional courses by students at various training units 
throughout the SANDF when the mid-year recess coincides with particular functional 
courses or when courses are scheduled for that purpose; 
 detached duty to various units throughout the SANDF for the employment of students in 
various roles; 
 participation of students in a variety of activities, projects and courses that are planned 
or conducted by the Military Academy.  Various activities are planned by the Faculty and 
the Section Military Development at the Military Academy.  This ranges from battlefield 
tours within the country, to visits to foreign military academies, to HIV/AIDS and other 
programmes at local schools and communities on the West Coast; and 
 students are allowed to take vacation or special leave if there is a specific reason.  This 
has been the case in the past, for example, in situations where students have planned 
their own (unofficial) foreign tours and visits.32 
 
It should be noted that, due to financial shortages and bureaucratic deficiency, not many 
students have been sent on courses and detached duty to military units throughout the Defence 
Force in the last couple of years.  This had a detrimental impact on their mission and combat 
readiness after three years of study at the Military Academy.  It also impacted negatively on the 
students’ military socialisation since they do not come into contact with other members of the 
military often enough. 
 
The agreement, addendum to the agreement and the instruction on the management of the 
Military Academy underpin its present organisational structure.  It is a structure in which the 
Commandant is the primary actor with almost dictatorial powers in the management of the 
Military Academy, including the Faculty of Military Science.  The position of the Dean of Military 
Science is subordinate to that of the Commandant, even to the extent that the Dean is nothing 
but an administrative official with almost no executive powers.  The Dean functions at the same 
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level within the organisation as the Commander of the Military Development Section, 
responsible for military training at the Military Academy, and the Chief of Staff, who is 
responsible for all the support services in the unit. (See Figure 6.1)  The predicament of the 
position of the Dean of Military Science will be discussed in greater detail in the next section. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1: Present structure for command and control at the Military Academy33 
 
6.3 UNIQUE CIVIL-MILITARY PROBLEMS: UNDERSTANDING THE CHALLENGES 
FACING THE MILITARY ACADEMY 
 
Much has been said in this study about the need for military education and the nature of military 
education and professional military educational institutions.  Mollo34 argues that there are three 
requirements for successful military education in addition to the recognition of the importance of 
professional military education, especially at the tertiary level.  The first concerns the budget 
and the crucial need for institutional support in this regard.  Mollo maintains that militaries often 
go to great lengths to procure the newest and best technology – in most cases to the detriment 
of educational budgets.  Instead of viewing military education as competing with technological 
improvement, the former should rather be complemented by the latter.  It should be noted, 
however, that no educational institution can provide high quality education on a restricted 
budget.35   
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The second requirement is the need for relevancy.  Mollo notes that military education could 
only be successful if the education that is provided responds to the ever-changing security and 
military-scientific environment.36  If this is not the case, a particular military may well distance 
itself from the need for military education.  This argument needs to be taken one step further, 
since educational institutions need to reflect the societal, economic and other trends of the 
world within which they exist.  In particular, educational institutions should be responsive to 
changes in the higher or tertiary educational environment.  Consequently, educational 
institutions should be vibrant institutions that not only challenge existing ideas, knowledge and 
paradigms, but which also generate ideas and knowledge and adjust themselves accordingly.  
This requires a certain amount of responsiveness from these institutions and a need to operate 
continually on the cutting edge with new ideas and paradigms.   
 
The last requirement is for military education to be an integral part the career paths of 
officers.37  Stated differently, a minimum level of higher education should be a requirement 
either to become an officer or to be promoted beyond a particular rank.  There is no doubt that 
military education should be linked to the particular career and promotional path of military 
officers.  This not only places a continued obligation on military educational institutions to 
ensure the relevance of their academic and other programmes, but also elicits continued 
linkage and interaction between the educational and operational components of the defence 
force.  These three considerations – budgetary problems, educational relevancy and career 
integration – are used to analyse civil-military educational challenges at the South African 
Military Academy in Saldanha.    
 
6.3.1 Managing the Military Academy budget 
 
A lack of funds is the single most inhibiting characteristic pervading the history of the South 
African Military Academy.  The initial creation of the Military Academy in Pretoria in the early 
1950s, Visser noted, was accompanied by a lack of funds that impeded the development of the 
Military Academy by denying it its own official posting, building complex and separate staff 
establishment.38  When in the late 1950s the Military Academy was moved to the Saldanha Bay 
area, the lack of funds impeded the development of an institution with the necessary facilities to 
allow for both the joint education of officers and service-unique training.39  
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An institution such as the Military Academy should be created, developed and sustained on 
military-philosophical grounds.  These philosophical issues have traditionally been well debated 
and sometimes even well understood in the South African military.  Nevertheless, once this 
theoretical emphasis was shifted to the concrete environment where these ideas had to be 
implemented, the driving factor became one depending on the funds that were available.  A 
number of investigations on the role and function, as well as the functioning of the Military 
Academy, have been conducted since its inception.40  Most of these investigations contained 
very sound recommendations, which the Defence Force (and the University) approved for 
implementation.  However, the failure to implement these recommendations has throughout 
been rooted in the lack of money.  One example in this regard was the common 
recommendation by a number of these reports for the development of particular disciplines in 
the Faculty of Military Science to address specific needs in the Defence Force.  For instance, 
the Potgieter Report referred to the subject areas of anthropology and military sociology.  
Elements of these disciplines were subsequently introduced as part of other disciplines.  The 
management of diversity, for example, has been incorporated into the curriculum of the Subject 
Group Industrial Psychology, while certain elements of military sociology have been introduced 
as part of the academic offerings of the Subject Group Military Strategy.41  But they have, 
however, not been introduced as independent disciplines at the Military Academy.        
 
In the Portfolio Committee on Defence Draft Report to the National Assembly on the South 
African Military Academy published in 2005, serious questions were posed regarding the 
funding of the institution.  In particular, it was noted that the budget of the Military Academy is 
insufficient for the student intake levels and needs.42  Several problems were pointed out that 
could be attributed to the unavailability of funds.  There is specific strain on infrastructure, in 
particular the living quarters of the students and the availability of classrooms, because of 
growing student numbers.  The long delays in the repair, maintenance and upgrading of such 
facilities were highlighted in the report.  It was noted in the report that some facilities do not 
even meet government safety regulations any more. 43  In addition, a number of concerns were 
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registered in relation to the physical infrastructure and resources, including the lack of access to 
laboratory and computer equipment, sport facilities and the internet.44 
 
The report is quite blunt in pointing out that the academic stature, performance and education of 
the Faculty of Military Science are undermined by the lack of funds, even to the extent that 
vacant posts are not filled as a matter of priority.45  It very often takes up to two years to fill such 
posts.  The appalling condition of the library with its dire shortage of books and periodicals is 
highlighted as a major alarming sign of the absolute absence of basic conditions for successful 
quality education.  Very few new books were acquired during the last three years, while the 
budget for the procurement of academic journals and periodicals has been cut to the extent that 
it is almost impossible to purchase any foreign academic journals and periodicals.  The very 
bureaucratic state tender processes followed for the procurement of these books and journals 
further exacerbate the situation.  Invariably the process is so lengthy that it takes up to six 
months or even a year for new books and journals to arrive.  This has led to a situation were 
very often not all the editions of specific journals are available in the library.46 
 
Almost no money is available for the payment of visiting and guest lecturers.  The payment of 
such persons is furthermore such a bureaucratised process that lecturers in the Faculty of 
Military Science are reluctant to invite eminent persons, since the scope of the paperwork that 
has to be completed requires inordinate time and effort.  This leads to a situation where 
academics and others become unwilling to participate in suchlike endeavours if they are aware 
that they will only be paid in three to six month’s time.  In addition, lecturers have experienced 
situations in the past where the Commandant at the Military Academy received well-known 
academics from abroad in a very negative way because of their ethnic and regional background 
(and this relates mostly to white Europeans).  There is thus pressure on academics to invite the 
“right” guest speakers.  This does not convey the notion of an environment conducive for a true 
educational experience.  This situation is reflected in the number of guest speakers at the 
Military Academy.  During 2002-03, the Military Academy hosted only two international guest 
speakers, four in 2003-04, and two 2004-05.47  In most cases, these speakers were not invited 
to the Military Academy per se, but they visited the Academy as part of a broader programme.  
This is particularly true of high-ranking foreign military dignitaries visiting the Academy.  They do 
not address students in specific classes about specific academic issues.  Rather, the principle 
of “… hiring a crowd” is applied to have as many students as possible in the audience, with all 
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the associated negative attributes that are obviously not in line with good educational practises.  
The report noted that an institution, such as the Military Academy, depends on international 
academic support since it is imperative for students to be exposed to as broad a range of views 
as possible.48 
 
The participation of academics of the Faculty of Military Science in activities that are normally 
associated with successful academic careers has become the exception rather than the rule 
because of the aforementioned lack of funds.  Only small amounts of funds are available for 
participation in academic conferences domestically and abroad.  The allocation of funds by the 
military for such endeavours, especially for the attendance of foreign workshops, conferences 
and seminars, is also highly influenced by the need for transformation.  State regulations and 
levels of payment in this regard, linked to the use of specific prescribed travel agencies only, 
entail such a costly endeavour, that in most cases two or three people can attend a conference 
if they personally have the opportunity and the means to arrange their visits.  Most often 
academics in the Faculty of Military Science have to rely on their own private funds and the 
research funds that they have accrued at the University of Stellenbosch through their own 
research for the attendance of such activities. 
 
The lack of available funds is, however, not only due to restricted budget allocations.  
Bureaucratic and geographical factors also play a role in this regard.  Since the Academy is 
outside the immediate “Pretoria sphere of influence”, this very often complicates matters.  Most 
financial and other authorisations have to be signed by senior officers at the Defence 
Headquarters in Pretoria.  For the Military Academy, situated about 1500 km from Pretoria, this 
usually requires a great deal of time, whereas if a different military unit, such as the Defence 
College for example, that is situated in Pretoria, has a problem, it is in a position to clear it up 
immediately with the relevant persons.  The same is true of bargaining power for the allocation 
of additional funding for specific projects.  The unit who is in a position to bargain for these 
funds in person has a huge advantage over those units who have to rely on the telephone and 
other means of communication with Defence Headquarters. 
 
In addition, because the Faculty of Military Science does not manage its own budget, this allows 
for substantial organisational uncertainty and other tensions.  At the Military Academy, the 
Commandant is ultimately responsible for the management of the budget, but he very often 
delegates the management of the budget to a person he deems suitable or capable.  It stands 
to reason that the management of the budget should be undertaken in such a way that the 
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interests of the supporting staffs, the military training branch and the Faculty are served, but the 
primary mission of the Military Academy needs to be emphasised.  Before the recent changes in 
the command structure, concerns had been raised in the Faculty with regard to the 
transparency with which the budget is managed.  These concerns were rooted in the reluctance 
on the part of the Commandant and the budget manager to brief the unit as a whole, and the 
Faculty in particular, on the management and spending of the budget.49  In addition, these 
concerns were and still are rooted in the total absence of an inclusive and proper budgetary 
process for the institution as a whole the past couple of years.   
 
A former Dean of Military Science emphasised that the University of Stellenbosch is very 
hesitant not to be seen as too prescriptive to the Faculty of Military Science, since it does not 
control its budget.50  Such an approach is understandable.  Because the Dean of Military 
Science does not control the funds available to the Faculty, this has a defining negative 
influence on his position as the primary manager of the Faculty and his management reference 
power in this regard.  This relegates the position of the Dean of Military Science to that of a 
mere administrative official.  A senior professor in the Faculty of Military Science argues that 
one of the biggest problems in the Faculty has always been the fact that the Faculty is 
dependent on the Defence Force for its budget and financing.  She is of the opinion that the 
budgetary and financial management system of the Defence Force is not flexible and 
responsive enough for the needs of an academic faculty.  This, she argues, has always been 
the biggest inhibiting influence on the autonomy of the Faculty.51 
 
It should be noted that the budget is a common problem facing all military units.  It is the 
responsibility of the Commandant of the Military Academy to manage the budget effectively 
according to particular objectives and to indicate to the Defence Force which objectives cannot 
be achieved because of the lack of funds.  The problems relating to the budget of the Military 
Academy are as much a management problem as it is a problem of size.  Often money 
allocated to the Military Academy is withdrawn to address priorities elsewhere in the Defence 
Force.  In the past, budget cuts have often been a bigger problem than the size of the original 
budget.  Ultimately, the size of the Military Academy budget and the cuts that are often made 
are a reflection of the lack of ownership by the Defence Force.   
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The Defence Force never has and still does not view the Military Academy as a strategic 
institution with a role in the wider, overarching system that is highly valued.  Higher education 
may perhaps be a priority for the Defence Force, but the role of the Military Academy as a 
provider of higher education is not.  This could be ascribed to the fact that for a major part of the 
history of the Defence Force the system provided a career to officers without the need for higher 
education, in other words there was no need for officers to have at least a B degree.  The 
training provided by the Defence Force was seen as of strategic importance – more important 
than education provided by an institution that does not form part of the broader Defence Force 
system.  Seen from this perspective, the Military Academy served as an exit mechanism for 
members of the Defence Force who saw the Defence Force as a steppingstone or gateway to a 
career in business or somewhere else in society.52 
 
6.3.2 Organisational relevancy and ownership of the Military Academy   
 
The organisational relevancy of an institution, such as the Military Academy, relates to two very 
specific considerations.  The first is the need for the kind of education, training and development 
provided at such an institution to be of relevance to the organisation at large.  This requirement 
is linked closely to the need for its curriculum to be relevant.  The underlying question in this 
regard is whether the academic offerings of the Military Academy provide in the needs of the 
SANDF.  The second is the need for such an institution to be ‘part of the system’ and to the 
extent that the end-product fits into and adheres to the requirements and expectations of the 
end-user system.  This particular matter is closely allied to the notion of ownership of the larger 
organisation.  The underlying question is whether the South African military at large takes 
ownership of the Military Academy. 
 
A former Dean of Military Science noted that operational requirements have always influenced 
the military educational offerings of the Military Academy and the Defence Force's attitude 
towards education.53  In a recently published article, Visser explored the changes in the 
academic curriculum of the Military Academy against the background of the general threat 
perception of the Defence Force.  Visser in particular analysed the former South African 
government’s perception of the Cold War and the liberation struggle as a framework for an 
understanding of “… the Military Academy’s response to the revolutionary onslaught” from the 
late 1960s onwards.  An analysis of post-Cold War and post-apartheid developments likewise 
was used in the article for an exposition of the changes in the academic curriculum of the 
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Military Academy since the early 1990s.54  Visser concluded that the Military Academy was not 
altogether successful in responding to the changing security and military scientific environment.  
Even though the academic offerings of the Military Academy reflected the societal, economic 
and other trends of the world within which it exists to a degree, there has never been a 
compulsory core curriculum for all candidate officers at the institution that introduced the 
candidate officers to the essence of the military profession. 
 
Consequently, the salient question is whether these changes came about in reaction to changes 
in the broad geo-strategic political environments, or whether these changes were made to 
provide in the specific needs of the Defence Force.  Kotze maintains that recent changes in the 
degree programmes of the Military Academy in 2000 were nothing but a re-organisation of the 
existing subjects and subject matter – it did not solve anything.55  What then is the problem that 
was not addressed or that the curriculum failed to address?  Kotze and a number of other 
academics and soldiers who were interviewed were of the opinion that the current academic 
offerings of the Military Academy do not contribute to the development of a military professional 
ethos in the Defence Force.  Military professionalism is rooted in the interaction between military 
education, training and socialisation.  In considering what the Military Academy ought to be, it is 
important to enquire as to what its primary mission should be, namely the development of an 
ethos of military professionalism.  Hence, the academic offerings should be aligned to address 
this particular issue.  
 
The Military Academy’s role in the development of such an ethos should be viewed against the 
absence of any purposeful and coherent military training and socialisation at the Military 
Academy.  This has a defining influence on the services’ neglect to take ownership of the 
institution.  The issue of training at the Military Academy is rooted in the challenge of students 
who arrive at their different units after completion of their studies at the Military Academy and 
who are not judged based on their intellectual agility, for example, whether they are able to 
“… think outside the box”.  Rather they are judged on whether, for example, they are able to 
command a platoon or whether they can function as administrative officers.56   
 
Visser emphasised that the Defence Force had never taken ownership of the Military 
Academy.57  This is indeed one of the historic problems at the Military Academy.  The result is 
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that there was never any urgency on the part of the Defence Force to implement any proposed 
changes at the Military Academy or to follow up decisions that had been taken.  This, Visser 
argues, related to a large extent to the lack of continuity of persons who deal with the Military 
Academy on behalf of the Defence Force and the absence of regular interaction between the 
Military Academy and the Defence Force in general.  Historically, the Defence Force viewed the 
Military Academy as a military university, which, indeed, it has been for most of its existence.  
The Defence Force consequently did not deal with the Military Academy as a proper military 
unit, but rather as a civilian institution and an extension of the University of Stellenbosch.58    
 
A related, but also important issue concerns the command and control arrangements with which 
the Military Academy is confronted with in the Defence Force.  As a rule, military command and 
control systems are structured hierarchical in such a way as to allow commanders to report to 
lower and higher-level commanders and that staff officers take the responsibility to 
communicate with other staff officers.  A situation where lower level commanders report to staff 
officers and receive their commands from higher level staff officers are avoided at all costs.  
Yet, for the biggest part of its existence, the Military has been confronted with a situation where 
it was organisationally linked to a staff department within the Defence Force.  In short, a staff 
officer “commands” the Military Academy from higher headquarters.  In the SADF, the Military 
Academy was for command and control purposes under the direction of the Chief of Staff 
Personnel.  In the SANDF, the Military Academy was placed under the Chief of Joint Training.  
However, decisions about the Military Academy budget and personnel, for example, are not 
made by the Chief of Joint Training.  These decisions are made by staff officers within the Joint 
Training Division.  In short, the Commandant of the Military Academy is held responsible by 
staff officers for the way in which he manages and commanded the Military Academy.59 
 
The SANDF’s instruction on the management of the Military Academy clearly defines the 
institution’s vision and mission.  However, Visser argues that the SANDF never internalised this 
vision and mission.60  In addition, some academics argued that the lack of ownership on the part 
of the Defence Force was reflected in the lack of a proper and clear policy framework within 
which the Military Academy could or should function.  A senior member of the Faculty of Military 
Science argued, for example, that most military academies in the world function under an 
autonomous policy framework established on governmental or national level.  In South Africa, 
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the existence of the Military Academy, or more specifically the Faculty of Military Science, has 
its roots in a departmental “agreement of goodwill” between the Department of Defence and the 
University of Stellenbosch.  The result of this agreement is a situation where both the University 
and the Defence Force are reluctant to involve themselves too deeply in the management of the 
Faculty in fear of overstepping the line and offending the other party to the agreement.  This is 
especially true of the University.  The situation that unfolds creates a vacuum of ownership 
within which the Faculty of Military Science exists, with both the University and the Defence 
Force being apathetic towards the management and control of the Faculty.61  The result is a 
total absence of higher order strategic management of the Faculty of Military Science.62    
 
The former Dean of Military Science was of the opinion that other educational, training and 
development institutions in the SANDF also experience some form of alienation.  This, he 
argued, is clearly evident in the silence of the broader SANDF and particularly its leadership 
elements in current programme presentations by these institutions to the South African 
Qualifications Authority (SAQA).  Their frustrations are rooted in a total absence of coherent 
inputs from the rest of the Defence Force in the development of these programmes.  This lack 
of input may be attributed to the present lack of personnel with an institutional memory in the 
Defence Force and the absence of expertise to make judgements on the inputs that should be 
provided.63  Though this may provide some perspective on the current situation with which the 
Military Academy is confronted, there is a major difference in the sense that there is a historic 
dimension in the Military Academy’s lack of ownership by the Defence Force that is not present 
at the other ETD institutions. 
 
In addition, Malan pointed out that the (educational) needs of the Defence Force are expressed 
in terms of its training requirements.  Whenever the Defence Force becomes enthusiastic about 
a particular academic programme, it invariably indicates where preceding training ceases and 
where training that is done later in the careers of the officers, may be linked to the specific 
programme.  There is a general lack of understanding in the Defence Force of the broad 
formative nature of education, which Malan describes as the “… ability to conceive of alternative 
realities”.  There is on the whole very little understanding that education exposes the individual 
to a broad spectrum of views on a particular matter that he should be able to evaluate critically.  
The Defence Force has at all times made an effort to link the education at the Military Academy 
thematically with the training that is done in the Defence Force in general.64   
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Kotze argued that the creation of the Military Academy was driven by the need for higher 
education for officers, namely that officers in the Defence Force should have at least a first or B 
degree.65  Yet, Kotze argued, “… nobody really understood what it meant and what they were in 
for”.  The Military Academy was established, initially offering two study directions (natural and 
human sciences) but with a high emphasis on natural sciences – rooted in an understanding by 
Brig P.G.J. de Vos, the first Commanding Officer and Dean, of what was required by the 
military.  Since its inception, however, the Military Academy failed to satisfy the needs of the 
Defence Force leading to its alienation and lack of ownership.  This inability of the Military 
Academy to provide in the needs of the Defence Force has underpinned all the subsequent 
investigations and studies about the role and function of the Military Academy conducted since 
the late 1950s.  In other words, the purpose of all these studies and investigations was to 
determine how to bring the academic offering of the Military Academy in line with the needs of 
the broader Defence Force.66 
 
The Malan Report of the late 1960s followed on what was considered at the time a scandal at 
the Military Academy with students going “overboard”.  The report in essence indicated that the 
Officer Commanding the Military Academy, Brig De Vos, did not provide the military guidance 
and direction that was needed for the Military Academy to be of value to the Defence Force at 
large.  Malan thus proposed a new model for the Military Academy.  Kotze subsequently argued 
that the Malan Report and all subsequent reports on the Military Academy, including the 
Kingsrow Report of 1989, were nothing but investigations about the legitimacy of the institution.  
The Military Academy was and still is not a legitimate military unit within the broader Defence 
Force.  Stated differently, the Defence Force has never accepted ownership of the Military 
Academy because the Military Academy never satisfied or addressed its needs.  Although each 
of these reports attempted to determine the role and function of the Military Academy, this 
particular issue has not yet been resolved.  The Military Academy still has no clearly defined 
place within the broader Defence Force system.67  The underlying question though is whether 
the Defence Force is capable of and indeed has communicated its educational requirements to 
the Military Academy in a clear and unambiguous fashion.  The exchange of information is the 
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glue that brings the different component systems together as a whole in a systems approach.  If 
this interaction is effective, the system becomes bigger than the sum of its components.         
 
This situation was and still is clearly visible in remarks made frequently by very senior officers in 
the Defence Force.  These would include remarks such as, “What are you doing at the Military 
Academy?” or “The people we get from the Military Academy are not employable 
(aanwendbaar) by the Defence Force”.  In addition, alumni of the Military Academy complained 
that they are not employed in the Defence Force in accordance with the subject knowledge and 
education they had received at the Military Academy.  The question that drives these complaints 
is whether the students understand the role of the Military Academy – not as an institution that 
prepares them for specialist posts in the Defence Force – but as an institution that should 
prepare them for a military career – as military professionals.  The Defence Force often 
complained that after three years of studies at the Military Academy, the student’s “… military 
knowledge is obsolete”.  As a result of the inadequate exchange of information in the system, 
there is lack of mutual understanding between the Military Academy and the rest of the Defence 
Force, and thus there is an absence of seamless integration of graduates from the Military 
Academy into the Defence Force at large.68 
 
Many questions have been posed about the “… product of the Military Academy” – the students 
who graduate from the institution each year.69  It seems that different individuals have different 
opinions about the attributes that a Military Academy graduate should have.  No empirical study 
has yet been done regarding the acceptability of non-acceptability of these students for the 
SANDF.  Malan consequently argued that the majority of complaints raised in this regard 
concern the lack of an understanding between training and education.  In most cases, there is 
an expectation that the Military Academy should prepare students for their first assignment. 70  
 
Since Military Academy alumni do not constitute a critical mass or fundamental number of 
officers in the SANDF, it is very difficult for the SANDF to develop an understanding of the 
nature of the Military Academy and its role.  The large number of Military Academy alumni who 
have resigned from the SANDF in the last decade has exacerbated this situation.  This should 
be linked to a situation where the majority of senior officers in the SANDF do not have any 
higher educational qualifications and, in most cases, also do not have an appreciation for the 
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need and value of such an education.  These officers have been denied the opportunity to study 
under the previous political dispensation.  Officers not in possession of any academic 
qualifications often feel threatened and see the need to degrade the Military Academy as a form 
of – what psychologists refer to as – projection.  Officers consequently project their own 
shortcomings on some extraneous object.  This could well be ascribed to the lack of a tradition 
of education in the SANDF and the resulting unintellectual organisational climate.71 
 
Kotze argued that this situation was dealt with for only a very small part of its history, which was 
in the period immediately after the Malan reforms in the early 1970s.72  Malan proposed the 
transformation of the Military Academy into an archetype Military Academy for the training, 
socialisation and education of young candidate officers at a single institution.73  Consequently, 
Malan integrated the Military Academy into the broader system of officer development in the 
Defence Force.  The most important element of the Malan reforms in the 1970s was the transfer 
of initial officer formative training to the Military Academy.  Officers first had to pass the officer 
formative training course at the Military Academy in order to be commissioned.  However, 
although the education that followed on the formative training at the Military Academy was not 
compulsory to become an officer, it established the Military Academy as the alma mater of all 
the officers in the Defence Force.  
 
Geographical isolation also seems to have influenced the Defence Force’s lack of ownership of 
the Military Academy.  Visser was of the opinion that the Military Academy is geographically 
removed from the attention and interest of the policy and decision-makers in Pretoria.  If an 
institution does not happen to be located in Pretoria and does not have a specific custodian, 
such as one of the services, this gives rise to a situation where no one cares about such distant 
unit.  This is exacerbated by the inability of the lecturers of the Military Academy to involve 
themselves with some of the programmes of the other Defence Force education, training and 
development institutions because of these institutions’ geographical locality and the lack of 
money to travel frequently between Saldanha and other centres, specifically Pretoria.74  
Neethling was also of the opinion that the lecturers in the Faculty of Military Science become 
intellectually very isolated in Saldanha over time.  He contrasted his tenure as a lecturer in 
Saldanha with the time that he served as a senior researcher in the Gauteng Branch of the 
Centre for Military Studies in Pretoria.  Being in Pretoria as an academic, not only allowed for 
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interaction with a vibrant academic environment because of the great number of academic 
institutions in the Gauteng region, but also allowed for interaction with governmental and other 
policy-makers, since Pretoria is the bureaucratic hub of South Africa.75 
 
A last factor that provides some understanding of the SANDF’s lack of ownership of the Military 
Academy, and one that the author considers as of critical importance, is the neglect in the 
academic offerings of the Military Academy to expose all students to those disciplines that 
constitute the heart of the military profession, such as Military History and Strategy.  Only a very 
small percentage of Military Academy students are channelled into those programmes where 
they are exposed to these disciplines.  Very few Military Academy students consequently have 
the opportunity to be introduced to, to ponder and to debate those issues that constitute the 
heart of the military profession.  Without any doubt, this influences students’ development of an 
occupational or institutional approach to their military careers.  It is a matter of grave concern 
that the majority of South African Military Academy graduates have never been exposed to any 
military-related disciplines while studying at the institution! 
 
6.3.3 Promotional relevancy of the Military Academy 
 
As was pointed out earlier in the study, no academic education of any nature is required for 
commissioning as an officer in the SANDF.  In the same manner that education has never been 
a requirement for officer commission, graduation from the Military Academy has never been a 
requirement for promotion.  The percentage of officers who have graduated from the Military 
Academy in the past is very small indeed.  The Military Academy, or more specifically 
graduation from the Military Academy, has never been a significant part of the career path of 
officers in the SANDF. 
 
There is, though, a growing concern about the lack of knowledge development in the SANDF.  
This could be ascribed to the growing concern in the Defence Force about the average South 
African officer’s lack of any academic qualifications.76  The continued academic education of 
officers throughout their careers has become increasingly important as the South Africa military 
repositions itself after years of isolation.  This notion was driven home by the need for career 
officers to prepare themselves for military diplomacy and international peacekeeping.  
 
The need for military diplomacy is highlighted through the increasing interaction between the 
SANDF and other foreign military forces.  Through this interaction, officers were exposed to 
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international military professionalism and its educational foundation.  This was especially true of 
the comparatively substantial number of South African officers who attended command and 
staff and other courses abroad.  In general, these officers fared quite well in these courses.  It 
was, however, more a reflection of their military experience than anything else.  These officers 
returned with the realisation that something needed to be done about the educational profile of 
the average South African officer if the SANDF was to be serious about new military missions, 
such as military diplomacy, that have become an important part of the job description of the 
military in the contemporary era.77  The need for academic education to be an integral part of 
the professional preparation of officers for their careers became an acceptable fact.  The 
Commandant of the Military Academy in particular pointed out that education plays an important 
role in providing officers with confidence in their interaction with foreign armed forces.78    
 
The second factor that highlighted the need for education to be part of the professional 
preparation of officers for their careers is South African participation in peace missions in Africa.  
This drives home the fact that circumstances, such as the weather, religion and culture differ 
vastly elsewhere in Africa from the situation at home.  Soldiers, for example, find it difficult 
dealing with complex issues such as child soldiers and armed civilians especially if they are not 
able to communicate with these people in the local language.79  If these factors are considered 
in their totality, education becomes a prerequisite for the preparation of officers for their military 
careers. 
 
Steps have been taken in the recent past to make some form of education at the Military 
Academy a prerequisite for commissioning.  With the recent introduction of the Military Skills 
Development (MSD) programme by the SANDF, completion of the first year of military training 
at the officer training units of the different services, as well as completion of at least one year of 
academic studies at the Military Academy has become a requirement for appointment as 
officers.  This will provide an officer with a short or medium-term contract.  If he has an intention 
to remain in the SANDF as a career officer, it is recommended that he completes the remaining 
two years of academic study at the Military Academy, either residentially or by means of 
distance education, or to complete a degree course at an academic institution somewhere else.  
It should be noted, however, that the motivation for the introduction of the MSD programme is 
rooted in political and not necessarily in strategic or military considerations.  It is questioned 
within the military and is seen as a simplistic short-term solution to a complicated challenge.      
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The Army is the largest beneficiary of the MSD programme, with the highest number of students 
who form part of the programme being in the Army.  The Army is in great need for junior officers 
and it remains to be seen whether this service is going to persist with the policy of not 
commissioning these candidate officers if they are not successful in their first year of study.  The 
question arises: How long will these members remain as candidate officers in the Army before 
the Army promotes them on account of the shortage of junior officers?  In addition, how are 
these students to repeat the academic courses of their first year of study and be successful in it 
by means of distance education if they have not succeeded during their residential studies?   
 
The Army, unlike the Air Force and Navy, is however notorious for keeping its distance and not 
actively engaging the Faculty of Military Science concerning the kind and nature of education 
that its students are supposed to received.  The Air Force, for example, has recently charged 
the Faculty of Military Science to be responsible for the “ground-school phase” of their pilot and 
navigator training.  These pupil pilots and navigators thus have to complete at least one year of 
academic education if they wish to continue with their training as pilots or navigators.  They 
should complete the remaining part of the degree course after completion of their training either 
through returning to the Military Academy or by means of distance education.  This has not 
happened as yet.  Indeed, there are serious questions about whether this will, in fact, come 
about once these students have been allowed into the cockpits of their aircraft.  The result is 
that there are almost no Air Force students in their second and third years of study at the 
Military Academy.  In addition, without doubt the division into two periods of the educational 
experience of students has a detrimental impact on the general formative nature of education.  
However, by actively engaging the Faculty of Military Science, the Air Force ensures that during 
their one year at the Military Academy students receives an education that serves as a basis for 
further training within the service.  This is in stark contrast to the approach of the Army.        
 
The Navy is also in the process of deliberating with the Military Academy for the development 
and tailoring of an academic programme in such a way that it addresses the specific needs of 
the Navy.  Its completion would be a requirement for the appointment of at least the combat 
officers in future.  The Navy’s requests have already been incorporated into the academic 
offerings of the Military Academy and are due to be introduced in 2007.  This includes inter alia 
the development of subjects, such as Naval Technology and Maritime and Shipping Law, as 
part of the Programme in Technology and Defence Management.  The Navy has also requested 
the addition of so-called “zero credit modules” to the programme.  The students have to 
complete these modules as part of the graduate programme at the Military Academy, but these 
are in fact practical modules to be completed during recess times on ships or in various naval 
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units.  This co-operation between the Navy and the Military Academy is an import step for the 
Navy in taking ownership of the Military Academy and its students at the Military Academy.  The 
Academy will be responsible for an important component of the commissioning of the Navy’s 
candidate officers in future.80   
 
With these initiatives, the Air Force and the Navy have provided important indications to the 
Military Academy regarding the way it should approach its own future and how it could be of 
value to the South African military in general.  In particular, these initiatives highlight the 
difference in the needs of the services and the importance for a joint institution, such as the 
Military Academy to continue addressing the needs of the different services.  The example of 
the tailoring of both these programmes for the Air Force and the Navy also provides interesting 
insights into the balancing of a general formative education with a vocational education. 
6.4 DEALING WITH THE CHALLENGES: POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS FOR THE 
DIFFICULTIES FACING THE MILITARY ACADEMY 
 
It is easy to criticise and to deconstruct.  The real challenge is to find solutions and to draw up 
constructive proposals to deal with very complex problems such as those that are confronting 
the Military Academy at present.81  Any concrete proposals to address such a complex 
challenge are bound to be controversial and in itself an object of critique.  It is within this context 
that the proposals and recommendations contained in this chapter should be seen.  It is hoped 
that this contains the seeds for a constructive debate that would eventually lead to better 
solutions.  Therefore, it is not implied that the suggestions and recommendations that are made 
constitute the sole or the full solution.  It is important to consider a number of influencing factors 
that should guide any thinking about the future of the Military Academy.  These factors have 
been identified throughout the whole of this study. 
 
6.4.1 Education as a requirement for officership   
 
An important requirement for successful military education is that such education should form 
an integral part of the career paths of officers.  Modern military professionalism requires from 
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officers a minimum level of academic education.  World-wide, possession of a first degree (B 
degree) has become the minimum requirement for academic entry regarding appointment as an 
officer.  An advanced degree has become the norm for appointment at senior levels.  The 
SANDF is far behind the rest of the world in this regard.  A first degree should also become a 
minimum requirement for officers in the SANDF – for those already in the system, and also for 
those who are newly appointed.   
 
How should the requirement for an educated officer corps be introduced into the SANDF?  
There are two routes to follow.  The first is to stipulate that if someone aspires to promotion 
beyond a specific rank, that person should have a degree.  For example, anyone who wants to 
become a senior officer and be promoted beyond the rank of major should have a degree.  
Another way to introduce such an arrangement is to allow a specific period of time, five years 
for example, after which nobody may be promoted without a degree.  This would allow those 
who wish to remain in the military sufficient time to obtain such a degree or to seek an 
alternative career.  Canada used this option with great success in the 1990s.82 
 
6.4.2 The need for military regimental socialisation at the Military Academy 
 
The Defence Force in general and the different services in particular, will not accept ownership 
of the Military Academy if the Military Academy does not become responsible for the whole 
process of the making of lieutenants.  The making of lieutenants entails the training, 
socialisation and education of candidate officers in preparation for their commissioning as 
officers.  A careful reading of Visser’s study of the history of the Military Academy clearly 
indicates that the services have always resisted such an arrangement.83  Their resistance was 
based on the notion that the services first have to socialise and regimentalise their candidate 
officers in a service-unique culture before they commence with their studies at the Military 
Academy.  Strangely enough, the services have never been concerned about the socialisation 
and regimentalisation of their candidate officers at the Military Academy itself.  Or, it can be 
argued that this was one of the reasons why the services have never truly taken ownership of 
the Military Academy: they do not have control over the socialisation of their officers in the 
educational environment of the Military Academy.  It is, however, true that one year of 
socialisation in a regimentalised training environment does not stand up to three years of 
socialisation in an academic environment.  Something needs to be done about the 
                                                
82
 See the next chapter for a discussion in this regard: Haycock, RC, “The Labours of Athena and the 
Muses: Historical and Contemporary Aspects of Canadian Military Education”, in Kennedy, GC & 
Nielson, K (eds.), Military Education: Past, Present, and Future, Praeger, Westport, 2002. 
83
 Visser, GE, Die Geskiedenis van die Suid-Afrikaanse Militêre Akademie, 1950-1990, op. cit. 
 262 
disequilibrium in the socialisation of candidate officers between their one year of training at the 
service colleges and their three years of study at the Military Academy. 
  
Some element is lacking in the socialisation of candidate and junior officers at the Military 
Academy that would ensure their smooth and successful integration into the SANDF after three 
years of academic study at the Military Academy.  At present, there is disequilibrium between 
the academic socialisation of candidate officers and junior officers at the Military Academy and 
the regimental socialisation at the service colleges, which is required by the SANDF.  In the 
past, the midyear recess training of students at various military units throughout the SANDF 
was supposed to fill this void.  With the Military Academy’s stringent budget of the last couple of 
years, however, regimentalised military training has fallen by the wayside. 
 
Training and the regimentalised military training environment represent a convergent approach 
to socialisation.  The individual is specifically socialised for a specific environment – the military 
environment in general and the warfighting environment in particular.  Education allows for a 
divergent approach where the individual is socialised to operate with ease in a range of social 
and other environments.  Whereas these two forms of socialisation form an integral part of the 
making of young officers at most foreign military academies, the emphasis is almost exclusively 
on academic socialisation at the South African Military Academy. 
 
If the two processes of socialisation cannot be done concurrently, then at least it would make 
more sense to first complete the broad general socialisation process before preparation and 
socialisation for a specific career, namely that of the military.  This implies a change in the 
sequence of the process as it is done at present.  It also provides a strong argument for 
transferring the formative training function of the different services to the Military Academy and 
extending the three-year period for education at the Military Academy to a four-year process of 
education and training.  Or, if this is not possible, to first complete the academic education 
before these candidate officers are sent for more specific regimentalised military training at the 
service colleges.  If the training of officers is transferred to the Military Academy, the current 
structure of the Military Academy needs to be changed to allow the military training branch to 
play a much more prominent role in the way that candidate officers are being dealt with at the 
Military Academy. 
 
Training cannot take a more prominent position at the Military Academy within the timeframe of 
the current three years of education for degree purposes and with the current basic skeleton 
personnel of the military training branch.  The services will have to strengthen the training 
branch with officers and non-commissioned officers who are able to serve as training staff and 
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mentors for the cadets and who can take responsibility for the cadets’ whole existence outside 
the classrooms at the Military Academy.  A four-year period of development for these candidate 
officers at the Military Academy would seem to be the very basic requirement for such an 
approach to be successful.  This is the process and timeframe that are followed at most foreign 
military academies.  Under the current three-year system, there is not sufficient time available 
for successful quality education, training and socialisation.  Since the University of Stellenbosch 
is involved in the quality assurance of the academic programme at the Military Academy and 
since the Defence Force minimises its involvement with the candidate officers at the Military 
Academy, training and socialisation currently fall by the wayside at the institution. 
 
6.4.3 The position of the Faculty of Military Science   
 
For the Military Academy to optimise its functioning, both the military and the academic 
components of the institution should be allowed to behave and conduct themselves according to 
their nature.  This means that military training and development at the Military Academy have to 
be militarised by presenting it in a more disciplined and regimentalised fashion.  A greater input 
and control of the military training at the Military Academy by the SANDF are required for this to 
materialise.  This also implies that the academic component of the Military Academy – the 
Faculty of Military Science – should be allowed to function according to its nature as an 
academic faculty.  The functioning of universities as academic institutions is rooted in the notion 
of autonomy.84 
 
At present, the idea of a military hierarchy dominates the interaction between the University and 
the SANDF where this interaction converges in the Faculty of Military Science to the extent that 
the academic autonomy of the Faculty and the optimal functioning of the Dean in his position as 
chair of an academic faculty of the University are kept in check by the military.  Unfortunately, 
there is currently very little understanding in the SANDF in general for the position and authority 
of the Faculty of Military Science in general and that of the Dean in particular.85   
 
Academic autonomy is rooted in an understanding that the ability of the Faculty of Military 
Science to make its academic offerings of relevance to the military is situated in liaison between 
the Faculty and the Defence Force.  This autonomy is however not situated in the control by the 
Defence Force of the Faculty and its academic offerings.  An autonomous Faculty and greater 
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militarisation of the training branch do not imply “greater distance” between the Faculty and the 
Defence Force.  Rather, it is a clarification of the function and control of the different 
components of the Military Academy of their particular fields of expertise.  It allows the different 
components to focus on their core business.  This implies inter alia that the budget and staff of 
the Faculty of Military Science have to be managed independently and autonomously by the 
Dean of Military Science under the auspices of the University. 
 
The previous Dean of Military Science emphasised that such an approach necessitates a co-
operative endeavour in which the two key role-players, the Dean and the Commandant of the 
Academy, are in touch with each other in an informal, collegial manner.  This should be done in 
such a way that they do not institutionally affect one another negatively.  The approach is 
underpinned by two considerations: professional authority and authority of the role positions.  
As the system functions at present, the professional academic authority of both the Faculty as 
well as the role-players in the Faculty is eroded. In addition, there is at present no clear 
definition and demarcation of the respective fields of authority of the Commandant of the Military 
Academy and the Dean of Military Science.86 
 
The Commandant and the Dean should ideally function at the same hierarchical level in the 
organisation.  The relationship between the Commandant and the Dean requires a strategic 
alliance that is determined by a certain level of emotional and social intelligence of the 
incumbent individuals.  This is the reason why the SANDF should be very careful in the 
selection and appointment of the Commandant of the Military Academy.  As a minimum, it 
should be somebody who reflects all the attributes of a professional officer.  In particular, it is 
recommended that the candidate should at least be in possession of a masters degree.  This is 
necessary to ensure that the Commandant has an understanding of the nature of the academic 
world in general and the functioning of an academic faculty in particular. 
 
6.4.4 The development of academic programmes   
 
It stands to reason that a partnership between the Defence Force and the Faculty of Military 
Science is of extreme importance in the development of the academic programmes at the 
Military Academy.  This would ensure a fine balance between general scientific/academic 
formative education on the one hand and the vocational needs and education of officers for their 
military careers on the other.  Both these elements are of vital importance in the preparation for 
professional vocations the world over.  The Faculty of Military Science, without doubt, will 
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emphasise the general scientific/academic formative nature of education in its interaction with 
the Defence Force.  The SANDF in general, and the different services in particular, would 
necessarily emphasise their vocational needs.  It is, therefore, of critical importance that the 
services involve themselves with the education of their candidate officers at the Military 
Academy.  Clear signs of such involvement are visible in the recent tailoring of academic 
programmes for the Air Force and the Navy in the Faculty of Military Science.  The process 
though, has to become formalised and be expanded to include the Army and the Military Health 
Service.   
 
A first and very important requirement for interaction of this kind is an understanding that such 
interaction between the Faculty and the Defence Force is rooted in the recognition of the 
autonomy of the Faculty of Military Science as a faculty of the university.  As pointed out earlier, 
the autonomy of universities is central to their being and existence as academic institutions.  In 
addition, the interaction between the University in general and the Faculty in particular and the 
SANDF should be based on the guidelines that form the basis of co-operation between all the 
statutory professional councils with which universities interact in the provision of professional 
vocational education.  The interaction between the Faculty and the Defence Force, also, should 
be based on an understanding that some form of tension is the norm in this kind of interaction 
and not the exception.  The Defence Force and the University are ultimately two entities that are 
different in nature, and tension between them could therefore be expected to be the norm and 
not the exception. 
 
The Defence Force’s understanding of the need to balance general scientific/academic 
formative education with its own vocational needs is already clearly visible in the guidelines for 
the development of academic programmes in the Faculty of Military Science.  These guidelines 
in the Department of Defence’s Joint Training Implementation Instruction on the Management of 
the Military Academy make provision for so-called primary disciplines that need to provide depth 
and auxiliary disciplines, which constitute the width of the programmes.87  However, this 
stipulation should be extended further to make provision for a core curriculum in the 
programmes of the Faculty of Military Science.   
 
At most military academies the world over, such a core curriculum constitutes the essence of 
the academic programme.  It is interesting to note, for example, that even in military academies 
designed according to what Caforio calls a “… convergent approach to education”, the 
university subjects at military academies coincide to a remarkable extent with those studied in 
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Political Science programmes at civilian universities.  Those institutions that reflect a convergent 
approach in the making of officers tend to bring officer education closer to the national university 
system.  Caforio, though, emphasised that the underlying question in this regard is, “How close 
is a country’s basic education system for officers to that for the other professions?”88 
 
6.4.5 The need for a core academic curriculum   
 
A core curriculum for each of the services is an important first step to balance general 
scientific/academic formative and vocational education and to ensure ownership of the Defence 
Force of the Military Academy.  In most military educational institutions, such a core curriculum 
is designed to introduce officers to the philosophical roots of the military profession.  There are 
a number of ways to design such a curriculum.  One way to design such a curriculum is to use 
military professionalism as the driving principle.  This ensures that the candidate officers are 
introduced to those academic disciplines that constitute the essence of military professionalism.  
Academic disciplines that are included in such a curriculum should provide students with an 
understanding of four knowledge clusters, identified earlier in this study, that are seen as the 
core of military studies: 89 
 
 the higher order security environment;  
 the internal bureaucratic military organisational environment; 
 the professional military environment; and 
 the military operating environment. 
 
The underlying philosophy is a service-unique degree programme for each of the different 
services at the Military Academy.  Degree programmes in the Faculty of Military Science 
typically should include three types of modules that constitute the whole programme.  There 
are, firstly, those modules that all students in the Faculty have to include in their degree 
programmes irrespective of their service.  These modules are on the one hand those that 
constitute the heart of the profession, such as military history and strategy.  On the other hand, 
they comprise those that are required for better facilitation of the educational process, such as 
English and Basic Computer Literacy.  The former Dean of Military Science emphasised that the 
quality of secondary school education in South Africa necessitates the inclusion of the latter 
type of modules.  These modules, however, consume valuable time in the degree programmes.  
This is time that should have been used for other academic modules.  However, this is a unique 
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South African problem with its roots firmly in the history of the country and is bound to be part of 
the educational landscape for the foreseeable future.90 
 
There are, secondly, those modules associated with the nature of military power in a specific 
geographical sphere that a particular service needs to include in its degree programmes.  These 
modules need to constitute and provide depth to a specific service’s degree programme.  This 
will differ from one service to another.  The Navy, for example, will require that all its officers do 
some modules regarding Nautical Science.  The SA Army, for example, might decide that all 
Army students at the Military Academy should do a specific course in Military Strategy, Military 
Management or Mathematics.   
 
Thirdly there are those types of modules that might be included in the programmes as electives.  
These are modules in which students may exercise a choice.  This would enable students to 
include modules in their studies that reflect their own interests, such as Psychology. 
 
The essence of the proposal for a core curriculum is the need for the different services to 
identify those modules that are of central importance to that specific service.  In other words, the 
different services will have to make an analysis of the academic attributes that are required from 
officers in that specific service.  Since navies and air forces are technological instruments of 
military power, the education of their officers will be driven primarily by academic disciplines 
from the natural sciences environment.  Armies, being manpower-driven organisations, will 
primarily emphasise academic disciplines focusing on management and humanities in the 
education if its officers.  These attributes should then be linked to the different academic 
disciplines in the Faculty that are able to provide such attributes. 
 
The University in general, and the Faculty of Military Science in particular, should show some 
flexibility in the design of these programmes.  This specifically holds true for the coherence of 
the different disciplines in the specific programmes.  The Army, for example, might request that 
different modules that are associated with the natural sciences, the management sciences and 
the humanities be included in their programme.  Questions would be posed about the academic 
coherence of such a programme.  However, the centre of gravity regarding such coherence will 
shift from coherence between the different disciplines that constitute the programme to 
coherence in the professional expertise that is required from officers in the different services.  
Such a core curriculum should be carefully developed in consultation with the higher education 
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authorities in South Africa in order to find a balance between the directives for programme 
development emanating from the higher education environment and the needs of the SANDF. 
 
6.4.6 Structural changes for the introduction of a core curriculum and military training   
 
Balancing the need for training and education at the Military Academy and the general 
scientific/academic formative education in the Faculty of Military Science with military vocational 
education, necessitates a four-year programme for candidate officers at the Military Academy.  
It will never be possible to introduce a core curriculum and to include a strong training 
component at the Military Academy without extending the tenure of training and education at the 
institution to four years.  This will allow not only for quality education and training, but will also 
permit the necessary military socialisation of candidate officers at the Military Academy.  A four-
year programme should be supported by important organisational changes at the Military 
Academy in which the different services accept ownership of the training and socialisation of 
their candidate officers at the Military Academy to ensure the development of a service-unique 
culture among students from a particular service.  The autonomy of the Faculty will also be an 
important consideration in such a structure.  It should be asked how this can be achieved. 
 
An important first step is to have a clear line of demarcation between the academic and military 
components at the Military Academy.  To translate this into reality the Dean of Military Science 
and the Commandant of the Military Academy have to function as equal partners on the same 
level within the organisational structure. (See Figure 6.2)  Each should be responsible for the 
management of the resources being allocated to that specific component.  Managing the budget 
of the Faculty through the University will allow the Faculty flexibility to operate as a proper 
academic faculty with emphasis on the right strategic priorities.  Such an arrangement is used 
with great success at the Australian Defence Force Academy and its interaction with the 
University of New South Wales.91  It is also being used with considerable success at 
professional military education institutions in Britain. 92 
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Lines of academic authority 
Lines of military authority 
Lines of consultation 
Figure 6.2: Proposed system of command and control at the Military Academy 
 
Each of the services needs to develop a very strong Service Training Branch at the Military 
Academy, namely an Army Training Branch, an Air Force Training Branch, a Naval Training 
Branch and a Medical Service Training Branch.  These training branches should become 
responsible for all student activities, in fact the candidate officers’ whole existence outside of the 
classrooms at the Military Academy.  The responsibility of the training branches will end the 
moment the student walks into an academic class, and will become their responsibility once 
again the moment the student walks out of that class.  In particular, the training branches should 
be responsible for all the training and socialisation of their particular service's candidate officers 
at the Military Academy.  
 
The training branches should be staffed with high quality officers and non-commissioned 
officers that can serve as role models and mentors for their candidate officers.  The different 
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year groups of candidate officers of each service should have at least an officer with the rank of 
major and a sergeant major to command that specific year group.  The Army Training Branch, 
for example, should typically consist of a colonel as its commander and at least four officers 
with the rank of major or captain for the control of each year group of students.  Each of these 
four officers should be supported by a sergeant major or senior non-commissioned officer.  The 
students’ management organisation should function under close scrutiny of the structures. (See 
Figure 6.2) 
 
A very senior colonel (captain [SAN]), with a masters degree as a minimum academic 
qualification, should be appointed to head the training branch of each service.  Command of a 
service’s training branch implies a dual appointment.  Such a person should on the one hand 
command the Service Training Branch and be responsible for the training and socialisation of 
the candidate officers of a specific service at the Military Academy.  He, on the other hand, 
should be responsible for the management of that specific service’s input into its academic 
programme in the Faculty of Military Science.  This should be done in co-operation with a senior 
faculty member who is responsible for that service’s programme in the Faculty.  Together, this 
senior academic (preferably a professor) in the Faculty, and a senior, well experienced and 
well-educated colonel (captain [SAN]) should firstly manage the academic programme of that 
service at the Military Academy under the auspices of the Dean of Military Science.93  Each 
service will therefore have a professor in the faculty who accepts responsibility for that service’s 
programme.  The commanders of these different Service Training Branches should, on the one 
hand, be members of the Faculty Council and, on the other hand, be in command of their 
specific service’s training branch at the Military Academy.  Secondly, the professor and colonel 
(captain [SAN]) of each branch together should manage the time of students at the Military 
Academy in such a way that a balance is found in terms of time spent on academic, training and 
socialising activities. 
 
The commanders of the different Service Training Branches should have the intellectual and 
other attributes to build the bridge between the academic and military worlds. These officers 
should, therefore, be very carefully selected by the military as the primarily link between the 
Military Academy and the specific service.  They should be officers that really have an 
understanding of the nature of the academic world as well as the nature of the military 
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profession.  Under such a system, the different services become responsible for the training and 
socialisation of their candidate officers at the Military Academy and provide a strong input into 
the nature of education these candidate officers will receive as part of their degree programmes 
in the Faculty of Military Science.  More importantly, the Military Academy in general, and the 
Faculty in particular, will have a close feedback system from the Defence Force.  Such a system 
will allow the Military Academy to tailor its training, socialisation and education to the needs of 
the Defence Force.  In short, the system will oblige the Defence Force to take responsibility for 
an institution that has been created for no other purpose than to serve the needs of the Defence 
Force. 
 
6.4.7 Post-graduate studies and research  
 
The introduction of a core curriculum should be carefully planned in order to facilitate 
progression towards post-graduate studies.  This includes a careful balancing between liberal 
and vocational education in the choice of majors during the last year of study.  Academic 
subjects should be structured in such a way as to allow for post-graduate study later in the 
career of an officer at civilian universities. 
  
If young candidate officers spend four years in preparation of their careers at the Military 
Academy, they should not be allowed to engage in any full-time post-graduate studies 
immediately after their graduation from the Military Academy, as is the practise at present.  This 
does not mean that they should not engage in post-graduate studies later in their careers.  A 
culture of life-long learning should become an essential element of their careers.  However, 
operational experience is also of critical importance in the making of officers and after four years 
of study, candidate officers have to be introduced to the military operational environment. 
 
An important shift in emphasis is required from the Faculty of Military Science in its post-
graduate offerings.  Such a shift necessitates an understanding of the close connection 
between the academic education provided at the Military Academy and the role and function of 
the South African National Defence College outlined in the framework proposed in Chapter 
three.  In short, the post-graduate courses of the faculty should be tailored in such a way as to 
accommodate officers who are participating in the Executive National Security Programme 
(ENSP) at the National Defence College.  This will not only contribute to the Defence Force 
taking ownership of the Military Academy, but will also allow the Military Academy to make an 
active contribution to the education of the senior officers in the SANDF. 
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A small step has already been taken in this regard with the involvement of the Faculty in the 
evaluation of the research projects of the senior officers doing the ENSP94  In addition, initial 
steps have been taken as regards the involvement of the students of the National Defence 
College in the academic programmes of the Military Academy with the development of the 
MPhil Programme in Security Management.  The first seven students (senior colonels and junior 
brigadier generals) who completed the ENSP in 2005 have been accepted for the MPhil 
Programme in 2006.  The academic offerings of the Military Academy should, however, be 
expanded to other disciplines to provide a wider choice of programmes to the students of the 
National Defence College.  Initially, this process will be a challenge because of the general anti-
intellectual organisational climate in the Defence Force and the small number of officers with a 
first degree who can be allowed to the MPhil programmes.  Other budgetary, logistical and 
bureaucratic difficulties will also influence the process.  However, the long-term benefits are 
vast, not only for the SANDF, but also for students from Africa and other parts of the world who 
could be accommodated in such a programme. 
 
Allowing the Faculty to operate according to its nature, will result in the Defence Force not only 
benefiting from the under and post-graduate academic studies at the Military Academy.  It will 
also allow the Faculty to align post-graduate education with research in the Department of 
Defence.  Post-graduate education and research can greatly assist in ensuring the continued 
interaction between the operational and educational components of the Defence Force.  It is 
important to guide the research activities of the Faculty to respond to the needs of the Defence 
Force.  It is believed that linking post-graduate military education and research will be more 
appropriate and cost-efficient than for the Defence Force to make use of external service 
providers in this regard. The value of such an arrangement has already been proven, for 
example by the Centre for Military Studies (CEMIS).95 
 
The important guiding principle concerning research is that academics be allowed to make their 
research findings known to the world by means of conference papers and publications in books 
and accredited academic journals. The way in which CEMIS functions has demonstrated that 
such an arrangement is possible. It requires from the Defence Force to refrain from interference 
in the research findings of academics. Without the publication of their research, academics are 
not able to build up their own stature, which is of critical importance for their credibility as 
                                                
94
 At the National Defence College this is known as the “Commandant’s Research Papers” (CRPs). 
95
 The Centre for Military Studies forms part of the Faculty of Military Science of the University of 
Stellenbosch.  It is a research centre primarily responsible for military, defence and security-related 
research in the South African Department of Defence.  The Centre has a branch situated at the 
Military Academy in Saldanha and the Gauteng branch situated at the National Defence College in 
Thaba Tswane, Pretoria. 
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academics. The acceptance of a certain degree of transparency by the Defence Force as well 
as the acceptance of legitimate criticism is an important first step in a process of transforming 
the organisation in such a way that it function is ultimately optimised. 
6.5 CONCLUSIONS 
 
The chapter aimed at providing an exposition of ways in which the structure, focus and 
functioning of the South African Military Academy can be optimised.  This was done through an 
explanation and analysis of the policy and legal environment within which the Military Academy 
exists, the primary challenges with which the institution is confronted, and proposals on ways to 
address these challenges to optimise the institution’s functioning. 
 
A unique civil-military interface between the University of Stellenbosch and the Department of 
Defence defines the existence and nature of the Military Academy.  The Military Academy is 
therefore on the one hand a normal military unit of the SANDF, while on the other hand it is the 
home of the Faculty of Military Science of the University of Stellenbosch.  This unique civil-
military arrangement for the education of officers for the South African military reflects the 
tensions that are typical of civil-military relations the world over.  At an organisational level, the 
tensions are exacerbated by the absence of an overarching governmental policy framework 
regulating the functioning of the institution.  The existence of the Military Academy at present is 
rooted in a departmental agreement between the University and the Department of Defence that 
allows for wide interpretation.  The SANDF has issued a departmental level instruction to the 
command cadre of the Military Academy in an effort to provide clearer guidelines on the 
functioning of the Military Academy.  There are, however, still a number of challenges that 
create tension within the institution and between the two higher order partners – the University 
of Stellenbosch and the South African Department of Defence. 
 
Three primary challenges have been identified.  There is, firstly, an absence of sufficient funds 
for the optimum functioning of specifically the Faculty of Military Science.  The budgetary 
situation is worsened by the military component of the Military Academy, having almost 
dictatorial powers over its management.  The Faculty of Military Science, responsible for the 
core function of the Military Academy, is dependent on the military for its funding while the 
University supports its functional priorities.  The Military Academy, and in particular the Faculty 
of Military Science, secondly, finds itself in a situation where neither the University nor the 
SANDF takes ownership of the institution.  The reasons for this lack of ownership are diverse.  It 
include inter alia the presence of an anti-intellectual organisational climate in the SANDF, 
academic programmes that are not attuned to the needs of the SANDF, the lack of a 
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regimentalised institutional culture at the Military Academy and a tension in the role definitions 
of the Dean of Military Science and the Commandant of the Military Academy.  Lastly, academic 
studies at the Military Academy (or anywhere else for that matter) are not part of the career 
paths of officers in the SANDF.  This gives rise to the idea that attendance of the Military 
Academy is needed to prepare soldiers for a second career instead of preparing them for the 
profession of arms and a military career. 
 
In debating solutions for the challenges confronting the Military Academy in general and the 
Faculty of Military Science in particular, a number of considerations have to be kept in mind.  
The requirements for officership in the South African military need to be brought in line with 
international best practises by making academic studies a prerequisite for entry.  Training and 
education of officers at the Military Academy should be done in such a way that successful 
candidates integrate with ease into the general regimentalised military system.  It can only be 
done if the primary focus on education at the Military Academy is supplemented with sound 
training and military socialisation at the institution.  An elementary prerequisite for the 
successful integration of education, training and development at the Military Academy is an 
extension of the present three-year education to a four-year ETD process.   
 
The position of the Dean and that of the Faculty of Military Science should be optimised by 
allowing these the opportunity of functioning according to their nature.  Academic institutions 
can only be successful if they operate in an environment that gives them a certain amount of 
autonomy and independence.  This necessitates an understanding on the part of the Defence 
Force of the nature of higher education and the attributes of the vehicle required for the 
provision of quality higher education.  In addition, academic programmes should be designed in 
such a way as to maximise the value of the education that is provided at the Faculty of Military 
Science for the SANDF.  A search for ways in which to balance general formative academic 
education and vocational education should determine the nature of programmes that are 
designed in the Faculty.  The tension in the balance between these two demands should be 
accepted as normal and healthy.  However, the services should make a careful analysis of their 
educational needs in order to identify those disciplines that should be included in a programme 
that addresses the specific needs of that particular service.  These disciplines should constitute 
the core curriculum of the education provided to members of that particular service at the 
Military Academy.  This necessitates the active involvement of the services in the nature of the 
education provided to their young candidate officers.    
 
Structural changes have to be made at the Military Academy to accommodate a programme 
that makes provision for military training, education and socialisation as well as the active 
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participation of the services in determining the nature of the education that should be provided 
to the candidate officers.  These changes should be made in such a way as to clarify the 
position, role and function of the academic and training contingents, as well as the Dean of 
Military Science and the Commandant of the Military Academy respectively.  The Faculty of 
Military Science has to consider its role very carefully so as to provide not only in the needs of 
the Defence Force at under-graduate level, but also at post-graduate level and taking into 
consideration the research needs of the Defence Force.  Close co-operation between the 
Military Academy and the National Defence College is an important vehicle for such an 
endeavour.  The SANDF should facilitate such an endeavour through the provision of the 
necessary institutional support. 
 
It is believed that these proposals will allow the Military Academy its rightful place in the 
education of officers, not only for South Africa, but also for the continent as a whole.  Tertiary 
education will in future be of paramount importance to facilitate greater regional co-operation, to 
engender sound civil-military relations and to serve as an important confidence-building 
mechanism between African defence forces.  More importantly, the strengthening of South 
Africa’s military educational capability at the South African Military Academy will contribute 
towards reducing African military’s widespread dependence on foreign institutions to provide 
quality education to its officers.  Indeed, the development of the South African Military Academy 
into a military educational institution suited for the demands of the African defence environment 
has become indispensable. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
SYNTHESIS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Education is not the panacea but the sine qua non of military effectiveness. 
RC Haycock1 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The study embodies a descriptive analysis of the tensions that underpin the need for an educated 
military in South Africa and, more specifically, the role of the South African Military Academy in 
providing this education.  The purpose of the research was to demarcate the proper role of the 
South African Military Academy in the academic and professional preparation of officers for the 
South African National Defence Force (SANDF).  This purpose necessitated, firstly, an analysis of 
the need for education in armed forces in general and in South Africa in particular, with specific 
reference to the tensions underpinning military education and training.  It, secondly, called for a 
broad assessment of the nature of professional military education in the SANDF at large to 
contextualise the role and function of the South African Military Academy. 
 
Four specific areas of tension in the education of officers in South Africa are identified in the 
introductory chapter.  An understanding of these underlying tensions and their causes provides 
some explanation as to why the education of the military in South Africa seems to be a 
controversial issue.  The first tension is the interplay between experience, training and education in 
the expertise required by armed forces.  For a variety of reasons, armed forces prefer to place 
emphasis on experience and training in the development of their manpower to the detriment of 
education.  This preference is highlighted through the second tension – a difference in the 
disciplined regimentalised ethos of the training establishment and the general scientific ethos of the 
academic world rooted in the need for freedom of thought.  The third tension concerns the 
academic world in particular, though traces thereof can also be found in the training environment.  
This is the tension concerning the focus of officer education or, more specifically, the question 
regarding which academic disciplines constitute or should constitute the essence of modern military 
education.  For example, should education prepare officers primarily to be efficient as military 
bureaucrats or to be effective as military professionals?  The last tension that is highlighted 
                                                
1
 Haycock, RC, “The Labours of Athena and the Muses: Historical and Contemporary Aspects of Canadian 
Military Education”, In Kennedy, GC & Nielson, K (eds.), Military Education: Past, Present, and Future, 
Praeger, Westport, 2002, p.. 171. 
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concerns the debate on when officers should be educated.  The specific question that is asked is 
whether the focus of military education should be on the making of lieutenants or the making of 
colonels.  This question is rooted in the notion that the military profession, like most other 
professions, should educate its members as a pre-requisite for entering the profession of arms.  
This view is opposed by the notion that the education of officers should take place later in their 
careers when, apparently, they have more time to busy themselves with academic studies.  In a 
more general sense, this represents a tension between pre-commission liberal academic education 
and professional military education within militaries.  On a higher level, this tension concerns the 
interplay between a general scientific academic formative education and a professional vocational 
education in the making of officers.   
  
Chapters two and three of the study address these concerns from a theoretical and philosophical 
perspective.  This theoretical and philosophical discussion concludes with a proposal at the end of 
Chapter three of a framework to understand and manage education in armed forces.  Chapter four 
comprises an analysis of education in the SANDF by means of this framework in an effort to outline 
both the positive and the negative attributes of the current system of education in the SANDF.  The 
last two content chapters of the study examine the role of the South African Military Academy in the 
education of officers for the SANDF.  More specifically, Chapter five is a historical overview of the 
debate since 1994 of what should be the proper role and function of the Military Academy.  Chapter 
six provides an analysis of the challenges facing the Military Academy at present and what ought to 
be done to deal with it in constructive manner.  This chapter is therefore divided into a synthesis 
and conclusion of the theoretical discussion of military education and a discussion of education in 
the SANDF and at the Military Academy.  The last part of the chapter outlines some broad 
recommendations. 
 
One of the challenges posed by the research was the noticeable disinterest of SANDF personnel in 
general.  This in itself was proof of the need for a study on education in the South African military.  
In addition, it was sometimes difficult to balance the emotional and political biases of service 
personnel to provide an objective account and analysis of education in the SANDF.  To address 
this problem, an effort was made to look past the present and to project particular issues towards 
the future operational effectiveness of the SANDF.  This was also done in an effort to minimise any 
personal prejudices that might have influenced the study.  All matters that may be controversial, 
politically or otherwise, were therefore approached with the question on how it will affect the 
operational effectiveness of the South African military in years to come.  This specifically relates to 
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the matters addressed in Chapter 4.  Though the SANDF supports the research, no resources 
other than normal support services at unit level were forthcoming from the SANDF.  This support 
was restricted to local travelling and printing facilities.  The study subsequently resulted in an 
individual effort from its commencement to its completion, with little if any institutional support by 
the SANDF.      
7.2 TENSIONS UNDERPINNING MILITARY EDUCATION 
 
The “Western Way of War” has a long tradition of officer development by means of both training 
and education.2  Modern military education has its roots in the Western European context, 
particularly in the military reforms in Prussia and elsewhere that followed on the Napoleonic wars.  
The political, industrial and military changes of the 19th century together with the globalisation of 
conflict and technology in the 20th century provide further impetus to the need and the expansion of 
education in the development of military officers.  The increasing need and use of education in the 
development of officers brought to the fore the difference between training and education in the 
military context.  It also outlined the difference between a general scientific education (ein 
gebildetes Offizierkorps) and a professional military education (ein berufsgebildetes Offizierkorps).  
In the modern context, it is of critical importance for militaries to incorporate all three notions – 
training, professional military education, and general scientific education – in the professional 
preparation of armed forces.  A balance between these notions ensures tactical and strategic 
agility, in other words, the ability of military forces to do the right things in the right way. 
 
A balance between training, professional military education, and general scientific education is 
rooted in an understanding of the nature of the three notions and the role of each one in the 
preparation of officers.  The nature of the three notions, on the one hand, highlights the tension 
between them.  An understanding of the role of each notion, on the other hand, emphasises the 
interaction between training, professional military education, and general scientific education in the 
preparation of officers.  Thus, the three notions are different by nature, but interdependent in the 
professional preparation of officers throughout the whole of their military careers. 
 
                                                
2
 Parker provides specific reasons on why the “Western Way of War” has become dominant throughout much 
of the world.  Consequently, the statutory armed forces of the majority of states in the world operate 
and organise themselves according to the “Western Way of War.”  See Parker, G, The Cambridge 
Illustrated History of Warfare: The Triumph of the West, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
1995, pp. 2-9. 
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Modern military professionalism calls for the intellectual mastering of the military body of knowledge 
and the physical development of the military skills that allow officers to be effective in the 
management of violence, the management of defence and the management of peace.  Training is 
essential for inculcating military skills.  Professional military education facilitates the comprehension 
of and insight into the military body of knowledge.  However, no effective professional military 
education is possible without a sound foundation of general scientific education.  Militaries have a 
natural inclination to train.  This inclination is rooted in the nature of training, the fundamental nature 
of the military profession and the military being the only role-player in the training realm.  This is 
augmented by the reality that training provides soldiers with skills that are needed for the tactical 
challenges with which they are confronted at present.  The socialisation and experience of most 
soldiers are also primarily restricted to scenarios directly related to the training domain. 
  
A general scientific or broad liberal education equips officers with the attributes needed for higher 
order intellectual thinking and analysis.  It provides the individual with the necessary scientific, 
philosophical and personal qualities to facilitate knowledge-driven processes, whether in the 
application or utilisation of scientific knowledge or in its the development.  The need for scientific 
knowledge in the military in general and the officer corps in particular is rooted in the understanding 
that military (fighting) skills alone are not enough to prepare officers for the role of the military in a 
modern democratic society.  An understanding of security, people and politics, defence and the 
preparation of armed forces for defence, as well as the deployment and employment of military 
forces across the whole spectrum of conflict, necessitates the higher order cognitive preparation of 
officers by means of a general scientific academic education.  It is only through the general 
scientific development of the military mind that the negative attributes of the military way of thinking 
can be transformed into something that is of value to the greater society.  
 
Whereas a general scientific education normally is provided by civilian institutions of higher learning 
or military academies and universities, professional military education is the domain of military, war 
and defence colleges.  Professional military education bridges the gap between military training on 
the one hand and general scientific education on the other.  This means that no professional 
military education is possible without a foundation of broad liberal education.  Stated differently, a 
general scientific education is a prerequisite for successful professional military education.  This is 
the primary reason why a general scientific academic education together with training should 
constitute the minimum requirement for entry into the officer corps. 
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A general scientific education at the beginning of an officer’s career is vital in order to counter the 
negative attributes that shape the “military mind” or the “military way of thinking”.  Military 
mindedness is inculcated primarily through the training process that in most cases is also used as 
the primary vehicle for military socialisation.  Being military minded is an essential ingredient of any 
successful military.  However, taking the idea of military mindedness too far may breed orthodoxy 
and may therefore lead to a military being very dogmatic in its approach to complex security, 
military and other challenges.  The outcome of a general scientific education is diametrically 
opposed to such a rigid approach to complex issues.  It is therefore understandable why militaries 
are uncomfortable in an environment rooted in an educational ethos.  However, education is as 
much an essential prerequisite for successful militaries as is the need to be military minded.  Both 
the regimental military ethos of the training environment and the critical open-minded ethos of the 
educational world are essential ingredients of a successful military establishment. 
 
If a general scientific education is a prerequisite for professional military education, and since 
professional military education needs to bridge the gap between a broad liberal education and 
training, two specific questions need to be answered.  Firstly, what should be the focus of military 
education in general?  Secondly, when in the career of an officer should he be exposed to general 
scientific education, professional military education and training?               
 
The military’s emphasis on training to deal with present and current challenges also influences its 
approach to education and the need for education not to be of a general formative nature, but to be 
of specific relevance.  The difficulty concerning which academic disciplines really constitute the 
essence of the art and science of war further complicates the education of the military.  Almost any 
academic discipline can be justified in the education of officers.  Officers, though, should have a 
higher order academic understanding of at least four knowledge clusters:  
 
• the broad security environment within which armed forces in general operate in the world;  
• the nature, characteristics and features of military organisations;  
• the employment of armed forces across the whole spectrum of conflict; and  
• the physical battlefield or operating environment within which they will have to operate as 
soldiers, sailors, and airmen.   
 
From this perspective, it is no longer a question whether armed forces should be educated in all 
four these domains.  On an individual level, though, it may be a matter of organisational necessity 
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and personal preference that possibly orientates the individual to emphasise one of these domains 
in his personal academic education.    
 
In a world where the military is called upon to take on new roles such as military humanitarianism, 
border patrol, crime fighting, drug control, and peace missions, officers need to display greater 
mental flexibility in order to deal with the complex security environment and the nature of the 
threats that arise.  As organisations, militaries need to develop the ability to adapt to geo-strategic 
and other societal changes in war and peace, while at the same time maintaining their bureaucratic 
efficiency and operational effectiveness.  One of the challenges militaries need to manage to 
ensure operational effectiveness is to balance the need to prepare for warfighting with the need to 
prepare for a variety of so-called “soft missions”, and to balance the need to train for battle with the 
need to prepare for war.  The need to prepare for different missions, including warfighting, is rooted 
in an understanding of the operating environment within which military staff operates.  Tactics, 
geography, leadership and command, technology, and cohesion and morale are some of the 
factors that may have a defining influence on military operations and which should be instrumental 
in the preparation of officers to prepare for the operating environment.  These ideas on what should 
constitute the essence of officer education correspond to a large extent with the approach that is 
followed by a number of leading armed forces worldwide. 
 
Most armed forces of the world have three different focus levels in the education, training and 
development of their officers.  Pre-commissioned basic military education focuses on the making of 
lieutenants.  It includes the necessary training and socialisation young officers need to operate at 
that specific level.  In addition, young officers are academically educated at civilian institutions of 
higher learning or at military academies to enable them to deal with the intellectual nature of the 
military professional and as a prerequisite for successful professional military education provided by 
military, war and defence colleges.  Military doctrinal preparation concentrates on the tactical 
training of officers to be successful on the battlefield and professional military education to ensure 
success as operational level campaign commanders.  Politico-military education is primarily of a 
general scientific nature, focusing principally on the social sciences and humanities, to prepare 
officers for the challenges of high command.  Looking at the preparation of officers from this 
perspective, it is clear that questions about education in the career paths of officers are a matter of 
focus.  The real issue at stake is the kind or nature of education that is provided to officers at 
different times in their careers. 
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Combining the idea of general scientific education, professional military education and military 
training with the different focus levels in the preparation of officers in armed forces and 
superimposing that on the idea of different knowledge clusters in the education of officers, allows 
for the development of a framework of officer education.  Such a framework may be used as a 
guideline for the structuring of officer development in the armed forces.  It also allows for an 
analysis of officer development in the armed forces, such as the South African National Defence 
Force.   
7.3 SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY EDUCATION AND THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY 
ACADEMY 
 
Since democratisation in 1994, the South African National Defence Force had to align itself with a 
new strategic environment and adapt to a new political climate.  This required a careful balance to 
ensure the SANDF is representative of the society at large while maintaining expertise and 
professionalism.  From an educational perspective, the black population in particular was deeply 
affected by apartheid.  The apartheid government did not invest great amounts of money in black 
education, while at the same time the liberation movement mobilised the youth of school-going age 
as part of the liberation struggle.  The general pool of available educated black people that was 
essential for the SANDF to align itself with the new strategic and political environment since 1994 
was, therefore, not only very small but the SANDF also competed on the general labour market for 
these scarce human resources. 
 
Fortunately, for the SANDF, South Africa did not face any significant threats from either the 
domestic or the international environment since democratisation.  The SANDF was therefore in a 
position where it could focus its attention on organisational and structural issues such as the 
integration of pre-1994 belligerent forces, the downsizing of the force to reflect the significantly 
smaller defence budget, the Africanisation of the organisational ethos, and the development of 
doctrine for the kind of operations that were foreseen for the future.  Time was also at hand for the 
re-orientation, re-training and re-education of forces to reflect the non-offensive and non 
threatening ideas on defence that were reflected in most of the defence policy documents since 
1994. 
 
The SANDF did not inherit a history of general scientific or professional military education.  Neither 
the old SADF nor the revolutionary forces that were brought into the military since 1994 had a 
strong tradition of education.  The SADF was largely tactically and operationally minded in its 
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orientation – which suited the strategic realities with which it was confronted.  In contrast, the 
revolutionary forces – as revolutionary forces the world over – were very political in orientation.  
Their political mindedness, typical of revolutionary armed forces, was rooted in political 
indoctrination.  In general, though, these forces brought various positive attributes into the SANDF.  
They had a better understanding of the political world and were in general more analytical, creative, 
and adaptive, which made them more receptive for an educational approach to officer development 
than was the case with their counterparts from the SADF.  However, they were not used to operate 
in a bureaucratised armed force with its regimentalised and more disciplined ethos.  In addition, 
officers from the SADF who stayed on in the military since 1994 increasingly recognised that 
military training is not enough for a career in a peacetime and peace mission-oriented military.  The 
result was an increase in the number of officers involved in academic education. 
 
Part of the restructuring of the SANDF was the creation of a Joint Training Division responsible for 
co-ordinating education, training and development (ETD) in the Department of Defence.  The Joint 
Training Division is responsible for aligning ETD in the Department of Defence with the SANDF’s 
military strategy.  The Joint Training Division faces a number of very serious challenges in the 
provision of ETD.  The SANDF is in essence an anti-intellectual organisation with no distinction 
being made between education, training and development of officers, even to the extent that 
question are raised about the quality of both training and education.  The SANDF also faces a 
challenge concerning the availability of well-trained, educated and experienced directing staff at 
most of its senior training and educational institutions.  This concern on the one hand is rooted in 
the need for representivity and affirmative action (a positive consideration), and on the other hand 
in the replacement of merit with political affiliation in the promotion of officers (a negative 
consideration).  Rising operational budgets and deployments because of peace mission 
commitments in Africa are also negatively affecting ETD in the SANDF to the extent that serious 
questions should be raised about the suitability of forces for these assignments.  This matter is 
aggravated by the increasing bureaucratic nature of the SANDF making it almost impossible to 
spend the money available in the budgets.  This particular challenge is shaped by the question of 
discipline and a lack of trust in Defence Force personnel.  The lack of discipline and trust is linked 
to the societal problems of general ethical disintegration and criminality in the broad South African 
society. 
 
The analysis of ETD in the SANDF by means of the framework proposed in Chapter three, makes 
possible some interesting positive observations.  The SANDF does train and educate young 
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officers for their entry into the officer corps.  Training and education, though, are not being done at 
the same institution, as is the norm in the rest of the world.  There is nothing wrong with such an 
approach if the education programme is a joint endeavour attended by members from all the 
different services.  However, the process of socialisation should then be managed in a very careful 
and deliberate manner to ensure the inculcation of students at the training and education 
institutions with the right organisational ethos.  This will not only ensure the smooth integration with 
the Defence Force at large, but will also positively influence the organisational ethos of the military 
in general and the services in particular.  This seems to be a particular problem at present.  The 
nature of education provided to these young officers at the Military Academy also needs to be 
reconsidered. 
 
Doctrinal training and education are offered at the different service colleges and the National War 
College.  The creation of the National War College greatly contributes to the professionalisation of 
officers in the SANDF.  The use of professional military education at the National War College 
regarding doctrinal education that focuses on operational or campaign level military operations was 
a great leap forward in the creation of ETD institutions for the preparation of officers for the SANDF.  
The presence of international students and the inclusion of military bureaucratic education in the 
curriculum is recommendable and in line with international best practices.  The service colleges 
responsible for tactical training seem to face a challenge at present, with the Army College facing a 
particular problem in this regard.  Nothing can replace training as the primary vehicle on the tactical 
level of war that relies primarily on the execution of drills and standard operational procedures.  Yet, 
it seems as if the colleges, with the Army College as the primary example, are increasingly moving 
into the direction of professional military education.  The corps schools are responsible for corps 
training.  The question then arises as to who should be responsible for the training of officers in 
combined arms operations.  This is an especially thorny issue since the dismantling of combined-
arms units such as 61 Mechanised Battalion Group and the downscaling of combined arms 
exercises at the SA Army’s Combat Training Centre at Lohathla. 
 
Politico-military education is provided at the National Defence College by means of the Executive 
National Security Programme.  Though questions are being asked about the quality of the 
education that is provided, the Defence College should be credited for their efforts to develop the 
programme into a real academic programme.  Efforts to link the programme with a masters-level 
qualification at the Military Academy is also a huge step forward in transforming the SANDF into a 
learning and more intellectual organisation.  Concerns need to be raised about the focus of the 
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programme since no institution in the SANDF at present takes responsibility for providing officers 
with an understanding of military strategic matters from an academic perspective.  
 
Since 1994, the role of the Military Academy is a heavily debated issue.  The debate focuses on 
issues such as whether the Academy should be a military university or a military academy, what the 
role of civilian academia in the development of officers should be, what the nature of the academic 
programmes at the Academy should be, whether the Military Academy should develop a core 
curriculum, whether the Academy should also fulfil a training function, and what the nature of the 
Military Academy “product” should be.  Many of the problems the Military Academy is faced with 
point towards the departmental level agreement between the Department of Defence and the 
University of Stellenbosch on which the existence of the Academy is based.   
 
The agreement between the Department of Defence and the University of Stellenbosch gives rise 
to the problem that neither the SANDF nor the University takes ownership of the institution.  This 
also translates into an inadequate budget for the Military Academy and the academic qualifications 
of the Military Academy not being of professional and promotional relevance to the SANDF.  These 
challenges can only be effectively addressed if education – i.e. a first degree – becomes a 
requirement for officership, the socialisation process for students attending the Academy is 
addressed, the organisational position of the Faculty of Military Science at the Military Academy is 
reconsidered, a core academic curriculum for all students attending the Military Academy is 
introduced, and structural changes are made to draw a clear line of demarcation between the 
academic and military apparatus at the Academy to allow them to operate according to their nature.     
7.4 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVED MILITARY EDUCATION IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
The first obvious recommendation that should flow from this study is the necessity for the SANDF 
to develop a clear understanding of the need for an educated officer corps.  The history of modern 
war is rooted in the need for knowledge.  Indeed, the need for knowledge about military and 
strategic affairs is one of the building blocks of the modern military profession.  In this regard, the 
military profession does not differ in any way from any other profession in a modern democratic 
society.  A body of professional expertise that is rooted in training and education is a defining 
characteristic of any profession – also the military profession.   
 
A second important recommendation is the importance of the SANDF to understand the difference 
between training and education.  If the SANDF is serious about being a professional armed force, 
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an effort is needed to cultivate a body of professional expertise.  Professional expertise consists of 
a body of defined theoretical knowledge and practical skills.  The body of theoretical knowledge can 
only be mastered through prolonged and in-depth study, while the practical skills are acquired 
through training.  Thus, professional military competence in South Africa will be reflected in the 
extent to which the individual members of the SANDF have, firstly, been trained in tactical and 
other military skills and, secondly, have mastered the body of theoretical military knowledge 
through education.   
 
The SANDF should also be conscious of its natural preference for training and with that the 
development of military skills.  The SANDF is the only role-player in the training of its forces in 
South Africa.  The education of its personnel, in contrast, is something that can only be done in co-
operation with the general academic community in South Africa.  The SANDF should cultivate an 
ethos of co-operation with and understanding of the academic community in South Africa.  The 
SANDF should also refine its bureaucracy to be flexible enough to facilitate the education of its 
members, either by sending them to civilian academic institutions or to incorporate the help of 
civilian academics in the ETD provided at military institutions throughout South Africa.  
 
The need for an understanding of the difference between training and education should be linked to 
the need for the SANDF to develop an appreciation for the role of training, professional military 
education and academic education.  It does not seem as if anybody in the SANDF really knows 
what is implied by the idea of “development” in the SANDF’s organising notion of “Education, 
Training and Development”.  It is proposed that the SANDF clearly define the idea of development 
to imply the professional military education of officers.  An understanding of the role and importance 
of professional military education is rooted in the recognition that professional military education 
cannot be done in an effective and efficient manner unless it is rooted in a thorough general 
scientific academic education. 
 
From this argument flows another important recommendation: all officers in the SANDF should 
have some academic education as a minimum entry requirement into the officer corps.  A minimum 
academic qualification of a first degree (B degree) should be the recommended requirement.  This 
might be a tall order in a country in which education is a contentious issue because of the legacy of 
apartheid, the defence budget that has been minimised, and the operational responsibilities of the 
SANDF that have increased significantly over the last number of years.  However, being part of the 
African continent where African military unprofessionalism has been one of the legacies of 
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colonialism and the root cause of many problems in most of the African states, this might not be too 
high a price to pay for peace in a democratic South Africa.  The outcome of the alternative – an 
uneducated and unprofessional defence force – is too ghastly to contemplate. 
 
The SANDF needs to understand that the education of the military is conditioned by, firstly, the 
uniqueness of the military forces and military institutions as well as the unique environments within 
which they exist and operate and, secondly, the unique nature of the military’s primary task – the 
defence of society, if need be through warfighting.  The SANDF will therefore have to overcome a 
number of obstacles.  These obstacles are diverse, ranging from military or organisational cultural 
reasons (officers see themselves as men of action), to institutional reasons (militaries are huge 
bureaucracies), to theoretical reasons (an interdisciplinary approach is needed), to budgetary 
reasons (education is seen as a nice-to-have).   
 
The unique nature of the art and science of war justifies almost every conceivable academic 
discipline in the education of officers.  Militaries, including the SANDF, do not have the institutional 
capacity to translate their educational needs into coherent academic areas of focus.  Thus, it is 
recommended that the SANDF should focus on the four knowledge clusters referred to earlier.  A 
broad overview of the educational focus of armed forces from different parts of the world confirms 
the need to focus on these four core educational requirements. 
 
One of the most important recommendations of this study is the need for the SANDF to structure its 
ETD according to the proposed framework in Chapter Three.  Aligning the SANDF’s ETD system 
with the proposed framework will ensure the right kind of ETD is provided to individuals at specific 
times during their careers and that the ETD that is provided has the right focus in terms of content.  
This means, for example, that the education of young officers is of an academic nature and focuses 
on all four identified knowledge clusters.  The training that is provided on this level, though, needs 
to focus almost exclusively on the “operational environment” knowledge cluster.  The making of 
colonels, i.e. the development of officers for operational command, will include both training and 
professional military education.  Training and professional military education will build the bridge 
between three knowledge clusters: the operating environment, the military professional 
environment, and the internal organisational environment.  The education of officers for high 
command will be of an academic nature with a focus on the external and security knowledge 
cluster.  The proposed framework, consequently, allows the SANDF to co-ordinate and integrate 
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the training, professional and academic education provided to officers at different times during their 
careers into a coherent structure and whole. 
  
The analysis of ETD in the SANDF indicates that a large segment of the preparation of officers is 
aligned to the proposed framework.  A number of changes, however, need to be made.  Though it 
was not the purpose of this study to examine the socialisation of officers, it is obvious that the 
socialisation of young officers in the SANDF in general and at the Military Academy in particular 
requires some further research.  A particular question that needs to be answered is whether it will 
not be better to educate young officers at the Military Academy first before their service-specific 
training at the different service training colleges.  This might require an adjustment of the academic 
programme for first-year students at the Military Academy to include a short training course 
orientating future candidate officers to the military environment.  However, it will ensure that young 
officers are aligned with their specific service cultures at the service training colleges for young 
officers before they enter the different services.  This is more or less the development process for 
young officers in most armed forces of the world. 
 
Another recommendation that flows from the proposed framework is the need to re-align the 
service colleges3 to focus on training in the development of officers for tactical command and 
combined-arms operations.  The colleges should make a deliberate effort to prepare officers in the 
tactics of combined arms operations by means of training.  If the service colleges do not train 
officers in tactics, it is not being done in the SANDF at all since the corps schools focus on corps-
specific training, while the War College focuses on professional education to prepare officers for 
operational level campaign staff and command. 
 
In addition, it is recommended that the National Defence College makes provision in its programme 
to address the military strategic level of command and the management of defence.  None of the 
different colleges addresses this particular issue at present and it is of critical importance to officers 
in military high command.  It is important that the National Defence College maintains its focus on 
(human) security as the defining, organising and focusing concept for its programme.  However, 
this focus should be enhanced or supplemented by a focus on military strategic issues and defence 
management.      
  
                                                
3
 The Army, Naval and Air Force College. 
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A number of recommendations need to be made about the specific role of the Military Academy in 
the education and preparation of young officers.  It is obvious from the discussion that the current 
agreement between the Department of Defence and the University of Stellenbosch is insufficient as 
a constituent document for the creation and existence of an institution of such strategic importance 
as the Military Academy.  Many, if not all the organisational and functional problems experienced by 
the Military Academy since its creation, that once again came to the fore over the past couple of 
years, are rooted in the shortcomings of this departmental-level agreement.  The Military 
Academies of most countries are constituted and regulated by means of national legislation.  It is 
therefore recommended that the future existence of the Military Academy be assured through 
national legislation.  The existence, function, organisation and structure of the Academy should be 
clearly defined in this legislation.  This does not mean that the involvement of the University of 
Stellenbosch in the education of young officers at the Military Academy be terminated.  However, it 
does imply that the existence, functioning, organisation and structure will not be based on a 
“goodwill-approach” between the University and the Department of Defence. 
 
Underpinning the idea of national legislation to constitute the Military Academy is the importance to 
institute the changes in the organisation and structure as outlined in this study.  Two particular 
recommendations need to be carefully considered as part of the legislation process.  The first is the 
employment of the academic staff of the Faculty of Military Science as members of the University of 
Stellenbosch.  Such an arrangement will go a long way in clearly defining the role and function of 
the Faculty of Military Science at the Military Academy.  In addition, it will draw a clear line between 
the academic and military apparatus of the Military Academy and will allow each one of these 
components to operate according to its nature.   
 
A second important consideration concerns the budget of the Military Academy.  It is clear that not 
only is the size of the Military Academy budget a problem, but the highly bureaucratic nature in 
which the defence budget is managed is highly unsuited for the purposes of and way in which an 
academic institution functions.  Ring-fencing the budget of the Military Academy as part of the 
Defence budget might be one possibility to contemplate.  Another possibility might be to ring-fence 
it as part of the national education budget.   The management of the budget of the Faculty of 
Military Science, though, should be done through the University of Stellenbosch.  This is however a 
matter that requires careful consideration and further research. 
 
 290 
From a military perspective, it is recommended that the command and control structure through 
which the SANDF manages the Military Academy be carefully considered.  The training, education 
and socialisation of young officers are of critical and strategic importance for the professional 
nature and the organisational culture of the SANDF.  Of critical importance is the need to 
incorporate the Military Academy into the direct command structure of the SANDF and not to deal 
with the Military Academy via the staff structure.  This is a matter of organisational restructuring for 
the SANDF and requires some careful consideration and further research.  This should preferable 
not be done by a commercial consultation company that does not understand the military culture, 
ethos and needs.    
 
Did the study solve the problem that was outlined in the research question?  The individual tensions 
that determine the need for an educated military were clearly outlined and analysed.  A specific 
effort was made in the proposed framework for the education of officers to explain how these 
tensions can be dealt with in the training, professional education and general scientific education of 
officers in the military.  An effort was made to discuss the tensions in the SANDF by means of this 
particular framework.  The impact of these tensions on the South African Military Academy was 
also outlined.  The proposed recommendations suggest ways to deal with these tensions in the 
provision of education in the South African military in general and at the South African Military 
Academy in particular.  It is believed that education in the SANDF and, more particularly, the 
Military Academy can be optimised if the proposed recommendations are implemented.    
 
South Africa is situated in a region and on a continent plagued by military unprofessionalism.  One 
of the building blocks of a professional military is education.  The future role and success of the 
military in a democratic South Africa is dependent on the extent to which the South African National 
Defence Force reflects the attributes of an educated military.  It is in the interest of a democratic 
South African society that the South African National Defence Force makes a deliberate effort to 
ensure its members are well trained and educated. 
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